Intentionality and Potentiality

Posted on September 29, 2008
Filed Under Davidson, Derrida, Philosophy |

Maverick Philosopher on Intentionality and Potentiality.

“Reference to an object is thus an intrinsic feature of mental states and not a feature they have in virtue of a relation to an existing object. This is why Brentano speaks of the ‘intentional in-existence of an object.’ It is also why Husserl can ‘bracket’ the existence of the object for phenomenological purposes. Intentionality is not a relation, strictly speaking, though it is relation-like.”

The issue of what is or isn’t a relation is important. Which entails obviously the question of what a relation is. This issue obviously pops up in Davidson’s externalism. I think it ends up being key in some of the post-Husserlian phenomenologists like Derrida as well where the relationship between the actual and the possible is complex.

One problem is that what some will call a relation others won’t. Consider for instance a sign and the relation to its object and its interpretant. Are those really relations or are they something else? While that seems like a profound issue I tend to think it’s more a terminological one that sometimes comes off as a profound philosophical issue if you aren’t careful.

Potentials exist in a similar fashion. One thing one has to quickly ask is the ontology of potential which gets into the question of “what is a thing” and various temporal issues. Once again I think this can be made to appear more mysterious than it actually is. So long as one is clear on ones terminology I think problems can be avoided. However different traditions in philosophy won’t necessarily make the same assumptions.

As Dr. Vallicella suggests, some traditions may even equate intentionality and potentiality. That is intentionality is understood as future potential acts.

(Edit: moved from sidebar to main because it was too long and I expanded it a bit while I was at it.)

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