Real interesting post on Williamson’s view of knowledge as a basic mental state by Brian Weatherson. You may recall me raving about Williamson's book Knowledge and Its Limits here a few weeks ago. Williamson's basic assertion is that knowledge is its own unique mental state and shouldn't be considered justified true belief. Further it is a basic mental state. There's all sorts of interesting implications to this view and I mentioned a few in my thread on the book. However Weatherson raises one that I think is relevant to our recent discussion of Alma 32.
Now Alma 32 has the odd construction of trying out Alma's words, having some phenomena which leads you to consider them to be good, with this being tied in some way to knowledge. (I intend to give a fuller argument on all this from a close reading of the text. But it'll be a few days) Weatherson, utilizing Williamson, makes a rather interesting argument that seems somewhat similar.
1. X is happy that p
2. If X is happy that p then X knows that p.
C. X knows that p
Now the discussion in the comments of his post debate this somewhat. Some of the criticisms seem to miss the premise that we adopt Williamson's views on knowledge. But the argument certainly is interesting. I should add that I'm still reading (and rereading) Williamson's book. So I'm not quite prepared to argue Williamson's position. (I got distracted from reading it by a few things related to medieval philosophy and then the whole Derrida thing) Still Weatherson's post makes me even more excited to get back to Williamson's book. It's one of those philosophy books that really makes me rethink a lot and see things in a new light.
I've closed comments in order to avoid spam since I don't check this older blog as much anymore.
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Blogged by Clark Goble