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	<title>Comments on: Block Universes, Free Will, and Alternative Possibilities</title>
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	<link>http://www.libertypages.com/cgw/2008/03/14/block-universes-free-will-and-alternative-possibilities/</link>
	<description>Musings on Science, Religion and Philosophy</description>
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		<title>By: Clark</title>
		<link>http://www.libertypages.com/cgw/2008/03/14/block-universes-free-will-and-alternative-possibilities/comment-page-1/#comment-202</link>
		<dc:creator>Clark</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 03 Apr 2008 17:13:57 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.libertypages.com/cgw/2008/03/14/block-universes-free-will-and-alternative-possibilities/#comment-202</guid>
		<description>I think &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.libertypages.com/cgw/2008/04/02/mele-part-ii&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;Mele&#039;s argument&lt;/a&gt; ends up being similar to Michael&#039;s.  There&#039;s still the question of whether it&#039;s possible to have two universes identical except one has free will and the other doesn&#039;t.  So Mele&#039;s is a tad more complex since it raises the question of luck vs. free will.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I think <a href="http://www.libertypages.com/cgw/2008/04/02/mele-part-ii" rel="nofollow">Mele&#8217;s argument</a> ends up being similar to Michael&#8217;s.  There&#8217;s still the question of whether it&#8217;s possible to have two universes identical except one has free will and the other doesn&#8217;t.  So Mele&#8217;s is a tad more complex since it raises the question of luck vs. free will.</p>
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		<title>By: Clark</title>
		<link>http://www.libertypages.com/cgw/2008/03/14/block-universes-free-will-and-alternative-possibilities/comment-page-1/#comment-79</link>
		<dc:creator>Clark</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 16 Mar 2008 15:38:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.libertypages.com/cgw/2008/03/14/block-universes-free-will-and-alternative-possibilities/#comment-79</guid>
		<description>It seems to me the obvious rejoinder is whether it is possible to have two identical universes one with free will and one without.  I don&#039;t think it is.  (Much like I don&#039;t think it is possible to have two identical people: one a zombie and one conscious)

I should add that it appears to me that this is the big difference between ontological emergence and mental dualism.  The dualist is committed to the idea that the physical universe can be identical in two possible worlds that are different whereas the ontological emergentist is committed to them being the same.  (Beyond that it seems to me that there is no difference between the positions)</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>It seems to me the obvious rejoinder is whether it is possible to have two identical universes one with free will and one without.  I don&#8217;t think it is.  (Much like I don&#8217;t think it is possible to have two identical people: one a zombie and one conscious)</p>
<p>I should add that it appears to me that this is the big difference between ontological emergence and mental dualism.  The dualist is committed to the idea that the physical universe can be identical in two possible worlds that are different whereas the ontological emergentist is committed to them being the same.  (Beyond that it seems to me that there is no difference between the positions)</p>
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		<title>By: Michael Dorfman</title>
		<link>http://www.libertypages.com/cgw/2008/03/14/block-universes-free-will-and-alternative-possibilities/comment-page-1/#comment-78</link>
		<dc:creator>Michael Dorfman</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 16 Mar 2008 08:16:08 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.libertypages.com/cgw/2008/03/14/block-universes-free-will-and-alternative-possibilities/#comment-78</guid>
		<description>Clark: I&#039;m even rustier than you in the whole &quot;free will debate&quot;, because I can&#039;t even seem to find a way for the notion of &quot;free will&quot; to be useful as a discriminator.

Suppose we have two identical universes (let&#039;s say, for the sake of argument, identical to the universe we now inhabit), with identical histories.  They are alike in every particular, except that one has free will, one doesn&#039;t.  The inhabitants of each believe they have free will, and act identically in both universes.

My question: so what?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Clark: I&#8217;m even rustier than you in the whole &#8220;free will debate&#8221;, because I can&#8217;t even seem to find a way for the notion of &#8220;free will&#8221; to be useful as a discriminator.</p>
<p>Suppose we have two identical universes (let&#8217;s say, for the sake of argument, identical to the universe we now inhabit), with identical histories.  They are alike in every particular, except that one has free will, one doesn&#8217;t.  The inhabitants of each believe they have free will, and act identically in both universes.</p>
<p>My question: so what?</p>
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		<title>By: Clark</title>
		<link>http://www.libertypages.com/cgw/2008/03/14/block-universes-free-will-and-alternative-possibilities/comment-page-1/#comment-70</link>
		<dc:creator>Clark</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 16 Mar 2008 02:01:53 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.libertypages.com/cgw/2008/03/14/block-universes-free-will-and-alternative-possibilities/#comment-70</guid>
		<description>Note I&#039;m not taking a stance on how to interpret QM.  I find Von Neumann&#039;s interpretation horribly problematic.  I&#039;m more just talking about how there are many possibilities that become one actuality.  Just as at any moment there are many choices open to us but somehow they become one.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Note I&#8217;m not taking a stance on how to interpret QM.  I find Von Neumann&#8217;s interpretation horribly problematic.  I&#8217;m more just talking about how there are many possibilities that become one actuality.  Just as at any moment there are many choices open to us but somehow they become one.</p>
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		<title>By: Jacob J</title>
		<link>http://www.libertypages.com/cgw/2008/03/14/block-universes-free-will-and-alternative-possibilities/comment-page-1/#comment-69</link>
		<dc:creator>Jacob J</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 16 Mar 2008 01:47:57 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.libertypages.com/cgw/2008/03/14/block-universes-free-will-and-alternative-possibilities/#comment-69</guid>
		<description>Clark,

I am looking forward to the future installments.  I&#039;ll hold off on the free will stuff until I read more of what you have to say.

&lt;em&gt;Ultimately though all the collapse consists of is the move from pure possibility to pure actuality.&lt;/em&gt;

I am not sure I can agree with this, maybe you can convince me. Your statement makes it sound as though things exist in pure possibility (whatever that means) until an observer observes them, at which time they have to &quot;collapse&quot; to one of those possibilities.  I think it is a bit more complicated than that.  In the famous two-slit experiment, you get an interference pattern on the screen even if you fire electrons through the slits one-by-one, so that we are left to wonder how the electron interfers with &lt;em&gt;itself&lt;/em&gt; as it goes through the slit(s).  So, what is the status of the electron as it travels through the slit(s) in that case?  Is it &quot;pure possibility&quot;?  It seems that it must have been more than a possibility as it went through the slit(s) or it could not have ended up at the screen eventually.  All of this is elementary to you, but I am writing it so you can either correct me or at least understand what I am thinking.  We have these concepts like quantum superposition to try to capture the state of the electron when it is not being observed and what I am saying is that it is much more complicated than the term &quot;pure possibility&quot; seems to suggest.  Saying that &quot;all the collapse consists of is...&quot; seems a bit too simplistic and the devil is in the details.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Clark,</p>
<p>I am looking forward to the future installments.  I&#8217;ll hold off on the free will stuff until I read more of what you have to say.</p>
<p><em>Ultimately though all the collapse consists of is the move from pure possibility to pure actuality.</em></p>
<p>I am not sure I can agree with this, maybe you can convince me. Your statement makes it sound as though things exist in pure possibility (whatever that means) until an observer observes them, at which time they have to &#8220;collapse&#8221; to one of those possibilities.  I think it is a bit more complicated than that.  In the famous two-slit experiment, you get an interference pattern on the screen even if you fire electrons through the slits one-by-one, so that we are left to wonder how the electron interfers with <em>itself</em> as it goes through the slit(s).  So, what is the status of the electron as it travels through the slit(s) in that case?  Is it &#8220;pure possibility&#8221;?  It seems that it must have been more than a possibility as it went through the slit(s) or it could not have ended up at the screen eventually.  All of this is elementary to you, but I am writing it so you can either correct me or at least understand what I am thinking.  We have these concepts like quantum superposition to try to capture the state of the electron when it is not being observed and what I am saying is that it is much more complicated than the term &#8220;pure possibility&#8221; seems to suggest.  Saying that &#8220;all the collapse consists of is&#8230;&#8221; seems a bit too simplistic and the devil is in the details.</p>
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		<title>By: Clark</title>
		<link>http://www.libertypages.com/cgw/2008/03/14/block-universes-free-will-and-alternative-possibilities/comment-page-1/#comment-65</link>
		<dc:creator>Clark</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 15 Mar 2008 20:54:21 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.libertypages.com/cgw/2008/03/14/block-universes-free-will-and-alternative-possibilities/#comment-65</guid>
		<description>Jacob, I&#039;ll delve more deeply into that in my next post.  I had a few paragraphs on that but the post was too long as it was so I deleted them.  Roughly I&#039;m pointing to two different libertarian positions in the literature.  One, the one you are probably familiar with, is the agent-libertarianism.  This is the idea from our intuitions that free will requires that causes arise in an agent who is ontologically irreducible to other causes or to chance.  

The second kind of libertarianism sees freedom in events rather than agents and is quite comfortable seeing agents as emergent out of more fundamental events.  (Emergence here meaning it&#039;s more common sense rather than ontological emergence)

There are problems with event-libertarianism.  And Blake and probably Geoff won&#039;t accept it in the least.  I just thought I&#039;d throw it out.

I hope to do a post in the future on cognitive science and why I think we demand there be irreducible agents in our intuitions.  I think these intuitions are more due to how we cognitively think and detect agents in our environment.  (This is partially why I am skeptical - although I still think the appeal to responsibility is a powerful argument)

I agree that the collapse of the wave function is what happens mathematically although Von Neumann is who elevated it to a philosophical position.  Ultimately though all the collapse consists of is the move from pure possibility to pure actuality.  

I don&#039;t think this meaningless pseudotheory though - although I certainly understand why some might say that.  The point is that if one denies determinism (which I think physics points to although it doesn&#039;t demand it) then if there is a block universe it must be something like the collapse of the wave function.  

I&#039;d also add that this is a question in quantum theory regarding the nature of the collapse (in Von Neumann&#039;s formulation anyway) and what an observation &lt;i&gt;is&lt;/i&gt;.  Further there&#039;s the obvious question about whether the entire universe is a single entangled entity.  Thus demanding that one think about it in those terms.  A lot has actually been written here.  It also points one back to the kind of ontology that say Spinoza (and to a limited degree Leibniz) suggested.  Minus the determinism.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Jacob, I&#8217;ll delve more deeply into that in my next post.  I had a few paragraphs on that but the post was too long as it was so I deleted them.  Roughly I&#8217;m pointing to two different libertarian positions in the literature.  One, the one you are probably familiar with, is the agent-libertarianism.  This is the idea from our intuitions that free will requires that causes arise in an agent who is ontologically irreducible to other causes or to chance.  </p>
<p>The second kind of libertarianism sees freedom in events rather than agents and is quite comfortable seeing agents as emergent out of more fundamental events.  (Emergence here meaning it&#8217;s more common sense rather than ontological emergence)</p>
<p>There are problems with event-libertarianism.  And Blake and probably Geoff won&#8217;t accept it in the least.  I just thought I&#8217;d throw it out.</p>
<p>I hope to do a post in the future on cognitive science and why I think we demand there be irreducible agents in our intuitions.  I think these intuitions are more due to how we cognitively think and detect agents in our environment.  (This is partially why I am skeptical &#8211; although I still think the appeal to responsibility is a powerful argument)</p>
<p>I agree that the collapse of the wave function is what happens mathematically although Von Neumann is who elevated it to a philosophical position.  Ultimately though all the collapse consists of is the move from pure possibility to pure actuality.  </p>
<p>I don&#8217;t think this meaningless pseudotheory though &#8211; although I certainly understand why some might say that.  The point is that if one denies determinism (which I think physics points to although it doesn&#8217;t demand it) then if there is a block universe it must be something like the collapse of the wave function.  </p>
<p>I&#8217;d also add that this is a question in quantum theory regarding the nature of the collapse (in Von Neumann&#8217;s formulation anyway) and what an observation <i>is</i>.  Further there&#8217;s the obvious question about whether the entire universe is a single entangled entity.  Thus demanding that one think about it in those terms.  A lot has actually been written here.  It also points one back to the kind of ontology that say Spinoza (and to a limited degree Leibniz) suggested.  Minus the determinism.</p>
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		<title>By: Jacob J</title>
		<link>http://www.libertypages.com/cgw/2008/03/14/block-universes-free-will-and-alternative-possibilities/comment-page-1/#comment-64</link>
		<dc:creator>Jacob J</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 15 Mar 2008 20:15:27 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.libertypages.com/cgw/2008/03/14/block-universes-free-will-and-alternative-possibilities/#comment-64</guid>
		<description>Clark,

Nice summary of the different scientific theories and their implications.  When you get to the description of the SFA theory, you lost me mostly.

&lt;em&gt; this is the idea that we act from a will formed by earlier choices and actions which were not determined. &lt;/em&gt;

What are these undetermined choices you speak of? Are they free in a libertarian sense, a compatibilist sense, or something else?

&lt;em&gt;Yet in an other sense it is indetermined that this would happen.&lt;/em&gt;

What is this other sense?  I missed it. 

Wrt the &quot;collapse of the wave function&quot;: This term is a description of what happens mathematically.  We continue to use it because we have absolutely no idea (at least nothing even heading in the direction of a consensus) what it means in terms of the real world.  So, when you start talking about our universe as a collapse of a giant wave function, it sounds to me like very fascinating, but mostly meaningless psuedo-theory.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Clark,</p>
<p>Nice summary of the different scientific theories and their implications.  When you get to the description of the SFA theory, you lost me mostly.</p>
<p><em> this is the idea that we act from a will formed by earlier choices and actions which were not determined. </em></p>
<p>What are these undetermined choices you speak of? Are they free in a libertarian sense, a compatibilist sense, or something else?</p>
<p><em>Yet in an other sense it is indetermined that this would happen.</em></p>
<p>What is this other sense?  I missed it. </p>
<p>Wrt the &#8220;collapse of the wave function&#8221;: This term is a description of what happens mathematically.  We continue to use it because we have absolutely no idea (at least nothing even heading in the direction of a consensus) what it means in terms of the real world.  So, when you start talking about our universe as a collapse of a giant wave function, it sounds to me like very fascinating, but mostly meaningless psuedo-theory.</p>
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