Free Speech: European Double Standards?

Posted on March 21, 2008
Filed Under Politics |

I noticed that yesterday’s bin Laden tape attacked the publication of cartoons about Muhammad. What was more interesting, to me were some comments about European double standards. Now let me say up front that I obviously condemn the reaction towards the Danish cartoons. I definitely take an American ideal towards free speech.

Here’s where I have some trouble. Europeans generally don’t adopt an American view of free speech. There’s plenty of especially political speech they regulate.

Given that, is it really fair to say limit speech about the Holocaust while simultaneously not limiting speech that is offensive to many if not most Muslims?

I don’t see how you can have it both ways.

Now I think there are differences in the level of offensiveness. Just drawing Muhommad is offensive to conservative Muslims. Whereas generally one has to be engaging in holocaust denial to really raise the hackles of European (especially German) censors.

Thoughts?

Comments

5 Responses to “Free Speech: European Double Standards?”

Hi,

Here’s one thought: offense is the wrong thing to focus on. Americans, as you know, do limit some speech, particularly threats against the President, and inciting violence. This isn’t because such speech might offend the President or the target of violence. The limit is part of the recognition that words–in certain circumstances–can lead directly to violence, and insofar as the government is justified in preventing violence, it is also justified in preventing speech that is likely to directly cause it. That is, free speech is not taken to be unconditionally good, even in the US. Its good is still weighed against other considerations. Similarly in Europe. Holocaust denialism sure does offend many. But that isn’t why it’s been banned. Similarly, Nazi insignia may offend many, but that is also not why Germany bans them. Rather: national socialism still has appeal for some. One way of trying to prevent a Fourth Reich is to ban (1) the symbols used by the Nazis and (2) attempts to claim that the horrors perpetrated by the Nazis weren’t all that bad. That is: what is banned is not some offensive form of self-expression, but any form of self-expression that most directly threatens to re-ignite the sentiments of National Socialism. Very different.

Americans also limit speech relative to State secrets. (After working in a national laboratory I’m all too aware of that — there’s still stuff I’m not sure I’m allowed to talk about)

Certainly the points you raise is the defense. I think one has to ask how much talking about the holocaust would, as a practical matter, raise the likelihood of a resurgent Nazism. My feeling is that what gets banned is vastly larger than is necessary here.

Second, one could easily make the claim that in the current environment pictures of Muhammad likely can cause inflamed tensions and violence.

So even if one makes the move you suggest it seems that there is still a double standard at work.

Clark, those are good points. So I guess more distinctions are called for. True, pictures of Muhammad are likely to cause violence. In fact, they are much much more likely to cause violence than denials of the Holocaust. And this is why Muslims offended by the pictures can claim a double standard: free speech, they might say, is limited to protect Jews, but not to protect Muslims! But again, the difference is this: Denials of the holocaust are tied to violence against Jews; pictures of Muhammad are tied to violence by some Muslims. So in the second case, the violence is caused by someone taking offense; in the first case, it is not. I think this is the relevant difference. “Causing offense” is not and should not be used as a limit on free speech. In holding free speech valuable, we have to decide what sort of speech is worth defending, because other values besides free speech are in play.

About the Holocaust… Let’s put it this way: the Holocaust happened. This is a fact. So there can be no value to denying it, other than instrumental value in the service of anti-semitism. Some “historians” think that if we want to learn the truth about history, we may have to deny the Holocaust. But since evidence for the Holocaust is overriding, there is no real harm done in banning denialism, except to anti-semitism. And protecting speech on the grounds that it strengthens anti-semitism doesn’t seem something worth fighting for.

So in the second case, the violence is caused by someone taking offense; in the first case, it is not. I think this is the relevant difference.

However if one is appealing to a distinction on purely consequentialist grounds can you make that move? That is if what leads to the ban is what might happen why does it matter how it happens?

The claim seems to be that folks who would do violence also deny the holocaust so that banning holocaust denial slows these folks down. But that seems backward. It isn’t the case if this is true that these folks are violent because they deny the holocaust. Rather they deny the holocaust because of their views. The idea is, at best, to not gives these folks publicity which might increase their popularity.

However consider the radical Islamic view. Here you are allowing speech that will make them violent. Further the speech will increase their numbers.

It’s hard to see how one can maintain the ban.

Yeah, I don’t think the consequentialist considerations are paramount. I think they have to be limited by deontological considerations about what the value of free speech is. In a perfect world, all speech would be allowed. But in an imperfect world, we have to look at the consequences of certain kinds of speech, and weigh them against the value of free speech. I’d claim that the value of free speech is, in some cases, overriding; in others, it can be trumped by negative consequences. (This is why the “how” matters.)

My suggestion would be that debate about values by its nature requires freedom; debate about established truths, on the other hand, does not necessarily require it. I’ll have to write up a post about this (tomorrow), because it requires a bit more detail.

Sure, the goal in the case of Holocaust deniers is to limit their publicity and popularity. As for the Islamist case: if the publication of the Mohammad cartoons was merely insult, and had the consequence only of leading to violence, it would be pretty hard to justify. But of course this isn’t the case. First, the cartoons were published precisely as a criticism of the violence leveled at anyone who portrays Mohammad. Second, they were published at least partly as an affirmation of the value of free speech, especially on issues of value. Third, while many Islamists reacted with violence, many others were willing to enter into a dialogue, to condemn the aspect of the cartoons that was simply insult but to accept criticism as part of a start in the direction of reconciliation.

I know I’m being sort of sloppy here. The point, mainly, is just that consequences are important, but not the only thing that matters. We have to look at whether the case of speech in question does anything other than cause/reinforce violence, i.e., whether it has intrinsic value.

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