Just to muddy the semantic waters further: coming from a different tradition of ethics/meta-ethics, one could frame “responsibility” as “being-called-upon-to-respond-for”, and thus divorce responsibility from freedom– one can be held accountable for one’s actions even if one was not wholly free in making them.

Clark:

“Now one claim I make is that it is impossible from the individual’s perspective (i.e. via non-scientific means) to tell what underlying processes produce any particular intuition.” -But isn’t there something of an asymmetry involved and possibly something like a category mistake involved in the appeal to scientific means? I might know that some “act” is produced by an extrinsic causal process in the anomalous case where it is unfree, because causal determined, say, caused by a seizure, (or more ambiguously, due to a psychosis, since, except for the most extreme states and conditions, I think psychotics retain some degree of disposal within and over the states that afflict them, such that one can’t hold them fully responsible, but also one shouldn’t strip them entirely of “moral” status), but in “normal” cases, within the range of attributable dispositions and capacities, I can’t know whether an act is free or not in scientific, causally explanatory terms, without pre-judging and eliminating the issue. And is the causal basis of the intuitions which we exercize really what we consider to be solely or even pre-eminently at issue? (I.e. don’t cases of moral conflict that give rise to ethical reflection rather concern gaining mutual insight into the relational interaction between agents?)

On the other hand, are “intuitions”, which we can’t readily explicate, thereby to be put down to sheer givenness, immediacy, “mysticism”, unintelligiblity, or ineffability. In the case of a sense perception, I think that it can’t be reduced simply to an “act” or event of mind or the mental, since not only is there much more to its mental organization than its sheer givenness to focal consciousness, but I think behavioral interaction with the objects of perception or, more generally, the environment, also plays a significant role in its habitual organization, such that such perception is, in part, an embodied know-how. Might not other kinds and claims for “intuitions” also, at least partly, be “cashed out” as kinds of know-hows, so that, at least in principle, it might be possible to tease out the implicit micro-rules involved in their exercize? That fact that it is not possible to give an immediate “justification” to such claims of intuition does not entail that no degree of “justification” can be given, nor that the “justification” need occur in causal rather than behavioral terms. (Though that would draw into question any neat distinction and separation between denotation and connotation, between reference to objective phenomena and the social relations and practices in which they occur. When Wittgenstein says that, in the first instance, we follow rules blindly, he means to imply that such primitive rules, “deeply” embedded and implicit in our practices and understandings, condition and render possible more advanced, refined rule-governed performances).

And then again, to what extent is the demand for a full “justification” of the reasons for which we act and judge itself fully “justified”, without which judgment and attribution of responsibility can not itself occur? One can’t really say, “all my beliefs are fully warranted”, because then none of them would be at all warranted, since the process of warranting a belief would have no foot-hold to get going, since fully warranting a belief, to the extent possible, is an arduous process, often requiring much study, reflection and even technical competence. Actually, only a few select beliefs of any person’s web-of-beliefs are so warranted, but that does not mean that many of those beliefs aren’t reasonable and subject to rational constraints. (It would be hard to see how any reasonable social and practical life would be possible otherwise). Further, it is not obviously the case that we are even aware of the whole web-of-belief, but rather we might only become aware that we hold a certain belief when something goes awry or becomes conflictual, or becomes problematical in some other way. Often we might be acting from sheerly implicit beliefs and commitments, for which we don’t have thematically accessible and readily formulated reasons. I don’t think that is tantamount to acting entirely without reasons, nor does it involve any complete lack of responsibility for those reasons. But it does suggest that they would arise into reflective awareness and efforts at discursive “justification”, in terms of argument and deliberation, in specific situations of conflict. It is then that we can become accountable for our beliefs and their possible supporting reasons and possibly for their revision, as well as, the acceptance of their possible consequences, but there is no singular type of reason, nor logically self-enclosed space of reasons, but rather we put together disparate types of reasons, in accordance with our best judgment, to try and “justify” our acts. But then I would advocate a return to the older conception of practical reason, as something distinct and separate from theoretical reason, which stems from Aristotle and of which Vico was possibly the last traditional exponent. Such practical reason is oriented toward resolving conflicts, whether within or between agents, rather than to solving problems in solely cognitive terms, such that theoretical reasons are not depended upon, and don’t necessarily relevantly apply.

It is possible that, examining a case thoroughly with all due diligence, we would judge that another has done some wrong, with harmful consequences, (though I’ll exclude the case of psychopaths or Aristotelian “bestiality” here, as utterly outside the circle of human reasons or rationalization), but we also judge that the party in question, due to some combination of lack of capacity and lack of awareness, is not capable of owning up and becoming accountable for the act and its consequences. We nonetheless might still judge it best to hold that person accountable, in terms of imposing some sort of coercive sanctions on that person, which would be detrimental to his best interests or possibilities, but we do so on the basis of our own responsibility for that judgment and its effects, (which ought to influence how we go about the issue). But that judgment in turn is exceeded by the responsibility it invokes, and the open horizon by which it too might be subject to revision, inspite of our best efforts and judgment at the time. I don’t see how such a notion of responsibility would make any sense, if there were no margin, at least, of “freedom” involved. But such responsibility which exceeds our actual freedom doesn’t require any full-fledged account of LFW. (In fact, as I’ve mentioned before, if LFW is required, since we can only be responsible for conditions we directly intended or effected, then that yields too little and not too much responsibility. And it tends to appeal to a metaphysical-theoretical ideal of “freedom” as autonomy, which not only can’t be ever substantiated, but might be repressive of and damaging to what actually existent freedom exists, since one shouldn’t confuse existential separateness with complete self-mastery or self-disposal in the face of the other). But in many instances of the smooth functioning of ethical life, (or, since modern societies involve differentiated “systems”, whose functioning is relatively disemburdened of ethical considerations, non-ethical life, though the notion of practical reason is not just restricted to ethics), the issue of responsibility in relation to “justificatory” reasons does not arise in a problematic and baffling way. But still, the question of responsibility, however little efficacious it may be in the actual course of worldly affairs, remains on the horizon, since the ethical remains inextricably riddled with ambiguity, not just because of conflict over acts and interpretations with others is endemic, but because there is nothing to guarantee that ethical norms, values, ends, or goods can “necessarily” be harmonized and integrated, but rather conflicts within the “good” itself can always suddenly loom up in situations without any ready resolution.

Clark: “I’d say that the question someone like Blake would raise is when one can justifiably be called to respond for something. That is when is the call just.”

Yeah, that is exactly what i would say since we can obviously call one to account when it is inappropriate to call that one to account. The question is not merely what humans in fact do in calling others to account, but when they ought to be called into account.

John: i admit that I can make no sense of what you’re talking bout when you refer to responsibility that exceeds our freedom. Freedom is the condition of responsibility, not something that is commensurate in magnitude with responsibility.

Clark: You’re right that the continental philosophers often speak of responsibility in terms of being called to account. I’m well read in Sartre and Levinas and know how they speak. But when we’re asking what we are actually morally responsible to do and for which we can be justifiably held morally accountable, we can’t just talk about the fact that we are in fact called to account. The fact that we are called to account doesn’t entail that such call is in fact morally justifiable. I may call you to account for racism against minorities — the question is whether my calling you to account is justified and in fact lays any moral obligation on you. Why should it? We must ask what it is that justifies that calling to account. That is a different analysis.