The Problem of Evil and Wanting to Not Get What You Want
Posted on August 20, 2008
Filed Under Religion |
Over at Crooked Timber earlier this month there was an interesting point about how sometimes we want to not get what we want. The example the author used was not wanting ones football team to always win so there was a bit of excitement, suspense and challenge. I think this ends up being a difference between general wants and particular wants. So I may want for all particular games my team to win but I don’t want the general of always winning. While there is an apparent contradiction there the difference between general and particular means it’s not an actual contradiction. (The nominalists among us who are want to reduce generals to particulars will object I’m sure)
I want to extend this thinking to the problem of evil.
At its basic level the problem of evil can only be solved by adopting the claim that it is evil to have no evil. Or put positively, it is good to not always experience the good.
You’ll recall that the limited God solution doesn’t work since while it solves the logical problem it doesn’t address the problem that there are evils that can’t be explained away by logical necessity, free will, or so forth. One could say that God is so limited he couldn’t take care of those remaining evils but that just seems quite implausible since we can easily conceive of how he could do it. So many see the problem of evil demanding some pragmatic utility for evils.
What we end up with is the idea that God wants the good for any particular event but also wants there to be some evils for broader wants so he limits himself.
The remaining problem is in figuring out why God would want some evils and how God decides upon the level of evil. I think there are fairly plausible reasons for the former. A popular LDS view is that we need to experience evil so that we can better understand and appreciate the good. A second related view is that we need to experience evil so as to develop our personalities.
Obviously this still leaves a big gap.
Comments
I’m not sure that explains things Brian. After all there is a wide series of experiences of evil. Do we want to say, for instance, that someone who gets a flesh eating bacteria or some other nasty disease experiences it just because God did? And what does that say about the rest of us who have a relatively calm walk through life?
I’ve long thought the “tempted more than we can bear” phrase was problematic. The one reading of it requires a kind of Molinialist God who knows all possibilities and picks the one where everyone has exactly the kind of experience they need. While I’ve not discussed that I think many of Blake’s arguments in his first volume explain that away. If we don’t have a set of custom experiences what on earth does it mean to say “more than we can bear?”
I don’t think “more than we can bear” requires that experiences (or “evil levels”) be customized. It may simply mean that God keeps evil to a low enough level that everyone can overcome it—maybe some individuals could overcome even greater evil. A sort of lowest common denominator. On the other hand, God could buoy those who experience “more than they can bear” in the event that their abilities were overestimated (yes, I realize that this implies that God misjudged; an idea that is problematic in itself).
A problem is that I might be thinking of evil differently than you. To me, evil is about temptation to rebel against God. A flesh-eating bacterium is not itself evil. It’s undesirable, it’s tragic, but it’s not a temptation. It might, however, invite a temptation to curse God, etc. If I was, in fact, misreading you because I was thinking of a different definition of evil then I will reread and rethink. (I don’t mean to make this into a discussion of what is evil.)
At any rate, I didn’t mean to imply that the exact evils that we experience are ones that God experiences. Rather, I would group evils into “kinds”. And I prefer to think about our life as preparation for living as God does now and not how he may have in the past. Thus, it doesn’t matter to me how much or what kinds of evil God may have experienced when (if) he was a mortal.
(Sorry that this comment is scattered.)
If you want to call it suffering rather than evil that’s fine. The problem remains the same. It’s the experience of evil that’s an issue rather than necessarily the performance of evils.
Ahh, I was indeed misreading what you meant by “evil.” Reading my comments with your usage of “evil” gives them a meaning I totally did not intend. (Read with my usage, they are off-topic!)
A popular LDS view is that we need to experience evil so that we can better understand and appreciate the good.
My problem with this is that to appreciate pleasure we often need only the potential for suffering. That seems to be how our brains are wired up. And where it is otherwise - cf. the pleasure of leaving a cold shower, or the high of having been jogging for a while (although presumably those could be obtained directly from manipulating our brains, had we the ability) - that does not really address the problem of suffering, which is such things as children starving to death, or their more deliberate abuse. Is it plausible that there is such pleasure to be found in the afterlife as could only be enjoyed by those who have been abused to death as children (and which outweighs such suffering, and the collateral problems of others in a world around such suffering)?
A second related view is that we need to experience evil so as to develop our personalities.
Suffering can indeed be transmuted into goods of a higher order, but the suffering of this world seems too haphazard for that to be the explanation for it. Prima facie this world is totally unlike a Gymnasium or Academy. Too often tortuous suffering seems to destroy characters, rather than building them up. E.g. there seems to be an empirical correlation between suffering as children and growing up with bad characters. Now, I’m sure that there is some sense behind both of those suggestions, but as you say, they leave a big gap.
If we can find what exactly is wrong with those two suggestions (my worries are likely to be a bit off) then we will know the size of the gap, which should indicate what is lacking. I like your idea that we are such as sometimes want what we do not, in some other way (but no less genuinely), want.
Some of us want to go on exciting holidays, for example, so we may choose to do dangerous things just for the fun of trying to avoid sufferings that we could easily have avoided by staying at home. There are problems with that as a solution too, though. E.g. is life like a holiday? For the rich it is, but what of all the others? Would they have chosen their lives, as we might choose an adventure holiday?
And why would God have made us to find safe things boring anyway; or why would he have allowed evolution to shape us in that way, when the result is the collateral suffering of world wars and such? …but this comment is long enough now, I think (btw, what is LDS? :-)
Clark: Obviously this still leaves a big gap.
That’s the understatement of the year.
Regardless of how you slice it, you’re still left with the “best-of-all-possible-worlds” argument, and I don’t think there’s anyone who can seriously argue that the amount of suffering in this world is the absolute minimum required (for whatever imagined purpose.)
I’m not sure you need an absolute minimum. But it has to be close. I don’t think that entails “best of all possible worlds” since if evil has a pragmatic utility the amount needed may well depend upon future free choices of individuals. (In LDS theology mortality is a testing ground for the development of free individuals that was necessary for their development) Further if there is indeterminism involved then you have to cover the limits of that indeterminism and not merely the best possible world (since there will be possible worlds not actualizable by God)
Enigman, while I don’t think I’d agree quite with the way you put it, it does seem implausible on the face of it that the level of suffering experienced here is necessary for individual experience.
I think though that many of the evils we encounter are defendable by allowing free choice in humans. While that’s not completely resolving things (couldn’t we be free while having some cognitive limits or at least strong instincts against certain behaviors?) it does change that debate somewhat. The real problem are natural evils. While we could point to earth quakes, tidal waves, floods, and so forth one could also point to obvious biological problems such as deformaties or even physical mental illness. (And arguably many “chosen” evils are in large part due to natural evils like sociopathy, lead poisoning and so forth - why have bodies where free will can be so impinged and simultaneously not have it effected in a good way?)
I think that’s part of what you are getting at too. Perhaps the biggest question of natural evils is the very nature of our bodies.
Suffering is a good, I don’t know that anyone disputes that. The amount of suffering which may be necessary is all that we argue about. One element of suffering that I feel is important is how it invites compassion from those that witness it, as they also have suffered at times. If our theology is only about our unity with God, then we will forget the bigger picture of also being in unity with our fellow brothers and sisters.
I’ve often wondered why it is so difficult for the dead to repent, when temptations wouldn’t have the same pull on them as on the flesh. The main thought I’ve had is that when nobody needs anything to live, how can I love that person and sacrifice for him? Meeting the needs of the flesh through sacrificing the needs of the flesh seems to be an essential part of how we determine who loves us and who we love.
If suffering was always manageable, how much compassion could I have for another (it’s only a flesh wound)? If life wasn’t occasionally terrifying and random, how could I be awakened from my selfish stupor? I find the concept that this world is just as evil as it needs to be, in order to offer opportunities to perfect loving ties, to be morally satisfying; especially in light of the concept that the spirit world is where we can be able to look back on “lessons learned” and at that point grow from those experiences (when often in this life that doesn’t seem to happen).
But, given our brains, how much suffering can be endured that way? For instance children who are abused have cognitive changes in their brain which will affect every aspect of their lives.
The idea that suffering could always bring compassion seems dubious. But even if it could, is it necessary? That is could one have compassion without the suffering.
Clark: I’m not sure you need an absolute minimum. But it has to be close.
Fair enough– but I’d argue that we aren’t anywhere close to a minimum. Even if you argue that there is a utility to evil/suffering, I’ll claim that there is an excess) much of it not dependent on free will) far beyond what would be needed.
Clark: I don’t think that entails “best of all possible worlds” since if evil has a pragmatic utility the amount needed may well depend upon future free choices of individuals. (In LDS theology mortality is a testing ground for the development of free individuals that was necessary for their development)
Sure– but there’s a lot of suffering that does absolutely nothing to further “individual’s development”, and does not depend on the free choices of individuals. (I’ve spend enough time on the pediatric oncology ward to know this one first-hand.)
Clark: Further if there is indeterminism involved then you have to cover the limits of that indeterminism and not merely the best possible world (since there will be possible worlds not actualizable by God)
Sure, but that reduces to the same thing– either a) this world is the best God could do, in which case I find him useless, or b) he could have made a better world and chose not to (in which case I find him a mean bastard).
I don’t see how this world can be reconciled with any strong monotheism.
Clark, it is obvious that the weight of my argument regarding the benefits of suffering depend upon the belief in an afterlife where those experiences can begin to hold value (if they haven’t already in this life). Viktor Frankl’s idea that suffering begins to hold value when it can be employed (or hoped to be employed in the future) in the service of others is one that resonates well with me. I think one popular argument has been that since an individual hasn’t found benefit from his/her pain, then it is therefore unnecessary. I think that argument is attempting to prove too much when we have no idea how suffering in this life may additionally benefit us after this life.
I am not asserting that suffering always brings compassion. I am rather asserting that the experiences of others are more like beacons to us which require a decision on our part on whether to give heed to them. I subscribe to the ideas of Terry Warner on this point. The end result of suffering in this life is that I am constantly challenged by the reality of other’s lives as being as real as my own. Whether or not I heed the call is the point, isn’t it?
I know that suffering brings compassion, and I really have no other evidence that compassion comes in any other way. To live is to suffer, no? The burden of proof lies on the antagonist to find a compassionate individual who has not experienced pain in his life. I believe that Alma 7:12 supports the concept that God gained much through suffering that could not be gained in another manner:
And he will take upon him death, that he may loose the bands of death which bind his people; and he will take upon him their infirmities, that his bowels may be filled with mercy, according to the flesh, that he may know according to the flesh how to succor his people according to their infirmities.
Well I’m certainly very open to the idea that the meaning of any act of suffering is entailed in its effects which often lay on a person’s free reaction to it. (A Nietzsche said, that which doesn’t kill me makes me stronger - or words to that effect) And the appeal to our reaction in the next life versus this life is a popular LDS move. (And one I’m obviously apt to take myself)
Having said all that though there’s still the issue of the difference in levels of suffering here. I’m not sure that this can account for that issue.
The real issue though isn’t how we react to suffering. The issue is whether it is just to ignore suffering. That is to allow evils to occur when we could prevent them. If God could have made things so there was less suffering then it seems he ought to have. I don’t see the approach you take really dealing with that fundamental issue.
Michael, I think in LDS terms that a lot of suffering is for our growth and development. That meaning depends upon what we were like prior to our mortal birth and what we will be like after. This is basically Kent’s point. The fact that for most Mormons we are in a sense uncreated and some element of us is beyond God’s direct power to control entails that we have open to us a pragmatic move that most other theists do not.
Now would this convince the typical non-Mormon? Probably not. However what’s of interest to me is less the persuasive power of this line of reasoning, since it depends upon first buying into several ontological premises of Mormonism. Rather what’s of interest is finding a solution that works logically.
The idea that God is “useless” in these cases seems problematic to me, unless one demands that God fulfill the conception of Greek absolutism. I have no trouble with God being somewhat limited. If one rejects creation ex nihilo and variants of pantheism then a lot of that follows rather naturally.
Clark, with regards to the different levels of suffering, can you define the issues for me? The two issues I see are 1) the perceived injustice of one individual suffering more than another individual 2) the idea that a “good” God is responsible to limit or end suffering.
I don’t see why, given the framework of Mormon thought, it is difficult to believe that this world is the best possible world that God had the ability to create and still meet his and our purposes. Just because I can imagine a better world doesn’t mean it was a possibility for God. If God doesn’t know the future acts of free agents perfectly, how can he say when a certain amount of suffering would become detrimental rather than beneficial (accounting for the possibilities of growth in the afterlife)?
Well here’s an obvious example where God could have made a better world. He could have made mental illness impossible. He could have eliminated earthquakes and volcanoes.
Again, I reiterate, how do we know that such a world (given the purposes of mortality) was a possibility for God?
It seems easily obtainable given what we know of the universe. Unless one can provide a plausible reason why God would be so limited that he couldn’t do this it seems fair to assume he could.
Put an other way, how weak is one willing to make God in order to absolve him of evil?
Clark, given what we know of God, why the need for an evolutionary track in the creation, rather than a six day creation? Maybe we really don’t know as much about the universe and what is possible for God as we think.
I will grant that if God is able to diminish suffering and still accomplish his purposes (and our purpose in accepting mortality), and yet doesn’t, it would appear to be a moral failing on his part. I just don’t see any evidence that we can say so with such limited information.
I will take a God that is so weak he can only do what is possible and yet still be able to accomplish his purposes.
Clark: The idea that God is “useless” in these cases seems problematic to me, unless one demands that God fulfill the conception of Greek absolutism. I have no trouble with God being somewhat limited.
From my perspective we’re talking about much more than “somewhat”.
I agree that the important point is not the “persuasive factor”, which as you point out, isn’t high, but rather one of logical consistency. And from my perspective, it’s not.
The original notion– that we don’t always want what we want– is a bit of a ruse. Most people want a million dollars, but they wouldn’t like a million dollars worth of nickels dropped on their heads. They might want chocolate cake, but they wouldn’t want nothing but chocolate cake, or so much chocolate cake that they drown in it.
More to the point are the issues you raised with Kent: earthquakes, volcanoes, and mental illness. We’re left either trying to justify why these are necessary (which leads to all kinds of gymnastics), or to justify why God was capable of doing better and chose not to (i.e, the “mean bastard” theory), or to accept that this is the best he could do.
As you know from our previous conversations, I believe that in the absence of dogma, the self-evident assumption has to be the First Noble Truth. The reality (and pervasiveness) of suffering is, to me, indubitable. So, I think you put your finger on it when you write: “how weak is one willing to make God in order to absolve him of evil?”. For me, the answer dictated by logic is “so weak as to be inconsequential.”
The real problem are natural evils.
Well, only if you include the physical consequences of our free choices in that category. Why would tbe benefits of Free Will require that victims actually suffer? Nice discussion, btw… (My interests are in theodicies in general, rather than Mormonism in particular, so I don’t know what ‘LDS’ means…)
…indeed suffering can lead to compassion, but sometimes it does not so one wonders, is there something already in those of the former kind, and if so is it not that that is worthwhile? And even if not, the aim of compassion is to reduce the sufferings of others, so there is something illogical in allowing suffering because it leads to compassion (if it does, if it is not really something else manifesting as compassion in the presence of suffering).
It is true that we don’t know the full effects of the actual suffering in the world, but it does seem that a compassionate God would not allow victims to suffer as a result of the evil acts of others, if that could be avoided. Ultimately beneficial suffering could be allowed, but it seems unlikely that the suffering caused by a sadistic torturer would be particularly well designed to be ultimately beneficial, not if that torturer was creatively exercising his free will (and as I say, the opportunity for the victim to display bravery and compassion is surely not that much better than the pre-existing bravery and compassion). Indeed, were it ultimately beneficial, then we should perhaps look forward to an ultimately beneficial but very hellish life after this one, so that we can all benefit so!
So, if we suppose that such suffering is not especially beneficial (so that it should not be caused), then we either assume that it is only apparent, or we do indeed have the residual problem of why God would allow it. Regarding the former, it could hardly be wrong to deceive torturers about the pain they were causing, and which they should not be causing (given the wrongness of the apparent pain). And who that was good enough to abstain from torturing because of not wishing to cause such suffering would be upset that the potential victim was in even less danger of suffering?
Enigman, LDS = Latter-day Saint. The actual name for our Church is The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. So the most common shorthand is LD. Although Mormon is a close second.
I think free will would require some suffering but I think one could clearly limit (or for the mentally ill actually increase) the amount of freedom only slightly and create a huge decrease in suffering. LDS are pretty big on free will (although theologically we typically use the term agency) but don’t have a terribly detailed theology of it. (Thus all the free will debates here)
Michael, I think there’s a middle ground between making God far too limited (as I think some positions have as a logical implication) and making God far too powerful (as I think the Greek philosophers were wanting to do). I think the view that it was necessary is the best solution. I don’t think it ends up requiring mental gymnastics since, as I mentioned, for Mormons the ontology of being-in-the-world for God is already there prior to the raising of the problem of evil.
I think Kent’s point is that any suffering can have it’s meaning change by future reactions. (Which I agree with) So he’s trying to cut this whole issue off at the pass, as it were. Although I don’t think it works to the degree he hopes.
Kent I think the problem is that you are making God weaker than we are. Consider likely technology available in the next 500 years. Surely God is at least as powerful as that? Heavens, take technology now. Why couldn’t God have revealed technology thousands of years ago to ensure that they had lessened the suffering to the same degree we have lessened suffering.
I’d say that the absolute minimum level of power one could allow God is that of a highly advanced technology. Otherwise, as Michael says, the very notion of God loses its meaning. It becomes very implausible that there is a being who simultaneously could do all we require of him while being unable to do things we could easily do.
Clark,
I don’t think I disagree with you at all on how powerful God needs to be. My position is not that God can’t do certain things (not powerful enough), rather that he can’t do certain things based on pre-existent (or co-existent) realities and get the results that he (and we, since we agreed to experiencing the pain of this life) require in order to obtain maximal value from the experience.
Take your example, for all we know God did reveal many technological innovations which men chose not to act on, or God wished to reveal such things but men refused to be open to receiving them. I propose that God has to play with the cards he has been dealt in order to accomplish our mutual purposes. God may not be able to annihilate matter/energy for example, or time-travel (like changing a Jack to an Ace with a blink of the eye), but he is a master at playing within the rules of the game and can do all things which would not be detrimental to our mutual purposes. My position is that since knowing all of the rules of the game, so to speak, is beyond us in mortality (one of the ground rules for mortality), we can’t say if God is failing to hold up his agreement by allowing something that appears to be unjust or unnecessary to occur.
I grant that God has enough power to know all things which are knowable, and to do all things which are doable (maximally so); so I guess the example of a technologically superior extra-terrestrial fits. Mortality (this dimension at least) may just require constant gravitational forces which God cannot ignore or supersede. Is God necessarily weak if he cannot bring about diversity of life on a planet in one second rather than in 2 billion years? Yes, he is weaker than such a creature that I can imagine (the Greek absolutist God). However, a being who can bring about the current state of existence may still be the most powerful creature possible, though it may take billions of years for his work to be accomplished rather than one moment.
What matters to me is whether God can guarantee that my personality will continue to exist after death and that all the experiences which I have had in this life which caused me pain will some day become benefits to me for which I will be grateful. I need a God that is powerful enough to guarantee that I will be better off for having had this experience than if I had not had it. How powerful do you need God to be to get what you want out of your (supposed) eternal existence?
Kent, I think my question is largely can we find a plausible explanation. Certainly we can always play the “take it on faith” card. But that’s unsatisfying. I’m not even saying we have to say our solution is most likely or so forth. But I think it behooves us to find a plausible explanation. And making God so unable to fulfill his purposes by minor changes seems implausible. Possible? Yes. Plausible? No.
The claim that God maybe did reveal technology and people didn’t accept it just seems implausible again. I think that if Jesus was revealing say anti-biotics or the printing-press it would have really taken off. Why not in a manner akin to the Sermon on the Mount talk about germ theory and why you should use clean cloth to wash wounds and boil the clothes?
I can understand the response that this issue doesn’t bother you. It doesn’t particularly bother me either. However it does bother many people. So I think it behooves us to think through the issues. Plus I think any plausible answer will have significant theological implications. And that does interest me.
Clark, since plausibility is in the eye of the beholder, I accept your point, what will satisfy one will not satisfy another. I wouldn’t consider myself a process theologian, since I believe that God has far more power than they do (especially the ability to resurrect me and my personality), but I find the approach (with a hybrid of Openness Theology) morally satisfying. The problem of evil has bothered me considerably in the past since it was as much a logical puzzle as an emotional one. I do believe I have thought through most of the issues carefully.
You state in your original post:
One could say that God is so limited he couldn’t take care of those remaining evils but that just seems quite implausible since we can easily conceive of how he could do it. So many see the problem of evil demanding some pragmatic utility for evils.
I am less confident in my understanding of the universe than others may be, so I find it difficult to know what constraints a God may face in his decisions to act; which to me seem simply solved by my hypothetical propositions. It is less about faith for me than about acknowledging my limited knowledge about the universe. I think a discussion regarding the constraints which a hypothetically loving God faces is all we are left with, since going the other direction (towards an absolutist God) gets us in deeper.
I am open to other possibilities to explain God’s inaction in the face of terror and pain, but the only one I’ve found that satisfies my moral barometer is the one in which God would intervene if he could, but can’t because of external constraints. The logical problem is solved in this manner, though I accept that such a view is emotionally unsatisfying for many. I only need a God to be powerful enough to heal my pain and the pain of my fellow mortals, and to ensure my joy in an eternal afterlife.
“The real problem are natural evils. While we could point to earth quakes, tidal waves, floods, and so forth one could also point to obvious biological problems such as deformities or even physical mental illness.”
Before the creation of this earth God resided in a ‘universe’ different from ours. In his universe there was no death and no time. In other words, His universe operated within different dimensions than ours. In order for us to come here and acquire a body, a four-dimensional universe had to be created. To do so such a universe needs the rules by which a four-dimensional operates. This requires mass, change, death, and time.
Look at the element of change – evolution. Evolution can only exist within a changing environment. Without change life would still be moss sitting on rocks (if that). Thus evolution is guided (if you will) by a changing environment. Only certain changes can develop within a specific environment. (Air-breathing mammals cannot evolve in an all water environment.)
Today I was reading about a gigantic grouper discovered in the eastern Pacific. It is a different species from the Atlantic giant grouper. Scientist said at one time there was only one species of groupers. Then South America popped up and split the population in two. The end result was two different species. Now South America was created by plate tectonics (bringing earth quakes). And by new land created by magma being thrust through the earth’s crust (volcanoes). Tidal waves and floods are simply phenomena created according to the four dimensional rules required for the creation of this world and for the creation of life on this world.
Deformities and mental illness (at least in part) are simply the manifestation of the rules needed in order for this world to exist and for life to appear. Neither will affect their eternal progress (which is what it is all about). Natural suffering exists when humans interact with the consequences of the four-dimensional laws required for the creation of this world and the creation of their own bodies. It seems you (or God) cannot create a four-dimensional universe without using the four-dimensional laws which govern that universe. Change it and it is no longer that universe.
Rich
Kent: I am open to other possibilities to explain God’s inaction in the face of terror and pain, but the only one I’ve found that satisfies my moral barometer is the one in which God would intervene if he could, but can’t because of external constraints. The logical problem is solved in this manner, though I accept that such a view is emotionally unsatisfying for many. I only need a God to be powerful enough to heal my pain and the pain of my fellow mortals, and to ensure my joy in an eternal afterlife.
It sure doesn’t look like the logical problem is solved– on the one hand, you argue that God would intervene but is powerless to, and then claim that you require a God to be powerful enough to heal the pain of you and other mortal creatures– which, as you just pointed out, he apparently isn’t.
Michael, I argue that often God may be powerless to intervene in this mortal life, yet is powerful enough to heal my pain in an afterlife. I can see how you may have read that I was asserting availability for healing from pain while in a mortal state.
Rich, how are you using time? I’m not sure I can agree with how you are using it.
Kent: from a strictly logical (non-dogmatic) perspective, there’s no evidence of anything outside “this mortal life,” much less any future goods that could satisfactorily offset the suffering which is evident in this world. The Afterlife is an article of faith, not of logic. (Unless you have a case to make…)
One might argue that logic has little or nothing to do with any existents. It all depends upon premises. Garbage in…Garbage out.
But with regards to a theodicy it seems to me than an appeal to an afterlife is a pretty valid move. Recall that a theodicy is only trying to explain how evil and God are reconcilable. It seems odd to make a critique of a theodicy due to the claim of an afterlife. If one is going to be naturalistic in ones criticisms one would surely find the existence of God as a bigger issue. Yet without God then the theodicy makes little sense.
Just to add Kent, I do think asking about the meaning of suffering and then invoking the temporal sense of meaning will be necessary for any successful LDS theodicy. The hidden assumption in many critiques of evil is that suffering’s meaning is wrapped up purely in the period in which it occurs. I don’t think that a fair assumption.
I am curious, I have never seen someone give a scenario where God can take more of an active part in our lives and not give His hand away in doing so. I remember years ago trying to figure out why God did not kill Jeffery Dahmer in a single car accident (or how ever) instead of letting him kill so many people. No one would ever know that God did it.
But when you think it through, the question that must be answered is, at what point does God draw the line. Does He save everyone, or just certain ones? This one but not that one? I am not sure how God could do more than he does without giving away the ending.
In the OT God wanted Moses to bring the 70’s up to meet Him and they were all afraid to go. This was a time when it seems that God was willing to show more of Himself than He is today. Could it be, if God was willing to show more of Himself today, we would be any more willing to go and meet with Him than they were? I do not know. Probably not the God of the OT anyway. :)
I think the claim that we don’t want God to tells us things is pushed way beyond what is legit. If only because the society today is so much unlike primitive societies. We may not like some thing he asks. But that’s true in general.
As for your earlier question of drawing lines. I think the problem is akin to the old paradox of when someone is bald. If you keep plucking out hairs there’s no one point you can say the person is bald. But that doesn’t mean we can’t tell someone is bald. Likewise while we may not be able to say, “here’s the line and go no father” we can tell plausibly that the line is much farther away than what is enacted.
There is a claim that God actually is intervening and stopping serial killers and so forth. But I think it’s just implausible that this is the case. Those making the case certainly have the burden of proof.
Clark: ”Rich, how are you using time? I’m not sure I can agree with how you are using it.
Let’s begin with Alma 13: 7,
“This high priesthood being after the order of his Son, which order was from the foundation of the world; or in other words, being without beginning of days or end of years, being prepared from eternity to all eternity, according to his foreknowledge of all things—“
The phrase “beginning of days or end of years” I read as a metaphor for terrestrial time. Even our own creation myth, the Big Bang, has a beginning of days.
D&C 78: 16
“Who hath appointed Michael your prince, and established his feet, and set him upon high, and given unto him the keys of salvation under the counsel and direction of the Holy One, who is without beginning of days or end of life.”
Once again we see the metaphor in use with the slight change. In the place of end of years we have end of life. Both are metaphors for the terrestrial dimension of time. And both are denied efficacy with regards to Celestial beings. Now add to that:
Alma 40: 8
“Now whether there is more than one time appointed for men to rise it mattereth not; for all do not die at once, and this mattereth not; all is as one day with God, and time only is measured unto men.”
Again, the dimension we know as time is not applicable to God. Lets move on to Abraham. This is the scripture “young earth” members of the Church turn to in support of their thesis. I think this is a misconception of what these passages mean.
Abr. 3: 4-9
4 And the Lord said unto me, by the Urim and Thummim, that Kolob was after the manner of the Lord, according to its times and seasons in the revolutions thereof; that one revolution was a day unto the Lord, after his manner of reckoning, it being one thousand years according to the time appointed unto that whereon thou standest. This is the reckoning of the Lord’s time, according to the reckoning of Kolob.
5 And the Lord said unto me: The planet which is the lesser light, lesser than that which is to rule the day, even the night, is above or greater than that upon which thou standest in point of reckoning, for it moveth in order more slow; this is in order because it standeth above the earth upon which thou standest, therefore the reckoning of its time is not so many as to its number of days, and of months, and of years.
6 And the Lord said unto me: Now, Abraham, these two facts exist, behold thine eyes see it; it is given unto thee to know the times of reckoning, and the set time, yea, the set time of the earth upon which thou standest, and the set time of the greater light which is set to rule the day, and the set time of the lesser light which is set to rule the night.
7 Now the set time of the lesser light is a longer time as to its reckoning than the reckoning of the time of the earth upon which thou standest.
8 And where these two facts exist, there shall be another fact above them, that is, there shall be another planet whose reckoning of time shall be longer still;
9 And thus there shall be the reckoning of the time of one planet above another, until thou come nigh unto Kolob, which Kolob is after the reckoning of the Lord’s time; which Kolob is set nigh unto the throne of God, to govern all those planets which belong to the same order as that upon which thou standest.”
The Lord tells Abraham that one day of the Lord is a thousand years of Abraham’s time. Here I believe we are dealing with a metaphor: a thousand years. I think the metaphor is meant to represent a long period of time or in other words eternity. We do not have a conceptual image of eternity. Eternity lies in a dimension we don’t have. So we deal with it in terms of metaphor and I think that’s what going on here.
Abraham, at the end of the verse is told that the reckoning of God’s time is according to the reckoning of Kolob. We know the Lord exists within the Celestial Kingdom. I read Kolob to be a metaphor for the Celestial Kingdom.
The next verses outline the principle of authority and governing. But verse 9 is very interesting. With regards to terrestrial time, Celestial time dimension sets the parameters for the existence of the terrestrial time dimension. The higher regulates the lower. But they exists as separate dimensions. The dimension of “time” which exists with God is not the dimension of time which exists with us.
Some of this I am incapable of defining further because I an incapable of conceiving eternity which is the “time” dimension of God.
Rich
Clark, I agree that the existence of God is a bigger problem for a theodicy, but to me it seems that saying “the suffering here is irrelevant, because God makes up for it in some other world” is just so much hand-waving. You’re still left with the problem of why he caused (or allowed) the suffering in this world, and any future compensation is irrelevant.
So far, the consensus here seems to be “Hey, he did the best he could.” Which, it seems to me, tends to lead to Deism (since there are clearly lots of small tweaks that could improve things here).
Presumably this means a God who had his hands tied during Creation, and has been sitting on them ever since. But that doesn’t agree with the scriptural accounts of miracles.
It’s a puzzler….
Michael: I think that your limited perspective and naturalism are non-starters for a discussion of the adequacy of a theodicy. Most importantly, the after-life provides a context for discussing the greater goods that God may seek out of a life where we confront evil. If God’s purpose is soul-building over the longer term, then a hedonic paradise will not suit God’s purposes and a world where we confront the challenge of genuine evils makes a lot more sense as Clark has suggested. Further, the after-life isn’t an ad hoc explanation to escape a difficulty but part of the theists’ world view that puts life in the context of God’s purposes for us. The notion isn’t that being in pleasure later makes up for the pain now, but that God has purposes to accomplish that cannot be accomplished without allowing free will and the possibility of genuine evil. I may allow my son to experience the the pain of an operation that causes a lot of pain because he has the rest of his life to live and in the long run it makes sense. But if he has only 3 days to live, I would make a different judgment. God may have purposes of soul-building and allowing an environment where we are free to choose to love him or to reject him that require permitting evil. If we have only this life, then such evils don’t make a lot of sense, but in the eternal scheme of things they can be more than justified.
Further, beginning with naturalistic assumptions that precludes God is simply to assume what must be shown in the context of theodicy. In other words, your very stance begs the question that is at issue — can God exist given the kinds of evils we confront in the world?
Blake, I don’t think that’s a fair point about naturalism. Realize that the point Kent is bringing up basically is Nietzsche’s. It’s also a position common within several strains of postmodernism that I’m sure Michael is familiar with. The idea that the meaning of any event is holistically determined by other events surrounding it. The common analogy (also brought up by many LDS philosophers) is a note in a symphony. The meaning of the note makes sense in the piece as a whole and not just the immediate past.
I think though that Michael’s point is one I’m very sympathetic to. It’s a kind of criticism I’ve used against many forms of consequentialism. (Even though I’m probably more sympathetic to consequentialism as a vague approach to meta-ethics than many alternatives)
The problem is that even if the meaning of an event in the distant future is good that doesn’t justify the evil meanings prior to that time. Especially not if that future good could be arrived at via better means. In other words all one has done is transformed the problem of evil from a question of suffering at a particlular point into a question of question of suffering along different paths. (I’d bring up an analogy to path integrals along all possible time lines but I’m sure everyone’s eyes would glaze over)
The point being that changing the nature of the question doesn’t resolve the question.
Michael, I think though that the LDS rejection of creation ex nihilo changes things a lot. Certainly it moves one away from Deism. If there is pre-existent matter which God has limited control over then he’s bound by that limited control. If his aim is to help other existents progress but can’t simply ‘make them’ into whatever he wants then he at best can create a situation where they can choose for themselves and progress themselves. Thus the common LDS analogies to various kinds of suffering as we adopt certain kinds of progression here. (Sport and exercise analogies being particularly popular)
The problem, as we’ve all noted, is that it isn’t clear that this explains all the suffering experienced here. But it certainly does point to a solution and I think gets one much further than any other alternative I’ve encountered. So even if there isn’t a fully plausible answer I think it is plausible that continuing to think along these lines will yield an answer.
Clark - It was not so much as a claim as it was a question. I agree that times are different now and people are not so superstitious. Although, a number of years ago, I was reading a book and I had the distinct feeling/impression that if I would look up I would see an angel. I did not look for two reasons. First I did not really think there would be an angel there and second, I was afraid if there was an angel there I would not know what to say or do. Maybe I missed my big chance. :)
Why would we think, if we can figure out that the weak force of gravity can bent light and 96% of what makes up the universe cannot be seen and yet must exist, that we would not be able to discern if there wasn’t some force (Goldilocks) making everything just right.
If no one ever got sick, died before a certain age, no one was a bad person, no tidal waves when there was a shift in the tectonic plates, no tornadoes when there should be, daughters did not give you gray hair when they turn 14-15, wouldn’t we figure out something strange was going on? That there was someone/something fixing things to work other than they should?
It seems to me, there are “just” enough strange things happening to give one a reason to believe in God, and yet not enough to dispel the nonbelievers of wanting more proof of God.
I am not saying I like the way things are, sometimes I think if I were God, I would do things differently, but at the same time I assume, just maybe, I would not. I think to maintain a belief in God, one has to believe that God is doing all He can. What is the point of believing in an impotent God?
Clark: I may have missed what Michael was saying, but after re-reading I think that it is you who have missed it. Michael is what I call an “intolerant naturalist” in the sense that the only evidence that counts is scientific or what is evident given naturalistic assumptions. I don’t see him talking about Nietzsche but about scientific acceptability. Of course, Michael is always free to enlighten us on what he means because he’s not dead yet — at least as far as I know.
I also agree with CEF that a God who is doing all that he can is far preferable to a god that isn’t.
Blake, I don’t think that’s fair. In any case I think the criticisms made by Michael have to be answered. Merely crying “naturalism” answers nothing.
Certainly I prefer a God who is doing all he could. But it seems the question is how to reconcile that belief with the evidence before us. Isn’t that ultimately the whole point about the evidentiary problem of evil?
CEF, I think you’re right regarding evidence. I think a lot of that is wrapped up in the problem of the hiddenness of God. Once again I think Mormon’s notion of this life as a test givens extremely persuasive answers to the problem of hiddenness. Indeed I think it offers a complete answer.
Rich, I’m familiar with those scriptures. I guess my question is why you feel they entail the ontology you put forth. To me time is defined in terms of change. Either we are merely talking about different relative measurements of change or else we’re not talking about time at all. I also think we have to be careful about reading back into the scriptures modern scientific senses of terms. The whole Kolob analogy is, in my opinion, more a geocentric astronomy view of orbits used as an analogy to intelligence. I think it dangerous to read more into it than that.
Blake: no, I’m not dead (yet), and Clark’s reading of my comments were fairly accurate. I didn’t bring up Nietzsche this time, but it wouldn’t have been unlike me.
Clark: I agree with you that the notion of “spiritual progress” (or whatever the term of art is) is insufficient to explain much of the evil/suffering here. It may be the case that this type of thinking brings one closer to a solution than other theodicies, but I’d argue that it is still pretty far from satisfactory.
Even keeping the non-”ex nihilo” factor into account, Biblical accounts (if taken seriously) show a God who is capable of physically intervening in the events of this world. Assuming that this capability was not in some way time-limited (and that we’re now past the expiration date), we’re left wondering why God doesn’t take any of the possible seemingly small steps to erase some of the evil/suffering that shows no purpose vis-a-vis “spiritual progress”.
I think CEF hits the nail on the head when he writes: “I think to maintain a belief in God, one has to believe that God is doing all He can. What is the point of believing in an impotent God?”
Rich: “In order for us to come here and acquire a body, a four-dimensional universe had to be created.” But if there was no time, no change, then nothing could be done (for that would require change) and in particular nothing could be created. How things change here may well be different to how they change in Heaven, but there must be some similarities, e.g. the past that we experienced in the past could not now change so that it did not exist so that we did not experience it. One difference could be that God could experience as finite a temporal interval so long that it would stretch beyond any finite time that we could imagine.
Michael: I would modify CEF’s statement. One has to believe that God is doing all that he can within the constraints of his purposes for us. God could literally stop every murder that occurs. However, if he has committed to honor free will, then stopping such murders may conflict with his purposes though within his powers.
Clark: Are you saying that a soul-building theodicy is far from adequate as Michael asserts? I read you differently to say that you think it goes a long ways to explain God’s non-culpability for evil.
Of course these notions must be augmented by what is entailed in a soul-building theodicy such as a natural law theodicy and essentially free self-existing selves that are forever learning and growing. Evil in this world looks much different from that perspective.
However, in the end I think that we must all say that God has purposes and it is beyond our ken to judge whether the evils that actually occur are justified in light of all of these factors known to God but not to us..
I always challenge those who propose that evil is evidence that God doesn’t exist to put their argument in premise form so that we can focus on the crucial issues. I suspect that once that is done, the issue comes down to whether we should expect to be able to judge the kinds of “all things considered” judgments that God must make in fashioning and working with the world.
Michael I’d agree that we don’t have a solution but I think we’re closer than you suggest if (1) there is a broad notion of a test that requires suffering, (2) a test that requires divine hiddenness to work (i.e. limited intervention), and (3) the recognition of suffering as having a temporal aspect that changes. (i.e. making suffering not as significant as it appears now)
The remaining problem is more a “best of all possible worlds” requirement that asks whether there are different paths that could reach the same results with less suffering.
Blake, I think a soul-building theodicy is incomplete. (I’m not alone in this, as I recall Dennis Potter made a similar point at the SMPT conference)
Evil looks different in such a scenario but it simply doesn’t explain away enough suffering.
The epistemological point is fair. However I think that to someone earnestly curious the amount of suffering is probably the biggest logical reason to reject theism. So I think you discount it too much, partially (it appears) by making a burden of proof move. I don’t think that works in this case. I don’t think we need be able to judge all the things God does. I think we have to reach a stage where it is plausible that God had a reason. The LDS notion of test gets one part way there but insufficiently close.
Given that most people seem able to be tested without experiencing earthquakes, plagues, volcanoes and so forth I think one has to provide a plausible reason why these common but insufficiently common experiences are necessary for testing. Interestingly your position of agent libertarianism actually makes the typical moves Mormons make to explain those less possible. That’s because the common lay LDS move is to say that God foreknows who will experience such matters and in a quasi-molinistic way he uses his foreknowledge of possibilities to put everyone exactly in a situation where they get the individual level of experience they need. (i.e. the claim that those experiencing plagues, earthquakes and so forth need it) For the record I don’t find that move plausible, although perhaps some elements could be rescued from it.
Clark: I agree that we’re left with a “best of all possible worlds”-type problem, and I’d argue that it is difficult (perhaps impossible) to reconcile this world with that notion, especially if you posit a non-Deist God who has (in recorded history) intervened in earthly affairs.
Michael: I can’t see any way that Mormonism would be left with a best of all possible worlds problem. The best world given the constraints of uncreated realities and free will and the requirements for growth within God’s purposes for us may be far different than the best conceivable possible world — and that even if God is active in every moment in this world.
Enigman, “One difference could be that God could experience as finite a temporal interval so long that it would stretch beyond any finite time that we could imagine.”
But that’s the problem. The scriptures say that God is not bound by temporal time. Our time is not His “time”. If we were Celestial beings we could understand God’s “time” or Celestial “time”. But we are not. All we can comprehend is temporal time. The scriptures confirm that we cannot project temporal time onto God.
Rich
But it doesn’t say time is general temporality. There are numerous other readings. The obvious ones just note how time was used by the Hebrews. I’m in SF trying to type on an iPhone so I can’t look it up right now. But there is a standard text on the issue. Reading it as implying a greek philosophical absolutist conception of time is acontextual. Not to mention hard to reconcile with lds thought even ignoring early Utah theology. Even if one moves towards absolutist conceptions one need only invoke the notion of a multiverse which is ubiquitous in contemporary physical theory to see you claims don’t follow logically.
Blake: My ignorance of Mormon theology is almost limitless. That being said, it’s precisely this notion of “God’s purposes” that seems to me to be at stake here. If I can conceive of a (slightly changed) world containing less evil/suffering, it follows necessarily that either a) God lacks the power to bring about said change, or b) God chooses not to, for reasons unknown. If the case is a), we’re left with a fairly impotent God– at the very least, a God incapable of performing the types of miracles described in various scriptures. If the case is b), we’ve got a more serious problem. After subtracting the usual suspects (free will, spiritual progress, etc.) we’re still left with a class of evils/unnecessary suffering that cannot be explained or reconciled with a benevolent God.
Michael: How do you know that we still have a lot of unnecessary evil? It seems to me that you have to know what God’s purposes are and how they relate to all things considered in the physical world to accomplish them. I’ll bet that neither you nor I know or have a grasp of any such thing. I agree that there is unexplained suffering; but that is a lot different than unnecessary suffering. And unnecessary for what? Unnecessary for God’s purposes? You just don’t know that — and no one that I know does.
Blake, that sounds suspiciously like a dressed up burden of proof argument.
Clark, it is just an accurate reflection of our epistemic position. To miss that is to miss a lot about the problem of evil — and the discussion of the inductive argument for the last 20 years.
“If I can conceive of a (slightly changed) world containing less evil/suffering, it follows necessarily that either a) God lacks the power to bring about said change, or b) God chooses not to, for reasons unknown. If the case is a), we’re left with a fairly impotent God– at the very least, a God incapable of performing the types of miracles described in various scriptures.”
Some additional thoughts in agreement with Blake’s observation . . .
We can conceive of infeasible, incomplete and inconsistent systems because nothing forces our exercise in conception to bound itself to the feasible, complete and consistent. While modeling and simulating possible worlds in our minds, we should remember our limitations. A single limitation to the power of an otherwise powerful God may, when comprehended at the level of intelligence of that God, be sufficient to justify all the evil we now observe. The cascading effects of more frequent intervention in human affairs may increase overall risk to our system.
Consider, as a low magnitude example, the relation between the community of persons that engage in Internet communication and a community of persons living primitively in the heart of the Amazon rain forest. The Internet persons could perform miracles in the eyes of the Amazon persons (and perhaps vice-versa), yet the consensus morality of the Internet persons leads them to refrain from interfering much in the affairs of the Amazon persons (and perhaps vice-versa). It seems that this behavior arises from the various features (since limitations from one perspective are empowerments from another) of the communities, including how each imagines its features relate to those of the other, even if mistaken.
Sorry, Lincoln and Blake– I’m with Clark on this one. The suffering/evil is self-evident. Where’s the evidence for the satisfactory explanation/justification, except wishful thinking?
Blake, the epistemic condition though varies among groups. Thus the burden of proof issue.
To merely reply to someone who sees suffering with no plausible answer that it’s up to them seems wrong somehow. I’m not saying that it logically follows that you have no reason to believe. Just that it seems undeniable that the problem of evil is a real problem for some people. (Indeed I’d say it is the problem most people who aren’t believers have with God) Being able to provide a plausible answer is, I think, pretty important.
Clark and Michael: First, the argument from evil can have various approaches. One is to use it as an argument that God doesn’t exist. If that is the use, then the one asserting the argument has an obligation to come up with some valid deductive or inductive or abductive argument showing that God’s existence is incompatible with the existence of evil. You have not come close to doing that.
One could approach it as a theist with befuddlement at why God allows the kinds and magnitude of evil that he does.
I grant that suffering and evil are self-evident. What is not self-evident is that we are in an epistemic position to grasp God’s purposes and reasons for allowing evil — if he has them. I don’t have to provide a theodicy or satisfactory explanation when you just generally observe that evil exists. You have to show that such evil counts against God’s existence. Where’s your argument for that? Merely by observing that God may have reasons which are beyond our ken for allowing evils dispels the logical argument. It also places the burden squarely on the shoulders of the one who asserts that we have such epistemic status to make all things considered judgments to show how what we know is inconsistent with God’s existence — since the mere fact of evil ain’t.
Michael, if your assertion is that there isn’t a justifiable response that is acceptable to everyone, I agree. But then maybe I’m more easily satisfied than you. But whose to say that your standard of being justified is the one I have to adopt? I believe that I can demonstrate within the Mormon world-view that evils don’t prima facie count against God’s existence. I can also tell a story that places the evils we experience into a context that justifies them. However, I don’t pretend to know God’s actual reasons and anyone who asks for such a thing is simply asking for what no human can be reasonably expected to provide.
Blake, certainly the problem of evil can so be used. (Atheists sometimes use it like this) And as such the appeal to ignorance certainly is useful. But I am more thinking of whether it is a “live problem” to most people.
But it doesn’t say time is general temporality. There are numerous other readings. The obvious ones just note how time was used by the Hebrews. I’m in SF trying to type on an iPhone so I can’t look it up right now. But there is a standard text on the issue. Reading it as implying a greek philosophical absolutist conception of time is acontextual. Not to mention hard to reconcile with lds thought even ignoring early Utah theology. Even if one moves towards absolutist conceptions one need only invoke the notion of a multiverse which is ubiquitous in contemporary physical theory to see you claims don’t follow logically.
I did run across “The Hebrew Concept of Time” by Ronnie Littlejohn. Is that the text you had in mind? It was interesting. In your response, you used the term ‘absolutist’. I’m not sure how you are using this term. The term Littlejohn uses is ‘abstract’. So that is the term I’ll use.
Alma wrote “without beginning of days or end of years, being prepared from eternity to all eternity.” ‘Beginning of Days or End of Years’ would seem to reflect the Hebrew sense of time being tied to events: birth and death. However, Littlejohn points out the Hebrews do not have a term for eternity. Indeed, I did a word search in LDS scriptures and while I found a number of references in BofM, D&C, and NT I found nothing in the OT. Since all three scriptures were meant to come forth in our time with our concept of general temporality, I don’t believe a Hebrew reading of these texts would be appropriate model by which to understand these scriptures.
”. Not to mention hard to reconcile with lds thought.”
Well, I’m not exactly a neophyte with regards to LDS thought. And I don’t see the problem. While matter is uncreated, I don’t know of any writing that states time is uncreated.
”Even if one moves towards absolutist [abstract?] conceptions one need only invoke the notion of a multiverse.”
Is there a multiverse theory in which the greater rules the lesser as Abraham wrote? If not, then I see no problem with my logic.
Rich
Rich I’m typing on an iPhone and have had zero free time here so I can make only a fe comments. The Hebrew for Eternal is ‘olam which Joseph often transliterated following his Hebrew teacher as gnolaum. It is often translated as age. The distinction of that from more Greek conceptions being my point.
Could it be spelled differently? I’m coming up zero with ‘olam.
Rich
Clark, ”The distinction of that from more Greek conceptions being my point.”
But notice Clark, the BofM, D&C and the book of Abraham were meant to be brought forth in a period in which the Greek paradigm of time was predominant. They were not brought forth to be understood by the Hebrews. Therefore, I think it best to understand these scriptures in terms of our understanding of time and not the Hebrew understanding of time.
Rich
Has anyone here been watching the series “Heroes” on TV? I spent some of the long weekend watching the second season. I saw most of if during the last season, but missed some, so I just watched all of it and even went back to watch some of the first season.
It is obvious that the main theme is the battle of good against evil, but I did not think to frame it in a context of theodicy until this discussion. It is a fascinating take on that theme. I think the writers are trying to explore some of the same questions we have here, and IMO are doing a decent job.
For instance, the character played by Richard Roundtree says to Peter shortly before he (Roundtree) dies, something like, “the only thing that really matters is love.”
You see people doing extraordinary things because of love. I am curious, is there a more motivating force in this world than love? Do all religions have love defeating evil in the end, or is it just Christianity?
I am not sure what any of this has to do with the discussion, but thought I would ask
No, that’s one of the main transliterations Rich. So for example chayei olam is the Hebrew for eternal life. I don’t have LittleJohn handy but as I recall his point was more that there wasn’t in the original Hebrew a word for the Greek (primarily Platonic) sense of Eternal. Once you have Hellenized Judaism that changes and especially in the mystic tradition olam comes to have that connotation. But in early Judaism and much of the Talmudic tradition it simply doesn’t have that sense.
It is interesting that what we have in D&C 19 which we often talk about actually does line up in many ways with the Hebrew use. I admit I often bring that text up as an example of scripture having unexpected senses. But that’s more in the 19th century setting. In an early Judaic setting it’s much less “surprising.”
While it is true that our scriptures come forth in a period when Greek thought dominates I also think you can see a lot, if not most, of Joseph’s restoration as reversing this movement. Thus we move from Greek absolutist conceptions of God into a finitist conception much more in keeping with early Judaism. Blake’s book, which I unfortunately had no time to write about while in San Francisco, does a nice job discussing this - the best of the texts he references on the subject in Levenson’s Creation and the Persistence of Evil. It also interestingly ties these earlier Judaic senses of God and creation to the problem of evil and the issue of a theodicy. So it is tied to the topic at hand.
Anyway, I’d do a google as there are a lot of discussions of the term in various contexts. (Not all that well done, I should caution)
I will say this may make a good future post though. (Assuming I have time any time soon - it’s going to be a very busy week and I was hoping to spend last week writing ahead and instead wrote nothing.)
CEF, I confess that while I can see love offering a motivation to solving evil I’m not sure how it would resolve evil.
No. I do not see love resolving evil either. But I do see it over coming evil in the end. As in John 3:16.
I think I have come to see this as more of a discussion of free will. If we are not free in making our own decisions, then I do not see how we can be accountable for anything we do. Hence, no evil. At least man made evil. I think to ascribe evil to God defeats the concept of what God is suppose to be. Natural disasters are just that, something caused by nature, or the natural state of things. Could God create a world in which such things do not occur without showing his hand? I must believe if He could, He would have done so here.
Could God have done a better job of some things? From my minuscule perspective, I can think of one particular instance of something I think, as an older man with an enlarged prostate, that God could have designed differently. :)
I read your post about how we can be responsible without free will, but I guess I just did not understand it.
I confess I don’t ultimately see this issue as one of free will. Free will defenses will only get you so far. The biggest issue is that of natural evils.
To claim, as you do, that God couldn’t have created a world in which there weren’t fewer earthquakes, fewer pests, or so forth just seems implausible on its face. If God is that limited then he is so limited that it seems hard to call him God. Surely at a minimum God could have done the equivalent of our anti-malaria programs and so forth. If God is weaker than even our civilization and our technology then that’s a pretty compelling case for atheism.
Clark - I think atheism would be a reasonable position to take if one discounts faith. As I said earlier, there seems to be enough evidence for something divine at work in the universe, if one wants to see it. Of course not enough evidence if one wants to discount it or ascribe it to something else. I am not sure how it could be otherwise and we live by faith. For that reason, I do not think we will ever have more evidence than we already have to support the BOM.
Your minimum requirements seem very much like your bald man paradox. I like exaggerations to make a point, so here is one: Lets say that God has designed this world so that only one thousand bad things happen per month throughout the whole earth. I would think that would be a whole lot better than what we have today.
Now lets say that one of those bad things happens to your wife. How is the world any less evil for you in this case? Making it one bad thing per month does not change anything if that one thing happens to your wife/daughter/son/mother/father…
It could be argued if God allows any bad/evil that He could do better.
I ask this question because I do not know the answer. Is it possible to be good if we are not faced with evil?
I think that atheism would be a reasonable position independent of evidence through revelation or the like. I’m not sure faith is relevant to the question at hand though. I don’t think one can say that one has faith God is weak. One can say given one knows of God’s existence and certain characteristics that one has faith in what he says. But the question at hand here is working between what he has said and what he has given.
While I think it could be argued that if God allows any bad he could do better I don’t think a persuasive case could be made along those lines. The more disturbing case is when there are significant evils that it seems quite reasonable to believe God could easily solve. That is the problem I look to. As I said in the above I think one can make a lot of headway towards solving that problem. I don’t think we’ve solved it yet. I do think we’re close enough to a solution to plausibly believe there is a solution.
Hello, I think that I might be of some help here, so far as the problem of evil goes. It’s funny as I have recently wrote about this subject elsewhere. . . Here goes:
So God is holy, perfect, without blemish, and He is totally in control of all things. The bible teaches that He created everything and that nothing transpires without His ordination; that is, He ultimately allows all things to come to pass. We must first recognize that God Himself did not create evil, but the potential for evil. This may seem like a fine line, but it isn’t. It is the same line that separates the Creator from the created. Just as He created angels with the ability to choose good or evil, He gave us this choice in the person of Adam, mankind’s representitive. We are by definition volitional beings who make choices constantly. Unfortunately Adam’s choice to sin created in us a curse, which is the sin nature we all bear.
God uses evil for good. For instance, look at the story of Joseph and his brothers: Joseph’s father loved him, gave him a multicolored coat, his brothers sold him into slavery, but ultimately Joseph became the second in charge in Egypt, during the famine his brothers came to Egypt to buy food, and Joseph revealed himself as their brother, Joseph forgave his brothers immediately even though he could have had them killed. Do you remember what Joseph said to his brothers? “What you meant for evil God meant for good.” God used the sin of Joseph’s brothers to eventually save Joseph’s family from famine. There are countless circumstances in life that we can look back and see God using evil to complete His good purpose. He always does this without ever condoning it, after all He is perfect.
So why does God allow evil to exist? Well look at it this way: Those who have given their life to Christ, have repented of their sin, and have openly confessed to follow Him, have been saved. Jesus says that “I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life, no one can get to the Father but by me.” These individuals, called Christians, have been given eternal life, free from the penalty of God’s just wrath; the penalty that all people deserve. Christians will experience the grace and mercy of God in its fullness in heaven. To understand this, let me pose to you a metaphor:
Lets say you were driving at 100mph on the highway. There are no speed limit signs anywhere and no one has ever given you any inclination that going over 65 mph is illegal. Would you understand that what you were doing is wrong? Now look at the law of God, the ten commandments. If we didn’t have the ten commandments would we know that idolatry is wrong? Probably not. In the same way, Christians, the true believers, would not be able to appreciate the extent of God’s grace and mercy if they were not intimately acquainted with the reality of evil. We live through it daily, the suffering, anguish, and pain are the converse of the grace, peace, and infinite love that God has for people. God has chosen to demonstrate His grace on this earth through the reality of evil. God chose to allow His son to be killed, and not only that, but while on the cross, God poured out His wrath on Him, the wrath that belonged to Christians. The Romans crucified Him, the Jews called for His blood, the people cheered, but what man meant for evil, God meant for good.
The problem with that is the question of whether the level of evil is necessary for the purpose of turning to God. It seems implausible that he did. So that explains some evil but not all evil.
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Could we expound on Mormon thought and say that God allows us to experience evil (does not completely shelter us) because he wants us to have his experience? The phrase “not tempted more than we can bear” suggests that God limits our exposure to evil to some degree. God could (perhaps) shelter us more from evil, but who shelters God? And who will shelter us when we are gods?