I fixed the blockquote. Thanks. I’m not sure how I missed that. (Must have been having to run away from the computer after posting)

With regards to coherence, I think that for any coherent view there are multiple other views also coherent. If I understand you your position entails out epistemic duty being to withhold judgment on coherent views but judge inferior any that are less coherent. My view is that among those that are coherent (say the free will positions in philosophy) there are ways to adjudicate among them that are reasonable. You’re position is that it is irrational to do this and I just don’t think that to be true.

I’ll have to think more about the equilibrium issue. The issue for me isn’t whether it’s possible to have an equilibrium state. (I think our brain moves to such a state on its own independent of conscious thought) I just think that the relation of the conscious and the unconscious here make it difficult to talk about superiority. I think you’re saying the same thing but moving from just not talking superiority to withholding judgment entirely. That seems a leap I don’t see as being valid.

I was meaning ‘epistemically superior’ to be a purely rational notion. The thought is that a reflective agent must take their beliefs to be more likely true than false, so that those with the contrary view are most probably going wrong.

In cases where it’s difficult to judge, one arguably should not have all-out beliefs at all, but only some intermediate degree of belief (or perhaps total suspension if we cannot even judge that).

I’m not sure I understand the regress problem. A rational belief state is one in which one’s first-order and higher-order credal values are in equilibrium (i.e. mutually supporting, or meta-coherent). Are you suggesting this isn’t possible? Note that these may be dispositional states, so it’s not like we actually have to attend to all those [infinitely many] propositions. And many will be pretty vague as well, especially when it gets to third-order judgments and the like. Perhaps it’s better to frame the constraint negatively: a rational agent had better not be in a state whereby their (perhaps merely dispositional) higher-order judgments undermine their first-order beliefs.

On your last point, I don’t think ‘disbelief in metacoherence… is as well supported as metacoherence’. I think the weight of reasons determinately supports my view. (You’re right that it would make the view weirdly self-undermining to think otherwise.)