Responsibility & Open Theism
Posted on May 26, 2009
Filed Under Philosophy, Religion | 21 Comments
I’m obviously just not finding the time to write (or read) the way I would like. So my apologies. I think that rather than attempting to write “big” posts I’ll just do some more thoughtful questioning the next few weeks. So take these as they are. More the raising of questions than summarizing a position.
First up is a question that came to me as I read an LDS-Herm discussion. (I’ve been too busy to contribute much there either) Someone noted that responsibility for many Continental styled thinkers isn’t thought in terms of an autonomous and independent agent to whom we attribute blame or praise. That’s the way we’ve tended to think about responsibility ever since the Enlightenment. However the Continental approach is closer to the call of a demand.
The idea is that we can be responsible for things that a more traditional Enlightenment thinker wouldn’t see us as responsible for. The classic example is the Good Samaritan who has a responsibility to the people he passes. If we accept that there is a call and duty independent of choice and that this is actually the conditions that make choice possible then a lot follows. For instance it is in responsibility that a self arises. Contrast this to the more Enlightenment view where it is out of a self that responsibility arises.
Without discussing this inversion let me note that it does relate to Open Theism and its proponents. (See a Mormon proponent view here for instance) The main defense of Open Theism (ignoring textual issues for now) is that responsibility can only occur if there is a robustly free self which entails Libertarian Free Will which entails an ontologically open future. (i.e. there are no future facts of the matter) If one takes this inversion where responsibility can arise with respect to things out of my control then the Open Theistic argument is seriously weakened.
Related posts:
- Responsibility & Foreknowledge
- Mormonism and Open Theism
- Block Universes, Free Will, and Alternative Possibilities
- Responsibility, God and Alternative Possibilities
- Heidegger vs. Levinas
- Responsibility, Ignorance and our Duty
Comments
Interesting site, but much advertisments on him. Shall read as subscription, rss.
Clark: If we accept that there is a call and duty independent of choice and that this is actually the conditions that make choice possible then a lot follows.
I think you are making a category error here. The Samaritan would still need an open future and LFW to be morally responsible for the way he reacted to the scenario/stimulus he encountered. Without LFW he might have still helped the injured traveler but he would not have been able to choose otherwise. So even if we agree that “it is in responsibility that a self arises”, if that self does not have LFW that self is not morally responsible for its actions.
Perhaps we are thinking too linearly. If, as I have been taught, time does not exist with God (it is a terrestrial event), what we consider as an open future may be seen by Him as our past. That He knows what we have done does not impact our open future.
Rich
Clark: I just don’t see how the view that moral responsibility arises in the interpersonal call of the other somehow negates the requirement that ought implies can. I happen to hold both views that you see as somehow inconsistent. If I could be called by the other, but I don’t have it within my capacity to respond to the call, are you saying that I am responsible for not responding? Could a call even arise from the other where I am incapable of responding in any way?
It seems to me that the real call is to see and get that our capacities to respond to the other are much broader and real than we are willing to admit to ourselves.
Geoff, while it might be wrong I don’t think that’s the same as a category mistake. I confess I don’t see what you mean there. Alternatively you’re simply assuming responsibility in terms of the will and critiquing the opposing view. But that’s not too helpful. The obvious rejoinder is that I can be responsible for others without being able to control what I hold responsible. So I can be responsible for my children’s welfare without being able to master their welfare. It is that conflict of will and mastery that is the divide as I see it. LFW is caught up in the Enlightenment project thinking metaphysically in terms of will and mastery.
Rich, I think most think time doesn’t exist for God simply as meaning he isn’t part of this probationary state. I don’t think it means physical time doesn’t ontologically exist for him. While some take it as such I see no justification for demanding that reading.
Blake, the problem is that responsibility isn’t an “ought.” Once again that is mistaking the call of responsibility for an act of mastery by the will. There are two senses of ethics. One is roughly a technological view in which the call of responsibility entails a determined set of acts. It is technological in a sense. However I don’t think that is how most Continental figures understand it. I think clearly Heidegger doesn’t understand it in that sort of Kantian way.
Can a call arise where I can’t respond to that other? Certainly. The Holocaust being the obvious example. The Holocaust still issues it’s call but there is nothing I can do for the people for whom that occurred. The demand sets up an existential change in me, but not the change that a will to power requires. Indeed it is quite the opposite. I am helpless within that call.
It is by limiting responsibility only to those cases where I have mastery that I think those adopting this position would see as a problem.
Responsibility always entails risk that demands that we don’t necessarily have mastery. It seems to me that what is central to this way of conceiving responsibility is the question of violence and not the metaphysical question of time. (Time conceived ontically)
Clark,
Blake said what I meant more clearly than I did. What I meant by category mistake was that you seem to be implying that the two positions you outlined are mutually exclusive but I agree with Blake that they are compatible with each other.
Think of it this way Geoff. I’m not saying they are incompatible. I’m saying the argumentative justification is lost once we give up a system that thinks in terms of mastery. That is the future must be open for LFW because the soveriegn self must have a certain mastery over the future.
It is not at all coincidental that the alternative approach tends to favor the middle voice for action.
Responsibility for LFW is a call of responsibility in terms of mastery and this violence – just that it is a violence for which one is praised or condemned. The Continental approach, to the degree I daresay I comprehend, is a responsibility that overwhelms my ability to respond.
I don’t think the idea that a self arises out of responsibility makes any more sense than “things happen” – it is essentially the assertion that the self is epiphenomenal to responsibility. Responsibility does this and responsibility does that, and it appears that there is an individual involved.
That’s quite insightful Mark and is the very approach that Continental philosophy often takes.
For Heidegger responsibility is wrapped up with his notion of “es gibt,” literally “there is” or “it gives.” This is the gift of the world to us of itself. This produces a demand for a response. But this gives us the opportunity to see ourselves as part of the world that is given. Responsibility is the demand of the gift – the demand for a response.
The same thing pops up in Derrida as “il y a” (in full il y a être or there “is” being)
For both Heidegger and Derrida this gift is the appropriating event. That is the appropriating of appropriation. (I had a post on this notion of Ereignis in Heidegger related to Grace but never posted it since I decided it was way too complex)
The point is that what we end up with is a subjectless process that produces responsibility. (Note that there are some differences between Heidegger and Derrida here but they are a bit subtle for the present discussion)
I think claiming that the self is epiphenomenal to responsibility is incorrect. Rather what givens the demand for a response (literally respons-ibility) also produces the self. So it isn’t epiphenomenal which is to think one kind of being (mind) in terms of an other kind of being (matter). Rather it is to think in terms of what is not a being.
Rich, I think most think time doesn’t exist for God simply as meaning he isn’t part of this probationary state. I don’t think it means physical time doesn’t ontologically exist for him. While some take it as such I see no justification for demanding that reading.
If material change is the definition of physical time, how do you reconcile that with statements from Moroni and Joseph Smith that God is unchangeable. That with Him there is “no variableness neither shadow of changing.”
Physical time seems to indicate a linear progression, change to change to change. Alma and Joseph Smith speak of eternity as being round not linear.
Rich
Unchanging need not imply anything about time. The speed of light is constant but there is still time.
Unchanging need not imply anything about time. The speed of light is constant but there is still time.
I don’t understand your response. Speed of light is a measurement. It measuring a rate of change (an electromagnetic wave moving from point A to point B). So I don’t see the relevance.
Are you saying God is a constant within the flow of physical time? That physical time is a reality for Him as well. It seems in order to say this one must say physical time is a metaphysical reality existing in pre and post big bang (or big bounce or whatever they are saying now). I’m not sure there is anything that justifies such an idea. More likely physical time is a component of the creation of our terrestrial universe. What then was the universe in which God lived prior to the creation of this universe. It is doubtful that is was a terrestrial universe because if it was there would be no need for the creation of this terrestrial universe. This implies that the laws governing this universe are very different than the ones governing our universe. Let’s call that a Celestial universe. We know there are certain differences in the laws between the two. For one thing, in the Celestial universe physical bodies cannot be created. That’s why God created this universe. It seems bodies can only be created in a Terrestrial universe. Also, there is no death in the Celestial universe that seems to imply there is no degradation leading to death. Here are at least two elements that differ between the two.
The scriptures are replete with statements that time as relates to man is very different as it relates to God. This is frequently followed with examples like ‘a day with God is like a thousand years with man’. I don’t think this is to be taken literally. I think it is simply a metaphor for big change. I think the instructive element is that God’s time is not man’s time (ie., is not terrestrial time). This seems to be confirmed when Celestial time (eternity) is likened to a circle, which I believe to be a metaphor for “non-linear”. I doubt a terrestrial being can adequately conceive of a Celestial state. This is probably as close as one can get to a description.
I read an interesting article on quantum mechanics in Scientific American (that’s about my level of understanding quantum mechanics). The article discussed entanglement and non-locality. That change occurs instantly even though the objects are not local. This seems to be an example of change without time. On of the ideas that has emerged is that our everyday experience of space and time is an emergent phenomena of configuration space. This idea of change without time runs directly opposed to the idea that time is a creation of change.
I’m not saying that the Celestial kingdom is located in configuration space and that our temporal universe is an emergent property of the Celestial kingdom. I’m saying that even physics is challenging our concept of time. I’m also saying that the idea that time is different with God, that past, present, future is all one for Him, is not an irrational idea. To insist that physical time is an ontological reality for God, given the indicators that this may not be the case, is a bit too ridged for me. The idea that the past, the present, and the future is all one with God and that he has seen what we have done with free will, and this accounts for his “foreknowledge” seems to be a valid option in the issue between LFW and God’s foreknowledge. You may not agree, and that’s fine, but I think it is a viable option and should be considered with the other options.
Rich
Yes, but to say God is unchanging can also be taken a description of a crude measurement of God. That is it need not be taken to say something about his temporality but merely a consistency in his interactions with humanity. And even that is probably more than one ought assume – I think it gets at his trustworthiness. Just as we can trust the speed of light we can trust God.
Most scriptures dealing with time and God just shouldn’t be read ontologically. Indeed I am of the opinion that one should never read ontology into the scriptures unless it’s crystal clear that is what is being talked about.
Entanglement is a very complex issue. And it is wrapped up with time. But one can’t say it takes place “without time.” I’d be willing to discuss that with you if you care. Rather it is saying that the two measurements are connected. It presupposes time. (The other interpretation is that there is backwards causality or a hidden variable that behaves in an odd fashion) One should be very careful about drawing out philosophical implications from Bell’s Theorem and entanglement.
Clark I don’t think you quite understand where I’m coming from. And that’s my fault. When discussing the philosophical ramifications of God’s foreknowledge and what impact that might have on free will, you seem to make certain assumptions about the nature of God that I think are unwarranted. You assume that physical time ontologically exists with Him. I don’t think we have the perspective by which to make such assertions. It’s like a two-dimensional being perceiving a three-dimensional object such as a dowel piercing it’s two-dimensional space. All that it will perceive is a round flat circle. It does not have the capacity to perceive three-dimensional space.
We’re in the same situation. All that we can perceive is our four-dimensional space/time. We do not have the capacity to understand Celestial “space” whatever that is. We do know that physical entities such as ourselves inhabit that “space”. God revealed himself to Joseph Smith. The only information we have about God and the Celestial kingdom is what he has revealed to us. Even there Celestial concept must be converted to Terrestrial concepts before we can have some idea what He is talking about. When He reveals that He is unchanging, it seems clear to me that he is saying that He is different from terrestrial beings. In other words, He is not like us. This does not reveal what He is other than He is not like us. When he says His ways are not our ways. This only tells us He is not like us. It doesn’t say what he is like. And so on, His sense of time is not our sense of time. But we don’t know what his sense of time is or even if there is a sense of time. When He says past, present and future are as one with him. To me it tells me that God does not share our time frame of past, present and future.
For me, I think this is enough to say that the way we perceive physical time is not shared by God. It doesn’t say anything ontological about God. Since this perception is different, all I can do is conjecture as to what a Being who sees past, present, and future as one might mean to the question of God’s foreknowledge. It seems pretty clear what we perceive as foreknowledge is not shared by God. Since God knows all from the beginning to the end, we can ask, “how does he know that?” Of course we cannot answer that definitively. But we can say what are the ramifications of past, present and future as one. I’m guessing of course but it seems logical that the decisions that we made in the past, and what we make in the present and what we will make in the future are all revealed to Him as an aspect of all being one. In other words, everything we have done, what we are doing now and what we will do in the future are all one to him. He has no foreknowledge, as we understand the word. He knows what we will do because he has “seen” what we will do as if it were the past rather than the future. This knowledge is knowledge of what we will do with free will. It is not knowledge of what we will do in the future because for him, the future has already happened. It is knowledge of what we have already done in the future. This knowledge has no influence on our free will because he has seen what we will do with free will. As such, it has no impact on the use of our free will.
Is this correct? Hell-if-I-know. However, it seems to be internally consistent based on the information revealed to us. As such should at least be considered when discussing the issue of Free Will and God’s Foreknowledge. However, this is your world and you can decide what will be considered and what won’t. Me, I’m just a fly spec on your website watching beings smarter than I; trying desperately to understand what they are saying.
As to discussing with you the intricacies of quantum mechanics, I would rather argue with you about chocolate. At least I would have a fighting chance. So I am not going to nay say anything you have to say about quantum mechanics. The issue I was reading was SA March 2009. Here is a quote:
Quantum-mechanical wave function cannot be represented mathematically in anything smaller than a mind-boggling high-dimensional space called a configuration space. If as some argue, wave functions need to be thought of as concrete, physical objects, then we need to take seriously the idea that the world’s history plays itself out not in three-dimensional space of our everyday experience or the four-dimensional space-time of special relativity, but rather this gigantic and unfamiliar configuration space, out of which the illusion of three-dimensionality somehow emerges. Our three-dimensional idea of localty would need to be understood as emergent. The nonlocality of quantum physics might be might be our window into this deeper level of reality.
What I read from this is there may be unknown processes in configuration space that allows instantaneous change between nonlocal particles. If this is correct, it seems to me that it violates the concept of physical time. In physical time change does not occur in time. Sequential change is time. I recognize that all this includes a whole lot of ‘ifs’ and ‘maybes’. If this line of inquiry is correct (and that’s a big if) then it seems that physicists may be challenging the very nature of time.
Then again, it may be something that I ate. By all means, if I have gotten this all screwed up, I would enjoy being show where I went wrong. Making errors is one of the best ways to knowledge.
Rich
you seem to make certain assumptions about the nature of God that I think are unwarranted. You assume that physical time ontologically exists with Him. I don’t think we have the perspective by which to make such assertions.
I think you’re missing my point. There’s nothing textual to argue that physical time ontologically exists with him and considerable reason to assume it does. (i.e. his interaction with us) If ontological time doesn’t exist with him then the resurrection isn’t really a resurrection since time is essential for embodiment.
I think what you want to say is that God can perceive the future and past the way we perceive the future in a fashion analogous to vision. But that’s a different issue from the nature of time. I think you are conflating the two.
Regarding physical time and QM I confess I’m not quite sure the point you are making. Could you clarify? I’m pretty familiar with most of the philosophical interpretations of QM so it might help if you refer to some of the major interpretations so I can see where you are coming from. I’m not sure what you mean by “instantaneous change” for instance. As I see it the simplest explanation for QM is that there’s simply a single Hamiltonian like evolution for the whole universe and what appears like “simultaneous change” (i.e. change of entangled particles) is just due to this wave equation’s evolution. i.e. it appears odd to us simply because we think in terms of Newtonian causality.
I think you’re missing my point. There’s nothing textual to argue that physical time ontologically exists with him and considerable reason to assume it does. (i.e. his interaction with us) If ontological time doesn’t exist with him then the resurrection isn’t really a resurrection since time is essential for embodiment.
It’s funny you should bring up the resurrection. I was sitting waiting for Sacrament meeting to begin when I looked up ‘time’ in my Bible concordance. It led me to Alma and his discussion of the resurrection. Alma 40:8 Now whether there is more than one time appointed for men to rise it mattereth not; for all do not die at once, and this mattereth not; all is as one day with God, and time only is measured unto men.
It would seem the sequencing of events (time), as we see them, is irrelevant to God. This sequencing of events, time, is only relevant to man not to God. As the actual changing from a terrestrial being to a resurrected being, this mornings Gospel Doctrine class may shed some light. We were reading D&C 101 (I think) where ii says during the millennium a man will die and be transformed to a resurrected being in the “twinkling of an eye.” I take that to mean instantaneously. This may also be the case when spiritual beings transform into resurrected beings.
The I came across a reference note in Alma referencing D&C 84:100 “the Lord hath redeemed his people; and Satan is bound and time is no more.” It seems to say that once God’s work is done and his people are redeemed Satan will be bound and physical time will cease.
I have no idea what time is for God but it seems that our time, physical time, is not God’s time. I think there are quite a few scriptures that indicate our time is not God’s time. All this leads me to believe that your assumption may not be correct.
Regarding physical time and QM I confess I’m not quite sure the point you are making. Could you clarify? I’m pretty familiar with most of the philosophical interpretations of QM so it might help if you refer to some of the major interpretations so I can see where you are coming from.
OK? But if it sounds like gobily gook, just remember you asked for it. I understand there is a problem between nonlocality and simultaneity of quantum mechanics and special relativity. Evidently Roderich Tumulka wrote an article in 2006. He suggested that empirical predictions could be made of entangled pairs of particles by a modification of GRW theory. The modification is nonlocal yet fully compatible with space/time of special relativity. There are some problems with this approach but it seems premising.
David Z Albert (one of the authors of the article) has shown that combining quantum mechanics and special relativity requires us to give up the idea that everything that we can say about the universe can be put into a narrative. Because of the way special relativity deals with space and time it transforms entanglements among distinct physical systems into something along the lines of an entanglement among physical situations at different times. This exceeds the sum of situations at distinct temporal times. The result involves the manipulation of wave function. The problem is on deciding what wave function is. However, wave function cannot be represented in anything smaller than configuration space. If wave function is a particle, then fourth-dimensional space/time seems to be an emergent illusion of configuration space. If universe cannot be put into a narrative, and if space/time is an illusion, what then is the nature of time? (Oh man do I have a headache.)
I hope that helps. I am already way beyond my limitations. But this does seem to question the nature of time itself.
Rich
Rich, please note that my point is that the scriptures just don’t speak on this in an unambiguous fashion. That is the passages dealing with time are better seen as talking about a period of time and understanding it as a whole. It’s more a point about not having as limited a perspective. I think it very rare one should draw ontological conclusions.
So I think what you are doing is reading any reference to time as an ontological one when contextually such readings just aren’t reading. So I think reading Alma 40:8 ontologically is just unsupportable. It’s just saying that if there isn’t a single short period for the resurrection it doesn’t matter because it’s all close enough to God. The analogy would be an adult looking at say a kid who wants a popsicle now and can’t fathom why he must wait.
I’d add that that it doesn’t say there isn’t time for God. Rather it makes the (common) analogy of something that seems long to us to being a short period to God. Say analogous to how long a day seemed when you were 8 versus when you are 40.
D&C 84:100′s claim of “time is no more” is more about a particular period of probation being over.
Regarding physics and ontology I can but caution one adopt a very skeptical approach to things. There’s not even consensus on these matters let alone empirical testing. I have my own preferences (which differ considerably from what you outline) but I recognize that one can’t trust much about it.
Sorry for taking so long to respond but I wanted to read the comments of 2007 in New Cool Thing, which discusses this same issue and digest them.
So I think what you are doing is reading any reference to time as an ontological one when contextually such readings just aren’t reading. So I think reading Alma 40:8 ontologically is just unsupportable. It’s just saying that if there isn’t a single short period for the resurrection it doesn’t matter because it’s all close enough to God. The analogy would be an adult looking at say a kid who wants a popsicle now and can’t fathom why he must wait.
I don’t agree. I think Alma is revealing something about the nature of God and how that nature differs from us. The question Alma is addressing is since men die at different times do they rise at different times or do they all rise at the same time? Alma goes on to say that it doesn’t matter because this way of reckoning time doesn’t exist with God. “all [men’s death and the resurrection] is as one day with God, and time only is measured unto men.”
I’d add that that it doesn’t say there isn’t time for God. Rather it makes the (common) analogy of something that seems long to us to being a short period to God. Say analogous to how long a day seemed when you were 8 versus when you are 40.
Again, I think you are wrong. This is not about a long period for man and a short period for God. In a society that notes the passing of time in days, to say all is one day is to say there is no time. For time to exist, there must be a second day. Thus Alma is saying “don’t worry about it because God doesn’t reckon time in this manner. It doesn’t tell us how God does reckon time. But Alma seems to be saying, it is not the way man reckons time.
D&C 84:100’s claim of “time is no more” is more about a particular period of probation being over.
But with the end of this probationary time, time ends. Time is associated with this terrestrial state. Once through this probationary period, time, as we know it, ends.
Joseph Smith wrote in Church History, “The great Jehovah contemplated the whole of the events connected with the earth, pertaining to the plan of salvation, before it rolled into existence, or ever ‘the morning stars sang together’ for joy; the past, the present, and the future were and are, with Him, one eternal ‘now’; [Teachings of Presidents of the Church: Joseph Smith, p 406]
Past, present, future as one eternal ‘now’ is certainly not how we view time. We don’t know ontologically what time is like for a Celestial being, I certainly cannot get my mind around past, present, future as one eternal now, but the scriptures and writings of Joseph Smith seem to indicate that whatever time is like with God, it is not comparable to terrestrial or physical time.
Rich
What do you mean by “time as we know it.” It seems once again to confuse a kind of state with a fundamental ontological condition.
I mean it’s fine if you see the next life as a kind of Platonic existence. I just don’t see conflating knowledge of past and future with there being no time. It just seems you’re taking knowledge and treating it as more than that without being able to provide a justification for that.
Part of the problem is whether you see God as part of this universe or as one standing outside this universe (prior to the big bang). As terrestrial beings, we sense of time is linear. If, indeed, one understand God outside this universe, there is no compelling reason why he would sense time as we would. The understanding here is that God has a sense of time that is different from ours, not that there is no time. We sense time as linear because we are terrestrial beings. He being outside this universe sees time circularly (whatever that means).
I see no reason why what God perceives with his sense of time should be determinant within a universe that sense time differently.
Rich
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I think I might get what you’re saying. Open theists would say that free will came first, whereas the inverted responsibility you describe states that responsibility came first. (chicken/egg?)
I was wondering about something along these lines: does free will exist if there are no choices to be made? Also, it seems to me that one could adapt open theism to accept the inverted responsibility.