Metaphysics and Philosophy of Science

Posted on November 13, 2009
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It’s Only a Theory has up a great post on metaphysics and the philosophy of science. It’s basically critique of Sider’s view of metaphysics. I confess I’m more on Sider’s side here. (Sider and Williamson are my two favorite analytic philosophers at the moment – even when I don’t agree with them) Sider’s point is

Quine’s criterion for ontological commitment is good as far as it goes: believe in those entities that your best theory says exists. But in trying to decide how much structure there is in the world, I can think of no better strategy than this extension of Quine’s criterion: believe in as much structure as your best theory of the world posits.

Of course the problem for various realists is in how to take that. Consider say virtual particles in QED. One can accept the structure but it seems to me that this still leaves open a lot of positions. Likewise with say GR and the issue of a block universe. Of course Sider has famously argued for four dimensionalism or roughly taking a realist view of GR. But it seems to me that the contrarians can be realist as well.

Of course Eric’s point is a bit broader than those concerns (which are largely concerns from within the realist position). Eric is more looking at Quine and how logic within science ought inform metaphysics. And I’m not quite sure how to respond to him. Further some of the issues (such as conventionalism within science) are real issues I just don’t have an answer for beyond suggesting that one look at Sider’s point about metaphysics in general. (This is one of my all time favorite quotes about the epistemology of metaphysics)

I have no good epistemology of metaphysics to offer. It should not be thought, though, that this uncertainty makes metaphysics a worthless enterprise. It would be foolish to require generally that epistemological foundations be established before substantive inquiry can begin. Mathematics did not proceed foundations-first. Nor did physics. Nor has ethics, traditionally. …
Skeptics often ask too much of metaphysical arguments. A priori metaphysical arguments should not be faulted for not being decisive. … Metaphysical inquiry can survive if we are willing to live with highly tentative conclusions. Let’s not kid ourselves: metaphysics is highly speculative! It does not follow that it is entirely without rational grounds. (Sider, Four Dimensionalism, xv)

I should note that I’ve not read the paper Eric is discussing. So I’m somewhat limited in how to respond. Further, while I’m more on Sider’s side, the phrase “as much structure” seems too broad. Further it seems to me that the metaphysics isn’t just about structure but about reference. (Once again think virtual particles – you can be a realist about the structure and an anti-realist about the reality of the particles) I think Peirce’s conception of structure is quite useful here since it avoids some issues of substance vs. structure here. (Although once again I’ve not read the original paper so I may just be misinterpreting things)

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