Time and Harman

Posted on August 31, 2010
Filed Under OOP, Philosophy | 9 Comments

As I mentioned I’ve not had time to respond to Levi’s post on OOP and pragmatism beyond a few brief comments. I hope to finish that up tonight. I’ve just been really busy again. I did want to respond to Graham’s latest post though.

He wrote:

On the other hand there are people who claim to have read my books twice, but who still think I hold that time is a background in which objects move around. I don’t even know what to say to that, having slept on it. Prince of Networks is pretty clearly written, I think.

The section on time is just over a six page section starting on page 214. You can read this section at Google Books. Graham’s take of space and time arises out of his interpretation of Heidegger’s fourfold. There are two sets of oppositions in strife. One is real vs. sensual objects while the other dimension is real objects and their qualities. Space and time are “by products of a tension between objects and qualities.” (219)

Now all that said, I have to admit I’ve read this section numerous times and I must just be missing the obvious. My impression is that Graham took ubrage to that. Allow me a defense to my comments though. In last week’s post I wrote,

That is I don’t think there is a heavy engagement with the issue of time. It’s just taken as a clear and uncomplex background in which objects reside. [...]

First regarding what for lack of a better term I’ll call “simple background time.” It’s actually not at all an unreasonable position to take. While the simple notion goes back at least to the Stoics, I personally find time much more troubling. Maybe that’s just because I’m partial to Einstein over the traditional background interpretations of quantum mechanics. Leibniz and Mach just got to me and I’ve long thought spacetime emerges out of object relations rather than being some absolute non-object background. I just think time is related to objects more integrally.

Note though that I am not calling it a substance. Indeed I was careful by bringing up the Stoics rather than Newton. Newton has a substantial space time in which events transpire. The Stoics instead had something halfway between substantial space ala Newton and relative space ala Leibniz. Tensions were also a big deal for the Stoic, albeit not quite in the same way Graham’s OOO has. Interestingly Milič Čapek in his The Concepts of Space and Time: Their Structure and Their Development sees Whitehead as the closest modern analogy to the Stoic view.

Graham described his own system by saying, “space is not the site of relation but of relation and non-relation.” (218) He then said, “Space is both nearness and distance. Things make contact along specific surfaces but are not exhausted by this contact, and recede partially into private depths.” (ibid, emphasis mine)

Of course now I’m wishing I’d never brought it up at all, but it seems pretty clear the Graham doesn’t think his system the same as Leibniz. The link in the post Graham objected to was to Lee Smolin arguing for a more more Leibnizean solution.

Levi appears to have read me the same way as Graham did when he says,

Clark rejects Graham’s account of time because, he says, he is sympathetic to Einstein. However, it is difficult for me to see how Graham’s account of time isn’t perfectly consistent with Einstein’s account of time. Einstein says exactly the same thing: that time and space are produces of objects and how they bend space-time as a result of their mass and velocity. [...] However, the point remains that OOO does not treat space and time as containers in which objects exist. Exactly the reverse.

But let me reiterate that to say there is a background is not to say space or time is a container.

Further I must point out that Einstein failed in achievign Leibniz’ and Mach’s vision of a relativized space time. Many philosophers have actually argued the debate itself is outmoded. (Which might have been a more interesting rejoinder for Levi and Graham to have taken) Certainly I never said Graham’s theory of space and time can’t be reconciled with the physics of General Relativity just as I suspect someone could show it compatible with the traditional sense of time within Quantum Mechanics.

It seems surprising both Levi and Graham took such umbrage to my passing comments. They were, I thought, at best vague and pointing to a promised future discussion.

The main statement I made was,

I’ve long thought spacetime emerges out of object relations rather than being some absolute non-object background. I just think time is related to objects more integrally.

I certainly regret now using the word “absolute.” Which probably was the cause of much problem. Although I meant it more in opposition to the Leibnizean view.

All that said though, I’ll fully confess to not really understanding his view of time and space. After rereading it several more times in light of Levi’s and Graham’s contents I think he is trying to say that we should view time in a near phenomenological sense from the “perspective” of the object looking at its own properties. But that doesn’t quite make sense either. But I think that’s what he’s after. In which case I was wrong. I’ve no problem admitting that. (Indeed it was figuring out OOP that was the point of posting on OOP rather than making an attack on OOP)

Since Levi thinks Graham’s view can be reconciled to relativity I’d love him to spell this out in a bit more detail. Because honestly right now I can’t make heads nor tails of it. Maybe someone else can chime in and help me out?

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Comments

9 Responses to “Time and Harman”

Clark,

Borth Graham’s point and my own is precisely that space and time are not mediums or containers. Objects precede space and time such that space and time arise from objects, space and time are not backgrounds in which events take place. To attribute the claim that space and time are backgrounds of objects in OOO is to claim the exact opposite of what OOO argues. Graham outlines this early in Prince of Networks when discussing Latour’s thesis about space and time. It’s for this reason that I’m perplexed by your suggestion that there’s some sort of contradiction between Einsteinian relativity and OOO. OOO is very much Einsteinian in spirit.

Levi, I suspect where I got confused was the examples and then the statement it wasn’t Leibniz or relations. So I probably was taking it as an emergent “something” out of that tension between objects and relations. Clearly wrong I guess, although I still don’t understand. It’s not enough to say objects precede space or time, in my opinion. But perhaps that’s where I was confusing you and Graham.

Once again though I wasn’t saying there was a contradiction between SR or GR and OOO but rather Einstein’s Leibnizean quest. But clearly I wasn’t clear enough in how I presented it. (Mea culpa)

But I really don’t mind being completely wrong in all this. I’m still confused as I said as I can completely understand space and time as relations. I can’t wrap my head around what OOO is arguing. Undoubtedly a cognitive limit of my own making.

Hello Clark!

I’ll offer up my own difficulties I have had whilst grappling with OO(x) and how I tackled them with the intention that it may (I hope!) shred some light on your own situation.

On the understanding of space and time I will point you to a quote by Kant on the topic of transcendental realism – found in Levi’s post here… http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2010/06/16/kant-and-empirical-realism/

To this idealism is opposed transcendental realism, which regards space and time as something given in themselves (independent of our sensiblity). The transcendental realist therefore represents outer appearances (if their reality is conceded) as things in themselves, which would exist independently of us and our sensibility and thus would also be outside us according to pure concepts of the understanding. (CPR, A369)

—–

Given that OO(x) is not a duality or a monism but a pluralistic ontology means that conceptions of time/space you may be familiar with via Kant get re-jigged from being something that is ‘general’ or universal and becomes anchored with the individual (singularity) of the object. There is nothing “in common” between objects including space/time.

However I would contend in line with Derrida and Nancy that there is a sharing of singularity that OO(x) is blind to due to wishing to posit itself as first philosophy and a fixation on the in-itself. I will point you to my post on this, which I am hesitant to do as it rather raw and unpolished and for these reasons I am little bit embarrassed… http://untiedthreads.blogspot.com/search/label/Nancy. Nothing like a bit of blind groping.

Will.

I think I’m just going to skip any discussion time until the end. Originally that was my plan and I really should have stuck to it. Despite Graham’s assurances this is clearly written, I’m pretty convinced I need to read Harman’s other books to make sense of this. I felt a little discouraged about this all. (I don’t like to make misreadings this egregious – the last time I did this was my missing something fundamental in Donald Davidson leading me to misread him in some key ways) However I talked to several OOP proponents and several of them said they didn’t understand Graham here either. So that made me feel a bit better. Or at least having company.

As to your point about objects not sharing time, that really helps. After Graham said I was so egregiously misreading him I kind of wondered if there was no shared time. That makes reconciling with GR or QM a bit confusing to me as in terms of physics some stable global manifold has to emerge. I suppose one could say the interactions create a space where it all happens to work out. But it’s terribly confusing to me. Partially because it’s not a normal “subjective time” ala Augustine or even Heidegger (despite the connection to the four-fold) but it’s not an objective time either. I assumed it was an emergent objective time since it wasn’t a relative time. But that’s obviously not the case either. As I said, I can’t make heads nor tails out of it.

I get Heidegger’s sense of time since it is the phenomenal experience of time and not time as such. (Ontological rather than ontic) With the move to OOO there isn’t that distinction to be made as such.

With OOO it’d be very helpful if there was a more detailed discussion of space and time, especially relative to regular physical objects and physics. Instead we only get the example of flying on a plane between two cities. But if we’re supposed to be avoiding correlationism then I’m not sure how that helps unless one completely treats objects like Heideggarian dasein which is what we’re not supposed to do.

Sorry for the delay responding to Levi on the pragmatism angle. I’ve just been totally swamped the past week.

I think I’m just going to skip any discussion time until the end.

That would be a shame.

Originally that was my plan and I really should have stuck to it. Despite Graham’s assurances this is clearly written, I’m pretty convinced I need to read Harman’s other books to make sense of this. I felt a little discouraged about this all.

It is counter-intuitive, which comes from the arguments needing the pre-comprehension of a ‘plural’ ontology. I was undetermined whether OOx was a throwback to the Greeks, or that of the singular god been multiplied authorized by an apparent rejection of ‘correlationism’ i.e. anthropocentricism. From what I have read, I am inclined to believe that OOx leans towards the latter.

I get Heidegger’s sense of time since it is the phenomenal experience of time and not time as such. (Ontological rather than ontic) With the move to OOO there isn’t that distinction to be made as such.

The thing with monotheism disposition, is not so much the singular god in place of the many, but by the fact of divine uncity is the correlate of a presence that can no longer be given in this world. In this sense OOx can be seen as the undoing of the work of Kant in the sense that he gives a certain pertinence to the empirical, whereas for OOx a kind of transcendental reduction takes place. The confusing thing being that it is a transcendental reduction not to a singular god, but multiple ‘gods’ each of these ‘gods’ are singular. At the same time though it introduces a problem of genesis of multiple singular gods (objects), in that like the Greek gods being custodians of the given (there is not a separate space for ‘divinity’ -in the beyond – and so there isn’t a ‘sending’ of the given, the given is just that, given – hence why ostensibly heidegger is seemingly of no use).

As to your point about objects not sharing time, that really helps. After Graham said I was so egregiously misreading him I kind of wondered if there was no shared time.

Teehee.

With OOx it is all about the interaction between the internal withdrawn object and the object in extension, in other words intra-objectivly, bearing in mind how the extended aspect of the object mediates with other objects in their extended state, and this mediation has limits due to the reduction to the ‘hidden’ withdrawn aspect of the object.

Despite protestations to the contrary, this to me seems ripe for an analysis along the lines of signification i.e. object = hidden/extended = signifier/signified in which the signified is ultimatly reduced to the signifier.

Will.

Well I just think time is the most difficult and complex issue so it’s better to see where I’m off in the more foundational issues (in terms of pedagogy).

As to the issue of time being the tension between the extension and withdrawal, I’d be interested if you can tell me if I’m out in left field on the following. It sounds a lot like Leibniz’ internal and external notions of the monads. However for Leibniz the pre-established harmony by God (his version of the logos) allows for this. That’s why a fully relational physics is philosophically possible for Leibniz. (Ignoring whether the physics ever worked out) Here we lose the external relationalism (and I can’t tell if Harmon rejects this entirely or is, like Heidegger, just worried about an other sense of time). But I don’t see how that tension between the two senses of monad works without the pre-established harmony.

Your comments about a plurality of gods seems to suggest this. (If I’m reading you right) The question is how one gets at a coherent physics from this. Levi in particular says OOO is compatible with GR, but if there is no way for the separate monads/objects to “link up” in a coherent fashion then I just don’t see how that is possible.

There is an echo (and perhaps once again mistaken on my part) of Husserl’s attempts via a kind of Cartesian reduction to save the inner and outer worlds at a common “point.”

As for your point about signs, that’s going to be part of my reply to Levi that I’m far, far behind on. In that area I think I’m a bit more confident.

I like the idea of OOO. However the more I think about it the less I think I can accept Harman’s form. (Although there is still Levi’s and others out there)

Well I just think time is the most difficult and complex issue so it’s better to see where I’m off in the more foundational issues (in terms of pedagogy).

As to the issue of time being the tension between the extension and withdrawal, I’d be interested if you can tell me if I’m out in left field on the following. It sounds a lot like Leibniz’ internal and external notions of the monads.

Spinoza or Leibniz? OOx for the later, but I must confess I know very little of L and of monads and probably could been more lucid in my last reply with a greater familiarity with his work.

However for Leibniz the pre-established harmony by God (his version of the logos) allows for this. That’s why a fully relational physics is philosophically possible for Leibniz. (Ignoring whether the physics ever worked out) Here we lose the external relationalism (and I can’t tell if Harmon rejects this entirely or is, like Heidegger, just worried about an other sense of time).

I’m grappling with a similar series of questions. On my reading there is an ‘other sense of time’, each time, ‘each time’ because of the plurality of objects.

But I don’t see how that tension between the two senses of monad works without the pre-established harmony.

The ‘pre-established harmony’ is not between internal/external aspect of objects in general, but on the basis of each singular object. An object is “for-itself”, in which other objects are absolutely other and irreducible. There is not a general ‘harmony’, but many harmonies as there are objects.

Your comments about a plurality of gods seems to suggest this. (If I’m reading you right) The question is how one gets at a coherent physics from this. Levi in particular says OOO is compatible with GR, but if there is no way for the separate monads/objects to “link up” in a coherent fashion then I just don’t see how that is possible.

The goal posts of what counts as a coherent physics shifts once the apparent plurality of substances is reckoned with. This is beyond me however.

There is an echo (and perhaps once again mistaken on my part) of Husserl’s attempts via a kind of Cartesian reduction to save the inner and outer worlds at a common “point.”

Yes I’ve been drawing upon Husserl in my understanding as he deals with similar problems as with OOx. At risk of sounding monotonous though, what one has to bear in mind is that for Husserl (like Kant) there is one ‘general’ common point, but for OOx there are as many ‘common points’ as there are objects. Many logos, nevertheless for there to be an understanding of the ‘many’ there is an pre-comprehension of the “one” that goes unacknowledged.

As for your point about signs, that’s going to be part of my reply to Levi that I’m far, far behind on. In that area I think I’m a bit more confident.

A certain axiomatic of OOx means that any reference to signs get lumped with correlationism from the get go, and so rhetorically you will be way behind and facing an uphill struggle. If I was you, I would get familiar enough with OOx to put the thrust of your argument in their own terms. Otherwise you face the additional task of grappling with the fierce reactionary policing of territory whenever OOx is viewed as under attack from an “outside” other. In other words from OOx perspective, critique stemming from signs does not respect the distinction between internal/external relations (which to my mind is a fundamentally flawed understanding of signification on their part), so you must demonstrate a certain pertinence to the distinction via signification.

I like the idea of OOO. However the more I think about it the less I think I can accept Harman’s form. (Although there is still Levi’s and others out there)

It reckons with plurality in such a way that it does not de-centre a singular logos, but perseveres it, holds it back in reserve, in order to repeats it, and copy it. All this talk of plurality obscures a negated “one” that gets expressed in strictly limited domains. In this way, on my reading, it conforms to the Heidegger’s ‘enframing’ (gestell) which ironically is a mode of human existence.

Will.

The problem of what you present is that if true it treats each object as having nearly a sollipsism. That is I don’t understand the place of actual objective interactions. I’ll hold off saying anything more until I get to the issue of relations in OOO as that’s a place I’m pretty confused as well. (Not as badly as with time, but in some ways it’s a more foundational issue)

As for signs, I think the problem is that most OOO proponents see times purely in terms of human language use rather than something “objective” and outside of humans. (I know that was Levi’s original critique, although he backed away from it a bit given Peirce’s semiotic realism)

It could well be that there is the necessity of a One here to make all the pieces fit together. (More or less what Leibniz had with God fulfilling this role) I don’t want to make that claim though just due to the nature of things.

I tried to clarify my thoughts on a recent blog post, my contention is that for OOP, substantial forms is used in such away as to to be external to signification process but Derrida/Pierce already covers this via a critique of the transcendental signified.

http://untiedthreads.blogspot.com/2010/09/levis-use-of-substantial-form-and.html

I would be grateful if you could skim read it and see if you can follow it.

Will.

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