Mele, Freedom and Luck

Posted on March 31, 2008
Filed Under Free Will, Philosophy |

Free Will and LuckI’ve got about 4 books I’m working on right now. One of them is Alfred Mele’s just recently released book Free Will and Luck. I’m only about 1/3 of the way through it but it’s been somewhat frustrating. Parts I rather like. For instance Mele’s agnostic about the whole free will issue. Yet one can see that he’s somewhat frustrated with most of the main positions. I certainly feel the same way and thus am, from the outset, sympathetic to Mele’s position.

Where I get frustrated though is in how he makes his criticisms.

Now let me first say that he does a very good job in chapter 2 criticizing the psychologist Libet’s thesis that free will is an illusion. This was the experiment where Libet claimed that well before we were conscious of choosing our subconscious had already decided. Mele goes through the evidence quite well and, I think, shows that Libet makes a mistake not separating out more general desire from decided upon intents.

When we get to Mele’s discussion of Libertarianism and Luck however things get a bit messier. First off Mele’s not quite as clear a writer as he could be. (Contrast him with say Fischer who provides lots of examples that makes following him quite easy) Mele instead is in that middle ground between not fully embracing a symbolic notion and yet not providing enough examples. So we have lots of short hand abbreviations that one is constantly flipping back and forth to make sure one has kept them all straight.

Ultimately though what is most dissatisfying is that Mele’s ultimate critique is that there is no real difference between luck and agent libertarian free choices. One can simplify his position by saying if there is a set of possible worlds for the time when the agent makes a choice then what is it that makes the agent libertarian free will proponent’s position different from mere luck. Isn’t the agent merely lucky that they made the choice they did.

Now when put in those terms - looking only at possible worlds - there is clearly no difference. But this seems to be due to ignoring the whole issue of causality wherein possible worlds can be distinguished simply because what counts aren’t merely states of affairs but what joins them. That is we can draw a difference between states of affairs connected by a free choice from states of affairs connected by some kind of randomness.

It’s frustrating that Mele doesn’t see this. It’s almost like he’s making a Humean point about causality. That all truth about affairs must be captured purely in terms of states of affairs. Yet I think many of us would say that an ontology that worries only about states and not about relations is an ontology stricken with poverty.

Now there is beyond this annoyance some interesting claims. Mele discussions the temporal gap between forming an intent and acting on that intent. Since the acts we worry about are freely chosen acts and one presumes that it is in the intent that the choice is made and not the act this period is most important. Now normally one might assume a deterministic relationship between intent and act such that forming the intent allows the act to proceed baring any physical impediments outside of my mind. (i.e. I may intend to walk across the room but trip on a toy left on the floor)

The question then becomes what about luck? What if it is purely luck that my intents are allowed to become acts? Am I still free? Our intents usually say yes. (For instance we don’t want to say I’m not free to walk across the room merely because there may be a random chance of tripping on a toy) But if we allow luck in this case, why can’t we push it further? At what point does luck become a problem?

It’s an interesting question even if the ways Mele addresses it aren’t fully satisfying.

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4 Responses to “Mele, Freedom and Luck”

“The question then becomes what about luck? What if it is purely luck that my intents are allowed to become acts? Am I still free? Our intents usually say yes. (For instance we don’t want to say I’m not free to walk across the room merely because there may be a random chance of tripping on a toy) But if we allow luck in this case, why can’t we push it further? At what point does luck become a problem?”

When I read this paragraph I thought about Blake’s first book, where he discusses God’s “concurrent” power (I think that is the term, I don’t have the book with me at the moment). If I remember accurately, through the Light of Christ God is in and through all things, and therefore the source of power of all things, i.e., all creation can function, all agents can act due to God’s concurrent power. “Death” results when God withdraws this power. If I am dependent on God’s concurrent power for my ability to act (and possibly even to self-form intention in the first place), then when I do act is it merely luck (God’s grace that I continue to be the recipient of concurrent power) that I am allowed to act? How far and in what ways can we stretch and apply divine “concurrency?” Does our pitcure of libertarian freedom change (is weakened) under such a view or is it strengthened (i.e., in order for LFW to work it must be grounded genuine alternatives; divine concurrency may provide the grounds).

Oh, and speaking of Blake’s books, I pre-ordered Volume 3 a week ago and Amazon sent me a message saying they so far cannot find the book to deliver it to me. Anyone else having this problem?

Jacob, you may want to contact Kofford books directly and find out when they are shipping to Amazon. It just came off the press last Saturday.

I know they had them at the SMPT conference on Friday. I was going to pick up a copy but was late to pick up my kids. So I’ll be ordering from Amazon once my next Amazon coupon arrives.

I’ll have to break out Blake’s first volume again. I vaguely remember having some problem with this but finding it perhaps resolved in the second volume. In the second volume Blake makes a big distinction between free will and morally significant free choices. One can have free will without the choices being morally significant. (i.e. what toothpaste to use) Blake’s argument, at least in the second volume, is that Grace allows us to make morally significant choices whereas we couldn’t make them without it. That’s because of our ultimate fate. And this is the argument of the Book of Mormon where we are made free by Christ.

While I am somewhat skeptical of Blake’s ontology of free will the other issues he raises here seem fairly strong for the most part.

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