Davidson on Irreducible Concepts

Posted on November 8, 2008
Filed Under Davidson, Philosophy |

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A concept is irreducible only relative to specified resources. When it comes to the large, grand concepts that concern philosophers, like the good, truth, belief, knowledge, physical object, cause and event, I think of a concept as irreducible if it cannot be defined in terms that are as general as the concept to be reduced, at least as clear, and that do not leap in a circle. With respect to the concepts I have listed, I think the search for such a definition or analysis is doomed. (Davidson, “The Irreducibility of the Concept of the Self” in Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective)

This seems quite right and avoids some of the “spooky nature” that sometimes gets applied to irreducible concepts. (Or to the very act of reduction - such as we find with the neoPlatonists)

The main place to attack Davidson, although I’m not sure I want to, is over the circular definition. It reminds me of a paper in my Philosophical Writing class back in the day. I had a paper on the early Socratic dialogs and my frustration that Socrates never really seemed to get anywhere but just went in circles. My prof, while giving me an excellent grade, also wrote a note that circles are fine if they are big enough. Now the topic there was epistemology but I think there’s some truth to this.

I ought write a post some day.

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