Over at First Things there is an interesting article against pragmatism. It is interesting for several reasons. First off it argues that pragmatism is incompatible with Christianity. This is interesting for a secondary reason. Mormonism is often considered a fairly pragmatic religion. (Certianly our more naturalistic critics might debate that at times) What struck me though was the basic reason the author saw in this conflict.
Christianity is essentially a contemplative faith. The ultimate purpose of life is to know God, and beyond this end there is no other end. Action is necessarily relegated to a position of lesser dignity than contemplation. The kingdom of heaven cannot be envisioned as a place where we shall be able to get a great deal done, for there will be nothing to do apart from rejoicing in God and in the glory of a redeemed creation.
Obviously this is the exact opposite of a Mormon conception of heaven. Indeed I suspect many Mormons would suggest that contemplation without action isn't really contemplation. (A rather pragmatic perspective) Certainly our conception of heaven is filled with work and we conceive of God as fundamentally having a work and a purpose. To know as we are known entails joining in with this work.
So the essay is of interest to Mormons, although ironically for reasons opposite to what the author intends. He may well show you why considering pragmatists like Peirce, James or others is a good idea. After all the author writes:
But a follower of James, or Peirce, or Dewey could scarcely be an orthodox Christian and carry on a life devoted to participating eternally in the beatific vision. It may be hyperbolic but it is not baseless to say that a Christian's heaven - a scene of profound, everlasting inaction - must have some resemblance to a pragmatist's hell.
Evil is an interesting topic - possibly even more interesting than the good. After all we all have some sense of the good coming from God and being tied up with his manner of being in some fashion. But what about evil? Is it simply being mistaken? Is it tied to our intents? Is it privation? Is it lack of harmony?
Over at the University of Virginia their Institute for Advanced Studies has an interesting social and philosophical journal called The Hedgehog Review. Many of the topics are quite interesting, but one of the more interesting was a whole issue devoted to the topic of evil. Check it out. At a bear minimum even if you don't find the essays too terribly interesting, the topics raised are. And sometimes the best use of a paper is to get you to reconsider issues rather than necessarily learn anything from the writing itself. But personally I was fascinated by the issue. It reminded me of some of the things I'd considered when reading Ricouer's The Symbolism of Evil
Speaking of Ricouer's extremely interesting work, some of you may be interested in the following paper which discusses some very interesting issues:
"Me, the Self I make Myself and Evil: The Completeness of the Fault in Paul Ricoeur's Philosophy of the Will" by Rachel Waterstradt.
I also probably ought to at least provide one quote from Ricouer so that I can perhaps excite people to read this often neglected philosopher.
. . . a symbol is first of all the destroyer of a prior symbol. Thus we see the symbolism of sin take shape about images which are the inverse of stain images; in place of exterior contact, it is now deviation (from the target, the straight path, the limit not to be crossed, and so on) which serves as guiding schema. This switch in themes is the expression of an overturning of fundamental motifs. A new category of religious experience is born: that of 'before God,' of which the Jewish berit, the Alliance, is the witness. . . . What becomes then of the initial symbol? On the one hand, evil is no longer a thing, but a broken relationship, hence a nothing; this nothing is expressed in terms of the vaporousness and vanity of the idol.... But at the same time a new positivity of evil arises, no longer an exterior 'something,' but a real enslaving power. The symbol of captivity, which transforms a historical event (the Egyptian captivity, then the Babylonian captivity) into a schema of existence, represents the highest expression achieved by the penitential experience of Israel. ( The Philosophy of Paul Ricouer, 40)
Earlier this week I discussed Derrida and the Plotinian notion of matter. Probably a few people who are familiar with Derrida are unfamiliar with Plotinus beyond the typically negative portrayal of neoPlatonism usually given in many texts. One good overview of Plotinus is found at the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. He portrays quite well how matter is the principle of differentiation and is completely other.
My thoughts on Derrida unfortunately really haven't been written on in any online sources I could find. Derrida clearly alludes to the notion by his discussion of Khora and the notion of two discourses being present in the Timaeus. This alludes to Plotinus I think (who is mentioned by Derrida in "How to Avoid Speaking." I'm rather surprised that only the concept of God in neoPlatonic thought is addressed. I did find one reference to a paper by Matthew Halteman called "Similar Spaces: Plotinus and Derrida on Matter and Khora." However I don't think it has ever been published.
To clarify what Plotinus means by matter somewhat, it might be best to simply say that matter is not "stuff" for Plotinus but rather the principle of ultimate differentiation. It is pure difference. All of the other kinds of "Being" that Plotinus discusses are all holistic in nature. For instance while we can talk of souls (basically the level of discursive thinking) those souls are still holistic and technically are portions of the world-soul. Any separation is artificial. As we rise above the level of soul to the level of intellect we have a pure kind of "intuition" which is still more holistic and involves none of the progression we find in discursive thinking. (The difference of say pain itself as compared to speaking about pain)
When we think of Derrida's work of differánce as that which enables discursive thought (arche-writing or signification in general terms) then his notion of différance makes a lot of since as pure difference or the principle of differentiation. It also explains his use of the Khora from Plato's Timaeus. The Timaeus is a very primal writing that uses "images" rather than pure discursive thinking as is common in philosophical writing. Indeed it is one of the most "mythic" of Plato's writings. Place and Matter are very similar and the conception of Matter is almost certainly based upon the use of receptical in the Timaeus, both for Matter proper and intelligible Matter.
For those not qutie as familiar with the issues, for Plotinus Matter or pure differentiation limits the intellectual realm differentiating it. Thus at the level of intelligible matter or discursively thinking what is left is only a trace of the "whole" being signified. Further, such significations are misleading and incorrect. It parallels Umberto Eco's definition of a sign as something we can lie with. Differentiation, in Plotinus' view breaks or shatter the essential holism of Being. In the original holism all signs participate in each other and are unified. In differentiation which makes possible the very act of signification, the opposite trend occurs.
For those not familiar with Derrida's notion of différance here is a good overview.
A few people asked me why I keep discussing infinities. Infinities are difficult concepts at the best of times. Even people with mathematical backgrounds often have a hard time grasping them. For instance mathematicians recognize that there are numerous kinds of infinity. For instance the set of integers is the infinity called aleph-0. Obviously the set of integers is infinite, but it turns out that the set of real numbers is actually larger and is called aleph-1. There are then even more infinities above this. Cantor did a lot of work on this developing the notion of transfinite math.
So how is this relevant to Mormonism? Well often these notions are tied to neoPlatonism, a topic I've broached here a few times. I'll not go into the details, but typically in neoPlatonism the intellectual realm is infinite and the higher realms have higher sets of infinities - often considered to be greater than any kind of infinity. Perhaps we might even call this aleph-infinity.
The implication for this can be seen in some common sense notions about religion. Mormons often consider rules like the Law of Moses approximations of what God wants, tailored for the needs, understanding, and capabilities of a given people. As people learn and increase in knowledge they are given a better understanding of both morality as well as of God. In Judaism there is a notion called "having the law written upon your heart." This is found in the scriptures as well, such as Rom 2:15 or 2 Ne 8:7. The idea is that ideally we should obey laws which aren't spoken or written approximations of what to do but rather be in harmony with the real law. This true law is the source of all discourse about law but must transcend them. Why? Because it is infinite and any finite set of commands will always leave something out and add something unintended. Thus the progression in Mormon thought is from a finite set of descriptive laws to the ultimate presecriptive law. That prescriptive law is the infinite found within God's will. As our will and God's will are unified, we come to encompass this law.
There are other examples of this infinity, especially in Mormon metaphysics. But perhaps that example can explain why infinity is some important. The reason why there are higher infinities is slightly more complex. As a brief, perhaps somewhat misleading explanation, consider if you need to do an infinite number of tasks, each one of which relies on some other kind of infinity. Then imagine and infinite number of those. Depending upon how the tasks are interrelated this may require higher infinities. If we start discussing possibilities or potential acts in terms of intents toward other potentials then this can occur quite easy. Once again many of these notions are anticpated in prior discussions of infinities - especially the infinities found within many forms of neoPlatonism.
My apologies for falling so far behind in the blog. We found out last week my wife is pregnant and so probably updates will be far more infrequent than I'd intended.
Derrida has frequently been tied to neoPlatonism and Christian mysticism. Derrida himself has in numerous places denied this connection. Most notably in "How to Avoid Speaking: Denials." In connection with the famous neoPlatonist mystic, the pseudo-Dionysus, Derrida contrasts his discussion of différance as a discussion of a hyper-ousia or being beyond being and something less than being and less than real, often discussed by Derrida as the Khora. The term Khora arises out of Plato's dialog, Timaeus. It is sometimes translated as place or receptical. Derrida wants to suggest that his notion is what provides a place for discourse but not what is more full than discourse.
Most philosophers who have tried to tie Derrida to some sort of neoPlatonic theology or even mysticism often see in différance the One of neoPlatonism. I'll not go through their arguments, but they wish to see in the One not a totalizing One, as often conceived as the One of neoPlatonism. (Especially in the German idealist conception culminating with Hegel) Rather they wish to see an unbound conception of the One which is beyond any expression. The problem is Derrida's denial's of this One.
Some philosophers have argued with Derrida's understanding of neoPlatonism and the One. They note that literally the One is a not-being and not a hyper-being as Derrida portrays it. (Although that is but one interpretation of neoPlatonism) I discussed Eric Perl's article "Signifying Nothing: Being as Sign in Neoplatonism and Derrida" a few months ago. Perl's argument is that the "nothing" labeling the One of neoPlatonism is literally that: nothing. It is a lack of ground for existence. As such he certainly finds himself adopting a position more like Derrida's.
What I wish to do is to suggest a different position. As I see it, if différance is the place for discourse, what it parallels best in neoPlatonism isn't the One but Matter. Keep in mind that Derrida speaks of différance as the "completely other" (toutre autre) This notion of Other comes from Levinas and his ethics of the other. Yet Derrida radicalizes the notion, even as he follows logically its economy. While Derrida's language often does sound like the language of the neoPlatonic One, it also sounds like the Matter of Plotinus.
Now Matter is a thing that is brought under order - like all that shares its
nature by participation or by possessing the same principle - therefore, necessarily,
Matter is The Undelimited and not merely the recipient of a nonessential quality
of Indefiniteness entering as an attribute. [...]
Matter, then, must be described as Indefinite of itself, by its natural opposition
to Reason-Principle. [...]
Then Matter is simply Alienism (Other) [the Principle of Difference]?
No: it is merely that part of Alienism which stands in contradiction with the
Authentic Existents which are Reason-Principles. So understood, this
non-existence has a certain measure of existence; for it is identical with
Privation, which also is a thing standing in opposition to the things that
exist in Reason. [...] For in Matter we have no mere absence of means
or of strength; it is utter destitution - of sense, of virtue, of beauty, of
pattern, of Ideal principle, of quality. (Enneads, II.4.15-16, emphasis mine)
Note how for Plotinus, unlike the One which is ineffable because it is more than Being and the source of Being, Matter is the exact opposite. It is totally other (Alienism in the above translation) as opposition to all reason - all discourse and all intelligibility. If privation is the "gap" in a thing relative to its "complete" intended sense, then Matter is pure privation. It is the gap, the difference, in which all discourse finds itself.
Derrida's attempts to avoid the One of theology or neoPlatonism focus on a not-speaking not because what one does not speak of exceeds what one wishes to say. He wishes to avoid speaking because there in nothing to say. As Derrida says, "this secret can not be determined and is nothing, as these people themselves recognize, they have no secret." ("How to Avoid Speaking: Denials" in Derrida and Negative Theology, 89)
and Theology
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