OOP

Graham kindly mentioned my post. He does get a bit concerned over the whole “question of priority.” Rather than do an other post I’ll just make some brief comments here.

First he says,

I’ve never met a pragmatist who could swallow the idea of essence or of objects apart from their relations. Indeed, these are the very ideas that pragmatism prides itself on knocking down.

Just to clarify I’m not talking about Graham’s position on essences. I’m actually pretty critical of that, although I understand why he adopts the position he does. However it’s not exactly clear to me what is the essence of OOO given that so many OOO proponents hold to different metaphysical positions here. (Say the virtual vs. the actual between Levi and Graham)

This issue of essences was actually to be my first post on OOO and a closer reading of Graham. So I don’t want to give too much away. What I’m more interested in is how a more Derridean/Peircean OOO would turn out. Now perhaps Graham would say this isn’t OOO at all. And that’s fine. At that point it’s a bit more of a semantic issue of who gets to be part of a movement.

All that said though, the issue or relations ends up being a bit more complicated. Especially in a more Peircean context. So we have to be a bit careful of equivocation since “related” is a bit of an overloaded word. Unless we unpack what a relation is we can talk past one an other quite easily. As I think I’ve mentioned before it is precisely the issue of relation that is the most confusing to me in OOP up until now. (Although upon my second read of Prince of Networks I noticed Graham said in a couple of places that it was the same as Whitehead’s prehensions so I’m assuming I can more or less take Whitehead’s use as Graham’s)

Graham kindly put a short statement about his OOO which I’ll make some brief comments to. (If only to orient future posts and to have something to refer to)

1. objects are irreducible to any relations with other objects

2. while dependent on their component pieces, they are also irreducible to those pieces

3. objects merely encounter caricatures of each other, and in ontological terms this happens in the same way whether a human or animal is involved or not

4. the fact that objects cannot encounter each other directly means that only indirect relation is possible

5. however, we cannot follow either the occasionalists (who make God the sole medium of relation) or Hume or Kant (who invert occasionalism by making human habit or categories the only known site where this occurs)

6. there is an infinite regress of objects, but not an infinite progress toward ever larger ones, up to and including the “universe as a whole” (which doesn’t really exist for me)

7. both real and sensual objects are polarized between an object-pole and a quality-pole

8. this yields a fourfold structure, which generates not only space and time, but their previously disowned sisters which we might term essence and eidos

Allow me to address each.

1. Objects are irreducible to any relations to other objects. Now let me temporarily lay aside the issue of whether a relation can be an object. (i.e. is “brother” in abstract an object) I think that both Derrida (as I read him, which I recognize isn’t the anti-realist way many read him in lit departments) and Peirce wouldn’t object to this. As Michael put it once, Deconstruction can’t be taken as a reduction. For Peirce this definitely is the case since Firstness can be an object for a sign. But firstness is inherently a matter just of itself. So by definition it is irreducible.

Where Peirce might object to Graham is that he allows a sign to be an object. A sign can have as its object either a matter of firstness (pure feeling or pure potential) or secondness (pure force or a pure relation) or an other sign. Now to answer Graham’s statement is a bit complex precisely because signs end up being complex in that way. I think Graham wants to say any object has an irreducible “part” that isn’t relations. But the question then might be whether this irreducible “part” can be identical with some other object’s irreducible “part.” My sense from Prince of Networks is that it can’t. But I’m not prepared to argue that just yet. (See 2)

2. I think Peirce would agree here. A sign, for instance, can’t be reduced to its components since it is the “standing for” and “determining an interpretant” that makes a sign a sign. Once again though whether Graham would see this as fulfilling his 2 depends upon the nature of relations.

3. This is inherently part of Peirce’s semiotics in which everything is mediated. Although once again it gets a bit complex since one has to ask what it is to encounter. For Peirce one could talk about secondness or pure action between two entities. Yet to be a true encounter between objects I think you need (for Peirce) a constituent of thirdness. Ontologically this is independent of human knowing. (I think Derrida can be read this way too, although I don’t want to revisit the Derrida wars – but Peirce is explicit about this being the case)

4. This might be a bit tricky, again because Peirce has both secondness and thirdness. All signs are mediated so any sign encounter is mediated. However secondness or pure force is by definition involving only two logical terms. Roughly it’s akin to the phenomenological encounter with the Other in Levinas, except that once again it’s an universal ontological principle. So this needs unpacked in terms of what does it mean to encounter.

5. Peirce definitely isn’t an occasionalist. He describes himself as “a scholastic realist of a somewhat extreme stripe.” (CP 5.470)

6. The universe as a whole is somewhat problematic. Peirce’s solution to this is his continuity. So there is infinite progress to what Peirce, following Aristotle, calls the entelenchy of the universe. However this is simultaneously infinitely deferred. To such an extent that there is a debate among Peirceans over whether this (which is caught up in his pragmatic sense of truth) can be anything other than a regulative ideal. Infinity is a complex and important ontological consideration for Peirce so this is difficult to discuss briefly. (Plus it’s also a bit of a matter of debate)

7. For Peirce Graham’s “real object” and “sensual object” is probably better seen as the dynamic object and immediate object. It doesn’t map exactly onto Graham’s category but is close I think. (See the SEP on Peirce’s Semiotics for more info) But once again given Peirce’s trichotomy we can always talk about firstness (quality being an example) and thirdness.

8. This is hard to briefly discuss and I’ll hold off on this one. As I said time and space is complex and it’s one place I disagree with Graham. So I’ll hold off on this one. I think though elements of this can easily be explicated within Peirce. Peirce of course has a threefold structure although some (such as Ben Udell) argue this should be a four-fold category. (I disagree, but it’s a position within the Peircean community)

Going on with Graham’s post:

but even of finding one that matches the basic model: a cosmos of objects at countless different scales, all real regardless of whether anyone or anything is currently interacting with them, and all withdrawing from one another and interacting only indirectly through a sensual medium.

This is inherently Peirce’s position’s dependent upon what we mean by “sensual medium.” There is a ssense of withdrawal inherent to the nature of the sign.

Are you commenting on your own post?

Are you and Harman on first name basis?

Since he promises to only read your posts, and not the comments to them, do you think he will see you additions/clarifications?