Peirce & Being

Posted on June 1, 2010
Filed Under Peirce, Philosophy | 1 Comment

My wife just had our daughter today (our third child) so posting will be light. I’m somewhat incoherent from lack of sleep, as you might expect. I long ago learned that writing while sleep deprived is never a good idea. That said I’ve been reading a bit here as my wife and baby sleep and came upon a few quotes about Peirce and Being.

 

Over against any cognition, there is an unknown but knowable reality; but over against all possible cognition, there is only the self-contradictory. In short, cognizability (in its widest sense) and being are not merely metaphysically the same, but are synonymous terms. (W 2:208)

 

This can be taken to equate being and knowing as was common in some idealist traditions. However Peirce means by this something quite broader (as his qualification suggests above). Rather Peirce means thinking in its broadest sense.

 

The purpose of every sign is to express “fact,” and by being joined with other signs, to approach as nearly as possible to determining an interpretant which would be the perfect Truth, the absolute Truth, and as such . . . would be the very Universe. Aristotle gropes for a conception of perfection, or entelechy, which he never succeeds in making clear. We may adopt the word to mean the very fact, that is, the ideal sign which should be quite perfect. . . . The entelechy of the Universe of being, then, the universe quâ fact, will be that Universe in its aspect as a sign, the ‘Truth’ of being. (NEM 4:239-40)

 

Related posts:

  1. Peirce on Truth
  2. Gary and Peirce on Mind and Functionalism
  3. Virtual Peirce
  4. Peirce & OOP
  5. The Problem of Extra-Semiotic Entities
  6. Sleep and Experience

Comments

One Response to “Peirce & Being”

“In short, cognizability (in its widest sense) and being are not merely metaphysically the same, but are synonymous terms.”

Thanks for quoting this. I believe this is the best definition of “being” I have ever seen.

Leave a Reply