I've been writing a lot about faith the past while and I'll probably expand upon the various approaches I've taken. It's an interesting question. Dennis Potter over at LDS-Phil raised a very interesting question about whether propositional knowledge is required for faith. This seems fairly similar to the issue of whether faith is rational, that I discussed last week. I want to think about Dennis' arguments for a bit before replying. But I thought I'd mention them here since not all readers of the blog read LDS-Phil.
ANTI-CORRELATION ARGUMENT. This argument claims that there is very little correlation between knowing correct doctrine and doing what is right. I may have a better grasp on "true" doctrine than my neighbor, but she is by far much better at living with Christ than I. My reasons for believing that this correlation between theory and practice does not exist are anecdotal. Most of the best LDS and non-LDS Christians I've known know very little about Mormon doctrine. From my experience there is no correlation between the level of propositional knowledge and practical knowledge (actually knowing how to be a Christian).
EXAM ARGUMENT. Suppose that beliefs about theological reality are necessary for salvation. It follows that most are not saved because they are not “smart” enough. If the propositional view of religious faith is right, then there will be a final exam and most will fail. Most Mormons don’t have the correct view of the nature of God. I don’t say this because I think that I have the correct view. But I say this because of the differences in the logical implications about the views that most Mormons have. There is a significant amount of diversity, and they cannot all be correct. It doesn't matter who is right, many are wrong.
INDETERMINACY ARGUMENT. One might say that there must be unity on basic doctrines and that these have determinate propositional content. But I claim that propositional indeterminacy infects the most basic of doctrines. What is atonement, faith, repentance, baptism, and priesthood authority? There are certain interrelations that these concepts play with practice and other concepts. But these interrelations underdetermine the propositional content of claims involved. Christ ATONES for our sins. But does this mean he literally pays for them? Some think so. Others think not. Both are perfectly consistent with the practice and yet both have completely different propositional contents. It might be important that we say "Christ atones for our sins" but it certainly doesn't seem to be important what particular proposition we intend to express with this.
Here's a few thoughts I answered with on LDS-Phil. I think they are very provocative questions. My own opinion is that while faith has a lot that is non-propositional, there is an essential core that is propositional or rational. In fact that was a big part of the discussion on that subject last week.
This argument claims that there is very little correlation between knowing correct doctrine and doing what is right. I may have a better grasp on "true" doctrine than my neighbor, but she is by far much better at living with Christ than I.
It seems this argument can't establish that faith is non-propositional in the sense you express but that only that there some minimal basis of knowledge is required. i.e. it might only establish that what you know beyond your neighbor is unessential.
The contrasting argument is given in the Lectures on Faith. There they go to considerable effort to demonstrate that a fair bit of knowledge was always present in western history. This is so as to establish that knowledge enabling faith always was there.
I'd add a second point that knowledge might establish greater potential for faith but that something beyond the propositions is necessary to actualize it. Thus your neighbor may have more exercised faith but you may have greater potential for faith than her. You just don't make use of the potential you have.
Suppose that beliefs about theological reality are necessary for salvation. It follows that most are not saved because they are not “smart” enough. If the propositional view of religious faith is right, then there will be a final exam and most will fail.
I'd prefer "informed" to the term "smart." However the obvious rejoinder to this line of reasoning is work for the dead and the missionary work on the other side of the veil. Thus the claim that most will fail because of insufficient information is alleviated. So while I think this a very strong argument, I believe that the very notion of temple work and the LDS interpretation of Christ entering spirit prison are designed to answer it.
Most Mormons don’t have the correct view of the nature of God. I don’t say this because I think that I have the correct view. But I say this because of the differences in the logical implications about the views that most Mormons have. There is a significant amount of diversity, and they cannot all be correct. It doesn't matter who is right, many are wrong.
It seems that the Lectures on Faith and other texts answer this by appealing to the notion of degrees of faith. Presumably the person with greater correct understanding of God will have the potential for greater faith. Which in turn may lead to greater personal revelation which increases ones faith.
But I claim that propositional indeterminacy infects the most basic of doctrines. What is atonement, faith, repentance, baptism, and priesthood authority? There are certain interrelations that these concepts play with practice and other concepts. But these interrelations underdetermine the propositional content of claims involved.
This is a very interesting claim since it gets to the heart of certain issues I've long found fascinating. It seems to me that the issue of vagueness can apply here. I have faith in God but my faith is a vague faith. Whether or how you relate vagueness to propositions will thus determine how this argument turns out. I've written a fair bit on this issue from a Peircean point of view.
Peirce allows a proposition to be vague in the sense of having elements that are indeterminate (or uninterpreted) But I can still hold the proposition. (I'd add that for Peirce a proposition is the potential for a future assertion)
I have two scanned in selections from Peirce that are helpful on this. (Forgive the OCR errors) Here and here.
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