Philosophical Event-Horizons

Posted on August 26, 2008
Filed Under Philosophy |

Interesting post at GFP. The post is actually about incompatibilism. But the intro discussed Quine and the notion of an ‘event-horizon’ such that some major philosophical figure’s ideas immerse a culture so much that reading him becomes almost pointless. I want to go off on a bit of a tangent on this idea of event-horizons in philosophy. But let me start by quoting the relevant paragraph from the post.

Something like the literature event-horizon effect was well in effect with much of Quine’s work when I was entering graduate school. Our professors tended to assume everyone had read Quine’s most famous papers and perhaps some of his lesser ones, that we knew about their importance, and that we appreciated why each was an achievement in its context, and so on. In contrast, many of us then-graduate students had read very little of Quine or the debates of the 1950s. We tended to have absorbed many of the basic lessons and the surviving Quinean legacy as part of the general philosophical background radiation with almost no explicit instruction. When we did read Quine, it seemed so completely familiar as to be almost unremarkable or so obviously wrong in light of the subsequent literature so as to not require much attention. Now I’m exaggerating a bit, and of course there were students who did read a lot of Quine or had particularly interests that gave them a deeper appreciation for Quine, as well as professors who thought it was important to have us read lots of Quine. Quine isn’t really the point but just an example of how figures and positions tend to go from being widely shared and known to gradually less familiar over generations. So, if you will, just substitute whatever figure or issue you like that makes you nod your head in knowing agreement about the literature event-horizon effect.

So which philosophers have reached that event-horizon effect?

The first time I noticed this phenomena was when I had to read Francis Bacon is school. Everything seemed so ‘obvious’ that I wondered what the point was. As Manuel Vargas said either everything was unremarkable or obviously wrong. Unless you are interested in the history of ideas the thinker himself isn’t that significant.

Who else is there? I think Descartes’ main ideas used to fit that role until the 20th century when there was a general reaction against him. (It started earlier but became dominant in the early 20th century)

I can’t think of too many figures whose ideas have become as dominant as Quine’s.

Comments

5 Responses to “Philosophical Event-Horizons”

Actually let me add that I think with Vargas that the Consequence Argument clearly does fit into this event-horizon. (Or if it doesn’t it’s pretty close to being there) People take it so much for granted that the period before it was brought out doesn’t make much sense.

Perhaps instead of talking about people we ought talk about positions or arguments.

These event horizons are backwards-looking. There are also forward-looking philosophical event horizons.

Like?

We only philosophize about that which our environmental, anatomical and communal contexts enable, and we can work to discern these limitations — like Kant contended to do. As our context changes over time, so does our ability to reason. As it is “almost pointless” to read historical ideas in which we’ve now become fully immersed, it would be similar to read far-future ideas (or ideas from minds far advanced beyond our own)in which we are not immersed. They would be almost meaningless or nonsensical to us.

I’m not sure I buy that. It seems to me that the limits are reasoning are pretty broad unless one buys into a strong version of Sapir-Worff, which few do.

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