People Assign Blame to the Mentally Ill

Posted on May 5, 2008
Filed Under Philosophy, Science |

There’s a great post at Garden of Forking Paths on how people will assign moral responsibility to the mentally ill. I found this was something my wife had intuitions about as well. I took her down some thought experiments and she reconsidered her opinion. But I think this is a fairly common view.

Obviously it has huge implications for the free will debate to the degree that we take what the terms mean in terms of our societal linguistic use and intuitions. I’m not sure we should so conceive of the problem. I’m very, very skeptical about intuitions. But I have to admit this is an interesting study.

It seems to me that regardless of how one views the free will - responsibility debate that we would still be better off thinking in terms of “repair” rather than in terms of responsibility and punishment. Not just at the individual level but also at the societal.

I’d be the first to admit that this is in a tension with what I see as libertarian tendencies. I’m no libertarian but I do think that government ought not be in the business of trying to get people to behave in what they see a socially beneficial way. Not because I think there’s anything wrong with people living a better life. Just that I distrust the government’s ability to decide what is good or to implement it competently. So it’s not a philosophical position (the way it is for true libertarians). For me it’s more of a practical issue.

Having said all that though if we could make small changes to society which would determine that many people behave in better and happier ways, should we? I say yes in theory and no in practice.

My complaint with rehabilitation in criminal cases is that the government has not shown itself competent here. Yet, given the large number of drug cases and the costs of internment I really think we should return to the question of rehabilitation. We have a ridiculous amount of people in jail. And a lot of criminals can be educated. The problem is that many can not. (I’m not at all convinced there is any current technology for ‘curing’ rapists for instance)

So I’m all for rehabilitation if we are very realistic about our capabilities in psychology and sociology.

Interestingly this puts me almost the reverse of how many philosophers think of this. It’s usually the determinists who are incompatibilities about free will who argue we should change our thinking about rewards and responsibility. The various kinds of free will incompatibilists, such as libertarians, are the ones usually arguing for responsibility and blame assignment. (Although obviously semi-compatibilists like Fischer do as well). I’m skeptical about libertarianism and disbelieve determinism. Yet I think that to the degree we can treat people we should.

Comments

16 Responses to “People Assign Blame to the Mentally Ill”

There are some big problems with the way the experiment (discussed on Garden of Forking Paths) was conducted, it appears.

Here’s the problem. Under the first condition…

“Dennis has recently found out from his doctor that he has a neurological condition that has caused him to behave in certain ways. Were someone else to have this neurological condition then that person would have had to behave in the same ways as Dennis”

… many people would probably be OK with this description in a general sense. In other words, most people can accept a degree of biological necessitarianism in terms of mental illness. (However, this says very little about what is actually meant by “the same ways.” Surely we don’t mean EXACTLY the same, and certainly many people might think of “the same ways” in a more limited sense — they have the same general symptoms, perhaps, that would come into play with whether Dennis was morally responsible in certain ways.)

In any case, when a person hears the next scenario …

“Dennis has recently found out from his doctor that he has a neurological condition that has, in the past, caused him to rape women. Were someone else to have this neurological condition then that person would have had to behave in the same ways as Dennis.”

… the person might shift their position for a crucial, logically defensible, reason. “I DON’T BELIEVE THAT THERE IS A NEUROLOGICAL CONDITION THAT CAUSES A PERSON TO RAPE WOMEN!” Now, not everyone would be able to defend their shift in this way, but I bet this belief is often at the heart of the supposed inconsistency.

And this is where the study appears to be disingenuous (based on my secondary reading of it). I have studied abnormal psychology and have also worked in a prison, and I can tell you — there is no neurological condition that causes a person to rape women! Even if one were to make an argument that a certain mentally ill person had no ability to have done otherwise than rape women (of course, an impossible claim to prove), this hardly recognizes that a person has a discrete neurological condition that would cause any other person to rape women!

At any rate, surely we are going to hold any rapist (mentally ill or otherwise) responsible for their behavior. The person would need to be institutionalized in some way. Thus, we can say he is “responsible” in a loose sense.

But there’s a deeper problem with this scenario, at least from a mainstream psychological perspective. Psychology (including neurobiology) really holds no room for human agency of any kind. Thus, from a purely psychological perspective (which I strongly disagree with), NO ONE is able to have done otherwise! We all are an efficient causal product the past, both in terms of our evolutionary history and our socialization, neither of which we control. Thus, why is the mentally ill person immune from responsible and not everyone else?

And, indeed, by certain (moral) categorizations, could we not say that ANYONE who rapes is ill? This is one of the big problems with the insanity plea (at least in theory) — which rapist or murderer isn’t insane?! Indeed, the sanity-insanity slope is an awfully slippery one to get onto. But my opinion on these matters is, of course, efficient causal determined, so you can hardly hold me responsible for it :)

I’m not sure psychology accepts as a premise determinism. One could say that structures underdetermine behavior but that if we have a structure where a behavior is determined then it isn’t free. Now libertarians will argue that mere indeterminism is insufficient. But I think for discussion that’s sufficient to say when someone isn’t free.

Regarding your other point, I agree that’s a flaw in the study. And I’m not sure how it can be corrected.

Going back to my discussion from a few weeks ago with my wife, that ended up being the issue. She didn’t really believe in most mental illnesses.

True enough, there is not a formal premise of determinism in psychology. But, for the most part, psychology restricts itself to efficient causal explanations. Thus, everything is explained in terms of the past, ad infinitum. Thus, I am never free to act in a way that is inconsistent with my past. How could I be if responsible if there is never any need to take into account my present behavior? Where, then, does my responsibility lie?

You certainly are not going to see (in the mainstream) a psychologist make a philosophical defense for free will. I do think that many clinicians assume free will, however — or at least think it’s a good idea for their clients to believe that they have free will. But the mainstream assumptions about causation and epistemology are completely incompatible with free will, at least of the libertarian nature (which, for me, is the only kind of free will worth talking about).

On the other hand, behaviorists have, for the most part, explicitly considered themselves to be determinists. Most of the assumptions that the entire discipline holds today can be traced to these behaviorist assumptions.

But to talk about efficient causation is really orthagonal to issues of freedom. Consider physics which is the classic example of talking only in terms of efficient causation. This doesn’t entail all is determined. Indeed there’s a lot of freedom in QM even if the structures limiting freedom are deterministic. (I’ll leave alone whether this should be taken epistemologically or ontologically) The point is that freedom is much more in terms of underdetermination.

I’m also not at all convinced psychology limits itself to efficient causality. While I’m hardly a psychologist I’ve certainly seen a lot that seems based on teleology. Certainly sociology has a lot of teleology. Biology did up through the 60’s when folks tried to make it more respectable by reframing theory to be reducible - at least in theory - to physics.

Regarding a psychologist making a defense of free will. I’m not sure how they could. It seems to be something quite independent of what they could claim. Of course most psychologists probably buy into physicalism of some sort. But that seems independent of the science much as whether a physicist is an instrumentalist, empiricist, or realist is largely independent of the science.

Clark, there is virtually nothing in psychology (today) that is teleological. (Of course, even if there were, teleology and free will are not exactly synonymous.) There might be things that “seem” to be, but if you look at their theorizing, it really doesn’t allow for free will, in the sense of being able to do otherwise. Like I said, this is the only meaningful notion of free will, as far as I’m concerned, because other notions (e.g, compatibilism), by the principle of parsimony, are unnecessary to even work into a theory. Thus, if efficient causal explanations are sufficient for explaining something, then there is no place for free will of this kind. If I am 100% determined by my past, then how can I do otherwise from it? Can you explain this to me? I suppose that, yes, I can be an exclusive efficient causal theorist but also throw my arms up in the air and say that efficient causal explanations do not explain everything, via an appeal to underdeterminism. But to merely do this is pretty lazy, if you ask me. It actually constitutes an intellectual dishonesty, in which there is really no room, technically, in my theory for free will, but then if someone asks me if I’m a determinist, I say no. But if free will is important, then it would be manifested in the very theorizing of the science, rather than smuggled in via some kind of off-handed appeal to “emergence” or “underdeterminism.” So, in short, I fail to see how an exlusively efficient causal approach to any science can take seriously the issue of free will. Rather, they would have to have an explicitly final causal approach to theorizing (as well as formal causal, I would add). Psychology almost never does, with a few exceptions, such as George Howard and Joseph Rychlak. However, the only reason I even know about these individuals is because my area of study is theoretical and philosophical psychology. Almost everyone else in psychology wouldn’t have a clue.

Also, I am not a physicist, but wouldn’t the theory of relativity require formal causality (hence not exclusively efficient causal)?

Well, I’m just not up on the philosophy of psychology so I can’t say too much there.

I do think that “ability to do otherwise” itself has ontological commitments I’m not sure are necessary. But I’ll leave that discussion alone. (While I’m not opposed to Libertarianism I’m agnostic towards it or any particular view of free will)

My point ultimately though is just that deterministic structures doesn’t entail determinism.

Given my agnosticism towards Libertarian accounts of free will I’ll probably not buy your comment about how it need be in science. Indeed I honestly can’t figure out how it could be part of science in any particular way. What would it even look like?

Regarding physics relativity is a classic theory even though non-physicists don’t think of it in that way. While it rejects the conception of time that Newton invoked the theory itself basically is a classical physics view of matter. So it definitely is deterministic. Quantum Mechanics probably is not. (There are hidden variable theories such as by David Bohm - but they aren’t dominant) In any case QM structures which are deterministic underdetermine motion. Which is why you get those probability functions.

So it [General Relativity] definitely is deterministic. Quantum Mechanics probably is not.

Indeed, which is one of the big reasons that deriving an ontology from physics is still hopeless.

To a degree although I think any purported ontology has to consider physical theory - which many do not.

Clark (6),

Regarding your comment about how libertarian freedom even COULD be a part of science in any particular way:

Well, it certainly couldn’t be, I don’t think, in a science whose purpose is simply to predict and control. So, if that’s what science is and must be, then certainly libertarian freedom wouldn’t work. But if science is about understanding, then there is certainly a role for libertarian freedom. But this would only work in a science that is not exclusively efficient causal. The big problem is that people have virtually equated “science” with efficient causality (as well as empiricism).

Now, I can’t speak for physics or the natural sciences, but regarding the human sciences, there is a lot of room for taking libertarian freedom seriously. This probably would require more qualitative approaches, such as hermeneutical, narrative, ethnographical, and phenomenological approaches. These approaches could also serve as the grounding of psychotherapy and other practices.

But your comment about how you could not even see how libertarian freedom could be a part of science is revealing to me. It makes me wonder whether the science you are referring to (presumably efficient causal?) is not agnostic to libertarian freedom, but is atheist to it. Were it truly agnostic, then it would not be committed to efficient causal approaches. Because, as I said before, there is absolutely no room for libertarian freedom in a 100% efficient causal world. An agnosticism would, at the least, be open to a pluralism of epistemologies and methodologies.

I think that often people use the term “agnostic” towards something when they really are “atheist.” (William James had something to say about this — a so-called agnostic is, for all practical purposes, an atheist.) And, frankly, I wonder this about your own “agnostic” position on libertarian freedom…

It seems to me that science talks about what is determinate. I don’t think that necessarily entails efficient causation. There’s no reason why one couldn’t talk of Aristotle’s other causations in a determinate fashion. The reason I say science is agnostic is because what is indeterminate simply can’t be spoken of beyond pointing out it is indeterminate. It can point to structures around what is indeterminate. But the indeterminateness can’t really have much said even though there very well may be many kinds of indeterminateness. (I’m skeptical of that - but certainly that’s key to the Libertarian position)

To say that science is ‘atheistic’ towards freedom seems odd. Rather it at best can say it is indeterminate and thus not something that can be spoken of.

So to say that the human sciences should turn to qualitiative methods you outline seems somewhat odd. For one I’m not sure what an ethnographical approach would even entail. But secondly it seems to me that phenomenology, hermeneutical and so forth are already part of scientific methodology. Maybe in a somewhat naive fashion - but then scientists have often not had a lot of use for philosophy of science. But it’s still going on.

The danger I see is that Literary interpretation gets taken as science and that would be very disappointing indeed. Even if folks from the humanities make those calls every now and then - often being quite unclear exactly what they are saying. (I’m here thinking of some quite odd feminist critiques of science that were popular in the 80’s)

11 Michael Dorfman on May 8th, 2008 10:44 am

Clark:To say that science is ‘atheistic’ towards freedom seems odd. Rather it at best can say it is indeterminate and thus not something that can be spoken of.

Yes! Science can say “X happened”, or even, “given a certain set of conditions Y, it is necessary that X occur”. But: it has no way of saying Y is necessary, without entering into an infinite regress. Ultimately, this comes down to “given the way things are, things are the way they are.” I, for one, don’t see how the presence or absence of “free will” would (or could) make a whit of difference. That we tend to act as if we had free will is, to me, much more significant than whether or not we actually possess it.

12 Michael Dorfman on May 8th, 2008 10:50 am

Regarding the original topic (of mental illness and responsibility), it’s worth remembering that there is only a tangential relationship between mental illness and the legal notion of insanity. To be legally insane is not to be crazy, or neurologically determined to commit an act; rather, it hinges on the (in)ability to tell right from wrong. If the rapist in the thought experiment knows that rape is wrong, he is legally culpable even if he cannot physically control his behavior.

Morally speaking, that’s a different topic.

Clark (10),

Well, I agree about the problem of literary interpretation being taken as science. Let’s hope, however, that in deciding what is science and what is not that we move beyond excluding what “seems somewhat odd” and working “in a naive fashion” without “a lot of use for philosophy of science.” Moreover, the fact that science “still goes on” doesn’t prove anything about what is appropriate science beyond might makes right.

I find it funny that the natural sciences are all about intense rigor and methodology, but then turn to folksy and faulty assumptions when defining what is science and what is not.

On that note, the human sciences ARE turning to qualitative methods (slowly) in spite of the fact that you, Clark Goble, are not sure what that might entail.

I think to the degree the soft sciences turn to qualitative methods (and I agree they are) they usually are simply doing bad science.

I also think that we needn’t solve the demarcation problem to do science. Just like we needn’t be able to say when, as we pull hairs off someone’s head, that someone is bald.

Allow me to amend (in caps) your comment:

“I also think that we needn’t solve the demarcation problem to do SOMETHING THAT WE CALL science, AS WELL AS FORBID SCIENTIFIC STATUS TO OTHER THINGS THAT WE DO NOT CALL SCIENCE.”

Yes. What’s more I’d say we can be justified in our claims.

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