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	<title>Comments on: Agents, Cognition and Free Will</title>
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	<link>http://www.libertypages.com/cgw/2008/03/17/agents-cognition-and-free-will/</link>
	<description>Musings on Science, Religion and Philosophy</description>
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		<title>By: Clark</title>
		<link>http://www.libertypages.com/cgw/2008/03/17/agents-cognition-and-free-will/comment-page-1/#comment-256</link>
		<dc:creator>Clark</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 10 Apr 2008 03:03:14 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.libertypages.com/cgw/2008/03/17/agents-cognition-and-free-will/#comment-256</guid>
		<description>Well, until really the second half of the 20th century the compatibilists was the &lt;i&gt;de facto&lt;/i&gt; position.  Now incompatibilists have the &lt;i&gt;de facto&lt;/i&gt; position.  (Whether those who favor Libertarianism or those who think it wrong)

As to the &quot;cash value&quot; I think there are some.  First, if Libertarianism is true, then I think we have to take seriously the irreducibility of the agent.  (I&#039;m convinced that there&#039;s no way to make it work without some kind of ontologically irreducible agent)  As such it is probably on par with zombie arguments about consciousness.  (Not quite, since one could argue there is consciousness as a property without arguing for irreducible agency - but most arguing for some sort of dualism believe in agents)  

An other one is the issue of punishments and rewards.  While one can, of course, reject Libertarianism while accepting responsibility, they are typically related.  Certainly even the semi-compatibilists engage the same arguments.  If there isn&#039;t this kind of responsibility then our very intuitions of punishment are wrong and we should probably switch to thinking of &#039;repair&#039; or &#039;treatments&#039; rather than punishment.  

From a religious context the issue is important as well.  Calvinism is false if Libertarianism is true, for instance.  There are plenty of theological implications of Libertarianism (as Blake has sketched out for Mormonism).  At a minimum there is no foreknowledge.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Well, until really the second half of the 20th century the compatibilists was the <i>de facto</i> position.  Now incompatibilists have the <i>de facto</i> position.  (Whether those who favor Libertarianism or those who think it wrong)</p>
<p>As to the &#8220;cash value&#8221; I think there are some.  First, if Libertarianism is true, then I think we have to take seriously the irreducibility of the agent.  (I&#8217;m convinced that there&#8217;s no way to make it work without some kind of ontologically irreducible agent)  As such it is probably on par with zombie arguments about consciousness.  (Not quite, since one could argue there is consciousness as a property without arguing for irreducible agency &#8211; but most arguing for some sort of dualism believe in agents)  </p>
<p>An other one is the issue of punishments and rewards.  While one can, of course, reject Libertarianism while accepting responsibility, they are typically related.  Certainly even the semi-compatibilists engage the same arguments.  If there isn&#8217;t this kind of responsibility then our very intuitions of punishment are wrong and we should probably switch to thinking of &#8216;repair&#8217; or &#8216;treatments&#8217; rather than punishment.  </p>
<p>From a religious context the issue is important as well.  Calvinism is false if Libertarianism is true, for instance.  There are plenty of theological implications of Libertarianism (as Blake has sketched out for Mormonism).  At a minimum there is no foreknowledge.</p>
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		<title>By: Rich Knapton</title>
		<link>http://www.libertypages.com/cgw/2008/03/17/agents-cognition-and-free-will/comment-page-1/#comment-255</link>
		<dc:creator>Rich Knapton</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 10 Apr 2008 02:37:10 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.libertypages.com/cgw/2008/03/17/agents-cognition-and-free-will/#comment-255</guid>
		<description>When I first started I was responding to the issue of free will. But as I thought more about the issue of free will, determinacy and agency I find myself answering the issue of agency without concepts such as free will and determinacy. For well over 2,000 years this argument has gone on with no real solution in sight. Maybe these concepts don&#039;t have anything to contribute to the issue agency. So what I&#039;m now asking is what issues do these concepts attempt to address.

Rich</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>When I first started I was responding to the issue of free will. But as I thought more about the issue of free will, determinacy and agency I find myself answering the issue of agency without concepts such as free will and determinacy. For well over 2,000 years this argument has gone on with no real solution in sight. Maybe these concepts don&#8217;t have anything to contribute to the issue agency. So what I&#8217;m now asking is what issues do these concepts attempt to address.</p>
<p>Rich</p>
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		<title>By: Clark</title>
		<link>http://www.libertypages.com/cgw/2008/03/17/agents-cognition-and-free-will/comment-page-1/#comment-252</link>
		<dc:creator>Clark</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 09 Apr 2008 18:48:47 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.libertypages.com/cgw/2008/03/17/agents-cognition-and-free-will/#comment-252</guid>
		<description>Yes, but many (such as Blake Oslter) would say that what you outline is necessary but insufficient for free will.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Yes, but many (such as Blake Oslter) would say that what you outline is necessary but insufficient for free will.</p>
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		<title>By: Rich Knapton</title>
		<link>http://www.libertypages.com/cgw/2008/03/17/agents-cognition-and-free-will/comment-page-1/#comment-251</link>
		<dc:creator>Rich Knapton</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 09 Apr 2008 17:57:19 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.libertypages.com/cgw/2008/03/17/agents-cognition-and-free-will/#comment-251</guid>
		<description>My question, which I didn&#039;t state very well, is what question does Free Will (however you understand that term) and Determinism attempt to answer. I was under the impression that that it was the question of agency. I attempted to show in the case of moral agency we have no need of the concepts of Free Will and Determinism.

If what I sketched out is correct, why do we need the concepts of Free Will and Determinism. What question do they attempt to answer?

Rich</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>My question, which I didn&#8217;t state very well, is what question does Free Will (however you understand that term) and Determinism attempt to answer. I was under the impression that that it was the question of agency. I attempted to show in the case of moral agency we have no need of the concepts of Free Will and Determinism.</p>
<p>If what I sketched out is correct, why do we need the concepts of Free Will and Determinism. What question do they attempt to answer?</p>
<p>Rich</p>
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		<title>By: Clark</title>
		<link>http://www.libertypages.com/cgw/2008/03/17/agents-cognition-and-free-will/comment-page-1/#comment-234</link>
		<dc:creator>Clark</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 06 Apr 2008 21:33:01 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.libertypages.com/cgw/2008/03/17/agents-cognition-and-free-will/#comment-234</guid>
		<description>While free will is one debate moral agency is an other.  However Libertarian Free Will proponents (like Blake) argue that to be a moral agent requires LFW.  However semi-compatibilists like John Fischer argue against this position.  

Both semi-compatibilists and Libertarians would agree with what say.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>While free will is one debate moral agency is an other.  However Libertarian Free Will proponents (like Blake) argue that to be a moral agent requires LFW.  However semi-compatibilists like John Fischer argue against this position.  </p>
<p>Both semi-compatibilists and Libertarians would agree with what say.</p>
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		<title>By: Rich Knapton</title>
		<link>http://www.libertypages.com/cgw/2008/03/17/agents-cognition-and-free-will/comment-page-1/#comment-233</link>
		<dc:creator>Rich Knapton</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 06 Apr 2008 21:13:26 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.libertypages.com/cgw/2008/03/17/agents-cognition-and-free-will/#comment-233</guid>
		<description>Clark, it seems to me the issue is not one of Free Will or Determinism but rather are we moral agents as shown by our moral behavior? And culpability depends on the ability to change. Our moral behavior is based on affective memory. How we differ from other animals is we can project alternative futures from our affectively established memory for the basis of future moral behavior. They cannot. This ability can be constrained based on the affective impact of particular memories. Fear established  memory is almost impossible to extinguish. The challenge of that memory and its associated behavior will exist throughout that person’s life. This doesn’t mean the person is doomed to repeat that behavior. With enough desire (an affection) new workaround memories can be established and alternative future behaviors can be made available when it comes time to choose an alternative future.

Sociopaths, for example don’t seem to be able to do this. First of all they lack the ability to judge their own behavior in a social environment. This is simply another way of saying they lack empathy. Empathy is the ability to project other feelings as your own. Empathy is like a feedback loop which allows us to judge our actions in terms of what how we feel the other person feels. Mirror neurons seem to be at the center of this ability. Nevertheless, empathy is a trained ability. Given cold distant care givers, the ability to empathize never grows. This is called Associative Disorder, the extreme wing of which is Sociopathy.  (All this is predicated upon a normal brain.)

Are we moral agents. We would have to say yes, under normal circumstances. That is, if we grow up in a nurturing environment with nurturing care givers and a normal brain so that we can establish new behavior through the development of new affectively based memories. With a cold non-nurturing environment it becomes more difficult to establish affectively based alternative futures, a prerequisite for change. By the way, reason, in this process, is the means by which we evaluate and choose alternative affectively based futures.

Rich</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Clark, it seems to me the issue is not one of Free Will or Determinism but rather are we moral agents as shown by our moral behavior? And culpability depends on the ability to change. Our moral behavior is based on affective memory. How we differ from other animals is we can project alternative futures from our affectively established memory for the basis of future moral behavior. They cannot. This ability can be constrained based on the affective impact of particular memories. Fear established  memory is almost impossible to extinguish. The challenge of that memory and its associated behavior will exist throughout that person’s life. This doesn’t mean the person is doomed to repeat that behavior. With enough desire (an affection) new workaround memories can be established and alternative future behaviors can be made available when it comes time to choose an alternative future.</p>
<p>Sociopaths, for example don’t seem to be able to do this. First of all they lack the ability to judge their own behavior in a social environment. This is simply another way of saying they lack empathy. Empathy is the ability to project other feelings as your own. Empathy is like a feedback loop which allows us to judge our actions in terms of what how we feel the other person feels. Mirror neurons seem to be at the center of this ability. Nevertheless, empathy is a trained ability. Given cold distant care givers, the ability to empathize never grows. This is called Associative Disorder, the extreme wing of which is Sociopathy.  (All this is predicated upon a normal brain.)</p>
<p>Are we moral agents. We would have to say yes, under normal circumstances. That is, if we grow up in a nurturing environment with nurturing care givers and a normal brain so that we can establish new behavior through the development of new affectively based memories. With a cold non-nurturing environment it becomes more difficult to establish affectively based alternative futures, a prerequisite for change. By the way, reason, in this process, is the means by which we evaluate and choose alternative affectively based futures.</p>
<p>Rich</p>
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		<title>By: Clark</title>
		<link>http://www.libertypages.com/cgw/2008/03/17/agents-cognition-and-free-will/comment-page-1/#comment-102</link>
		<dc:creator>Clark</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 19 Mar 2008 20:36:54 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.libertypages.com/cgw/2008/03/17/agents-cognition-and-free-will/#comment-102</guid>
		<description>I ought write a post on this as I think this is one big place Blake and I fundamentally disagree.

I laid out my own points in the context of &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.libertypages.com/clark/10886.html&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;LDS epistemology and Peirce&lt;/a&gt;.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I ought write a post on this as I think this is one big place Blake and I fundamentally disagree.</p>
<p>I laid out my own points in the context of <a href="http://www.libertypages.com/clark/10886.html" rel="nofollow">LDS epistemology and Peirce</a>.</p>
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		<title>By: Kent</title>
		<link>http://www.libertypages.com/cgw/2008/03/17/agents-cognition-and-free-will/comment-page-1/#comment-101</link>
		<dc:creator>Kent</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 19 Mar 2008 19:54:33 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.libertypages.com/cgw/2008/03/17/agents-cognition-and-free-will/#comment-101</guid>
		<description>Blake Ostler gave a presentation on &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.fairlds.org/FAIR_Conferences/2007_Spiritual_Experiences.html&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;Spiritual Experiences as the Basis for Belief and Commitment&lt;/a&gt; which does touch on the heart of epistemology and the foundations of intuition. 

&lt;blockquote&gt;&quot;Now I ask again, can humans really know anything? Does the experience come from God, or do we merely interpret it to be experienced as coming from God? I&#039;m going to deal with the strongest arguments that I know.&quot;

&quot;Now I&#039;m going to make a suggestion. As counter-intuitive as it may seem, even our most rigorous reasoning rests, at bottom, upon human intuition. For reasoning, including formal logic and mathematics, cannot proceed without at least some basic axioms and assumptions: derivation procedures, formation transference rules, and rules of inference that cannot be proven by the same rigorous reasoning. These facets of reasoning can be justified only as basic givens which have the property of just seeming right or that lead to explanation and consistency of a range of experience and data.&quot;&lt;/blockquote&gt;</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Blake Ostler gave a presentation on <a href="http://www.fairlds.org/FAIR_Conferences/2007_Spiritual_Experiences.html" rel="nofollow">Spiritual Experiences as the Basis for Belief and Commitment</a> which does touch on the heart of epistemology and the foundations of intuition. </p>
<blockquote><p>&#8220;Now I ask again, can humans really know anything? Does the experience come from God, or do we merely interpret it to be experienced as coming from God? I&#8217;m going to deal with the strongest arguments that I know.&#8221;</p>
<p>&#8220;Now I&#8217;m going to make a suggestion. As counter-intuitive as it may seem, even our most rigorous reasoning rests, at bottom, upon human intuition. For reasoning, including formal logic and mathematics, cannot proceed without at least some basic axioms and assumptions: derivation procedures, formation transference rules, and rules of inference that cannot be proven by the same rigorous reasoning. These facets of reasoning can be justified only as basic givens which have the property of just seeming right or that lead to explanation and consistency of a range of experience and data.&#8221;</p></blockquote>
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