More Mormon Concept of God

Posted on February 20, 2012
Filed Under Philosophy, Religion | 11 Comments

Bill Vallicella last week had posted a followup on his questioning about the Mormon concept of God. I’ve meant to reply for some time but I’ve been sporting a rather nasty sinus infection and head cold. I’ve learned by hard experience to be careful writing analysis when sick. I rarely turns out well. Fortunately I was able to get some antibiotics and can think a little clearer now. Bill’s post is primarily directed to Blake Ostler and I don’t want to step in for Blake too much.

The post is basically about Anselm’s criteria for God. Now of course from a Mormon perspective we can always just ask what makes Anselm’s view so defining. Further it is wrapped up in a particular metaphysical argument that I just don’t find persuasive in the least. (Although I think the Ontological Arguments is something everyone ought engage with carefully – it’s much more subtle than typically thought)

Blake’s approach to deity makes a distinction between the persons and the ousia. Now I think there can be some problems there but for the sake of the discussion Anselm’s criteria will be applied just to the ousia, which for Mormon consists of the Godhead and more importantly the properties of the Godhead.

Bill’s main complaint is the following:

Ostler claims that the divine persons are contingently related to each other.  It follows that the Godhead as the unity of the persons contingently exists. Please note that if x always existed and always will exist,it doesn’t follow that x necessarily exists.  (If x exists at all times in the actual world, it does not follow that x exists in every possible world.)  If the divine persons “c an so plan that there will always be at least two joined as one” (321, emphasis added), it doesn’t follow that they must so plan.  Now if the Godhead contingently exists, then there can be a greater being than “God qua the divine persons united as one Godhead,” namely, a being having the same properties bu existing necessarily.

I’m not sure this follows. It may be that the Godhead is necessary but the figures within the Godhead are not. That is it is necessary there be beings making up the Godhead but not which beings those are. Put in a more modal presentation there may be no world such that the Godhead is not but there will be many worlds with different persons making up the Godhead. Thus the persons are contingent and the Godhead necessary.

The counter argument might be that if there are two Godheads but with different persons they can’t be considered the same Godhead. I’m not terribly sympathetic to that view although I know it’s more or less the same argument for why there must be a substantial soul. (i.e. there must be something that is the same when the parts all change – effectively this argument about Godhead is very similar to arguments about soul)

Now can we conceive of a greater being than this Godhead? Bill might reply it is greater to have the same beings making up the Godhead but it isn’t at all clear why that is greater.

 

There is a second point Bill makes which seems to be the issue of essence versus substance. Of course the ousia of the Trinity is peculiar in that it is both of a sort. That is the properties is a substance. Clearly Blake’s more social trinitarian approach doesn’t hold to that. I don’t want to deal too much with Blake’s view since there are some subtleties to his view which I’ve forgotten. Further how he thinks about the topic is pretty wrapped up in a type of Process Theology I don’t ultimately adopt.

It’s a good question that I think has largely been left unaddressed in Mormon theology. Orson Pratt attempted to adopt something like the traditional Trinitarian ousia but transformed into a material entity. Pratt’s view was repudiated by Brigham Young on several levels. Of course Young’s own views ended up rejected as well but Pratt’s notion ultimately never caught on despite the influence of some of his other ideas. Young’s main objection to Pratt was that it was wrong to worship the properties independent of the persons. To Young all that mattered were the persons. I think that Young/Pratt debate is probably illustrative for how Mormons will perceive the Anselm question in that I think it suggests Mormons are loath to talk about godhood except as manifest in persons or their community.

 

Related posts:

  1. Reading Club: Ostler 2 – My Views
  2. Problems with Mormons and the Trinity
  3. Reading Club: Ostler 2
  4. Reading Club: Ostler 1
  5. McDermott Responds to Critics
  6. Gadamer and Authority

Comments

11 Responses to “More Mormon Concept of God”

I am afraid I cannot take the Anselm-ian argument for the existence of God seriously. It is creative, but the idea that “a being of which nothing greater can be conceived” is coherent seems like an unjustified presupposition to me. What does “greater” mean?

As far as Mormon theology goes, I would say one reasonable view would be the position that neither the Godhead nor the fulness of divinity as we know it necessarily exists “in the beginning”, but that the probability of individuals forming a spiritual union that has those properties approaches one as time goes to infinity.

The key is that not that the divine nature exist necessarily, but rather that actions of individuals / eternal spirits ultimately lead to there being only one divine nature (corresponding to that which is shared among the members of that spiritual union), and only one ultimate spiritual union, not an arbitrary number of them.

I agree I can’t take it seriously, although Bill is primarily using it to determine an object of worship. My problem with the conceivability line is first, what makes something greater? I doubt I agree with Anselm on that point. (Note that divine simplicity arose out of that reasoning during the medieval era) But even ignoring the problem of ranking properties there’s the problem of the relationship of conceivability and reality. It might be we can conceive of something greater but there’s no way that great could be actualized. Where are we left then?

The problem of the “beginning” in Mormon thought is that the mainstream view assumes an infinite past. Beginning is just the beginning of this particular creation with there being an infinite number of creations.

Clark, when I say “beginning” I mean the limit as t goes to minus infinity. That is why I put it in quotes. Of course on some Mormon views it doesn’t make any sense to suggest that anything has ever been different on average at any time in the past or at any time in the future. I consider the suggestion almost as depressing as the idea that time goes around in a circle.

Oh, I understood. It’s a fairly common view I think. I’m not sure I buy it but then I’m not sure how to deal with a real infinite past either.

Here is my response to Bill: I think that you raise a good question. However, let me observe that I did not suggest or admit that a GCB must be a necessarily existing being. I think that conclusion must be demonstrated. You have assumed that a (the) GCB must be a necessarily existing being. I am going to argue that a GCB must be a necessarily existing being in one sense (but not the sense assumed by the ontological argument) and need not be in another sense — and indeed cannot be a necessary being in this other sense.

First, why think that God must be a GCB? Well, it seems reasonable to suppose that if we are going to rely on God for our deliverance in the sense required of faith, God must be trusted to never pass out of existence. If God could just cease to exist, then we cannot truly place faith in God. But is logically necessary existence required for this kind of faith? I don’t see why it would be. Suppose that God (and here I’ll leave God vague as between the Godhead and the divine persons) existed simply of factual or metaphysical necessity. That is, it is just God’s nature to exist — like in the sense that it is just the universe’s nature (in the broad sense of whatever just happens to be the case) to exist in naturalism. Or perhaps God could exist in the way that Platonic ideas are supposed to just exist but not of logical necessity.

Let me posit this: each of the divine persons exists of ontological necessity where the N is explained by the fact that it is just their nature to exist. Let me also posit that nothing can cause them to cease to exist. Think broadly of the way mass-energy was assumed to always exist in Steady State Theory. So the divine persons exist of such broadly factual necessity.

However, the divine persons are not necessarily divine in the sense that they always manifest a fullness of all divine properties. They could choose to not have such properties, but they cannot choose to not exist. They have the properties in dependence on a particular kind of indwelling sharing of life, glory and love for each other.

However, as I said, love is (necessarily) such that it must be freely chosen. There may be forms of love that aren’t voluntary or freely chosen, but they are inferior to the type of love that is freely chosen. The divine persons exist of factual necessity, and if they freely choose to love one another, then they also enjoy the fullness of divine attributes. When they love each other this way, they are joined in the kind of perichoretic unity spoken of in John 17. When joined as one in this kind of maximal unity where the divine persons are nevertheless distinct, they are one Godhead. Given that they are in this unity, they possess a joint power of maximal power. We could say that the divine attributes emerge or exist in dependence on being in such a relationship.

Here is a key point: nothing outside of the divine persons in the Godhead can cause them to sever their relationship which gives rise to (participate in, share, jointly indwell in or something like that) to the divine attributes. They possess the property of maximal power in virtue of being in this relationship. Therefore, unless they voluntarily choose to sever the loving relationship, the continued existence of the Godhead is assured.

Now, it is clear that it is logically possible that the Godhead could cease to exist. The Godhead does not exist of logical or factual necessity. However, the Godhead does exist in a way that is sufficient for faith: in the sense that we can trust them to always love one another in the same way we can trust God to always love us. However, as I stated, love must be freely chosen. What could cause the divine persons to cease to love one another? Well, a simple free choice by any one of them.

However, let’s also posit that the divine persons have the properties of perfect knowledge and perfect rationality as a result of sharing a fullness of the divine attributes (that seems pretty reasonable to me). Let’s also say that it is always rational to choose perfect love. After all, participating fully in the divine unity in such a loving relationship is believed to be the most fulfilling kind of life and existence possible by most Christian thinkers. So a rational being, if acting rationally, would always freely choose to be in such a relationship. So nothing outside of the Godhead can cause them to either cease to exist or to choose to cease to be one Godhead. Further, we can trust with perfect faith that they will not freely choose to cease to be in such a relationship in such a way that would leave the universe (all there is) at the mercy of meaninglessness and Godforsaken existence.

One more point is crucial based on a value judgment that I am willing to argue for (and have argued for): a being that can freely choose to love another is superior to one that cannot. A relationship that arises from freely chosen love is superior to one that is not. So the Godhead and the individual divine persons who participate in the properties of godliness or Godhood is superior to a suppose gcb that does not exist in such a relationship. The supposed purely simple gcb is not quite as great as it could be because it is not in a divine relationship of freely chosen love but at most in a relationship that is necessitated (though in what way it is necessary and by what the relationship is necessitated would have to be carefully parsed).

It is usually admitted that not all great-making properties are compossible. God cannot have both the property of being the most compassionate being possible and the happiest given that many in the world suffer greatly in many different ways. If God is just as happy if we all go to hell for eternity and suffer greatly as if we are all saved in eternal bliss, then so much the worse for “god”. When valuing great-making properties, I suggest that loving unity derived from freely chosen love is far superior to a single, solitary being that exists of necessity.

One last point: this view is far more Christian in my opinion that the view of the gcb in classical thought. Any view of the Godhead in Christian thought must allow for distinct divine persons and the possibility that one of the divine persons can become incarnated. That is what is driving this view.

If I recall Bill has trouble with the incarnation as I mentioned in his previous post.

I have to confess I’m just not up on the nuance of necessary beings since it’s never been a topic that interesting to me. I vaguely remember studying the issue so as to better grasp Anselm’s argument (both the original formulation, Plantinga’s formulation and then a few years later Marion’s take on it). However that was a heck of a long time ago. So whatever memory I had of the details has long since fled.

Anselm’s argument is one of those things I think everyone interested in philosophy ought study carefully to appreciate it but then move on. I’ve returned to it several times but never in careful detail.

I have tried to post a few times on his site, but he won’t allow it to be posted. My point I would really like to make, but he refuses to put on his post is that (and I tried to say this in demonstrative words) Mormons don’t play these games of what constitutes God. He just IS, or I Am that I Am and nothing more needs to be said. The Mormon God is built on Scripture and Revelation and not philosophy. I think he would be getting truly somewhere in his understand of Mormonism’s idea of God if this was allowed to be articulated. Even you and Blake state this is nothing more than mental exercises without impact on how Mormons really see the issues. For me, that he won’t even acknowledge this shows the weakness of his arguments.

It seems pretty clear to me that nothing other than the God of the philosophers can count as God to Vallicella. He is assuming his own conclusion, just like Howsepian.

Jetboy, he’s looking for a philosophical argument. Merely rejecting his premises isn’t really making an argument which is why he’s probably not allowing your post through.

Mark, I think he’s more or less stated that elsewhere. What he finds with his intuitions are the absolutism that the classic philosophers have brought up.

Jettboy: I’m trying to figure it out too since I posted the response in 7 above to his website 2 days ago and it still isn’t appearing.

Bill Vallicella has now posted my response at Maverick Philosopher. He kindly explained that it got hung up in spam because it was too long.

Leave a Reply