In the second chapter of his book, Ostler discusses the notion of
perfection and how it relates to both the development of
traditional Christian thought as well as Mormon thought. The basic
question is whether perfection ought to be conceived of in terms of
the Greek sense of absolutism. Now clearly Mormons do not have an
absolute God in either the Greek sense nor the slightly more
limited traditional Christian sense. As Ostler points out, there
are moves by some LDS theologians towards absolutism with respect
to various attributes. However by and large absolutism per se
never enters into Mormon theology regarding God. This is a very
significant difference between us and most other religions. Yet it
flows naturally out of our rejection of creation ex nihilo
and our placing God within the universe. Those two beliefs
limit God in ways that are simply fundamentally incompatible with
the move towards absolutism.
Ostler goes through and discusses these movements in a little more depth. I'm not sure we need quite as much depth as he gives beyond simply pointing out how this difference impacts traditional Christianity. He certainly is right that most of the differences between traditional Christianity and Mormonism can be traced to the injection of Greek thought into Jewish and Christian thought. However I would quibble a bit with the way he discusses this.
First off he tends to see neoPlatonism as the main source of influence on Christianity. I'd probably reject this. First off many of the Christians he labels as neoPlatonists live in the century before Plotinus. That is, they couldn't be neoPlatonists because neoPlatonism doesn't exist yet. They are more properly middle Platonists. Middle Platonism offers a lot of similarities to neoPlatonism and in a sense the difference is due to categorizing in the 19th century. Still, I think we ought keep them somewhat difference. A lot of the characteristic neoPlatonic doctrines arise from neoPythagorianism and many, if not most, middle Platonists didn't adopt neoPythagoreanism. Further it seems that a lot of the doctrines Mormons are want to label as "apostate" arise from Philo, the Jewish Hellenizer who develops the notion of creation ex nihilo. But Philo is writing prior to the birth of Christ. Put an other way, by the time Christianity can be Hellenized there is already a strong Jewish Hellenized theology. I'm not sure it is fair to discuss the early Christians as Hellenizing Christianity when Judaism already had a thriving Hellenistic way of conceiving thought. Given the dominance of creation ex nihilo in developing traditional Christian thought, I think that if there is a blame it is likely as much with pre-existing Judaism as it is paganism. This isn't to downplay, I think, the fact that at a certain point most Christians came from pagan, not Jewish, origins. It is merely to point out that any Hellenization was already part and parcel of the religion Christianity was breaking off from.
Getting back to the issue of neoPlatonism, I think it important to suggest that the real problem is whether to conceive of God as impersonal or personal. The tradition within Judaism already was to move towards thinking of God in metaphysical and not anthropomorphic terms. Yet this movement occurs in what is properly called the middle Platonic period. By the time of Plotinus and then Augustine, I think the foundation for how to think about God was already set.
I bring this up for two reasons. First off because I think neoPlatonism gets an undeserved rap. Secondly because I think the dates for neoPlatonism Ostler gives may be misleading to readers. While I understand why he takes the approach he does, I think this problem of how we are to think of God is key. The reason I say that is because when Ostler brings up Process Thought, I don't think he has really moved away from the fundamental problem of Hellenization. Ostler conceives of the problem merely as a problem of absolutism. Yet it seems to me that the real problem is anthropomorphism. When we move towards Process Thought we change the issue of absolutism but not the problem of anthropormophism. Because of this lack of return to original Hebrew thought, I find the appeal to Process Thought troubling.
While there are undoubtedly many useful ways of thinking about problems in Process Thought, the fact is that Process Theology has a conception of God that is just as problematic to Mormons as the God of Platonism. Ostler introduces us to the basic notions of process thinking, but to me this really hides many issues under rug. Consider if we conceive of existence fundamentally in terms of process. Consider, for example, the process of birth. Conceived as a process it clearly involves change. But conceived as a process as a whole, the temporal aspects are only in the manifestation of the process. We can talk about birth independent of any moment of the process. For instance the process of my wife giving birth and of Ostler's wife giving birth are the same process. Yet once we start down that road, just how different is process thought from neoPlatonism? It ends up being a critique not of Platonism but of a particular temporal approach to Platonism. Yet, while I may well be wrong, it seems that the differences aren't great enough to explain the difference with God.
If God is a process as yet unfinished, why can't we speak of the process as such? From our perspective within time of course what Ostler says is correct. Yet at the same time we can also speak of processes as processes and even as identical processes even when as yet unfinished. But in all of this, it seems we've still lost that basic sense of the issue for the Hebrews in terms of the anthropomorphic aspects of God. And it is that issue, not the issue of absolutism or temporality, which is of concern to Mormons. Put in an other way, the basic concern is the human-like aspects of God.
I could go on in this line. However I confess I'm not an expert enough in Process Thought to really critique it well. It seems to me, however, that Ostler's critique of both middle Platonism and neoPlatonism, while frequently technically accurate, overlooks the way time is conceived of in those movements. Put an other way, is time a fundamental and primordial "entity" within metaphysics? I'll leave that discussion, along with discussions on freedom, to those chapters in the book when we encounter them more formally. I'd merely suggest that just as a particular conception of free will underlies Ostler's book, so to is a particular conception of temporality.
None of this is to ignore the serious differences between absolutist theologies and process thought. Indeed Ostler's presentation of the differences between the Aristotle influenced Aquinas and the Process Thought influenced Hartshorne is an excellent guide. Many of these differences arise, however, due to the place of Philo's conception of creation ex nihilo in Christian thought. I should caution, however, that among the pagan Hellenistic figures creation ex nihilo frequently was not accepted. It isn't accepted by Plotinus, for instance.
I'd also caution that one problem in conceiving of the neoPlatonic conception of God is to reify it or treat it as a "thing." When you think of of it as a thing, then treating it like a static entity is natural. However many neoPlatonists are quite emphatic about this being incorrect. I think this incorrect way of approaching the One of neoPlatonism often leads people to characatures that may be misleading. I don't think the One of neoPlatonism ought be considered God in any sense. However I'd note that of late many philosophers in the postmodern tradition have ended up moving towards neoPlatonism in various ways. A lot, for instance, has been written about both Heidegger and Derrida relative to neoPlatonism. We ought be careful not to throw the baby out with the bathwater. While we may reject the "reconciliation" of the Hebrew God with the questioning of ultimate reality by the Greeks, we ought not assume that Greek thought has nothing to add or is always incorrect. Put an other way, the error might well be less Greek thought than equivocation over the meaning of God.
Just a brief note after rereading the above. It may appear like I am saying Ostler follows Process Theology with respect to God. I don't think he does. My point is, however, that just as the God of neoPlatonism is not the God of Mormonism, the God of Process Theology is not the God of Mormonism. The danger is, I think, in starting from a philosophy and re-interpreting scripture in light of it. Once again I'm not accusing Blake of necessarily doing this. I think though it an important point that will become more important in the upcoming chapters.
Discussions on individual chapters from Blake Ostler's Exploring Mormon Thought: The Attributes of Godliness can be found on our Reading Club page.
I'm not very familiar with neoPlatonism, but this chapter did reinforce for me how much starting with the idea of creation ex nihilo really changes the attributes of God and that there are real strengths to the Mormon model of the co-eternal nature of God and his children [although once we get more into the free will and foreknowledge part it's obvious that even Mormonism can't account for that whole thorny issue -- perhaps it's my lack of understanding, but I have yet to read a model that is completely (okay, to be honest -- even somewhat) satisfying].
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I don't recall if Ostler really goes into this, but I've begun to understand why an anthropomorphic God seems so heretical and/or weird to some mainstream Christians (and esp. to theologists).
It's hard to think of essential, eternal attributes in terms of physicality. Oh sure, spirit matter etc. And perhaps this speaks to the success of the dominant models of Western thought, but it's hard to think of matter in terms other than decay and temporality -- the reality we currently experience is so filled with it.
And it's hard to think of how a God with a body could be "perfect."
Obviously, I believe in such a God. And I find the core LDS doctrines on the nature of God, Godhead and divinity to be exciting, interesting and true. But as Clark continues to point out, and as Ostler admits in his foreword, trying to look at Mormon doctrine from a philosophical standpoint leads to some strange instances of dissonance.
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Also: Regarding reification. I wonder if the human tendency to want things as 'whole' [or to use another word -- finished/completed] contributes to the tendency towards treating things as 'things.' As Clark mentions, a process can be conceived as a whole, but [and perhaps this a reflection of the problems of language, of naming] once something is a whole, we tend to want to treat it as a thing, as a static entity.
In response to Clark's comments on creatio ex nihilo, it is important to note that the vast majority of Philonic scholars reject the view that Philo adopts creation ex nihilo. My own view is that he did not adopt creatio ex nihilo. When he refers to creation "from what is not" he is actually referring to a substrate that underlies formal existence. In other words, it is existence without form and consists of prime matter as it was conceived in Middle Platonism. However, I agree that the idea of creation ex nihilo (which I believe arose with the Middle Platonist Christians Theophilus and Tatian at the end of the second century) is a water-shed idea. If God creates ex nihilo, then it follows that he is the absolute transcedent of the tradition. If he does not, then it seems that something like the LDS view is required (or something like the process view) In the second volume of Exploring Mormon Thought, I give two arguments to show that creatio ex nihilo is incompatible with human agency (the first argument applies to both compatibilist and libertarian views of freedom and the second argument to libertarian freedom in particular). Thus, I argue that if humans are truly freely in any significant sense, if we are moral beings, or if we are the type of beings who can enter into loving relationships, then the notion of creatio ex nihilo in its theological sense must be abandoned. Blake
That's interesting Blake. I didn't realize that about Philo. As you say that would much more be in keeping with middle Platonism. Further it would also undermine somewhat, my comments regarding Judaism being the source for some of the Christian changes. That makes sense since latter Judaism never adopts creation ex nihilo but something closer to Platonism. I'll definitely have to read up on this more, if I ever get the chance.
BTW - I apologize for not commenting more on your book. I intend to later tonight. I had wanted to finish reading a few works on free will before going farther.
I've closed comments in order to avoid spam since I don't check this older blog as much anymore.
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