A few days ago someone wrote me asking me to write about ethics as an introduction for non-philosophers. I replied that I'm probably not the best choice for that job since I'm ill versed in ethical theory and further don't really find it that interesting. However, since I have a large number of readers without much background in philosophy and since the topic comes up a bit, I'll give it a whirl. Hopefully by the end I'll be able to explain why I don't care for ethics too much. (Or perhaps convince myself out of that position)
To start with one really ought distinguish ethics in terms of being ethical from ethical theory of the sort philosophers study. Richard Feynman reportedly said that philosophy of science is about as useful to scientists as ornithology is to birds. Well, to expand the analogy, ethical theory probably is just about as relevant for ethical people. Probably the best place to start to see how philosophers approach the problem is in one of the inaugural philosophical texts on the subject. Plato's Euthyphro.
Socrates asks Euthyphro, “are morally good acts willed by God because they are morally good, or are they morally good because they are willed by God?” This has ever since been called the Euthyphro dilemma and it orients in many ways what philosophers are interested in. They want to know the "why" of right actions and the good itself. In a sense, being actually concerned with the good and right action is of secondary importance. Rather than concern with practice, they are concerned with theory. This is of course not universally true. But one quickly sees that the focus is a very abstract theoretical one.
Those philosophers who favor the first choice see the good as something necessary - either in God or in nature itself. Their approach is often called natural law and sees the good as what is important. Right actions arise by extension from the good. Natural law theory can be seen in Greece amongst the Stoics but also in Thomas Aquinas on up through the early founders of the United States who felt there were self-evident truths and rights which man deserved. Natural law sees the good as something innate to the universe itself. Some might say we have intuitions of these goods (as I think many of the founders felt) or at least felt they were discernible through reason.
The other class of philosophers sees the good as something created by God through his own free actions. This is often called voluntarism or divine command theory. In other words the good is dependent upon God and he could change it if he wants to. William of Ockham is the major figure in this tradition. (Not surprisingly he also felt that physical law was also under God's control) Often those who focus on pure faith in God and have no concern of discerning a pattern in ethics end up adopting a kind of voluntarism.
There is of course a "third way" which is simply to deny the good as such at all. In a sense these people really adopt the second choice but then say either humanity, society, or the individual functions as God. The most obvious example of this move is ethical relativism which suggests that the good is really just what we desire.
Now if we ask where Mormon theology fits into all this the answer isn't a clear one. First off Mormons do tend to believe in moral absolutes. Thus presumably we favor idea that God wills the good because it is good. Indeed many, if not most, Mormons go so far as to completely separate the good from God. i.e. God's relationship to the good is like our relationship to the good. It is external to him. Many philosophers and theologians, such as Aquinas, might think God wills what he does because it is good, but still think the good exists in God's mind. i.e. it can't be separated in any reasonable fashion from what God is. In a sense despite favoring the first choice, they still invoke a lot of the second. Mormons, who typically see God existing in a pre-existent, uncreated universe(s), are much more willing to see the good as independent from God.
Having said that though, clearly Mormons also believe in goods that are closer to the second choice in Euthyphro's dilemma. Consider the word of wisdom. While many Mormons believe this is a principle that is inherently good, many also think that it is something God commands and that it is right to do it precisely because God commands it and not because drinking alcohol is inherently evil. (After all many early Mormons drank, as did prophets in the Bible and Book of Mormon) Even if one doesn't buy that line of reasoning with the word of wisdom, one can find other examples that seem close to the divine command theory.
However I think that while some of these examples and even sermons by Joseph point towards divine command theory, in context they point to something more practical.
Happiness is the object and design of our existence; and will be the end thereof, if we pursue the path that leads to it; and this path is virtue, uprightness, faithfulness, holiness, and keeping all the commandments of God. But we cannot keep all the commandments without first knowing them, and we cannot expect to know all, or more than we now know unless we comply with or keep those we have already received. That which is wrong under one circumstance, may be, and often is, right under another.
God said, "Thou shalt not kill;" at another time He said, "Thou shalt utterly destroy." This is the principle on which the government of heaven is conducted--by revelation adapted to the circumstances in which the children of the kingdom are placed. Whatever God requires is right, no matter what it is, although we may not see the reason thereof till long after the events transpire. If we seek first the kingdom of God, all good things will be added. So with Solomon: first he asked wisdom, and God gave it him, and with it every desire of his heart, even things which might be considered abominable to all who understand the order of heaven only in part, but which in reality were right because God gave and sanctioned by special revelation.
Joseph's comments get at the heart of Euthyphro's dilemma. First the right is dependent upon context. This isn't relativism, but appears to be the fact that our circumstances determine what one can do to bring about the good. Second, Joseph appears to point towards the good being bringing about happiness.
In philosophy, this view that the good is maximizing happiness is called Utilitarianism. In this theory there are no absolute laws or rules of behavior. Rather one simply ought to act what brings about the good in the long run. One of the most famous proponents of this theory is John Stewart Mill, whose book On Liberty has long been popular among Mormons. However Mill modifies utilitarianism somewhat, so as to move more towards having fixed rules. He basically rejects the idea that anything goes, so long as it maximizes happiness. Instead he asks what rules would best maximize happiness and then says we ought follow those rules. Note, however, that this runs up against Joseph Smith's comments with respect to God. Joseph suggests that general rules often can and ought be broken, if it maximizes the good. At the same time, however, humans don't have the right to determine when this can take place. It appears that only God can make this calculation.
This is probably a good place to point out the opposing approach to utilitarianism. Kant suggested that there was a right act in every circumstance and that it would be right for any person. Many people adopting this approach would say that there are a set of rules that are always right and that the good is following these rules. In other words rules and behaviors aren't determined by the good, but the good is determined by these rules.
Once again there is a strain of this in Mormon thought. Some see D&C 88:32-39 as indicating a rule based view of ethics. There are simply laws given (thus favoring divine command theory) and the good is obeying the law. However while this seems plausible at first glance, one need only ask if there is a why to what laws are given. In other words this reading begs the question Socrates asks Euthyphro. It may well be, for instance, that Celestial law is what it is because of the good. Further the law may be expansive enough so as to deal with the utilitarian approach to the good. Although, on the face of it, it seems to favor Mill's view that there are some laws developed to maximize the good rather than simply justifying any act that maximizes the good. But it certainly can be read in other ways.
So, from a very broad and very general consideration of ethical theory, it appears that Mormons would probably favor a kind of rule-based utilitarianism. (Thus the popularity of Mill)
However there is an additional question that arises in ethics. How do we know the good? Some might say by the scriptures. However given Joseph's earlier comments, it seems that they get us only so far since they don't account for all the circumstances one finds oneself in. Thus we have to appeal towards God. But that suggests personal revelation. Are our instincts towards what the good is purely dependent upon God?
This is the question of whether the absence of God leads to immorality, a charge some Christians often accuse secularists with. Yet, if we adopt a view of utilitarianism, surely one can believe that one ought maximize happiness, whether one believes in God or not. If happiness is our aim, then a knowledge of God isn't necessary to be good.
One ought also ask whether God will always tell us what is right. Even if one accepts that inspiration is always clear and unambiguous (a question assumption to be sure) it seems that God doesn't always tell us what is right. D&C 58:26-29 tells us we should be anxiously be engaged in a good cause of our own agency, and that we shouldn't be commanded in all things. I think this is largely talking about particular commandments rather than general rules, but it puts us back into the question of knowing what is right. Sometimes we struggle to know what the right thing to do is, and God won't tell us.
I think this might favor knowing some general principles, ala Mill, but presumably principles that are a little more provisional than I think Mill provides. By that I mean they might be generally true (true in most cases) but not universally true (true in all cases). We then have to decide when to apply them and which rule is most relevant in a given circumstance.
This is clearly very much a general overview of the situation. I probably ought write a follow-up to it. Further, it clearly doesn't even begin to touch all the various theories within philosophy on ethics. One problem with regards to utilitarianism, which I focused on, is the question of what exactly it means to maximize the happiness of everyone. How does one count happiness? It seems that to reasonably speak about maximizing happiness there must either be a way to add two people's happiness together or be able to speak of the happiness of the group. The scriptures don't seem to speak of the happiness of the group (although I may well be wrong on that). They seem instead to speak of individual happiness. But is my happiness really the same thing as your happiness? Further what do we mean by happiness at all? Also, do we always want to maximize everyone's happiness? What about the sadist to is happy to torture? Also, to speak of maximizing happiness presumably entails a "when" to when happiness is maximized. What may maximize happiness in 10 years may not result in maximal happiness in 20 years.
Some respond to these problems by suggesting that we really just ought stop talking about happiness, except in a general way. Instead we ought just say that the good is in terms of some set of consequences. (This is what I favor - I think talking about happiness is useful to explain things to non-philosophers, but ends up problematic when examined closely) But this raises the obvious question of what consequences count and why?
I should also note that Philosophy et cetera has a rather good discussion of John Stewart Mill's views which may be of interest to some.
Clark: You probably also ought to add virtue ethics to your list of possibilities. This is the notion that ethical conduct consists in the cultivation and realization of certain attributes of character, so that ethics becomes the science of human perfection rather than of happiness creation or the search for abstract right.
I'll probably talk about that in my next entry. I looked at how long it had already become and decided to cut it off. The way I thought about moving into discussion of virtue was through the discussion of what happiness is. The way many Greek philosophers conceived of it included perfection. This is especially true of the Stoics, for instance as well as Aristotle. It's just that the modern notion of happiness in ethics appears primarily to be tied to the more hedonistic views of groups like the Epicureans. I think most Utilitarians end up doing a hedonistic calculus in most cases. You are right though that the idea of happiness as a kind of perfection rather than an emotion or feeling of contentment is quite relevant for Mormon discussions of ethics. I also want to bring in Levinas and the issue of relations between individuals as well.
As I said though, I'm really not the right person for all of this. Perhaps this is an opportunity for you to write something up at T&S? Afterall I'd expect a lawyer with a philosophical background to have a lot of comments about justice and the good.
I believe that it is important to add to the list of ethical theories open to LDS an agape ethics. I develop such an ethic in my second and third volumes of Exploring Mormon Thought. I argue that developing agape in relationships is the basis of all moral obligation -- and that such obligations inhere in the fact that we are in relationship. While I like virtue ethics, it presupposes an individualist take on ethics that seems to overlook the essentially relational character of ethics. However, agape and virtue ethics need not be antithetical -- we could see love as a virtue that we develop in relationship with others and that a loving character/nature is the chief virtue which we are called to develop.
I think it is important to distinguish meta-ethics from normative ethics. Meta-ethics tries to give an account of where or moral values come from, what these moral inclinations or beliefs are, how (or if) we know morality, and why moral agents are motivated to be moral.
Normative ethics, on the other hand, focuses on how to make moral decisions and apply moral principles. So, things like "agape ethics" and "virtue ethics" fit in normative theories, while divine command theory is a type of meta-ethical theory.
FYI: I used to despise ethics too. I took an ethical theory course with an awesome professor, and I am starting to enjoy it more.
Would virtue ethics be normative? I thought that was basically a discussion of what the good was, and thus meta-ethics. Unless I misunderstand what virtue ethics is. (And I fully confess to not knowing what agape ethics are - unless it is a variation on Levinas)
Blake: I see no reason that virtue ethics is per se individualistic. Indeed, Aristotle, who argued that human perfection could only be achieved in a certain kind of community, would seem to be a rather obvious counter-example to your claim.
Nate: I think that you are correct that virtue ethics need not be per se individualistic. The virtues to be developed could be virutes in relationship or that only arise out of relationships or in communal life. So I agree with you to that extent. However, the focus and source of moral obligation (those messy meta-ethical questions) in virtue ethics remains on on one's self, on developing a character that exemplifies certain virtues. Further, what is the source of an obligation to be virtuous -- to whom is this moral duty owed? As Levinas has argued, it seems that moral duties arise prior to the self and its interests and are always already there in-relation-to the other in whose presence we are always already bound and obligated. I this sense, virtue ethics are self-centered (which is really what I meant to say) rather than other-centered because the focus is what is developed for a self, for a particular historical presentation of an individual identity (otherwise, what is it that possesses virtue?) In Levinas's epistemological-ethic the source of moral obligation is the other -- and thus moral duties arise only in relationships. Presumably a virtue ethics would impose ethical duties (from whereever they are derived) even in the absence of the other since we have a duty to develop certain virtueseven in the absence of the other.
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