God, Dasein and Omniscience

Posted on June 12, 2009
Filed Under Derrida, Heidegger, Religion | 8 Comments

It’s interesting to ask, in a Heideggarian context, what God’s knowledge consists of. That is when we ask about God’s knowledge we are asking in the traditional philosophical context of a way of knowing best called theoretic knowledge. (That is representational) I think Heidegger argues persuasively that this sort of knowledge is only possible against a background of already engaged in practices. Further that this present-at-hand knowledge is possible only against the breakdown of such practices.

For a divine being like God what does that say about his knowledge? In what way do practices break down for God if he is omnipotent? In other words if one claims for God a more classic sense of omnipotence doesn’t that make classic omniscience impossible? In other words isn’t omnipotence impossible for a Mormon conception of God as a dasein?

This seems a more Derridean point but made against the backdrop of Being and Time. That is the potential for positive knowledge demands the potential and actualization of a failure of power.

Related posts:

  1. Carnival Thoughts
  2. Peirce on Limiting the Pragmatic Maxim
  3. Reading Club: Ostler 1
  4. Does Heidegger Reify Language?
  5. McDermott Responds to Critics
  6. Gadamer and Authority

Comments

8 Responses to “God, Dasein and Omniscience”

I think Heidegger’s claim about theoretic knowledge is correct. The problem is that for theological absolutists, God is the exception to all rules, and very little can be said about him on a rational (as opposed to experiential) basis beyond (at best) the axioms of classical theism.

The way I see it, however, Heidigger’s claim pertaining to theoretic knowledge applies to divine society just as well as it does to the one here, and for the same reasons.

2 Michael Dorfman on June 13th, 2009 9:17 am

Fascinating, Clark– but I am having a bit of trouble following the argument.

Clark:“I think Heidegger argues persuasively that this sort of knowledge is only possible against a background of already engaged in practices. Further that this present-at-hand knowledge is possible only against the breakdown of such practices.”

This is true, as far as human experience goes– but can we generalize from there to some kind of divine epistemology/phenomenology? Are there theological reasons that keep you from appealing to alterity, saying something like “Of course, all bets are off when it comes to Mr. Big, because divine knowledge is of a completely different order than human knowledge”?

I definitely agree that classic omniscience and omnipotence are non-sensical propositions. But then again, I’m the token atheist, so I’d have to say that.

Well I think the basic Mormon stance is that God is a Dasein. He’s not Other the way the traditional theology takes him.

4 Michael Dorfman on June 24th, 2009 1:33 am

I wasn’t sure where to put this, so I’ll ask it here– I suppose it’s related, indirectly, to the conversation above.

Clark, I’d be interested in your thoughts on this. I haven’t read the book, but it sounds fascinating (and provocative).

Looks like you need a subscription to see that link. What’s the name of the book?

6 Michael Dorfman on June 26th, 2009 8:50 am

Sorry, the book is called “The Evolution of God” by Steven Wright.

Does this link work for you? http://www.salon.com/env/atoms_eden/2009/06/24/evolution_of_god/index.html

7 Michael Dorfman on June 27th, 2009 9:09 am

An excerpt from the book has been published here.

Ah, yeah. I’ve been pretty curious about it. He’s discussed it a lot at Blogginheads TV which he runs. It’s one of the main podcasts I regularly listen to. Arguably one of the best on the net. (It’s available as a podcast with no video from iTunes which is how I listen to it while at work) There was a really interesting discussion between him and Tyler Cowen of Marginal Revolution on it a while back.

I think there’s something to be said for the basic thesis, although it seems quite vague. The idea that religions with a cosmopolitan component necessarily emphasize elements about their religion that are more tolerant. That said I think Cowen raises a lot of problems in that Wright appears to focus primarily on the Judeo-Christian tradition whereas I think his thesis needs a much broader cross-section of religions. So there are some definitely problems, but it’s interesting to think about.

If you haven’t listened to the Cowan exchange do. (Although Cowan sounds like Joe Friday doing economics and philosophy) I found the question about how Wright’s theory deals with Unitarianism and related liberal Protestant movements quite interesting.

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