Davidson & Rational Animals

Posted on December 4, 2008
Filed Under Davidson, Derrida, Philosophy | Leave a Comment

155360A7-ACE3-4727-9939-43249308587D.jpgGetting back to my Davidson readings in Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, I found the paper “Rational Animals” rather interesting. This is the old idea that what separates man from the animals is reason. Now some, especially animal rights activists, don’t like this idea. While I agree that it’s likely there is a matter of degree in this it is also clear we’re the only ones with proper language. (Which as Davidson notes does not entail we don’t have an ethical responsibility towards animals)

What I found most interesting was the following argument.

1. To have a belief one must have the concept of belief.

2. To have a concept of belief one must have language.

Both those seem controversial or at least deal upon equivocation. Davidson has to suggest that while it appears that my dog believes there is water in the bowl to drink when he walks over to drink that he doesn’t. This just seems implausible to me.

I think, not entirely contra Davidson, that there is an equivocation here. Lets say there are two senses of belief. One is a belief as a belief. That is as a propositional attitude. The other is a belief in terms of certain behaviors. What Davidson wants to do is say that one key behavior of a belief is being able to relate the belief. If you can’t do that then it’s not a belief.

Now this is, in a certain sense, a very Peircean approach. I’m still deciding if I like the idea that we should only use belief in this sense. i.e. the meaning of belief is wrapped up in how we verify someone has a belief and part of that is the property of saying we have the belief. But why is that linguistic act so important for verification? I don’t see Davidson providing a compelling argument for that. That is I just don’t see why (1) is important.

Related posts:

  1. Davidson: Private Language
  2. Davidson: Knowing Ones Own Mind 2
  3. Davidson on Weakness of Will
  4. Davidson: The Myth of the Subjective 2
  5. Davidson: What Is Present to the Mind
  6. Davidson, Gadamer and Derrida

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