Now I’m actually pretty sympathetic to Rouse because I personally think a lot of language use is transparent coping. That is we typically in our average everydayness use language as one piece of equipment for a world. And different worlds have different languages in that sense. So my use of “I’m hungry” to get food isn’t that different from using a hammer. And just as the hammer becomes invisible to me as I hammer (until it breaks down) I think language often functions that way.

That said, clearly Heidegger and Dreyfus see a distinction between that sort of language use and explicit articulation. Dreyfus has a longish response to Rouse which is well worth reading. It’s there he makes a confession that touches upon the point you raise Gary.

I should never have said that for Dasein the animal way of coping is more basic than the social way, and I should certainly not have “assimilate[d] the contrast between bodily coping and social normativity to the more basic contrast between practical coping and the explicit articulation of propositional content.” …rudimentary social normas are already in force at the level of transparent coping. I know think that asking which is more basic, Merleau-Pontyian gestal-governed coping or Heideggerian socialization into the style (and language) of the culture is the wrong question to ask. [...]

If there is some disturbance and ongoing transparent coping is interrupted, we normally stay involved but pay attention to what is going on in the situation. This is the level of explicitation. Here it makes sense to speak of beliefs, desires, goals, and in general of propositional content. [...] Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty both acknowledge the importance of what they call representational thinking but both would say that all thinkers who begin their analysis on this propositional level begin one level too late.” (ibid, 315-6)

Now this isn’t quite what you were discussing. But clearly it is related. I think though that it is clear Dreyfus makes a distinction between these two ways of coping. While the regular “articulated” language use depends upon equipment breakdown, it is just to get it’s “start.” As articulated it becomes social and is a different way of coping. It becomes theory of a sort. So I think Dreyfus here explicitly rejects the characterization you give of him.

The line of attack on Rouse that Dreyfus offers is quite interesting to those of us interested in Derrida. Language is special precisely because it can be removed from one context and grafted into other contexts. (Moved between worlds) This is quite different from the normal discussion of worlds and tools. There is something special about language.

So that might be a problem too. That is to Dreyfus when we are in our everdayness we just encounter things as they present themselves without thinking about them carefully. It may well be that for Dreyfus as we start to think about things more carefully we then just aren’t being average. I note you use the term average – so is the real issue whether the conceptual scheme is occuring in our averageness?

If the issue is this “everyday coping” then I probably can see Dreyfus’ point. It might appear like we are using concepts but we aren’t really encountering them as concepts. Rather we are using language the way you use a broom when sweeping but not thinking about it. It is a kind of invisible coping. We don’t even see how the “as” structure is coming to us. It’s when we start to think (and then move out of that averageness coping) that we can encounter concepts more carefully. But these depend upon the break down of practice in order to give us present-at-hand entities which we can attempt to manipulate technologically. This then gets at the issue of why Heidegger sees the essence of science as technology: precisely because of that manipulation of concepts.

So I think concepts and conceptual based language is there. I am just skeptical that it happens during our everydayness. However, once again, it’s in that averageness that I find myself somewhat uncomfortable with both Dreyfus and even Heidegger. I’m not sure that it ultimately works except in a lose sense.

My problem is that I just don’t see Dreyfus opposing this, even if he doesn’t focus on it.

I think one has to recognize that our introspection can be authentic or inauthentic. Perhaps that is where some crosstalk is happening? Dreyfus might be using those terms to apply only to authentic introspection.

I have that two volume collection of papers in honor of Dreyfus and I vaguely recall some discussion with McDowell’s position. But I seem to recall the point of contention being a little narrower.

I’ll see if I can do a bit of research on this tonight — assuming I have time.

However, there is a sense in which Dreyfus is right to emphasizes a layercake model, because I do hold to an account of some transparent coping being “primordial” (such as perception and basic habitual action) with other coping methods being recently evolved less ubiquitous in everyday life(such as introspection and reflective cognition). However, I think it is bad phenomenology to stipulate that we are only reflective and introspective when equipment breaks down. If Dreyfus is right in interpreting Heidegger that way, then I believe Heidegger is wrong. On the contrary, I think introspection occurs throughout the course of everyday life as a part of our everyday intentional comportment.