Free Will Origins & Critiques

Posted on July 15, 2008
Filed Under Free Will, Philosophy |

I want to get to my oft promised discussion on revisionist accounts of responsibility. I think it’s important though to first set the stage by looking at what is going on at a fairly low level. So if you don’t mind let me set up these issues for those not as familiar with the literature. There are two main issues at play I think. One is the kind of control we have over events. This is often discussed in terms of guidance control vs. regulative control.


Guidance control is roughly the idea that something is able to do or bring about some activity.

Regulative control is roughly the idea that something is able to regulate between alternatives. (This obviously requires the ability to do otherwise than one does)

The reason for the distinction (and I’m here following Fischer) is because it is conceivable that we might wish to do something and, unawares, be unable to do something else. (The typical examples are rather fanciful thought experiments where a mad scientist makes a particular choice impossible but you would have engaged in the choice you pick whether or not the scientist had done anything to you) On an intuitive level the distinction makes sense as we can distinguish between trying to do something versus being prevented from doing other things. It also helps make a clearer distinction between responsibility and free will in our analysis.

Once we make these distinctions there is an additional distinction that needs be made. It is the distinction between an individual and a type. To draw an analogy we can talk about cars as a type versus some individual car in front of us.

Next we have to talk about how narrow or broad the type is. So, following our car analogy we can talk about Ford cars or American cars or cars sold in Utah. Where we draw the boundaries of our type will depend upon the kind of discussion we are engaged in.

In the responsibility discussion the debate is over the boundaries on agents as a type. That is if we are speaking of guidance control we can talk about people as a type. We’d say that they are able to drive if the class of individuals of a certain type can generally drive where they want. Now there will be exceptions (say cars out of gas, cars with bad transmissions, etc.) But in general the type can function in the appropriate way.

Note how this avoids the central ontological debates some focus in on. In terms of responsibility what is debated is whether people are able to function such that as a type they are able to exercise guidance control Now some individuals may not function correctly. (Say due to mental illness) Exactly how we separate out individuals who function or don’t function is debatable. (Thus the question of how narrow the type becomes) Often the way the boundary is drawn is over reasons-responsiveness. That is does a person have the capability (as a type) of responding to reasons. This is not to say that in every situation they will respond to reasons merely that as a type they are functioning such as they can. Now a very mentally ill person can seen as having a type of brain such that they can’t in any circumstance respond to reasons. Thus they are, as a type excluded.

I should note that the idea of reasons-responsiveness is only one way of considering a type of person that we’d call responsible. The details of this constitute much of the debate over responsibility. And of course Libertarians will typically argue that it is not guidance control that matters but regulative control.

Comments

23 Responses to “Free Will Origins & Critiques”

Clark: The question is whether reasons-responsiveness (and its attendant guidance control) is enough if it doesn’t include LFW. I think the only reason that reasons-responsiveness has any intuitive appeal is that it smuggles in assumptions and intuitions of LFW by simply moving the analysis back one step. If we think of our reasoning as a mere algorithmic processing of information, as obtains if determinism is true, then lack the intuition that we are morally accountable. That is, if my reasons themselves are merely the result of a-rational causal connections and I have no control over which reasons I consider, then I don’t see how we are free or morally responsible even if our actions are “reasons responsive” despite the suggestions of Ravizza and Fischer. At least I don’t have such intuitions.

On the other hand, if I am truly the creator or ultimate source of the reasons or reasoning, then it seems to me that reasons-responsiveness entails moral accountability for acting in a way that is responsive to my reasons and reasoning. But then it seems to me that what really underwrites my view is that my reasons are free in the sense of LFW. So merely suggesting that our acts are reasons responsive really doesn’t get to the issue. “Guidance control” is ambiguous as are the terms “able” and “bring about” since they have both compatibilist and incompatibilist readings.

I think the deeper question is whether this revisionist account of responsibility would allow our language to function if there isn’t LFW. I can understand why a LFW wouldn’t accept it. But that, to me, is not the issue given my rejection of intuitions as that useful or relevant.

Without intuitions, what are your criteria for moral responsibility? After all, moral responsibility seems largely to be a human sense of intuition.

As I’ve said I find intuitions completely unreliable - why should they be reliable in ethics when they aren’t anywhere else? Isn’t their dismal failure in folk physics and folk psychology a strong argument that they’d be equally unreliable in folk ethics? Unless you adopt a strong anti-realist view of ethics? And if you adopt anti-realism towards ethics doesn’t that just descend toward relativism such that responsibility loses any strength anyway?

As you know, I believe that ethics is built into us and we sense it at the level of intuitions. So I am both a realist and an intuitionist (you seem to think they are necessarily incompatible). So are you some kind of ethical Platonist? What is your theory of meta-ethics?

Further, I don’t think that we have intuitions about things like physics. We have intuitions about things within our experience where I believe that they work really well. I certainly have no intuitions about quarks and basic laws. I do have intuitions about the kinds of things whether it is wrong to steal or yell at my wife. I think they are completely reliable.

Yes, but I don’t believe that. I don’t have a theory about meta-ethics at all. Indeed as I’ve oft said I find ethics primarily a lost cause. Even Levinas, whose philosophy I find most appealing in this area, didn’t manage to really bring out ethical conclusions (IMO) only pointing to responsibility.

Ok Clark, so you don’t trust intuitions. What is your answer to Blake’s earlier question: “Without intuitions, what are your criteria for moral responsibility?”

I think the only clue we have for moral responsibility is our social practices (which we should always have a somewhat skeptical stance towards - witness slavery) and then religious revelation. We do the best we can to work it out from that. But I honestly don’t think we can give a real workable definition. (Which I don’t find problematic - I think that true of many if not most universals. I’m Socratic I suppose in that regard.)

But getting to the discussion of moral responsibility rather than create a definition that is based upon taking our common sense experiences and pushing them to the ontological realm where they were never really able to fit we should simply look at what we as a community call responsible and then work out what is the minimum requirement to fit most of the entities we call responsible.

The problem with your stance Clark is that it just ain’t morality you’re talking about but anthropology. You’re deriving ought from is, what we ought to do from what in fact do. That will never work.

Blake,

I have not been following this conversation; however, I would like to comment briefly on your critique of Clark, namely, using Hume’s famous quip that he is deriving an “ought” from an “is” and that that will never work. The main problem here is that Hume was and still is wrong, gloriously wrong. First, if he were right, it would not even be logically possible to have a correct moral theory; for all moral theories (Relativism, DCT, Utilitarianism, Kantianism, Intuitionism, Emotivism, etc.) fall prey to this — and, yes, even your moral theory falls prey (i.e., Action A destroys relationship R therefore A “ought” not be done. I admit this is an oversimplification of your view, but nevertheless even the full version commits the naturalistic “fallacy”). I will assume, however, for the sake of brevity and b/c I’m sure that you agree, that it is logically possible to have a correct moral theory. Thus, Hume is wrong and your appeal to the fact-value distinction as a critique of Clark is misguided. Second, Philippa Foot, in my eyes, demonstrated that when moral terms are “described correctly the logical gap between factual premises and moral conclusion disappears.” What else could a moral theory be but a relationship b/t the “is” and the “ought”? There’s just no way around it!

Doug: I believe that you just misunderstand Hume and I believe that he is right. The fact that you consider something right doesn’t make it so. Human practices don’t make something right or wrong, good or evil. The fact that our culture treats certain things as right and wrong doesn’t make it so. That is Clark’s view as I understand it — we see how folks in some culture actually attribute praise and blame, and that is the basis for saying that there is are moral facts of the matter. The fact is that such practices only establish what practices are, not whether something is morally obligatory.

Further, you are just wrong that all of these views entail that is implies ought. You’ll have to do a lot more arguing before that assertion is even rational. Look here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Is-ought_problem

Your mistake is to assume that if a moral theory implies moral obligations arising in the context of actual facts, then such a view implies that ought is derived from is. That is just a logical mistake and a rather big one. The basis for moral obligation isn’t the mere fact of the matter, but some property, feature or description subsumed under this factual circumstance which entails moral obligation. For example, in Kant’s theory it isn’t the fact that a person breaks a promise that makes breaking promises unethical, but the logical fact that the very concept of a promise is eviscerated if people are allowed to break promises in general. One can know the ethical duty even without knowing any factual situation and even if no one ever makes a promise.

Blake:

First, I never advocated Clark’s view as you attribute it to him. I merely pointed out that your criticism of his view is misguided.

Second, I am surprise that you would reject my conclusion that all ethical theories jump from facts to values and then in the very next breath affirm it with respect to Kant by saying it is the “logical FACT that the very concept of a promise is eviscerated if people are allowed to break promises” (emphasis added). Is not a logical fact subsumed under the broader category of a fact? As the saying goes, a fact is a fact.

Perhaps then we are equivocating on the term “fact.” I take the term “fact” to mean “anything (in its broadest possible meaning) that is actually the case.” So, when applied to Kant, it is the FACT (logical or otherwise) that lying renders the possibility of promise making impossible that makes lying immoral. You may wish to divide facts into logical and natural or “real” facts, but they are still facts. Logical facts are still things that are part of reality, i.e., the way things are. Thus, according to Kant, it is a part of the fabric of the universe (or at least the fabric of our minds), namely, logical facts, that makes something moral or immoral. Essentially, then, Kant argues “It is the case, i.e., it is a FACT that lying eviscerates (I like your use of this term) promise making. Therefore, lying is wrong.” In other words, he jumps from “is” to “ought”. The same argument can be made against any ethical theory, but I trust that you can see that.

Another very easy way to see that Kant commits this supposed “fallacy” is to apply Moore’s open-question argument. We can certainly ask of Kant: Yes, lying eviscerates promise making, but is it immoral?

Doug: Your broad use of “fact” makes your argument non-sensical. You use “fact” synonymously with “what is true” and so if it is true that we have moral obligation, then moral obligation is derived from what is. That is a trite tautology. That certainly is not what Hume is saying nor is it an answer in the least to what I have argued against Clark. I have argued that the mere fact (in this case an existential and anthropological fact) that people attribute moral accountability or have practices of moral attribution is not an indication of what our moral responsibilities actually are.

Look, if no one ever needs to make a promise, or even if it never needs to be the case that humans even exist, for it to be the case that breaking a promise is wrong on Kant’s ethical theory, then it is as clear as can be that this “ought” is not derived from what is. It may be a “fact” (though not an existential fact, which is the category of facts that are relevant here) that Kant’s theory is true and that if anyone were to ever exist and if they made a promise and broke that promise, then they would in fact be morally culpable. That just isn’t the kind of “fact” that we are addressing. We are addressing natural and existential facts. That is why I said you just fundamentally misunderstand Hume — and for the same reason your response doesn’t make contact with my argument against Clark’s anthropological and naturalistic relativism.

Blake,

Your response brings to mind one of my favorite lines from Arthur Miller’s play _The Crucible_, namely, “for a man of such terrible [i.e., great] learning you are most bewildered–I hope you will forgive me.” You hasty conclusions and overconfidence are quite unbecoming of a man of such erudition.

I certainly do not use the term “fact” synonymously with “true” as defined by the correspondence theory. The term “true” in the correspondence theory is defined as “a declarative sentence that corresponds to the facts, i.e., the way things are.” In other words, according to the correspondence theory of truth it is FACTS, as I have defined them, that MAKE statements true. Facts and truth are not synonymous! Truth on the correspondence theory is property of statements; facts are the way things are in the world. And, of course, if a statement is true then, of course, it is a FACT that it is true. That is, the statement’s being true is part of the way things are; however, I hardly see that as being tautological!

Furthermore, I never said I accepted the correspondence theory. You might want to try asking somebody what position they subscribe to before automatically assigning it to them and then calling their position non-sensical!

Now, you are correct in asserting that for Kant it is not the natural (or existential or whatever you want to call it) FACT that makes lying immoral. Rather, it is the logical FACT. That much we agree on. But now to defend yourself you arbitrarily claim that it is only natural facts that are relevant when it comes to the fact-value fallacy. Poppycock! It is any fact! What reason do you have for making such claim? What justification do you have for claiming that “fact X” commits the fallacy, but “fact Y” does not?

For Kant, using the correspondence theory of truth, it is the FACT that it is a matter of logic that lying eviscerates promise making that MAKES the statement “Lying is immoral” true. In other words, he reasons, lying is immoral because and only because it is true that “Lying eviscerates promise making” and, thus, we ought not to lie. This is the epitome of the fact-value problem. I’m sorry if you cannot see it, but as a wise man once told me when I could not understand the concept of timelessness, it is only more reflection on the problem that will make it clear to you, not arguing with me.

Peace!

The problem with your stance Clark is that it just ain’t morality you’re talking about but anthropology. You’re deriving ought from is, what we ought to do from what in fact do. That will never work.

I agree. But I think it’s the best we can do. That’s why I find formal ethics a lost cause.

We can talk about what makes people happy, what appears to improve their lives, and so forth, and work for those. But some absolute criteria is beyond our grasp.

Doug: Did you intend to be insulting and appear to be arrogant in your response and by your quip from the Crucible? Because that is how you’re coming off to me. Maybe the fact that a man of my erudition, whatever it is, asserts that you’re just missing the point ought to be sign to stop and think before you press the submit button.

First, Kant doesn’t accept a correspondence theory of truth — far from it. His use of truth would seek to inquire about phenomenal experience and noumenal reality that cannot be addressed in language. In responding to Clark, I am speaking of the fact that Clark takes mere anthropological phenomena as the basis of a theory ethics. I agree with him that it doesn’t get us very far to do that and in fact ethics is a lost cause if one adopts Clark’s view. You just don’t seem to see that. You’re missing the entire point of my response to Clark. In fact, this point is something that Clark and I are in agreement about — see his #15. He derives moral facts from the way we just happen to act. However, I take it that we could be wrong about morality. The fact that I judge and treat someone as culpable doesn’t entail that such a person is culpable in the least. The entire view is just a non sequitur.

Further, I didn’t assert that you consciously endorse or accept a correspondence theory or anything like it. I said that you treat propositions and statements about propositional facts as if they a part of the natural reality that I am addressing with Clark. In fact you do use the term “fact” that way whether you endorse a correspondence theory or not. Finally, you treat truths or statements as if they were Platonic realities, a part of what is. I wouldn’t come close to accepting such a view.

You use “fact” in a way that I don’t and I wouldn’t because you assume that any propositional statement, if it is true, is a fact about reality. It seems that you are using “fact” in the way that some truth-maker theories treat propositions — the proposition is true because the truth of the matter is that the proposition is true. I agree that such a view is non-sense. That assumes a Platonic view of truth and propositions that I don’t accept.

I agree. But I think it’s the best we can do. That’s why I find formal ethics a lost cause.

We can talk about what makes people happy, what appears to improve their lives, and so forth, and work for those. But some absolute criteria is beyond our grasp.

Correct me if I’m wrong, but I don’t see why a belief in LFW has to be either “formal” or “absolute.” I’m thinking here particularly of William James, whose position on LFW was neither formal nor absolute.

I realize that you’re not necessarily denying this, but I just want to clarify regarding your position here in relation to LFW.

Dennis, I’m talking ethics not LFW. LFW seems to be a concept that, as typically presented, crosses the lots of conceptual boundaries. The reason folks question LFW are due to some of the implications so usually discussion is limited to those implications. Thus typically when LFW is talked about it’s in terms of a certain notion of causality or the ability to do other than one did.

As to Blake’s critique that I’m merely offering anthropology. I’m not. I’m saying all we have access to epistemologically outside of a few vague revelations is anthropology. A different matter. I think ethics is knowable in the long run as we continue to investigate but I think our ability to provide even remotely plausible meta-theories or prescriptive descriptions is pretty limited. Put an other way, I think Blake is appealing to anthroplogy as well but just dresses it up so it doesn’t look like anthropology.

Clark: “I think ethics is knowable in the long run as we continue to investigate …”

As we continue to investigate what? How people act? How they attribute culpability in their outward behavior?

Look, you began this post with Frankfurt counterexamples to LFW. These counterexamples rely entirely on intuitions as to whether a person in a hypothetical situation is one that we intuitively see is morally responsible notwithstanding the conditions that seem to negate LFW, or more accurately, almost negate LFW because they seem to take away all relevant alternative possibilities. They function as intuition pumps. Without such intuitive guidance as to whether a person is morally accountable, these counterexamples cannot even begin to function as counterexamples to LFW. So I am confused. It seems that given your rejection of formal ethical theory and also of any intuitive guide to moral accountability, these Frankfurt scenarios cannot even function.

I’d be interested in how you see me relying on anthropology. You may be right that to the extent we rely on intuitions that are widely shared, we are doing an anthropological check on moral accountability. However, there is a reason that naturalists are never deontologists as well. Deonotological ethical theories (like my agape theory of ethics) require genuine free will or LFW to make sense of them. I believe a naturalistic world view can be accommodated by a utilitarian ethic.

The frankfurt scenarios, properly used, don’t depend upon intuitions. Rather they depend upon conceivability. A subtle but important difference. (There was actually a great paper on this I’d mentioned a few weeks back, “Who Needs Intuitions”)

But the frankfurt scenarios even if used via intuitions aren’t interesting because they tell us what “responsibility is.” Rather they are interesting because they point to some points of undecidability. At least that’s what’s interesting to me.

As to what I think about ethics, my position is basically Peircean. I think the universe acts on us but often in subtle ways. I think most of our intuitions are due to the cognitive structures of our brain (roughly our ideas of good and evil due to evolution) and then social development. Beyond that there are reassessments of values that continue, albeit slowly, as we develop. Since I believe the universe is acting upon us in a way that will subtly affect us I believe that continued inquiry continued long enough will reach a stable view on what ethics is.

What I disagree with is the idea that right here and now we have much ability to know what that is.

Clark: Yeah, that is what I thought you believed. It seems to be a thoroughgoing naturalism without any real moral responsibility to me. If all that we think is right and wrong, good or evil is merely due to brain structures and evolution, then I don’t feel any moral pull or obligation at all. I don’t believe that survival of the fittest is a moral imperative in the least and to the extent we have been fitted by evolution for that non-teleological means to no ends whatsoever other than survival, we live in an a-moral universe. I have long suspected that you are a rather eliminativist naturalist — just how that can be squared with your other commitments is beyond me.

Since I believe the universe is acting upon us in a way that will subtly affect us I believe that continued inquiry continued long enough will reach a stable view on what ethics is.

Shucks, it’s too bad that life requires us to have some kind of commitment regarding LFW today. I’m not speaking here in an intellectual sense, but in a practical sense. One’s actions either imply an embodied belief in LFW or they do not. It really does make a difference if I believe that I (or anyone else) can do otherwise (e.g., it really does matter — today — whether my wife is more than a computer when she says she loves me — same for my love for her).

Related to Blake’s last comment, I cannot understand how Latter-day Saints would opt to believe in some kind of deterministic worldview (even if it ends up being true!).

Dennis no one has been arguing for determinism. It’s been a debate about different kinds of indeterminism - where I think it’s impossible to tell them apart.

Blake, I believe God offers us the way out. I’ve got a post half written on this.

As to the other part - it’s an odd thing to say since it’s very obvious I’m not a physicalist. (For instance I think aspects of the first person view are irreducible to the second person view; not to mention I accept real universals) Further I never said good and evil are merely brain structures and evolution. I said that is most what we have access to. Then I further included revelation. (Odd you’d leave that out) I thought it clear I was talking about us from our current epistemic stance and not some ideal inquirer. (Which is what I take God to be)

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