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	<title>Comments on: The Problem with Metaphysics</title>
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	<description>Musings on Science, Religion and Philosophy</description>
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		<title>By: Clark Goble</title>
		<link>http://www.libertypages.com/cgw/2008/05/09/the-problem-with-metaphysics/comment-page-1/#comment-455</link>
		<dc:creator>Clark Goble</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 09 May 2008 18:42:04 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>Universals would be metaphysical in my view.  Although depending upon how you take the laws of physics ontologically that&#039;s debatable I suppose.  I think the implication of Peirce&#039;s position is that the line between physical and metaphysical is blurry at best.  At best it&#039;s a terminological one.

An other one would be four-dimensionalism verse three-dimensionalism.  There are arguments for both and clear differences in terms of how we attempt to verify them.  The arguments might be weak but not non-existence.

An even better example might be all the conflict over quantum physics.  As I take it Peirce would say that string theory; loop quantum gravity; and so forth are all reasonable theories with practical differences even if we don&#039;t yet have an empirical way of falsifying them yet.  That&#039;s because there are clear differences that aren&#039;t merely psychological between say loop quantum gravity versus string theory.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Universals would be metaphysical in my view.  Although depending upon how you take the laws of physics ontologically that&#8217;s debatable I suppose.  I think the implication of Peirce&#8217;s position is that the line between physical and metaphysical is blurry at best.  At best it&#8217;s a terminological one.</p>
<p>An other one would be four-dimensionalism verse three-dimensionalism.  There are arguments for both and clear differences in terms of how we attempt to verify them.  The arguments might be weak but not non-existence.</p>
<p>An even better example might be all the conflict over quantum physics.  As I take it Peirce would say that string theory; loop quantum gravity; and so forth are all reasonable theories with practical differences even if we don&#8217;t yet have an empirical way of falsifying them yet.  That&#8217;s because there are clear differences that aren&#8217;t merely psychological between say loop quantum gravity versus string theory.</p>
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		<title>By: Lincoln Cannon</title>
		<link>http://www.libertypages.com/cgw/2008/05/09/the-problem-with-metaphysics/comment-page-1/#comment-454</link>
		<dc:creator>Lincoln Cannon</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 09 May 2008 16:49:16 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>Clark, what is, in your estimation, a strong example of a metaphysical concept that has practical consequence beyond its psychological effects, and why is it metaphysical rather than physical?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Clark, what is, in your estimation, a strong example of a metaphysical concept that has practical consequence beyond its psychological effects, and why is it metaphysical rather than physical?</p>
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