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	<title>Comments on: 3 Kinds of Vaguess</title>
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	<link>http://www.libertypages.com/cgw/2008/03/24/3-kinds-of-vaguess/</link>
	<description>Musings on Science, Religion and Philosophy</description>
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		<title>By: Clark</title>
		<link>http://www.libertypages.com/cgw/2008/03/24/3-kinds-of-vaguess/comment-page-1/#comment-125</link>
		<dc:creator>Clark</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 27 Mar 2008 00:19:18 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>The Peircean way to address this problem which he feels avoids the traditional idealist/realist dichotomy is to posit an ideal community of inquirers who, in the future, will have consensus.  There are some problems about this (primarily related to the indecision&#039;s about #1) but it really is quite useful.  It&#039;s realist since truth doesn&#039;t depend upon what you, I or any finite group of people believe.  It&#039;s idealist since it is still related to mind.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The Peircean way to address this problem which he feels avoids the traditional idealist/realist dichotomy is to posit an ideal community of inquirers who, in the future, will have consensus.  There are some problems about this (primarily related to the indecision&#8217;s about #1) but it really is quite useful.  It&#8217;s realist since truth doesn&#8217;t depend upon what you, I or any finite group of people believe.  It&#8217;s idealist since it is still related to mind.</p>
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		<title>By: Jacob</title>
		<link>http://www.libertypages.com/cgw/2008/03/24/3-kinds-of-vaguess/comment-page-1/#comment-121</link>
		<dc:creator>Jacob</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 26 Mar 2008 05:09:25 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>I think you are correct to point to a social community which establishes its own notions of truth (and therefore what constitutes vagueness). Wittgenstein: &quot;the meaning of a word is its use in the language.&quot; Defining vagueness here would be a specific use of an imprecise predicate in a particular context. Wittgenstein famously discourses in his &quot;Remarks on Colour&quot; that when we reflect on the nature of color (&quot;is that bicycle white or light gray?&quot;) we conclude that our conceptualizations of &quot;color&quot; are integrated into the indeterminateness of our concept of the sameness of color. We generate a paradox or an imprecision ourselves when we insist that color should be determinate (determinative of their extensions in all possible cases).</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I think you are correct to point to a social community which establishes its own notions of truth (and therefore what constitutes vagueness). Wittgenstein: &#8220;the meaning of a word is its use in the language.&#8221; Defining vagueness here would be a specific use of an imprecise predicate in a particular context. Wittgenstein famously discourses in his &#8220;Remarks on Colour&#8221; that when we reflect on the nature of color (&#8220;is that bicycle white or light gray?&#8221;) we conclude that our conceptualizations of &#8220;color&#8221; are integrated into the indeterminateness of our concept of the sameness of color. We generate a paradox or an imprecision ourselves when we insist that color should be determinate (determinative of their extensions in all possible cases).</p>
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