I’m still too minds about this. And clearly am still thinking through all this. On the one hand clearly someone can argue for a difference in relation. Yet what practical difference is there? At best perhaps we can splice the kinds of differences ala Scotus.

The argument a free proponent can make is that the the objective probabilities are different. So that while in one case one can’t determine a difference over time the implications are quite different. But while that might resolve the “does it make a difference” charge I’m not sure it resolves the argument from luck.

Nothing.

I seem to remember making a similar point just a couple weeks ago, and you weren’t buying. Do you find it more convincing now?

This did end up being influential and I suspect contributed to the American process thinkers. But it’s so odd and has basically no argument behind it that I tend to just brush it over. I think it ends up being akin more to an event libertarian free will position ala Kane. Probably you’re not familiar with that position. It’s actually the position I’m most sympathetic to but it has pretty serious problems.

Maybe I’ll do a writeup on event libertarianism later today so as to clarify exactly what it is.

First let me say that I know nothing about this topic…

So two questions…

Is principle of sufficient reason (PSR) is compatible with libratarian free will. Because buying PSR would eliminate possibility that the difference between two worlds is based on luck.
But on other side, I guess, that would mean that there will have to be reasons for the free will choice.

And the second one is, would Mele (but also I’m interested about you personally and Peirce for that matter) accept a metaphysical argument (as PSR) which would serve to eliminate luck as possibility?