Nominalism, Pratt & McConkie

Posted on March 25, 2010
Filed Under Philosophy, Religion | 14 Comments

I’m bringing a discussion here that got a bit afield from the discussion over at BCC recently. It one of those narrow topics that not everyone will enjoy. I figured I’d bring it here to not distract from Daymon’s post at BCC.

The issue is Bruce R. McConkie, Orson Pratt and nominalism. Now I should note up front that none of the major Mormon theologians were philosopher. Yes Pratt and Roberts read a bit on the subject, but Pratt in particular was ignorant of a lot of things and made rather naive arguments. (IMO) So far as I’m aware, McConkie had no background in philosophy either. Right up front we have to be careful not to read too much philosophy into their writings. That said, I think there are some basic distinctions we can make.

Pratt’s theology can be seen as attempting to reconcile early 1830′s Mormon theology with Nauvoo theology of the mid 1840′s. In early Mormon theology many people thought that the Spirit or Holy Ghost was literally the mind of God. (See for instance Lectures on Faith 5 for an example of this teaching) The Pratt brothers fairly early saw creation as a kind of neoPlatonic like emanation process. Animation comes from this immaterial spirit. Literally souls are made of the Spirit. (Parley P. Pratt’s “The Regeneration and Eternal Duration of Matter” from 1839 goes into this theory along with the Pratt’s rejection of creation ex nihilo – also see Charles Harrell’s “The Development of the Doctrine of Preexistence, 1830-1844″ in BYU Studies 28:2). Note this obviously is speculative theology and not Mormon theology proper

In 1843 Joseph Smith receives D&C 131 which states that spirit is “more fine or pure” matter. Orson Pratt then develops his famous atomistic theology. It’s kind of fantastic but roughly is a way to reconcile the 1830′s theology with the mid 1840′s theology. Effectively he takes the view in physics of the time of an Aether in space which was the medium for light and turns this into God’s spirit. This is the universal-mind akin to the Stoics or neoPlatonists. Effectively it is God’s ousia which is the material cause of all divine properties. Each divine being (in Trinitarian talk the hypostasis) then is divine because of their unity with this Spirit.

Moving quickly to McConkie who is primarily writing in the 1950′s and 1960′s we have a shift. Instead of there being this shared substance that is the source of the unity of God and their divine properties McConkie sees the unity as merely being the same beliefs, intents, desires and so forth. Effectively the unity is akin to how two people are united if they have shared values.

Now the debate at hand is that I claim what we have is a move from Scholastic Realism towards nominalism. I further claim a more speculative point that this is due to an overall societal shift towards nominalism. That is McConkie is merely reflecting a common 20th century American way of viewing the world. (And, I might add, a completely understandable one given the way science had dominated thought) Divine attributes become just particular people acting in particular ways.

That all sets up the discussion, although I’ve skipped some parts (such as my perception of how Brigham Young’s and B. H. Robert’s views fit into the transition)

Mark, writing at BCC then wrote the following:

That could be characterized as either moderate realism or conceptualism, but probably not nominalism, from what I understand. If person A telling the truth as he understands it is an instance of honesty, one is a moderate realist about honesty. If the idea of person A telling the the truth as he understands it is real, one is a conceptualist about honesty. I don’t see how one can be a nominalist about honesty without denying both propositions, and I am skeptical that McConkie would have denied either.

I am also skeptical of the idea that he would have denied that the members of the Godhead share some sort of interpenetrating spirit, or “glow”. If he would have denied that some sort of spiritual energy or communication was spatially present between and among persons sharing a spiritual experience, that would certainly make him a conceptualist at best about spirit, which would be very interesting if true.

For those not familiar with the fundamental philosophical debate, let me briefly explain some terms. Nominalism consists of two different moves. One can either deny there are real universals (this is the medieval conception) or deny there are real (i.e. independent of any particular mind) abstract objects like numbers. Moderate realism was a position of Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas and (in modern times) D. M. Armstrong. Roughly it is the idea that universals or abstract entities exist as part of particular things but not in any independent sense.

Now let me note that I don’t see Pratt as a true realist partially due to the fact that his view of divine attributes exist within the Spirit which he saw as a spatio-temporal being. So in a certain sense he is closer to the moderate realists than a Platonist. (Although due to the nature of the Spirit in his view this gets complex fast) However it seems clear that Pratt is attempting to maintain a more traditional Christian view of God’s essence, albeit in a rather peculiar materialist conception. That is the divine properties are real, in some sense, independent of the persons who hold them.

With regards to McConkie, I don’t deny that McConkie accepts the reality of the spirit – although it’s unclear what he understands by it. But clearly he thinks it some kind of mind-independent phenomena. The question is whether he accepts divine attributes as being material independent.

Now moderate realism (or immanent realism) says there are universals like yellow but not independent of any particular yellow thing. Effectively it is saying there are universal concepts that correctly represent particular things. Thus yellow represents a feature common to many yellow things. But the concept of yellow in the mind is universal. Mark wants to allow that McConkie accepts the reality of the divine attributes but not independent of the divine persons. Put an other way, he wants McConkie to be able to say there is an universal concept like say love held by each divine being but that any particular manifestation is unique.

Let me note that Mark’s position isn’t that McConkie is a moderate realist. Just that we can’t distinguish between McConkie being a moderate realist from his being a nominalist.

Of course Mark is right, as far as it goes with respect to many properties. However the key issue is the unity of the Godhead and whether it is merely a shared conceptual unity or a more robust unity.

The key passage is found in McConkie’s Mormon Doctrine under the heading of Unity. (Page 814)

This unity among all the saints, and between them and the Father and the Son, is reserved for those who gain exaltation and inherit the fulness of the Father’s kingdom. Those who attain it will all know the same things; think the same thoughts; exercise the same powers; do the same acts; respond in the same way to the same circumstances…

Also under Faith (page 263)

The attributes of God are listed [by Joseph Smith] as: Knowledge; Faith or Power; Justice; Judgment; Mercy; and Truth. (Lectures on Faith, pp 42-49)

Relative to the perfections of God the record says: “What we mean by perfections is, the perfections which belong to all the attributes of his nature.” (Lectures on Faith, pg 50) That is, the perfection of God consists in his possession of all knowledge, all power, all truth, and the fulness of all good things.

I have to say that while I’ve only gone through a selection of McConkie’s writings, Mark appears correct. I’ve been overstating the move to nominalism. The reason I called McConkie a nominalist tends to arise out of places where he appears to see God’s knowledge in terms of the knowledge of particulars rather than universals or generals. See, for example, the following from Mormon Doctrine (264)

Without the knowledge of all things, God would not be able to save any portion of his creatures, for it is by reason of the knowledge which he has of all things, from the beginning to the end, that enables him to give that understanding to his creatures by which they are made partakers of eternal life; and if it were not for the idea existing in the minds of men that God had all knowledge it would be impossible for them to exercise faith in him.

The knowledge isn’t of universal concepts, abstractions or the like but of particular things. That tends to be characteristic of nominalism which sees knowledge as only knowledge of particulars. Even moderate realism allows for universal knowledge independent of particular things even if the concepts pick out particulars.

That said, I have to agree that based upon my current notes I can’t make the case McConkie doesn’t hold to moderate realism.

Related posts:

  1. God, Dasein and Omniscience
  2. Only Begotten in the Flesh
  3. Divine Council
  4. Debating the Mormon Theology of Spirits
  5. Reading Club: Ostler 2
  6. FARMS and ID

Comments

14 Responses to “Nominalism, Pratt & McConkie”

Thanks for clarifying that, Clark. It is certainly somewhat odd that McConkie doesn’t refer to a mechanism whereby members of the Godhead come to share the same thoughts, purposes, etc.

The level of identity he describes seems more than a little extreme to me, precisely because it suggests that divine will is a determinate question (i.e. not “free” at all). That seems related to a common conception of perfection in mid to late twentieth century Mormonism as a static ideal that likewise provides a determinate answer to any and all practical questions. I believe D&C 58:26-29 dispenses with that idea pretty completely.

I hear echoes of this on a pretty regular basis, the idea that there is a singular perfect answer to even the most pragmatic of questions, and that with sufficient faith that answer will be made known to the diligent inquirer. And of course if there is a singular perfect answer to any and all questions, divine perfection entails becoming a virtual clone of all other such persons, another idea rather common twenty to thirty years ago.

Clark there may be a slight problem in your chronology – not that it really effects what you’re saying. Pratt (either one) did not know about the Ramus instructions, neither the April 2, 1843 episode or the May 16-17, 1843 (the spirit is matter bit)- D&C 130-131. For example, well into the 1850s Orson is still teaching the Lectures on Faith version of the Holy Ghost. When he finally gets the message that the Holy Ghost is (also?) a person, he’s quoting the manuscript history version, which is different than the raw data version. Orson is developing his atomism by the summer of 1847. Probably Pratt was aware of the April 1, 1842 Times and Seasons editorial which says: “In tracing the thing to the foundation, and looking at it philosophically, we shall find a very material difference between the body and the spirit; the body is supposed to be organized matter, and the spirit, by many, is thought to be immaterial, without substance. With this latter statement we should beg leave to differ, and state that spirit is a substance; that it is material, but that it is more pure, elastic and refined matter than the body; that it existed before the body, can exist in the body; and will exist separate from the body” -this editorial is almost surely a collaborative production.

WV, that I good point I didn’t realize. However whether he knew of 130-131 in the particular words it seems clear the ideas were around and he’d been exposed to them. The problem of the fragmentary nature of D&C 131 is legendary as well – given the other texts we have of similar nature with multiple reports it would be nice to know a little better the actual utterances. In any case late Nauvoo theology had this transition to materialism. Of course Pratt and Young weren’t always there but it seems both picked up those key doctrinal shifts.

Mark the issue of freedom is a good one. My sense is that McConkie doesn’t take a position on the metaphysical debate but thinks that there is a right answer given knowledge of all things and that God would pick it. Of course he might acknowledge multiple right answers. The infamous example being what kind of tooth paste to use. It’s a silly question without a strong right answer. Yet at times he does present it almost as a kind of automation. The phrase “respond in the same way to the same circumstances” is kind of hard to reconcile to LFW. Exactly how far McConkie would push this isn’t clear to me. (Although as I’ve said I’ve not read his papers in detail for a long time)

What did you think about nominalism and the issue of knowledge only of particulars and not universals? Do you think this poses a problem to moderate realism? I ask because McConkie’s exchange to Eugene England and in The Seven Deadly Heresies seems to indicate a problem. There McConkie suggests that if God was continuing to learn that a new fact could undermine all his existing knowledge suggesting there aren’t any universals to know – contra having universal concepts.

4 Matthew Chapman on March 26th, 2010 9:38 am

In another book, “A New Witness for the Articles of Faith” Elder McConkie discourses on the “Light of Christ” which appears to perform the same functions as Orson Pratt’s original understanding of the Holy Ghost:

“There is a spirit—the Spirit of the Lord, the Spirit of Christ, the light of truth, the light of Christ—that defies description and is beyond mortal comprehension. It is in us and in all things; it is around us and around all things; it fills the earth and the heavens and the universe. It is everywhere, in all immensity, without exception; it is an indwelling, immanent, ever-present, never-absent spirit. It has neither shape nor form nor personality. It is not an entity nor a person nor a personage. It has no agency, does not act independently, and exists not to act but to be acted upon.”
“It is the agency of God’s power; it is the means and way whereby ‘he comprehendeth all things,’ so that ‘all things are before him, and all things are round about him.’ It is the way whereby ‘he is above all things, and in all things, and is through all things, and is round about all things.’ ”

Clearly, this description has its origins in Doctrine & Covenants 88: 7 – 13:
“This is the light of Christ… the light which shineth, which giveth you light, is through him who enlighteneth your eyes, which is the same light that quickeneth your understandings;
Which light proceedeth forth from the presence of God to fill the immensity of space—
The light which is in all things, which giveth life to all things, which is the law by which all things are governed, even the power of God who sitteth upon his throne, who is in the bosom of eternity, who is in the midst of all things”

However, McConkie specifically interpolates that “proceedeth forth from the presence of God” implies “exists not to act but to be acted upon”, placing him, I think, clearly within the nominalist definition..

That’s not the same as Pratt’s original understanding which was that the Spirit literally was the Mind of God and thus did have agency, acts independently, and so forth. So that’s a pretty big difference. The way McConkie uses it is a passive medium of communication from God rather than an active medium of God as you noted.

That’s not necessarily nominalist, except in a narrow sense, as I conceded to Mark. However it’s sure headed in that direction I think. So I think my larger point survives Mark’s overall criticism. I am curious to see Mark’s answer to my question in (3) though.

Clark: What did you think about nominalism and the issue of knowledge only of particulars and not universals?

If you mean with regard to McConkie’s view, I think reading the phrase “knowledge of all things” to refer only to particulars is an unjustified assumption.

With regard to the faith / omniscience question I maintain that strict omniscience is not required on the basis that two quasi-divine entities in different parts of the universe would either merge, cooperate, or be subsumed, that the only stable configuration of the universe is for them to do so, and that the nature of power by common consent (flowing upward D&C 121:46 style) is that it is impossible for an evil power to maintain universal hegemony in the long run.

I imagine this all happened hundreds of millions of years ago, because in my opinion, it is an essential part of what makes God God – i.e. the ability to maintain righteous dominion (by degrees) over the known universe. And on that world view, the knowledge and power of God is ever increasing, as the hymn says.

Now with regard to the Spirit, I like to distinguish between the Spirit as a person, the Spirit as an influence, and passive substrate that makes that influence possible.

The way I see it, the passive substrate is not that different from a quantum field, a field that can be used in principle to modulate any kind of spiritual influence or signal, intentionally or otherwise. Then by some artifact of biology, physics, and property dualism all living things are coupled to that field to some degree or another, in some amazingly subtle way, and the Spirit is felt most strongly when there is divine concurrence with whatever thought or activity is going on.

In other words, in my opinion the Spirit as an influence is the manifestation of divine concurrence. Unlike Pratt, apparently, I believe think the active, agentive, thinking principle of any divine person or influence is local to a person or persons, and that individuals both feel and emit such an influence (by degrees) on what appears to be a highly non-local basis.

Now I don’t know what exactly that has to do with nominalism, other than the fact that I think nominalism in the strict sense of the term is incompatible with objective reality and meaningful communication of any kind. The idea that linguistic or mental universals do not have even a conceptual association with reality on the ground is such a radical idea that I have a hard time believing that McConkie would have adopted it.

In my opinion, nominalism only has a significant following of any kind due to a straw man argument against a naive form of realism that was obsolete 2400 years ago. The pragmatic difference between Aristotelian realism and Ockhamist conceptualism is minimal, and neither is vulnerable to the sort of trivial arguments that many humanities majors like to throw out, based on what appears to be a complete misunderstanding about what both moderate and conceptualist realism actually entail.

Occasionally I read linguistics curricula and I find it absolutely astounding to find assertions to the effect that the overthrow of naive realism was the major discovery of linguists and language departments over the last couple of centuries or so. Only about two millennia behind the times, apparently.

The claim about McConkie and knowledge of particulars is a bit more than just the “know all things” since the things might not be particulars in such oft repeated statements. Rather the problem is that McConkie objects to progression of knowledge on the basis that a new fact could undermine knowledge. But of course if God knows an universal then he knows no future fact will violate the universal. The only way to claim a new fact could undermine universals (such as the plan of salvation) is if God knows only by knowing particular facts.

But of course if God knows an universal then he knows no future fact will violate the universal.

That is a rather unusual take on universals. Aristotelian universals don’t behave that way. Platonic universals do, of course. Of course the idea that Platonic universals are a timeless reflection of divine will is classical onto-theism.

Knowing that an Aristotelian universal will not be violated in the future requires either determinism or adequate power to prevent the violation from happening. My understanding is that McConkie maintained both strict omnipotence along with simple divine foreknowledge of the non-existence of other comparably rival powers. The classical Arminian position, more or less.

Either way, you seem to be making the argument that McConkie is either not a nominalist, or can’t be one, I am not sure which.

10 Martin Pulido on April 3rd, 2010 12:49 am

Just a few historical notes on the Pratts, spirit’s materiality, and their spiritual atomism. It is true that the Pratts were more vocal about the materiality of spirits after Joseph’s comments on the subject in 1843. On June 1, 1845, Orson Pratt spoke at a funeral and echoed Joseph’s sentiments that man’s spirit is a refined, material substance. In July 1845, Parley P. Pratt carried on with Joseph’s thoughts on the eternity of the elements in an article entitled “Materiality.” He urged that “the elementary principles of the material universe are eternal.” He further described God, Christ, angels, spirits, and men as “material organizations, intelligences, possessing body and parts.” Spirits were composed of some less tangible substance, difficult to perceive by man’s naked eye, which was eternal. As far as I understand, by Fall 1845 (not Summer 1847), Orson Pratt wrote an article called “Mormon Philosophy” tha would be his first treatment in a long series of metaphysical treatises in “spiritual atomism.”

However, I think there are some clear intimations of the materiality of spirit from Parley P. Pratt much earlier. In 1838, Parley would publish his response to L. R. Sutherland’s Zion’s watchman and mock Sutherland’s non-anthropomorphic, immaterial God. Parley argued that God had parts (a mouth to speak, etc.) and passions, and it was atheistic to think otherwise. However, at this time Parley only thought God was a spirit, not possessing a body of flesh and bone. Could he conceive of spirit immaterially and claim a spirit had parts like a mouth?

11 Martin Pulido on April 5th, 2010 1:14 am

So, I wanted to substantiate my claim on Parley more. I think the most firm claim would be in his 1840 An Answer to Mr. William Hewett’s tract against the Latter-day Saints.

In this work, Parley answers that there are three persons in the Godhead, the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, and the Father and Son are in the express image of each other, both having hands, feet, eyes, etc. Four pages later he adds that the Latter-day Saints “believe in the Father, Son and Holy Ghost, as one God,” and that “the Son has flesh and bones, and that the Father is a spirit.”

This seems to establish that at least one spirit–the Father–was without flesh and bones, and yet had parts.

Sorry for not answering earlier. I wanted to get my Pratt book and couldn’t find it.

For others following the discussion, the Sutherland response is in The Essential Parley P. Pratt, 34.

My sense is though that what is significant isn’t whether God the Father has a body. Given even early Mormon Christology (not to mention a possible interpretation of the first vision) this isn’t that surprising. The real issue for the Pratts is the Spirit and whether it is material. Put an other way one could still think God has a body while thinking spirit or spirits are immaterial.

Likewise the 1840 account distinguishes pretty clearly matter from spirit without noting that spirit on its own has quasi-material attributes. The issue isn’t whether a spirit has parts but whether it is material. You just don’t see anything akin to his later comments (such as around page 190 where he gets at what a substance is) Of course that is 1855.

Put an other way, to claim something has parts isn’t the same as saying it is material. (After all a Platonist might say any entity exemplifies or participates in multiple forms)

All that said, the bit about God as spirit is interesting since it tends to go against the earlier tract. There he says God has a body and parts, although perhaps he’s thinking it is a spirit body? Or is he talking about Christ?

13 Martin Pulido on April 5th, 2010 3:41 pm

I guess I am just confused how God could be a spirit (not having flesh and bones as he claims Christ has), and yet possess hands, feet, eyes, etc., and not be material. Parts such as these described by Pratt don’t seem to be interpretible in an immaterial or Platonic fashion. Are you suggesting that one can still read this as suggesting God has some other material vehicle besides a body of flesh and bones that consists of these anatomic parts, but that his spirit is yet immaterial? But then why does Pratt not claim Jesus has a body of flesh and bones, and the Father a body of X (whatever this other stuff is), instead of claiming he is jus a spirit? Perhaps Pratt was just being sloppy, but to me it seems to be a fair inference that he thinks the Father’s spirit is itself a body with parts (hands, feet, eyes, etc.). It seems hard to conceive of these specific parts in an immaterial sense. Of course, I do admit that Parley’s long and explicit affirmations of spirit’s materiality do not occur until his 1845 Materiality, 1853 sermons, and the 1855 Key to the Science of Theology. And this does not settle, as you mentioned in an earlier post, whether Mormons saw spirit and mind as equivalent (do spirits possess minds, or are they minds?). But Joseph did not answer this question either in his comments on the materiality of spirit.

As an aside, I located an interesting statement by Joseph in the History of the Church. On October 14, 1843, Joseph met with a physiologist and mesmizer and asked him to “prove that the mind of man was seated in one part of the brain more than another.” Perhaps Joseph is egging on the mesmizer, or it could be suggesting Joseph thought the mind rested in the brain as a whole.

Then, there is that comment by Joseph from April 1843, which claims that “no fundamental principle belonging to a human System… ‘ever goes into another in this world or the world to come…’ If any one supposes that any part of our bodies, that is the fundamental parts thereof, ever goes into another body he is mistaken.” Here, Joseph seems to be slamming on the transmigration of spirit that O Pratt entertains in The Seer.

Quinn discusses that a fair bit in Magic World View. I tend to see it as fairly decisive but those who defend a Jewish styled transmigration ala Kabbalism see Joseph changing his views on this matter. I’m pretty dubious about it.

Regarding Pratt, I don’t deny that all makes logical sense. I’m just not convinced we have enough information in those early tracts to claim Pratt’s followed that logic. Put an other way it certainly is a circumstantial argument for materiality. I just think it’s a tad too weak to argue about how Pratt conceived substance. I think an other way to consider it is that there already was in Mormondom conceptions that made the embrace of full bodied materialism quite natural.

I think I just learned from Mark’s comments above that while a circumstantial argument can be compelling it always is at best circumstantial and one ought consider the alternatives.

Leave a Reply