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	<title>Comments on: Mele, Freedom and Luck</title>
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	<link>http://www.libertypages.com/cgw/2008/03/31/mele-freedom-and-luck/</link>
	<description>Musings on Science, Religion and Philosophy</description>
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		<title>By: Clark</title>
		<link>http://www.libertypages.com/cgw/2008/03/31/mele-freedom-and-luck/comment-page-1/#comment-186</link>
		<dc:creator>Clark</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 01 Apr 2008 22:31:42 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.libertypages.com/cgw/2008/03/31/mele-freedom-and-luck/#comment-186</guid>
		<description>I&#039;ll have to break out Blake&#039;s first volume again.  I vaguely remember having some problem with this but finding it perhaps resolved in the second volume.  In the second volume Blake makes a big distinction between free will and morally significant free choices.  One can have free will without the choices being morally significant.  (i.e. what toothpaste to use)  Blake&#039;s argument, at least in the second volume, is that Grace allows us to make morally significant choices whereas we couldn&#039;t make them without it.  That&#039;s because of our ultimate fate.  And this is the argument of the Book of Mormon where we are made free by Christ.

While I am somewhat skeptical of Blake&#039;s ontology of free will the other issues he raises here seem fairly strong for the most part.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I&#8217;ll have to break out Blake&#8217;s first volume again.  I vaguely remember having some problem with this but finding it perhaps resolved in the second volume.  In the second volume Blake makes a big distinction between free will and morally significant free choices.  One can have free will without the choices being morally significant.  (i.e. what toothpaste to use)  Blake&#8217;s argument, at least in the second volume, is that Grace allows us to make morally significant choices whereas we couldn&#8217;t make them without it.  That&#8217;s because of our ultimate fate.  And this is the argument of the Book of Mormon where we are made free by Christ.</p>
<p>While I am somewhat skeptical of Blake&#8217;s ontology of free will the other issues he raises here seem fairly strong for the most part.</p>
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		<title>By: Clark</title>
		<link>http://www.libertypages.com/cgw/2008/03/31/mele-freedom-and-luck/comment-page-1/#comment-184</link>
		<dc:creator>Clark</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 01 Apr 2008 21:12:33 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.libertypages.com/cgw/2008/03/31/mele-freedom-and-luck/#comment-184</guid>
		<description>I know they had them at the SMPT conference on Friday.  I was going to pick up a copy but was late to pick up my kids.  So I&#039;ll be ordering from Amazon once my next Amazon coupon arrives.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I know they had them at the SMPT conference on Friday.  I was going to pick up a copy but was late to pick up my kids.  So I&#8217;ll be ordering from Amazon once my next Amazon coupon arrives.</p>
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		<title>By: Kent</title>
		<link>http://www.libertypages.com/cgw/2008/03/31/mele-freedom-and-luck/comment-page-1/#comment-183</link>
		<dc:creator>Kent</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 01 Apr 2008 18:43:55 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.libertypages.com/cgw/2008/03/31/mele-freedom-and-luck/#comment-183</guid>
		<description>Jacob, you may want to contact Kofford books directly and find out when they are shipping to Amazon. It just came off the press last Saturday.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Jacob, you may want to contact Kofford books directly and find out when they are shipping to Amazon. It just came off the press last Saturday.</p>
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		<title>By: Jacob</title>
		<link>http://www.libertypages.com/cgw/2008/03/31/mele-freedom-and-luck/comment-page-1/#comment-182</link>
		<dc:creator>Jacob</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 01 Apr 2008 18:30:02 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.libertypages.com/cgw/2008/03/31/mele-freedom-and-luck/#comment-182</guid>
		<description>&quot;The question then becomes what about luck? What if it is purely luck that my intents are allowed to become acts? Am I still free? Our intents usually say yes. (For instance we don’t want to say I’m not free to walk across the room merely because there may be a random chance of tripping on a toy) But if we allow luck in this case, why can’t we push it further? At what point does luck become a problem?&quot;

When I read this paragraph I thought about Blake&#039;s first book, where he discusses God&#039;s &quot;concurrent&quot; power (I think that is the term, I don&#039;t have the book with me at the moment). If I remember accurately, through the Light of Christ God is in and through all things, and therefore the source of power of all things, i.e., all creation can function, all agents can act due to God&#039;s concurrent power. &quot;Death&quot; results when God withdraws this power. If I am dependent on God&#039;s concurrent power for my ability to act (and possibly even to self-form intention in the first place), then when I do act is it merely luck (God&#039;s grace that I continue to be the recipient of concurrent power) that I am allowed to act? How far and in what ways can we stretch and apply divine &quot;concurrency?&quot; Does our pitcure of libertarian freedom change (is weakened) under such a view or is it strengthened (i.e., in order for LFW to work it must be grounded genuine alternatives; divine concurrency may provide the grounds).

Oh, and speaking of Blake&#039;s books, I pre-ordered Volume 3 a week ago and Amazon sent me a message saying they so far cannot find the book to deliver it to me. Anyone else having this problem?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>&#8220;The question then becomes what about luck? What if it is purely luck that my intents are allowed to become acts? Am I still free? Our intents usually say yes. (For instance we don’t want to say I’m not free to walk across the room merely because there may be a random chance of tripping on a toy) But if we allow luck in this case, why can’t we push it further? At what point does luck become a problem?&#8221;</p>
<p>When I read this paragraph I thought about Blake&#8217;s first book, where he discusses God&#8217;s &#8220;concurrent&#8221; power (I think that is the term, I don&#8217;t have the book with me at the moment). If I remember accurately, through the Light of Christ God is in and through all things, and therefore the source of power of all things, i.e., all creation can function, all agents can act due to God&#8217;s concurrent power. &#8220;Death&#8221; results when God withdraws this power. If I am dependent on God&#8217;s concurrent power for my ability to act (and possibly even to self-form intention in the first place), then when I do act is it merely luck (God&#8217;s grace that I continue to be the recipient of concurrent power) that I am allowed to act? How far and in what ways can we stretch and apply divine &#8220;concurrency?&#8221; Does our pitcure of libertarian freedom change (is weakened) under such a view or is it strengthened (i.e., in order for LFW to work it must be grounded genuine alternatives; divine concurrency may provide the grounds).</p>
<p>Oh, and speaking of Blake&#8217;s books, I pre-ordered Volume 3 a week ago and Amazon sent me a message saying they so far cannot find the book to deliver it to me. Anyone else having this problem?</p>
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