An Other Meta-Coherence Problem

Posted on June 24, 2008
Filed Under Philosophy | 13 Comments

This one is a tad more vague and nebulous in that I’m still thinking through it.

Let’s say as a conjecture that most fundamental points in philosophy can be disputed. That is there’s not clear evidence for them one way or the other. This could be the debate about free will, the different unprovable positions in epistemology and then of course most of metaphysics.

The principle of meta-coherence we discussed we discussed on the weekend would suggest we ought hold our beliefs on these matters in abeyance. That seems to me a clear implication of the idea that to believe something entails that were are epistemically superior to anyone who believes otherwise. Yet I just have a hard time believing for most philosophical claims that other philosophers are my epistemic inferiors.

What’s the implication of all this?

It would seem that for most knowledge claims there is an element that rests upon a disputed philosophical claim. But if we disagree on the philosophical claims can we agree on much of anything?

Consider the dispute over whether I’m living in a Matrix. I can say that there’s no positive evidence I am and that the burden of proof is on those who claim it is. But Richard’s position seems to entail that any two beliefs that are coherent and equally explain the evidence shouldn’t be decided upon. Is there a way to decide the Matrix question without an appeal to some other philosophically disputed point like say some principle of parsimony? I don’t think there is.

When we get down to issues like debating Ockham’s razor though those are very disputed and arguably of weak evidence. I suspect most of use believe them. But can we believe them in a way that is allowable for Richard’s rule? That is do we believe them in a way we can really see ourselves as epistemically superior?

I don’t think we can.

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13 Responses to “An Other Meta-Coherence Problem”

I should add that one can always say that we are epistemically superior on these philosophical points of contention. I’m just not at all convinced that we can say we are.

Right, rejecting skepticism (on my view) implies that the person who thinks he’s stuck in the Matrix is simply unreasonable (on grounds of parsimony, or some such). I’m happy enough to embrace that result.

My problem though is that I can’t see that I have evidence for parsiomony and many other basic principles. Maybe that’s just because I’ve read too many contrarian philosophers. But for me in terms of reasons I don’t think I have any epistemic superiority in them. That is while I often disbelieve many of the contrarian philosophers I don’t think I have good grounds in terms of evidence to do so. As I understand your position that would entail that I ought hold the beliefs in abeyance (whether I actually can or not). But if I hold those in abeyance it seems to follow that I must hold nearly all my beliefs in abeyance which seems a ludicrous position to assert.

I don’t think this is necessarily just a consequence of being unable to answer the skeptic. Although I suspect being unable to answer the skeptic on strong philosophical grounds is one way to critique your position. (If we can’t with reasons answer the skeptic, on what basis can we justifiable claim epistemic superiority?)

So the problem isn’t necessarily with you and your belief of epistemic superiority but those of us who don’t feel we can make that claim. Put in terms of your example it seems to me that the skeptic is making as good use of the evidence as I am.

You ought either to suspend belief, or else form a firmer conviction that the reasons determinately support your position (and undermine the contrary view).

My original metacoherence post was simply arguing that “humble convictions” are inconsistent. There are two ways around this: give up your convictions, or be less humble about them — judge that they are better than the contrary view.

Again: if you really don’t think there’s any more reason to accept principles of parsimony than to reject them, then what are you doing with the belief in the first place? That’s just a plainly inconsistent combination of views. (Compare: “I believe that p, but ~p is just as likely true.”) If, on the other hand, you continue to hold the belief, then you’d better believe it’s true, and more probable than its negation.

[This should be a trivial point, so I wonder whether your apparent disagreement stems from using certain terms -- perhaps 'evidence' -- in a more restricted way than what I mean.]

But the question is upon what basis should we have the conviction? By the facts? But then it’s inherently problematic since our superiority is merely a feeling of superiority rather than actual superiority.

As to your other point, I don’t think beliefs are volitional. That is I don’t think we arrive at our beliefs purely by reasons and I don’t think we are free to chose our beliefs. I’ve written about that a lot in a pragmatic context but the obvious example is going out and seeing a blue sky. Can we chose to believe it isn’t blue? Of course not. It’s not subject to a force of will.

Your rejoinder is merely that beliefs should be purely a matter of reasons but then that contradicts the move you make in your first paragraph. Either beliefs are a matter of reasons or they aren’t. If they are then forming a firmer conviction is a silly thing to request. We can but present the reasons. If they aren’t purely a matter of reasons then why worry about epistemic superiority at all?

I’m not seeing how your objections relate to my view. I haven’t made any positive claims about epistemic justification. Just plug in your favourite theory there. (As a placeholder: you should believe whatever you in fact have most reason to believe. If you really are epistemically superior, you should believe that, and if not, you should go the ‘humble’ route and give up your baseless/unjustified beliefs. But again, this is platitudinous.) I’m merely insisting on a constraint of rational belief. Just like you shouldn’t believe contradictions, nor should you have meta-inconsistent beliefs (e.g. believing P whilst also judging this belief probably false, or at least no more likely true than false).

What does volitionism have to do with reasons? I agree we can’t believe at will something which is obviously false (e.g. that the sky is green). That’s precisely what you’d expect from a reasons-responsive agent. The force of your will is not a reason, so your beliefs shouldn’t be responsive to it.

Anyway, I’m not requesting that you form a firmer conviction by force of will. I’m just pointing out the inconsistency in your beliefs. Appreciating the contradiction should be enough to change your mind.

Richard, I think you miss my argument.

1. On fundamental issues I don’t think arguments are justified.
2. You say I should not believe when I don’t have sufficient justification.
3. Therefore I should not believe any of the fundamental issues in philosophy.
4. Fundamental issues in philosophy determine higher order justification.
5. Therefore I shouldn’t believe higher order beliefs. (Such as whether there is a cup in front of me)
6. Therefore your reasoning leads to pyrrhonic disbelief.
7. (6) is ludicrous therefore I call (2) into question

You say appreciating the contradiction should change my mind. But I’m not sure where it should change it. Should it make me believe that I do have more evidence for my fundamental beliefs than I do? But that seems ludicrous. I should believe I know when I don’t simply because I don’t want to say I don’t know on an other? Isn’t the more reasonable belief simply that the implication from disbelief to disbelief is wrong?

As to the volition issue. The problem is that while we are reasons responsive (and I’ve never denied that) it doesn’t appear we are purely reasons responsive. To simply say you expect we’d believe what is obviously true and disbelief what is obviously false misses the point that we don’t have control on this matter. Thus in more boundary cases I am also unable to control belief. One could say I ought believe but if I can’t control this then I’m not sure what the point is.

I suppose an other way of framing this (dang I hate that term – now even I’m using it) is to ask whether I can

1. believe X
2. believe I have insufficient justification for X to know X
3. actually have sufficient justification to know X

I think your rejoinder only works if those are all compatible.

I’d say that the disbelief that some set of evidence E constitutes sufficient justification entails that for the agent it doesn’t justify. That’s because what counts isn’t just evidence but how it is put together. (Here I’m obviously distinguishing between evidence as facts and evidence as argument with the facts)

Consider the student who knows calculus, who knows how to interpret the question I give them on the exam, but who is unable to get the proper answer even though the answer is given as part of the question. (Fairly common in my physics exams) Now we don’t what to say they are epistemically superior to someone who claims they’ve got the argument successfully but don’t really.

But that’s exactly the case we have in my example.

Once you accept that then I think the absurdity of the implications demonstrates why your assumption is wrong.

I meant to be working with an impartial notion of epistemic reasons, which is largely independent of any individual’s psychology. (What an ideally rational agent would be believe, say.)

Responding to your former comment: I take it (1) is clearly false (at least if you replace ‘arguments’ with ‘beliefs’). Some fundamental views are more justified than others: induction is more reasonable than counterinduction, modus ponens is better than affirming the consequent, etc.

(Whether your fundamental beliefs are justified depends on what they are. Either they’re justified, or they’re not. You ought to believe whichever is the case.)

P.S. You seem to be assuming that you need to possess supporting evidence in order for a belief to be justified. I wouldn’t say that, at least if you have a narrow notion of evidence. (Do you have evidence that 2+2=4? But good reason to believe it, surely.) I’m just saying that if you believe there’s a cup in front of you, you can’t also think that this belief is no more likely true than its negation. (And you’d also better believe its preconditions.)

Ah, OK. If we’re not talking about an individual’s justification but some ideal agent then we’re largely talking apples and oranges. That clarifies things considerably then. I’d probably set my sights on the very notion of an “ideally rational agent” and the problems inherent there. But I’ll not bore you with that tangent. I tend to find the epistemology of the individual rather than some ideal individual or community more interesting. The latter I find useful only for certain normative conditions. (Such as making sense out of what truth entails)

The point about supporting evidence is somewhat but not essentially key. As to 2 + 2 = 4 that’s probablematic since the way most people in practice approach mathematics is much more as a normative practice. That is 2 + 2 = 4 is true as a normative practice.

If we move to formal mathematics it gets trickier not the least of which is precisely because of the foundational philosophical questions. Which to me really gets interesting since one could take the positions of the formalists, the intuitionists, the constructivists, and platonists and ask if we can convincingly decide among them in terms of what an ideal rational agent ought believe. I’d say an ideal rational agent can’t decide which seems to entail that only the narrowest set of mathematical claims are really knowable. (i.e. no infinities either potential or actual in proofs)

Yet I think many people would find such a conclusion disturbing.

As to me as a person I have good evidence for 2 + 2 = 4 but that’s because I’ve actually read Whitehead and Russell and know where to look up their book. (grin)

My ultimate point though is actually similar to what you end with. The strength of my belief is itself evidence for its justification. Not quite what you are saying but fairly close. (While I’m loath to say too much what Davidson would say, this appears to be a position he’d come close to as well)

Re the 9:08 post
As opposed to a straight appeal to lack of ludicrousness (to me arguments of that form seem to be lacking something important) maybe what we are saying is that we care about something along the lines of ‘usefulness’ and that usefulness might contradict truth seeking.

Or the stronger statement that it matters instrumentally in terms of truth seeking in that one might be more able to achieve truth if one doesn’t get to hung up on religiously enforcing the requirement to hold the beliefs in abeyance.

Well the problem with ludicrousness is that end ends up being a reductio ad absurdum but often such reductions depend upon an intuition. Since I’m such a critic of appeals to intuitions I recognize that this is ultimately weak. It ends up being that since I can’t handle the implication the premise is wrong. However when the implication is so bad I think this still is somewhat defensible. (If it implies I shouldn’t believe much of anything)

Your point about distinguishing between usefulness and truth is a good one. I’ll have to think through that. Normally I’m skeptical about that move but I can see how it would work here.

Someone else seems sympathetic to my view.

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