McMurrin, The Theological Foundations of the Mormon Religion, pp. 12 - 18.
The rest of McMurrin's introductory chapter deals two key philosophical issues that I think are extremely helpful for contrasting Mormon theology from mainstream Christian theology. The first is the issue of Being vs. Becoming. This is sometimes considered what remains constant and what changes in any phenomena. However McMurrin, unfortunately, dives right into fundamental ontology in terms of the absolutes of the universe. This is in keeping with how he approaches things up to this point, but as I mentioned this isn't the best way to introduce the topic as it tends to assume a fair familiarity with philosophy.
In terms of absolutes the issue is whether the fundamental character of existence itself is stasis, with change being an illusion, or change, with stasis being an illusion. McMurrin spends only a page or so on this topic, but as I mentioned, it really deserves more. I'll not spend much time on it, if only because I don't think Mormon philosophy itself addresses the issue. McMurrin introduces the topic because of the influence of Platonism on traditional Christianity.
In Platonism there are static ideals or ideas that are more real than the world of change we see around us. Thus, for instance, there may be numerous cats in this world, but they are all different manifestations of some ideal form of catness. This catness is both real and more fundamental than any individual cat. The way our modern mind thinks is exactly the opposite. We think individual cats are most real and that the catness they share in common is really just a collection of common attributes. Some might go so far as to say that this common "cat" they have in common is little more than a name or a title. Those of you familiar with Blake Ostler's introduction to his book this notion of names or titles is quite important. However, at least at this stage, McMurrin doesn't address this issue.
I don't necessarily criticize him for that, although it certainly would have given readers something more concrete to grab hold of and understand. But McMurrin's point is that the ultimate constituent or nature of existence is Greek thought moved over into Christian conceptions of God. If, for Plato, these abstract "ideas" weren't just ideas in a mind but individual existing "things" independent of anyone thinking of them, then the way Christians think of things like spirits, God, and other spiritual realities are viewed accordingly.
A related issue is the topic of universals and particulars. You can quickly see how they are related. My cat example discusses the notion of a universal of a cat versus particular cats. As I said, we tend to think of particulars rather than general notions or universals. When we do think of generals we tend to consider them as names or concepts in our head and not anything real. (Real in the sense that they exist independent of anyone thinking about them)
However there are things in modern thought that people consider universals. Consider laws of physics like the law of gravity. That seems a universal. We don't tend to think that a ball moves because it thinks about some idea about gravity and acts accordingly. Rather we think a ball is matter moving according to universal laws. Now those who think there are only particulars have answers for this. But I'll not get into that particular form of the universal / particular debate. I do want to bring up Orson Pratt. He tried to resolve this problem of universals by having all matter be intelligent. Thus there are universals, but they are universal precisely because they are just ideas in people's minds. A ball is made up of all sorts of simple individual minds that act according to these ideas.
I bring this up because in his discussion of universals, McMurrin assumes that Pratt adopts the view that universals are real in a platonic way. (i.e. they are universal ideas existing independent of any mind) This is quite different from what Pratt actually believes. Further while Pratt's ideas about God or Godness seem similar to Platonism, there is an important difference. Orson Pratt believes that it is individual things having the properties of Godness. Now he adopts the view that what we worship are the properties and not the persons who hold the properties. (i.e. we don't wosrship God the Father, we worship those godlike attributes that the Father happens to have) That is similar to Platonism, but important in the major difference that Pratt rejects abstract real entities. Given his discussion of Being and Becoming and Universals vs. Particulars, this is a rather egregious error to make. It is even worse since it is an important point that needed to be clarified in the issue of Being and Becoming. Because McMurrin looks only at the foundational level of ultimate existence and not more "regular" discussions, he misses this important point.
The other problem is that McMurrin completely misses the issue of names or titles versus substance. That is, does God refer to a title or does it refer to some entity. Mainstream Christians believe it refers only the the universal abstract entity that is the substance of God. That is God always refers to what we might call the Godhead but in terms of what is essential to this Godhead. This means not only is it not just a name or a title, but that the "universal" or abstraction that is God is more fundamental than the persons making up God. I know that is hard to understand, but remember our discussion of individual cats and catness. God, the word, is like the word catness with the added assumption that there is something real that is catness independent of any particular cat. Mormons invert this and further allow more flexibility to the term.
Having said all that, there is one other point in McMurrin's discussion of universals I want to get at. Mormons do appear, as McMurrin mentions, have a belief in universals. We speak of laws of the universe and seem to assume that there are some laws God himself is subject to. Thus these laws are universals and are the most fundamental things in the universe. However, what McMurrin doesn't tell you, is that many Mormons interpret this in a variety of ways. Pratt, for instance, contrary to the picture McMurrin paints (perhaps unintentionally) rejects such universal laws. Other Mormons don't believe that there is anything in the universe including law that isn't subject to God. I do think that McMurrin is right that the majority view in Mormon theology entails universal law independent of God, however.
McMurrin does mention that there is a tendency in Mormonism to think only of individual things and to consider all else as mere names. (The technical term for this in philosophy is nominalism) Pratt is but one example. It is unfortunate that, unlike Ostler, he doesn't make this his starting point. Since I think an analysis of the issue of names and relationships (what is beyond the name) would have clarified a lot of issues. It also would have been a much better introduction.
Responses to other chapters in McMurrin's The Theological Foundations of the Mormon Religion can be found on our Reading Club page.
Sorry. I am coming late to your essays. Your critique of the first chapter was very informative. I read the book when it first came out and have now forgotten many of the details, so I am now seeing it refreshed in my memory and in a new light.
I can't find fault with any of your criticisms, so I am asking myself why McMurrin didn't do better? He had an impressive career, and probably could have done better. I attach a section from the seb site "Who was Sterling M. McMurrin?" Looking at that summary of his career. I am wondering if in the 50s and early 60s he was in a very samll philosophy department in Utah and so didn't get much interaction with rigorous philosophy. I am also wondering if his book came from hastily prepared lectures to small groups that then found their way (by request) into book form. I am wondering if he was interested more in applied philosophy (religion, education, etc.) rather than rigorous metaphysics, epistemology, etc. I am wonering if his talents thrust him into so many administrative activities (see excerpt) that he didn't do the rigorous study he might have. Finally, I am wondering if his weak attachment to the Church caused him to miss the subtle ambiguities and not explore adequately the relationship of Mormonism to rigorous philosophical categories.
Looking forward to the other essays.
---------------
http://www.thc.utah.edu/PDF/Sterlingbio.pdf
---------------
Sterling M. McMurrin’s long career—as teacher, scholar, administrator, and advisor to
major national corporations, foundations, and federal agencies and as a perceptive
observer of the human condition—is virtually unparalleled among the native sons and
daughters of Utah. After earning his Bachelors and Masters degrees at the University of
Utah, he earned his Ph.D. at the University of Southern California and was appointed to
the faculty of the School of Philosophy. In 1948 he accepted a position as Professor of
Philosophy at the University of Utah.
Except for a two-year interval when he served as United States Commissioner of
Education in the administration of President Kennedy, Sterling McMurrin devoted his
professional life to the University of Utah, where he held faculty appointments in the
Departments of Philosophy, History, and Educational Administration, and
administrative appointments as Dean of the College of Letters and Science, Academic
Vice President, Provost, Dean of the Graduate School, and founding member of the
Tanner Lectures on Human Values. He was the first person to be designated a
Distinguished Professor at the University of Utah and the first recipient of the
University’s coveted Rosenblatt Prize.
During his life Sterling M. McMurrin received numerous honorary degrees from
universities and colleges across the nation, including an LL.D. awarded by the
University of Utah in 1961. Dr. McMurrin lectured and wrote extensively on the history
and philosophy of religion. He died in 1996.
The Sterling M. McMurrin Lectures in Religion and Culture were founded by Dr.
McMurrin, Lowell M. Durham Jr. (member of the English Department, and Director of
the Tanner Humanities Center from 1992 until his untimely death in September, 1997),
and friends Richard Smoot, Peter Appleby, Jack Newell, Brigham Madsen, and Boyer
Jarvis.
I believe most of the book did originate in lectures. The last part of the current edition of the book is, I believe (without looking), a transcript of a series of public lectures.
I'm not sure that excuses much, of course. After all a lot of Heidegger's books were originally lectures. Same with Derrida.
Jarvis: Sterling was my close friend. He didn't do better because he really wanted to argue for naturalism and wanted to convert Mormonism into naturalism. Moreover, McMurrin in his later years was in the history dept. and not in the philosophy dept at the UofU. He was more interested in the history of philosophy that philosophy itself.
I'm not sure how trying to make Mormonism into a kind of naturalism explains the odd choices and superficialities in the book. I'm obviously fairly sympathetic - to a point - with many kinds of naturalisms. But the treatment of Mormonism was simply amazingly superficial.
The McMurrin book was one of the great disappointments I have read in my life. This was because I had very high expectations for the book (my fault) and the author failed to meet even the lowest of expectations (his fault). The whole book seemed superficial and arbitrary. The title was in particular misleading (Philosophical Foundations of Mormon Theology). I was expecting a book which would talk about, well, the philosophical foundations of Mormon Theology. Instead it seemed like a series of haphazard comparisons between McMurrin's impression of Mormonism and random philosophical stances pulled from a limited subsection of the history of philosophy.
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