Derrida as Realist

Actually that was me, not enowning. My point though was basically what you say: to redefine the terms a bit. He’s clearly not a realist in the traditional mold. Nor even in the Putnam mold (here thinking of his latter period)

I’m clearly biased here by my reading of Peirce. Peirce can sound a bit like a traditional realist at times. For him realism is just whether structures or phenomena are independent of what any finite group thinks about it. However Peirce’s conception of mind is radical enough that it seriously undermines taking realism the way most do in what one might broadly construe as the Cartesian tradition. This isn’t just due to his externalism but the more radical conception of man as a sign. That is thoughts aren’t something the mind has but rather mind is something arising out of thoughts.

Regarding Derrida I think he certainly portray himself as a realist. I think his more devastating critique of traditional realisms is the way they take for granted philosophical discourse as enabling a certain discourse of realism. The idea of scientific realism as converging on some theoretical statements that are true is but one example. As if language could ever throw off its connotative aspects for a task of pure denotive efficiency.

But when he talks a little more straightforwardly rather than focusing so much in on the method of discourse I think Derrida is fairly clear on the realism issues. My old post Derrida on Derrida is what I usually refer folks to. (I know you’re familiar with those interviews) Put an other way the error in traditional discourse on realism is that the focus is purely on true judgement rather than the array of competing forces that make such judgments possible. Heidegger of course was the one to reformulate the traditional neoKantian way of privileging knowledge and truth as correspondence.