One of the predicted attacks to my brief sketch of a way of reconciling responsibility and foreknowledge in LDS theology is the issue of conscious awareness of our choice. I wanted to bring this up here as a separate issue. I say that because in my thought experiment, it seems there are ways of logically avoiding this, although they entail theological commitments some (Blake and Kevin) likely would reject. So let's here discuss the issue of Aristotle's two requirements for responsibility: it must be up to the agent and the agent must be aware of what they are doing or bringing about. Clearly Libertarians will add requirements (such as the ability to do otherwise). My thought experiment deals with most of those, it seems. The real issue is whether awareness must be conscious awareness.
I bring this up because clearly there are two senses of awareness. For instance while driving home from work I was thinking of other things. Yet I stopped at stop signs, avoided cars, and did a lot of other things without it really being in the forefront of my awareness. Until someone slammed on their brakes ahead of me, I was only really aware of my thoughts. Now perhaps that's not the wisest of driving tactics, but it does illustrate that the issue of awareness isn't an all or nothing situation.
I think if any reader considers this, they'll be able to find a multitude of similar examples.
Allow me one other. While hammering I often "lose" the hammer or it becomes invisible to me. The hammer often appears in my awareness only when it malfunctions. (Clearly a Heideggarian example)
I bring this up simply to point out that awareness is much more complex than it is often taken. Often it is a matter of degree. Now let us return to those examples. I am aware of hammering, but if I hammer incorrectly, surely I am responsible even if I am not conscious of the details I chose in the process of hammering. The earlier example is better. Even if I'm not aware of driving, but have instead focused my awareness on the problem of responsibility, clearly I am responsible for my acts of driving.
This is not to say that I responsible purely because of agent control. It is merely to assert that awareness can not be taken solely a conscious focused deliberation. To take such a view is to simply reject responsibility for the vast majority of our actions. While that may indeed be viable as a philosophical position regarding certain logical implications of our intuitions, it will not do for a religious sense of responsibility.
One brief comment. An obvious attack on the above is to suggest that while I may not be consciously aware of my actions, I choose to be aware of other things. That may be so, but the issue then becomes whether that choosing to be aware is itself a consciously deliberated choice.
I am a philosophical neophyte and, as such, I may be completely out of line. If so, be gentle.
I have often considered many actions as the output (x) of a function (f) with given inputs (a). Let us say that f is a composite of our physiology and sociology (that is our innate and external stimuli). Let us also say that x is an action, of which we are not aware (e.g. hammering). We are not aware of it because of the input (a=learning to hammer correctly at some earlier time (t)). For if we had never had a and were hammering for the first time, we would indeed be aware of it.
Now let us consider a less savory input (I know it is lame, but I haven’t thought about this too much). Let us say that an agent at some point (t=n) chooses to regularly listen to music that is full of vulgarity (a=listening to vulgarity) until t=(n+1). Now let us say at some point t>(n+1) the agent unwittingly curses (x). Is he not responsible for x because he was responsible for a (regardless if he consciously chose or was aware of his word choice)? That is if we can prove that a lead to x? (maybe something addictive like heroine use would have been a better example.)
I think what you are getting at is habits. I'm intentionally avoiding the issue of habits. Clearly for instance, when hammering, some part of the act isn't the result of habit. I somehow pick a nail, deal with what is unique, deliberate about alternatives, deal with unexpected details, and successfully hammer. It becomes conscious awareness only when something goes significantly wrong.
The claim Blake wants to make is that both free will and responsibility requires awareness of alternatives. The problem is that the use of "awareness" in the literature is vague. I did an other check today and I couldn't see much discussion. That's not to say there isn't one, but it is not discussed in the literature I could find (nor is it listed as a requirement in Blake's book)
Regarding reasons-responsiveness necessarily being conscious, I found a reference by Fischer which explicitly states the opposite.
We hasten to say that the process need not be explicit, conscious, or reflective (although, of course, it can be). And we emphasize that our notion of taking responsibility differs from some ordinary understandings of this notion: it is not, for example, simply a matter of uttering statements, or performing certain actions. Rather, taking responsibility, on our view, is a matter of having certain (dispositional) beliefs about oneself (and having acquired those beliefs in appropriate ways). ("Morally Responsible People Without A Freedom")
Clark:
It is important to note what Fischer and Ravizza require for responsibility and reasons-responsiveness. There is an equivocation in what one must be conscious of in the way you use the quote from Fischer and your view. We don't need to be conscious of the fact that what we do is in fact a breach of moral obligation. However, we must be conscious of the acts (or the failures to act) which result in our being morally responsible. The distinction is vital -- there is a vast difference between being conscious of one's act that one is doing and being conscious that the act one does is morally wrong. Fischer requires the former but not the latter.
However, I will go this far with you: we can be responsible for failing to be conscious of something. For example, if I am driving my car and not paying attention to what I am doing I am responsible for the fact that I had a duty to pay attention and because I was able to pay attention. If I cause an accident due to my lack of consciousness of what I could have been conscious about, then I am negligent and culpable. However, if I am unconscious for reasons where I don't have the ability to be conscious, then I am not responsible for causing the accident. For example, if I have a stroke while driving the car that renders me unconscious. I am not responsible for the accident resulting from such a stroke precisely because it was beyond my control and I couldn't do otherwise. However, if I am aware that I have a condition that may lead me to have a stroke, then I have a duty to refrain from driving precisely because I am aware that driving under such circumstances could result in my becoming unconscious and incapable of safely driving my car. I am therefore conscious of the danger that my condition causes and it is this very awareness that leads to my being responsible if I then have a stroke that renders me unconscious. In each case, what I am responsible for is something that I was conscious about or had a duty to be conscious about where I had the capacity to be conscious about it.
Either way, it seems to me that the libertarian requirement of ability to choose otherwise is the basis for attributing responsibility to the driver. So the way you use "consciousness" is in fact vague and equivocal, but the requirement of being able to be conscious about what we are doing and the ability to do otherwise when we are unconscious demonstrate that your notion of being unconscious won't do. In fact, Heidegger's example of using the hammer only strengthens this very point.
Moreover, are there any scriptures, any basis at all in LDS thought that you can give, for your metaphysically extravagant claim that we make every choice we ever make at the time of the wave collapse when the big bang occurs? Why should anyone buy such an extravagant claim?
I only have time to answer your latter claim right now. I think we're still equivocating over the former claim (consciousness) and it would be helpful to point to a passage with regards to the meaning of consciousness in acts. I just don't read them the way you are. That's not to say my reading is right, mind you. Just that it seems difficult to determine without turning to texts that argue why consciousness of a certain sort is important.
Regarding the latter claim, it provides a fairly straightforward way of reconciling responsibility and foreknowledge and is thus of interest to Mormons who wish to accept scriptural claims about foreknowledge at face value. If there is a way, then the strength of the libertarian position obviously falls.
Note I didn't say there was a wave collapse at the time of the big bang. Indeed that's not at all what I mean. Rather I mean that the universe as a whole is decided as a whole and that our choice is part of that creation.
Clark: if the entire universe is decided by an event over which we have no control, then aren't you really a determinist (even in a sense inimical to Fischer and Ravizza's semi-compatiblist claims)? Further, don't the LDS scriptures (e.g., 2 Ne. 2 and D&C 93) state that we must be able to appreciate the difference between good and evil (a knowledge that arises only with the fall) to be able to be free agents? I just don't see how your view is what you claim for it.
If I believed that the universe was decided over an event which we have no control over then I would be arguing for determinism. However the elegance of my thought experiment is that we do have control over the universe. We choose. We simply made the choice earlier than it sometimes appears.
The argument from knowledge is a good one, except that it is in the act of falling in which the choice is made. It all happens simultaneously and we are now coming to understand the choice. I confess that I think I see choice and agency in the scriptures differently than you do. I think you're reading too much of our cultural intuitions into the scriptures. I think that the scriptures concern is that choice by essentially mine and that it have options in the sense that there are two potential external choices available to me.
The only real argument I see from the scriptures for a more Libertarian conception of free will is the appeal to responsibility. If this thought experiment shows that there is a way to answer the question of responsibility, based upon a reflection of the "when" of choice, then I think that last real solid argument evaporates.
I should add that none of this is original to me, other than the particular appeal to Linde universes. It's all very mainstream neoPlatonism. I point that out not because I think it adds much. (It may even have the opposite effect and confuse matters) Simply I don't want to claim too much credit for this.
Once again you fail to answer the question as to why awareness of the difference between good and evil is a necessary pre-condition to agency. Moreover, the notion of a decision made in the abstract and with all decision made all at once is simply unintelligible to me. Isn't there always the possiblity of changing our minds after we once decide and any time passes? What of our deliberations -- it appears that they add nothing because we decided long before we deliberated, long before we knew the relevant circumstances for the decision, and long before anything was presented for us to decide. Of course your position also does violence to our direct experience that we choose in the moment of decision -- are you so far removed from the fact of that experience to completely discount it as a complete illusion? Are you really suggesting that when I am presented with the choice whether to go out and have a drink tonight that I decided already, long before I even knew what it was to drink? Long before I knew what it was to taste? Long before I knew what effects alcohol in a physical body could have? Moreover, it seems that if I already decided everything, then what I now do is just going through the motions and all of my experiences of choosing based upon the reasons that I now consider are sheer illusions -- indeed, my reasons for choosing one way or another are not merely superfluous, but how could anything I do be rational? I suppose I could have chosen the reasons for choosing based on reasons as well, but then we are stuck in an infinite regress of reasons for reasons.
Just where in the scriptures does it suggest that I made all choices in a single moment before coming to earth? Moreover, have you considered the irony of suggesting that I read too much of our cultural presuppositions into scripture when you openly admit that what you propose is neo-Platonism warmed over? I suggest that our cultural intuitions about moral responsiblity are based in part on what we are -- morally responsible individuals -- and our moral intutions are the light of Christ. Moreover, the example of the driver who has a stroke that I gave is an example of why we value the ability to choose otherwise and how our consciousness is tied into moral responsiblity. What of that example? You keep suggesting that the argument from moral responsibility is the only argument to support libertarianism -- it isn't -- but even if it were, it is a good argument.
There is more to moral responsibility that just choosing in the midst of open alternatives, there is also the ability to appreciate the consequences of our choices. It is the latter that is sorely missing in your account.
I didn't see that (knowledge of good and evil) as your fundamental issue, merely whether we had such an awareness. My own personal opinion is that it is due to difference. To choose one thing over an other we must see them as different. If we see them as the same, then how can we possible pick one or the other? With God we are worried about the choice between goodness and evil, so that is the opposition focused in on. But I consider it a logical necessity for existence and choice.
Moreover, the notion of a decision made in the abstract and with all decision made all at once is simply unintelligible to me.
Do you mean unintelligible or do you simply mean you don't believe it? It seems to me a fairly trivial statement and completely intelligible. It is certainly hard to reconcile with your preconceptions, which is what may be causing the problem. But that might be the problem of trying to understand it from a Libertarian paradigm?
You keep bringing in certain temporal notions, but they all seem to end up hinging upon being able to change ones choice after one has made it as being necessary to freedom and responsibility. I don't see how that is necessary.
Of course your position also does violence to our direct experience that we choose in the moment of decision
The awareness of the choice and the choice need not be the same. Further there are good reasons not to trust those intuitions, as I related. As I said, I don't find the appeal to intuition on choice trustworthy in the least.
Are you really suggesting that when I am presented with the choice whether to go out and have a drink tonight that I decided already, long before I even knew what it was to drink?
No. Quite the opposite. I am saying that when we become consciously aware of the choice we had already made the choice and that the "long long before" I knew what it was to drink.
You keep trying to interpret what I am saying in terms of Libertarianism. It won't work.
Just where in the scriptures does it suggest that I made all choices in a single moment before coming to earth?
I don't recall suggesting that it ever addressed the matter. There are many aspects of metaphysics left unaddressed.
Let me put it this way, which do you think is more theologically controversial? Suggesting that our fundamental freedom and responsibility arose at the time of our fall into this world, or the claim that God doesn't have foreknowledge?
I suggest that our cultural intuitions about moral responsiblity are based in part on what we are -- morally responsible individuals -- and our moral intutions are the light of Christ.
And I claim most of our intuitions are socially developed and are better described as the false traditions of our fathers.
That rather leaves us at an impasse. No?
My argument against intuitions is that nearly all our intuitions about the world investigated by physics are completely wrong. I don't think folk psychology has fared too well either. (grin) Given that track record, why should we trust it?
You keep suggesting that the argument from moral responsibility is the only argument to support libertarianism -- it isn't -- but even if it were, it is a good argument.
I agree it is a good argument, thus my argument which I feel meets the requirement of moral responsibility.
There is more to moral responsibility that just choosing in the midst of open alternatives, there is also the ability to appreciate the consequences of our choices. It is the latter that is sorely missing in your account.
I don't see how. Clearly we all appreciate the consequences of our choices.
There is one good argument though, that you've not brought up. If we've made all the choices at once, then how does it make sense to say someone isn't responsible for acts manifest at t1 but is responsible for acts manifest at t2.
Clark et al.
There was an interesting post over at the Forking Paths site by David Hunt in which he responded to a very compelling argument by Neil Levy that determinism is incompatible with moral attributions of accountability. Hunt said:
In response to Kip, there are ways to respond to Strawson's worries here is one, which I don't personally endorse but is at least logically possible. Suppose we believe dualism of a fundamental kind and that we exist pre-birth. Suppose the realm we live in then is libertarian, though this world is deterministic. Suppose also that we are excellent predictors of lives in the deterministic world, and we select which life we choose to be born into. Thus we can be held responsible for our actions, even though this is an entirely deterministic world. This hold since although we now have no choice about what we do, we did have choice about which initial conditions would apply with knowledge of the consequences.
I found that to be interesting because it more or less mirrors Clark's take on LDS free agency -- it is libertarian but not in this life. We had a choice at the time intial constants were established. I would raise the following problems: if I am making choices here that are informed by my mortal experience as a necessary condition to appreciating the consequences of my choices, then the choices I made way back then were not made with adequate appreciation of the consequence to ascribe accountability to me. If I chose to shoot you not really appreciating what death or pain are, then I am not accountable because I don't appreciate the consequences of what I do. This line of reasoning is the basis of the Mc'Naughton insanity defense at common law. If I think that when I pull the trigger a flower will be planted rather than someone killed, I don't appreciate the consequences of my choices sufficiently to hold me accountable or to attribute moral responsibility.
Further, this view still requires libertarianism at some time (and seems to adopt a view held by Kane that we must at least be initially free to choose otherwise). Yet if we grant libertarianism then, why not now? Granting the viability of libertarian free will admits that the strongest reason for rejecting it isn't a valid one, i.e., the notion is incoherent. Isn't our experience of choosing just that? We know that we choose among alternatives because we do it all the time.
Like I said earlier Blake, I really can't claim credit for the presentation I gave. I've read variations before, especially among neoPlatonic writers. So I think the ideas have been out there a lot. At best I gave it a somewhat unique LDS twist. Of course I could be vain and hope someone over at Garden of Forking Paths had read my blog. (grin) However I'm fairly sure Kip Werking and David Hunter came up with it independently. I do agree that whole thread was interesting though.
I do agree though that while this freedom in primordial "time" is similar to Libertarian free will, it has some unique differences. (The whole issue of consciousness being the obvious one and the point of much of our disagreement here and in the original thread)
I don't think I buy the "don't understand consequences" argument you make here though. In one sense I don't think we ever really understand consequences fully until we experience them. Consider someone who has never seen anyone die and hasn't experienced any significant pain nor seen anyone experience the same. It is a purely abstract notion. They are 18. They murder someone. They don't understand the consequences except in a very, very abstract sense. However I think everyone would agree they are responsible for their actions. Even if we buy the whole consequence line of argument (which I don't) it seems the bar of understanding is quite low.
The analogy to a flower vs. death seems to fail, because even if we can't comprehend the experience on a certain level, we can have an abstract intellectual appreciation of it.
As for the, "if we grant libertarianism then, why not now?" is presumably due to either scientific commitments or religious commitments. i.e. is there some reason, outside of commitments in the free will debate, to think there serious truths of the matter regarding the future.
Clark:
I think that you are correct that the libertarian free will that could be exercised primordially is truncated because it is not alive in the moment of free choice. On your view, when we think we are choosing, we are sorely mistaken about our immediate experience. I trust my experience more than you do -- and that is at least one fundamental difference between our views.
VanInwagen also makes the point in his verbal presentation that the problem of evil becomes very difficult to address without a free will defence of the type that requires a robust libertarian view. That presentation is found here. I suspect that is one of the primary reasons that philosophers of religion seem to overwhelmingly be libertarians whereas action theorists seem to be more open to compatibilism.
There is, however, a rather clear requirement that I am not responsible to the extent that I cannot appreciate the consequence of my acts. For example, while the 18 year old may not fully appreciate the results of his choice, we view his inablity to appreciatre the consequences and youth as mitigating factors in responsibility -- and that seems to support my view that the ability to appreciate the consequences is a necessary element of moral resonsibility and blame. If the person deciding what to do had not idea about the particular circumstances in which the choice arises, has no idea what it is to have a body, doesn't even have the relevant context of the choice present, then it seems to me that such "choices" made in the absolute abstract are merely abstract "choices" without any ability to appreciate what it means or what the choice entails.
The issue of degrees of responsibility is a good one, and a valid way to critique my model as well. I'll have to think about that one.
My sense of how to respond would be to distinguish responsibility for the act from the value of the act. For example we recognize a difference between a woman who intentionally decapitates their baby from that of a woman who is careless and backs over the baby. She is responsible in both cases, but how we view the seriousness of the act in terms of morality is different. If I understand you, you think this ought be seen due to degrees of responsibility. I'd say that we instead ought to see it as degrees of value of the act itself. i.e. intentionally killing someone is morally worse than accidentally killing someone independent of responsibility.
That clearly doesn't eliminate the question of degree of responsibility. It may well be that even with a value distinction responsibility also is a matter of degree. Being the Peircean I am, and quite convinced by his doctrine of continuity, I'm certainly very sympathetic to issues of degree. I just need to think through the implications. After all there are many aspects of "mineness" that comes in degrees. The way my coat is mine is obviously different from the way my son is mine.
The real issue though is the relationship between degree of responsibility and context. Even if one makes abstract choices and only comes to appreciate it later, does that really stop responsibility? i.e. even if, for the sake of argument, I concede your point regarding responsibility, can't I merely say that our responsibility for actions, while present, is less than the Libertarian believes? If I recall several Libertarians, while buying into the Libertarian perspective also suggest we are rarely free the way Libertarians believe.
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