Epistemology of Authority

Posted on May 19, 2008
Filed Under Philosophy |

I’d mentioned on the sideblog a bit about the Theologian’s Fallacy which ends up really being a critique of authority as epistemology. I hadn’t then had time to read Brandon’s post on the issue. It’s quite interesting and Brandon actually brings to bear an argument I’ve often used in some related matters.

The issue in case you haven’t read the original post is whether there ought be ‘trumps’ that people use whenever reason comes in contact. Thus, for instance, to a conservative Evangelical the Bible might be a trump over Evolution.

Now there are many problems with this on a naive level - not the least of which is that folks who apply trumps almost always neglect hermeneutics. That is they think a particular reading is ’self-evident’ and doesn’t offer justified competing readings. In my view that’s almost always incorrect and the hermeneutic issue is why I reject trumps.

Alan’s key point is found not in the post but in its comments.

Sure, the epistemic possibility that one is wrong about a Trump does not imply that he is in fact wrong about the Trump. But to acknowledge that possibility as a genuine epistemic possibility and to continue to use that source of authority as a Trump is performatively inconsistent. To use something as a Trump one has to act as if the epistemic probability that the Trump is false is zero, whereas to acknowledge the possibility that the authority is mistaken is to take the epistemic probability that the Trump is false to be non-zero.

Brandon suggests that

“Trumping” is in fact simply a tendentious way of saying “correcting one’s own reasoning on the basis of authority”; and the Trumper Rhoda particularly has in mind is someone who says that on matters where Scripture speaks plainly and “indubitably opposes our understanding” we should, in fact, correct our own reasoning on the basis of that authority.

Brandon’s approach is to raise the example of quantum physics. Let’s say I am reasoning about quantum physics but a physicist tells me I am wrong. Should I trust my reasoning or the physicist?

While I think this line of reasoning does apply to explaining why authority can’t be discounted I don’t think it in the least applies to whether there are trumps.

The problem is that if I am reasoning about quantum physics I either recognize that I know what I am doing or recognize (or ought recognize) that I do not. If I do not know what I am doing the physicist acts akin to a trump only because my reasons are themselves very weak. It’s not acting as a trump in this case. Simply counter-evidence that is quite strong.

If I do know what I am doing then of course I wouldn’t pay attention to the physicist telling me I’m wrong unless they can provide reasons. In which case they obviously aren’t acting like a trump at all either.

This is why I think Brandon is wrong. I don’t think anyone would say that an authority has no epistemic roll. But for a trump to be a trump it has to act the way it does in cards. Literally trump my reasoning. But I can’t think of any situation where such a trump could be easily justified.

In religion there’s the problem of hermeneutics. But even with regards to first person accounts of mental states do we necessarily find the authority trustworthy? If I’m a scientist and someone says they are in pain but all external indicators are that they are not who do I believe? Almost all doctors trust the indicators and think it’s a psychological problem.

The reason why Brandon’s example fails is that for a trump to function as a trump it must be infallible. Otherwise it is just a strong piece of evidence.

I should add one thing to the original post of Alan’s. For the record I don’t think the “burning in the bosom” (which is just one expression Mormons use to describe spiritual experience but isn’t necessarily the experience itself) is considered by Mormons a trump in the fashion he suggests. It might be strong evidence but not infallible. Mormons don’t theologically have anything like infallibility. Although obviously individual Mormons believe all sorts of things.

Update: Alan put up a reply to Brandon at his blog.

Comments

33 Responses to “Epistemology of Authority”

I think this makes the mistake Alan makes in the post, blurring together a sense of ‘trump’ in the sense of ‘authority sufficient for correcting reasoning’ and ‘trump’ in some other, never clarified sense that is supposed to involve infallibility, and somehow problematic because of it, but whose difference from the previous sense is never made out, and the relation of whose problematic character to infallibility is never adequately explained. Anselm (and Helm) tell us that Scripture is an authority always sufficiently important to defer to on matters where it “indubitably opposes” our reasoning. That is all. The quote attributed to Anselm doesn’t even say that it’s such an authority always: only where it “indubitably opposes” our understanding of things. I get the feeling, in fact, that Alan has several different, and mutually exclusive, positions in view, and thus ends up conflating them. And it is Alan, not, as far as I can see, one of his (explicitly named) opponents, who is making this an issue of trumps.

But my further point in the post was that, whatever the nature or value of trumps, Alan’s argument doesn’t work: it doesn’t raise the ‘performative contradiction’ he suggests it does, and the Trumper is not caught in any sort of bind at all. On the contrary, he is being reasonable given his initial assessment of authority (and if his initial assessment of authority turned out to be reasonable he would be reasonable simply speaking).

Well I can see that. But it seems the whole point is that a trump functions different from something that might be questionable but is of strong evidentiary value.

Take for instance someone who appeals to Genesis to say no matter what evidence there is Evolution is wrong. Such a person is not merely using the Bible as strong evidence. They are doing something much stronger.

Of course to say that some people use trumps is not to say that everyone using the Bible, “a burning in the bosom” or whatever uses it as a trump.

It seems to me that your point only holds if no one actually uses trumps the way Alan and I claim. But that seems a difficult thing to claim.

3 Michael Dorfman on May 20th, 2008 4:30 am

I am sure that this will sound hopelessly naive, but it still surprises me that there are people who are willing to consciously, knowingly allow an outside authority to “trump” reason.

Clark,

Of course such a person is simply using the Bible as (very, very) strong evidence. What else could they possibly be doing? That’s precisely my complaint: this ‘trumping’ is supposed to be something different from appealing to authority in order to correct reasoning, and yet it’s not clear at all what it’s supposed to be. In terms of how it functions in reasoning, I see no obvious difference. It’s possible that you are right, and it’s difficult to claim that no one uses trumps the way you and Alan suggest; but I still don’t know what way you and Alan are suggesting.

The notion that the “burning in the bosom” is a “trump” is a category mistake since it assumes that such confirmations for belief are commensurate with rational considerations for adopting a view. It is like loving one’s wife based on a rational cost-benefit analysis. Such an approach isn’t really love at all. Our hearts respond to the “truthfulness” of what we are called to and confirm a commitment; but they don’t confirm some propositional truth or analysis. And yes, Michael, some things are not based on reason but are still a valid basis for commitment and belief. I love my wife; but I couldn’t give any compelling reasons or analysis — and in fact attempting to do so would misunderstand the love that I have for her altogether. But that doesn’t make my love irrational; it just makes it not based on rationality as its raison d’etre.

Hello Clark,

I am curious, would you not see the epistemic claim of the LDS church (direct revelation from God) to be a trump card? If not, then how could it be the only true church on the earth?

I do not wish to be argumentative here, but this is a question I have had for some time now. Nothing set into stone, but I have a hard time believing that imperfect men can maintain a perfect gospel over any length of time.

Michael, I agree it is surprising folks think this way. It is to me inherently an irrational behavior. I think what Brandon is attempting to do is either say that this never happens or try and reformulate it so it is rational. But that later move as I see it ends up demanding a fundamentally different approach to evidence such that it simply isn’t rational any more.

CEF, no, I don’t see any revelatory claim within the Church as a trump card. Simply because Mormonism rejects infallibility and has a healthy acknowledgement of the hermeneutic problems. Of course individual Mormons do use such trumps. At least I’ve encountered them.

As to the claim of being the only true church one has to separate out the truth conditions from the justification conditions. It either is or isn’t true that the Church is the true Church. (We’ll leave alone the issue of what that means for now) The issue for the individual is how to know that. And I’d argue that to know it demands evidence. Trumps effectively are a way of pretending to have knowledge when one really doesn’t. They are a way of cutting off inquiry rather than opening it up.

The fundamental difference - and this is what I was getting at in my reply to Brandon - is that we have to distinguish between a trump with is an infallible and indubitable sign (a final interpretant to use the semiotic terminology) and something which merely acts as a very significant piece of evidence.

Blake, those are really interesting comments. I think I fundamentally disagree but probably ought to write a careful post on why. The short version is that I think we have to distinguish being able to give an argument (or reasons) from being rational. Further there is the issue of the unconscious which can be quite rational.

Put simply I think we have to unpack what we mean by reason and rationality.

Of course such a person is simply using the Bible as (very, very) strong evidence. What else could they possibly be doing?

Trumping. (bg)

More seriously though I think what Alan was getting at is that evidence, even strong evidence, doesn’t automatically refute any compelling argument. A trump does. Even with strong evidence one has to do a reconsideration of ones evidence and the ‘codes’ one uses to interpret them. Very strong evidence might make one reconsider and check ones reasons but it should never make one automatically abandon it.

That’s what I see as the difference between a strong appeal to authority and a trump. That’s basically what I was attempting to point out with example of quantum physics you brought up. (An interesting one since it is an example I’ve encountered in my own life: and I’ve found errors in even very brilliant physicists works)

I suppose one could recast this as there being valid appeals to authority and fallacious appeals to authority and we should reject fallacious appeals.

The simple presentation of my position is this. A trump always cuts off inquiry. It always ends an argument. Strong evidence even from authority always opens up inquiry. It entices you to rethink through your reasons and even continue to re-evaluate the evidence of authority and question it’s position. Of course this is the Peircean in me coming out but I think that considering the issue in terms of continued inquiry is quite helpful.

9 Michael Dorfman on May 21st, 2008 3:02 am

Clark:A trump always cuts off inquiry. It always ends an argument. Strong evidence even from authority always opens up inquiry. It entices you to rethink through your reasons and even continue to re-evaluate the evidence of authority and question it’s position.

Nicely stated. A (conventional) appeal to authority can be overturned by new evidence; an appeal to dogma cannot be. Although I’ll never understand it, there are some people who will cling to the “truth” of a bronze age text in the face of any and all evidence.

My question to you: as a rational but religious person, are there any dogmas (or matters of faith) that you personally feel could not possibly be overturned by new evidence? Do you feel there is anything that is off-limits to inquiry? Put another way, it is theoretically conceivable that you could come across evidence that would cause you to reject your (current) belief in God?

I don’t think anything is off limits to inquiry. The nature of truth is such that it resists being overturned. So to ask, “are there any dogmas . . . [that] could not be possibly be overturned by new evidence” is really just to ask what I think is true. That’s because it ends up being the meaning of truth.

So of course there’s a lot of dogma I think is true. I just think that one should continue to inquire. The faith comes in because I feel those particular beliefs will remain relatively stable in the face of honest fair inquiry.

I don’t like the word “dogma” simply because it tends to have a history where it is treated as “trump” rather than “stable conclusion.” To me religious dogma ought be what remains stable given inquiry not what one avoids investigating.

I think what Brandon is attempting to do is either say that this never happens or try and reformulate it so it is rational.

Actually, what I’m going for is more upstream from this: I don’t think that there has been any coherent notion of trumping presented, so there’s no consistent way to pin down any behavior that involves it and no point in complaining about how irrational it is. Knowing what we’re talking about first; applications later. That sort of thing.

Your comment (at 7:18 pm) seems to me simply to be simply a claim that in the trump case the authority is taken to be very, very, very good authority. And I don’t see any rationally principled way to hold that we should proportionally defer to what has been evaluated as defeasible authority, but not proportionally defer to what has been evaluated as indefeasible authority. Of course, one could argue that there is nothing that fits the latter description: but that’s a very different argument. (One of the problems I had from the first with Alan’s original post is that it seemed to waver between being an argument that the we could recognize such an authority but not use it as a Trump, and an argument that it’s impossible to recognize such an authority at all. The argument was never well-suited to yielding the latter conclusion; but if we recognized such an authority, then the argument presented no good reason not to proportion our deference accordingly.)

In any case, I have a further post coming on the subject of Trumping, which should be up by tonight, so I’ll be clarifying my position a bit in light of some of the discussion that has taken place.

It seems there are two issues.

One, when should something be taken as authority and how. That is the role of a particular authority claim must itself be justified.

Two, is there a difference between very strong authority and a trump? This is what you claim is not the case. To me (as apparently Bill Vallicella and Alan himself given this morning’s comments) there is a fundamental difference between a trump and “very, very good authority” based upon how inquiry proceeds. As I said valid authority claims open up inquiry whereas trumps close them down.

The claim that we should defer to authority seems incorrect in my eyes. We should re-evaluate but I don’t think we should ever defer. So to me it now appears like you are simply saying all strong authority should be treated as trumps. Which I just can’t agree with. (My example of quantum physics showing an illustration of why)

You are right that perhaps the debate ought be over whether there are indefeasible authorities or even “very, very, very good authority.” I think both Alan and I are assuming there are not.

Clark - Thank you for taking the time to respond. I thought it was a difficult question to answer, and that you did as well as anyone could.

I have another hard question for you. But to make it a little easier, I will not make it about you, but someone just like you. :) Do you think it likely/probable that the Church will ever call someone like you to be a GA? If not, does that mean that the kind of inquiry you are talking about does not exist in the Church?

I read the article by Elder Hafen about Elder Maxwell, and I am always impressed by people that can maintain a balance between inquiry and the lack of evidence you speak of. I keep looking for that balance.

I think Elder Oaks actually adopts many of the approaches I tend to do and he seems to engage in methods of thinking pretty similar. So I think it happened quite some time ago.

Interesting - Thank you.

To add, I think the Peircean perspective I give also describes how people actually function relative to knowledge much better than the kinds of discussions that typically go on in epistemology. That’s not to say such epistemological discussions are useless. Far from it.

Peirce would say that most philosophy and semiotics rests on ethics. That’s because ethics tells us what we ought do. We may not be free to decide what to believe or doubt. But what we can talk about is what we ought do. Epistemological discussions are inquiry into ways of appropriate thinking. Just thinking about such matters is a very important process of inquiry that can radically change how we think about such things.

Two, is there a difference between very strong authority and a trump? This is what you claim is not the case.

No: what I claim is that there has been no notion of trump put forward so far in this discussion that lays down coherently and consistently any such difference.

Likewise, I’m not saying that all very strong authorities are trumps. I’m saying that in this discussion no one has conveyed to me any notion of trumps, no analysis of trumps, no account of them, that is both coherent and not also characterizing ‘trump’ in ways that make it just seem like an absurdly tendentious synonym for “extremely good authority”. Everyone talks as if it were obvious what a trump is, when manifestly not everything that everyone has said in favor of Alan’s original argument is consistent with what everyone else has said. For instance, on your reading of the argument, nothing is a trump in being an ultimate authority. But in the comments to Alan’s original post, he seemed to indicate pretty clearly that that wasn’t the thrust of the argument — rather, it was that even if there is an ultimate authority it can’t be used as a trump without performative contradiction. Alan has given several examples of trumps that seem to be inconsistent with his actual descriptions of what a trump is. And so forth. My complaint is not that you guys are wrong. My complaint is that I seriously suspect, and can bring evidence to support my suspicion, that there is no coherent notion underlying the term ‘trump’ in this discussion.

Brandon has up a fuller rejoinder at his blog.

I’ll hold off until either tonight or tomorrow to provide a more complete response.

19 Michael Dorfman on May 22nd, 2008 3:17 am

Clark:To me religious dogma ought be what remains stable given inquiry not what one avoids investigating.

Sure, but that’s redefining the conventional meaning of “dogma” a bit. To believe something dogmatically tradionally implies that it is not considered “provisionally true with a high degree of stability”, but rather “absolutely true by definition, without room for question.”

Right, that’s why I said I don’t like the word. I think the history of the word dogma involves it more as a trump and I reject trumps.

Okay, now you really have me curious Clark. How could an active member of the LDS church not believe in any kind of trump? For instance, the D&C tells us that God and Christ have physical bodies. Would that not trump someone else saying that God is only a spirit? Or are you saying that even something as dogmatic at that is still open to inquiry?

If so, then it would sound like you are saying that perhaps we are no better off with our apostles and prophets than other churches that do not claim to have the same. Help me to see how I have this wrong.

How could an active member of the LDS church not believe in any kind of trump?

There are theoretical ways to reconcile God’s embodiment with God as a spirit in Mormonism. I’m not saying such views are correct, of course.

But let’s be clear. A trump is an infallible argument. I just think, given Mormon methadology, that there are none in Mormonism. There certainly are things we consider true. But that’s something quite, quite different.

I think you’re making the same mistake Brandon is by not separating out strong evidence from a trump. I believe that for certain positions there are strong evidence for them. But I don’t think that is what a trump does. (I recognize that Brandon’s position is more that a coherent presentation of what a trump is and how it is different from really strong evidence has not been given) Hopefully my post from earlier this morning clarifies that.

If so, then it would sound like you are saying that perhaps we are no better off with our apostles and prophets than other churches that do not claim to have the same. Help me to see how I have this wrong.

Apostles and Prophets can provide strong evidence but don’t act as a trump since their assertions can be overthrown as wrong due to human fallibility. I see that as a key position of Mormonism and one big place we differ from other conservative Christian theologies.

Clark, I am fully aware of our belief in further light and knowledge to be revealed at some future point in time. But I thought such knowledge would only enhance our understanding, not totally change it.

If I understand you ( and I am not sure I do) you are saying the kind of knowledge/belief we have in religion, differs from scientific knowledge/belief. The former has no trumps, and the latter has few. If that is what you are saying, I would have no problem with it, but it sure would be met with a different response with some other members.

Also, it would seem to eviscerate the whole foundation of the LDS church. Or any church that claims to be the true church. Truth would seem to be only subjective, different for everyone, no such thing as eternal truths. Or if there are such truths, it would be impossible to know them. Again, help me to see this differently.

But CEF it does often change it demonstrating that something folks thought was revealed wasn’t. The issue of blacks and the priesthood being a perfect example. 20th century figures assumed there was some revelation behind it (which I think has been fairly conclusively demonstrated to be false) and then a new revelation repealed what turned out to be based upon 19th century racist views.

I just don’t see how this eviscerates the foundation of the Church. I’d argue this view is part of the foundation of the Church. Could you perhaps clarify what you see as the problem? It seems entailed by that talk by Pres. Benson on the principles of following the prophet. Not to mention several sermons by Brigham Young and Joseph Smith.

Clark - I will offer a response to your last question in another post,(it will be a long post) but I really would like you to respond to my question about whether or not we are able to perceive/understand/know of eternal truths. It has nothing to do with what I will say about your question, I would just like to know/understand what you are saying/claiming.

CEF, you may want to read a presentation given by Blake Ostler titled Spiritual Experiences as the Basis for Belief and Commitment where he gives a methodology for interpreting and evaluating spiritual experiences.

Having spiritual experiences doesn’t mean that one is omniscient or knows all truth or cannot be mistaken about gospel principles. Revelation is continuing in the Church and it must be continuing for each individual. The fact that there is continuing revelation is a pretty good clue that we don’t know it all already, and we could be wrong. I repeat, we could be wrong.

I think we can know eternal truths but like all knowledge it is fallible. (One could argue that if we are wrong then it isn’t knowledge - which I agree but I think you know what I mean)

But I tend to come from the perspective that there is nothing inherently unknowable in theory. In practice, especially given we are finite beings, then problems occur. This contrasts with a more Kantian or Husserlian perspective where things-in-themselves are not knowable.

Clark - I hardly know where to start, so I guess I will just jump in and start. When in doubt, mumble, kind of thing. :)

I have no idea why I get myself into these discussions, one would think someone mentally challenged like me, would have sense enough to stay out of water over there heads. Of course if I had that kind of sense, it could be argued that I may not be mentally challenged.

Let me say first, that it is not that I really disagree with you, but I am not someone that is considered active in the Church. I only go less than half the time, the other times I stay home with my wife. She got her feelings hurt and will not go anymore. Another reason is because I have come to see the Church in the same light you are casting it in.

If we can expect new revelation to totally change the way we see things, as you suggest, and yes, Sec. 19 of the D&C would help you make your case, then what else might we have wrong?

If I extend your line of reasoning out to its (at least to me) logical conclusion, then I would have to entertain the following worse case scenario: Instead of seeing blacks and the priesthood, polygamy and maybe a few other things as anomaly’s, exceptions to the rule, not the rule itself, then I would have to wonder, okay, what??? - Where do I draw the line?

Perhaps Joseph Smith did not really see God and Christ, or any other angelic visitor. Maybe he actually wrote the “Book Of Mormon” himself, and made all of the other things up.

We say a person must be baptized in the LDS church to enter the Kingdom of Heaven. Maybe a new revelation will say, no, that is not true, one need only believe in Christ and repent to live with God. So for years we have denied people the belief/hope in going to heaven/CK if they refused to join our church in this life or the next.

I do not know about you, but that kind of thing would bother me. I would prefer to think there could very well be changes made in the way we see things, but not a major shift in our view of the gospel. Other wise, there would be no reason to try and convert people to our faith. What would be the point? I could make the same point about our authority, temples, ordinances, you name it, and it could easily be made to look trivial/unimportant by what you are saying.

I think Michael Dorfman is making the same point I am trying to make in #9.

“My question to you: as a rational but religious person, are there any dogmas (or matters of faith) that you personally feel could not possibly be overturned by new evidence? Do you feel there is anything that is off-limits to inquiry? Put another way, it is theoretically conceivable that you could come across evidence that would cause you to reject your (current) belief in God?”

I think somewhere, a religious person has to draw a line in the sand and say, this is it, I am willing to entertain everything else, but not beyond this point. And maybe that point is nothing more than Jesus and Him crucified. But again, I am not sure that works for members of the Church. I might as well be a member of the Catholic Church or *any* other church, because there would be no definitive/eternal truths that we can know. No trumps.

As I said before, I tend to agree with you Clark, but I am hardly considered a good active member. I wish I could square what I have come to believe with the claim of the Church, The Only True Church on The Earth. It just does not add up. If I could just go back and take the “Blue” pill, instead of the “Red” one, all would be well. :)

I would think most members, including GAs, would see you view troubling, at best less than orthodox. Of course that does not make you wrong, just different. And I am not saying different is bad, but it is different.

CEF I’ll answer in a new post later today.

Kent - Thank you for the link. I had read part of that somewhere, but never the whole article. I think it does go along with what Clark is saying, and even addresses some of my argument. I will try again in a moment.

Clark - You say -
“I think we can know eternal truths but like all knowledge it is fallible. (One could argue that if we are wrong then it isn’t’t knowledge - which I agree but I think you know what I mean)”

Yes, I think I know what you mean, but I think it is trying to have it both ways. I agree, if it is shown that something thought to be an eternal truth is not true, then it never was true in the first place. But if it can be shown that God is good today, and tomorrow He will be bad, then I think it could be argued that life has no meaning at all. At least it would not be a universe that I would wish to live in. Tell me that is not what you are saying. That when it really comes down to it, there really are eternal truths.

Maybe we lack the ability to present a trump card now, I would not argue with that, but at some point in time, a trump will be presented. And that with keeping with what Blake said, and I think what you are saying, that the LDS church will be the one that embraces those eternal truths.

Otherwise, I think one could make a good argument that our apostles and prophets are nothing more that pious frauds, or at best, delusional.

I’ve a post about half finished. (Sorry, I’m in the middle of making chocolate so even if I have a second I typically have hands too covered in chocolate to type)

Regarding your question, I think we have to distinguish between what I strongly believe to be true versus the implications of it if is false. The example I’m using in my post (which I don’t want to give too much away from) is the classic brain in a vat thought experiment. Clearly it is possible that we are just a brain in a box (or more interestingly just a computer simulation in some alien’s advanced video game). But it seems pretty ridiculous to believe such a thing even if the implications of it being true are quite dreadful.

So we have to keep separate the issue of trumps, which is a matter of justification and debates about justification, from issues of what is true which ultimately is a more ontological and not epistemological issue.

As I see it you are confusing the epistemological issues (how we know) from the ontological ones (what is ultimately true).

Clark - I am sure I have conflated the two terms. I think it is because of how we tend to think in the Church. The one, ontological, is a natural corollary to the other, epistemological. If the Church really does receive its doctrine from God by direct revelation to a living prophet, (epistemic, how we get it), then it is not a far leap to believe it is also ontological, an eternal truth, the trump card.

If I have a fundamental misunderstanding of those terms, please forgive me. Us construction workers do not use such words on a daily basis. We are not as complicated as folks here. The conversation is more along the lines of “I wonder if my wife will meet me at the door naked with a cold beer in her hand?” :)

I don’t think they end up being corollaries. At best I can say it’s important to keep them separate. Trump cards, as I’m using it, aren’t ontological. Rather they are epistemological. So if we’re discussing trumps then we have to separate out the ontological issue entirely. The question is entirely about how we know.

The question then becomes whether Mormons accept prophets as infallible. Clearly we don’t. Which pretty well ends the argument in a way. At least as you’ve presented it.

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