Tradition: Between Acting and Reality

Posted on October 13, 2008
Filed Under Philosophy, Politics |

There was a great post over at Postmodern Conservative. The author, Helen Rittelmeyer, was trying to explain her kind of conservativism which is much more akin to traditional conservativism. (i.e. don’t throw out tradition without good cause) as opposed to the more “activist” conservatism that I think characterized the Reagan era. (Although traditional conservatism was always a part of Reagan) Her comments remind me of a Derrida quote I have in my quote file that pops up in the upper right every now and then.

To pretend, I actually do the thing: I have therefore only pretended to pretend.

Now her point isn’t quite the same but it capture that sense of living in a middle ground. Her focus is that common analogy: acting in the sense of performative speech acts. (If you’ve read Searle you’ll know what I mean - if not then just ignore my introduction)

What does it mean to submit to authority in a world where the legitimacy of that authority has been undermined? Doesn’t leave us with the two options of either playing the God card (”Uno!”) or admitting that, at the end of the day, we just playin’? I don’t like invoking the Almighty in situations like this, and for a long time I ran on the assumption that traditionalism is a kind of play-acting, but such satisfying play-acting that its underlying relativism doesn’t really matter. Then I came across this paragraph in Raymond Guess’s introduction to Nietzsche’s Birth of Tragedy:

One has failed to experience the tragedy if one sees only one’s friend and fellow actor up there on the stage parading around in an odd mask. One has also failed if one thinks that it really is Oedipus up there, that the blood dripping down from his eyes is real blood, etc.

A good play can change not just a man’s life but his identity, but only if he “believes” it in a very particular way. He can’t really believe it—if he does, he’ll rush onstage to try and stop Oedipus from blinding himself!—but neither can he keep in the front of his mind that it’s just his friend Jeff in an Oedipus mask. That’s the kind of belief I have in my traditions, especially those that can’t be traced back to divine revelation.

I think the kind of conservatism Helen is going for is much like the Peircean sort. That is tradition has, in a certain way, been tested through human experience. When you consider how many humans have been involved in the test that gives it a considerable amount of weight.

Now while Peirce was a conservative of the late 19th century variety he also felt strongly that one should inquire. That is one shouldn’t merely accept tradition. One should investigate it to see if one should discard it. I think what happens all too often is that a superficial investigation of tradition finds some problems and then the baby is thrown out with the bathwater. (Witness the counter-culture movement of the 60’s and 70’s) We have to take a critical stance to tradition yet recognize tradition occupies a middle ground between “reality” and “fiction.” Those who uncritically treat it as one or the other are going to end up causing more problems than they solve.

Comments

5 Responses to “Tradition: Between Acting and Reality”

A few more Peirce quotes all tied to his form of conservatism which was tied to his philosophical fallibilism. Remember these were largely written at the end of the 19th century. So they both anticipate a certain skepticism more common in the 20th century. While he is attacking rationalism note that he’s not doing so uncritically. Rather he’s attacking a sort of non-reflective and uncritical rationalism that remains far too common to this day. (Especially among college students who sometimes have discovered the critical stance towards their own traditions without simultaneously discovering a critical stance towards their critical stance)

The mental qualities we most admire in all human beings except our several selves are the maiden’s delicacy, the mother’s devotion, manly courage, and other inheritances that have come to us from the biped who did not yet speak; while the characters that are most contemptible take their origin in reasoning. The very fact that everybody so ridiculously overrates his own reasoning is sufficient to show how superficial the faculty is. . .

It is the instincts, the sentiments, that make the substance of the soul. Cognition is only its surface, its locus of contact with what is external to it.

Reasoning is of three kinds. The first is necessary,. . . The second depends upon probabilities. . . The third kind of reasoning tries what il lume naturale, which lit the footsteps of Galileo, can do. It is really an appeal to instinct. Thus reason, for all the frills it customarily wears, in vital crises, comes down upon its marrow-bones to beg the succour of instinct.

Reason is of its very essence egotistical. . . . Men many times fancy that they act from reason when, in point of fact, the reasons they attribute to themselves are nothing but excuses which unconscious instinct invents to satisfy the teasing “whys” of the ego. The extent of this self-delusion is such as to render philosophical rationalism a farce.

Reason, then, appeals to sentiment in the last resort. Sentiment on its side feels itself to be the man. That is my simple apology for philosophical sentimentalism.

Sentimentalism implies conservatism; and it is of the essence of conservatism to refuse to push any practical principle to its extreme limits — including the principle of conservatism itself.

All these quotes are from his Cambridge Lectures printed in Reasoning and the Logic of Things pages 110-111.

Some might note that the above seems quite opposed to my great skepticism in intuitions especially in philosophical argument. I confess that I find Peirce’s conservatism quite different from my own. (Which I perceive to be more Reaganistic) However even in Peirce one can find an explanation. Without spending too much time on it though I think the following captures well my answer. This is from the same lectures.

I would not allow to sentiment or instinct any weight whatsoever in theoretical matters, not the slightest. Right sentiment does not demand any such weight; and right reason would emphatically repudiate the claim, if it were made. [ . . . ] We believe the proposition we are ready to act upon. Full belief is willingness to act upon the proposition in vital crises, opinion is willingness to act upon it in relatively insignificant affairs. But pure science has nothing at all to do with action. . . . Nothing is vital for science; nothing can be. Its accepted propositions therefore are but opinions, at most; and the whole list is provisional. The scientific man is not the least wedded to his conclusions. He risks nothing upon them.

[ . . . ]

Thus, pure theoretical knowledge, or science, has nothing directly to say concerning practical matters, and nothing even applicable at all to vital crises. Theory is applicable to minor practical affairs; but matters of vital importance must be left to sentiment, that is, to instinct.

Now I think Peirce goes too far with regards to science (or at least offers an ideal version that we never approach in our scientific communities). There’s also the issue of concern relative to scientific areas like global warming.

2 Helen Rittelmeyer on October 13th, 2008 11:55 am

Oh, my. This batch of Peirce quotations is an absolute treasure.

3 Rich Knapton on October 17th, 2008 11:20 am

Something has been nagging me about this topic. If I understand the issue, I think it is the idea that tradition has value because it has been around along time and therefore has mastered the test of time. How do we know that tradition was tested at all? Perhaps it has existed as an unreflective idea. The ‘test of time’ argument seems shallow to me. I think one accepts tradition because it is functional in today’s society. Those traditions which are no longer functional should be jettisoned. I consider myself a conservative who accepts tradition because it has weathered the test of time and because it still has function in today’s society.

And perhaps this is what you meant when you wrote: ”One should investigate it to see if one should discard it.” Investigate meaning question it’s current functionality (I’m not much for questioning it’s truth value so the issue of reality or fiction is a non-issue for me). I find nothing wrong with uncritically accepting tradition under the aphorism of “If it ain’t broke don’t fix it.” On the other hand, if there are indications that it may be broke, we must certainly be willing to question it.

Rich

I think you see tradition as testable if it is the sort of thing that societies are acting upon. Whether something is an unreflective idea or not seems somewhat easy to see. One need only look to see if there are practical effects on society. This doesn’t guarantee something is unreflective. Consider sexual mores for instance. But I think it does provide prima facie reasons for thinking the burden of proof is on those seeking to change the status quo.

5 jessica freeman on October 30th, 2008 1:55 pm

Hello

I really enjoyed reading your blog..Let me start by saying that I am an acting nut. What that means is that for the past 5 years I have tried to figure out the best way to do this thing. I have done Method classes, a two year Meisner Program and I always check out blogs like this one for more information.

What I got from all of these people was how to act like them. It wasn’t until I got to http://www.theactingcorps.com that they told me we’re going to teach you stuff, and you’ll do it every day, a lot, but in the end it’s you up there, and you have to like what you’re doing, you can’ t be worried about making your teacher happy. These people actually taught me to enjoy acting again through a technique that seems to take the best and most effective elements from a lot of the stuff I know. Anyways I look forward to all the updates. Thanks again.

Jessica

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