The Infinitist Theory of Epistemic Justification
Posted on September 12, 2008
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“Foundationalism for Modest Infinitists” (HT: Certain Doubts) I’ve not really read modern epistemological papers on this. I need to since I suspect I am an infinitist. Peirce is an infinitist in his early work although some read his later work (especially on his categories) as offering significant revision. See Aikin’s “Prospects for Peircian Epistemic Infinitism” for example. One big issue in all this is whether the infinite regress problem is really a problem. I’ve discussed that here in the past and probably ought revisit it one of these days.
Related posts:
- A Problem for the Dialetheist
- Heidegger and Kuhn
- Bacteriophages
- Harman on Derrida’s Realism
- On Touching
- Subjective Questions
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