Who Does Metaphysics

Clark, I find this interesting because I work with philosophers, and the deeper they get into problems of mind, the more their work begins to look like that of a cognitive scientist: developing computational models, running experiments, etc. Whatever it is that’s unique about philosophical methods seems to be put aside when the rubber hits the road, so to speak. There are exceptions: Jerry Fodor, for example, whose last few books have basically been one big scream of, “Look at me, cognitive psychology,” but he’s been largely ignored and/or mocked. Other potential examples like Michael Tye and David Chalmers are, I know from first hand experience, very interested in doing the cog sci thing, but find it difficult or too time-consuming to get productive collaborations going.

I bring this up because, while phil of mind ends up looking more and more like cog sci, metaphysics doesn’t look anything like physical science to me. If you’re doing physics, you might be doing ontology in a sense, but even when you are, you’re presupposing a larger metaphysics and epistemology that you certainly didn’t get out of the findings of physics.

This is not to say that physics isn’t relevant to doing metaphysics, just that its relevance doesn’t fall straightforwardly out of physics itself. If you’re doing metaphysics, chances are there are a lot of things you’re thinking about, and a lot of methodology you’re working with, that physics simply doesn’t speak to. The contrast between this and the phil of mind-cog sci relationship is telling, I think.

Jacob, I don’t think Heidegger means that one actually can overcome metaphysics in a straightforward way. If anything he means the opposite. Rather I think he’s looking at the historical situatedness of a particular way of metaphysical thinking and demanding we look beyond this. While, especially after his Turn, this was quite broad and fundamental. I think elements can be found in his concept of authenticity. I also think the very way he conceived of mathematical physics is interesting.

Chris, interesting since Lee Smolin recently wrote a book saying physicists ought embrace philosophy more. Even Instrumentalists, like say Feynman, end up doing a lot of philosophy. Just unconsciously and unexamined. I’d actually argue that most string theory is nothing but very mathematical metaphysics. The only question is how informed philosophically the thinkers are. Surprisingly there are a number of people who do embrace the philosophy. And I think the recent backlash against string theory, while partially due to the lack of empirical tests, is largely due to philosophical concerns regarding a lack of constraints. (That is it is too broad and too general metaphysically – whereas reality should be somewhere between allowing almost anything and pure determinism) The problem, once again, is that the philosophical underpinnings aren’t examined by enough people.

In the absence of empirical tests, what is physics other than (amateur) philosophy?

I agree. However, for a physical theory to get any traction it must at a minimum be consistent with previous empirical tests. That is the only way it can be considered as good as the existing alternatives.