John over at Fides Quaerens Intellectum has a couple of posts on the various religious views of evolution. (An overview of the positions, as he sees them, and then a critique of "theistic evolution") I obviously disagree with his views, although they are worth checking out. (For my own views along with plenty of LDS links, check out my comments on evolution I wrote a few months back)
The biggest problem I have with John's comments is that he sees rapid expansion of species as somehow being a problem. I guess I just don't follow his reasoning. It seems to me that evolution doesn't in the least require a constant rate of evolution. (Although there have been some mathematical models that suggest gradual evolution ends up being more successful than rapid evolution, all things being equal - which they rarely are) The other complain is the old standby of irreducible complexity. Now this is a common Intelligent Design charge which I confess to finding not at all plausible. For one, it suggests that without absolute knowledge there is a problem and this is an argument for the alternative view. Yet, to make a physics analogy, that is the same as saying that because M-theory (the new superstring theory) doesn't have the bugs worked out yet, it is false and God in a manner indescribable by physics unifies quantum theory with gravity.
Ignorance is not failure, as I think the Intelligent Design movement requires. It is really just a strong form of a "god of the gaps." While no proof of the sort ID requires for macro-evolution is available yet, there are plenty of good explanations that don't require a magical theistic intervention. Further evidence, especially through genetic study and manipulation, almost certainly will provide the proof in the next few decades. (That's my answer to the question of what you believe but can't prove)
While it comes from an odd place, there was actually a great comment along these lines over at the National Review blog today.
Lots of scientists believe in God. Einstein seems to have, for instance. So do I; and so do a great menay other people who think that ID theory is pure flapdoodle. It is possible to believe in God and not believe in ID; it is possible (as I pointed out in a previous post) to believe in ID but not God.
ID theory posits that certain features of the natural world CAN ONLY be explained by the active intervention of a designing intelligence. Since the entire history of science displays innumerable instances of hitherto inexplicable phenomena yielding to natural explanations (and, in fact, innumerable instances of "intelligent design" notions to explain natural phenomena being scrapped when more obvious natural explanations were worked out), the whole ID outlook has very little appeal to well-informed scientists. A scientist who knows his history sees the region of understanfing as a gradually enlarging circle of light in a general darkness. If someone comes along and tells him: "This particular region of darkness HERE will never be illuminated by methods like yours," then he is naturally skeptical. "How can you possibly know that?" he will say, very reasonably.
Examples readers have been sending me -- the origin of the universe, nature of consciousness, the convenient "scaling" of physical constants, and so on, in which big-name scientists occasionally sound off in an ID-ish sort of way -- are neither here nor there. They are not the main point of ID as promoted by folk like Behe. They are just coffee-break opinionating on large topics about which we know nothing. When the scientist comes off break and goes back to his lab, telescope, or (usually nowadays) computer, he never gives them a moment's thought. He is too busy working -- trying to find natural explanations for natural phenomena.
By contrast with these meta-topics about which we know nothing -- the questions about which may not even have meaning -- we know a great deal about the actual mechanisms of natural selection, gene function, inheritance, matter-energy systems, and the early history of the universe; but there are many things we do not fully understand, and the ID-ers wish to plug those gaps by invoking the intervention of a higher intelligence. Working scientists in these fields are much, much more likely to say: "Well, let's wait and see what a couple more generations of scientific inquiry turn up before we leap to conclusions like that."
I should add a caveat to the National Review article. While Einstein believed in God, it was the God of Spinoza which is basically a Deist view of God. (i.e. not an interventionist God at all)
I couldn't stop laughing when I read, "...I obviously disagree with his views, although they are worth checking out." I wonder how many people read my blog as an interesting (although false?) exposition of "the other side."
My complaint isn't just the periodic equillibrium, but also that the emergence of the various phyla occur almost simulataneously with no precursors. Moreover, once these phyla show up, there is no evidence that any large-scale evolutionary changes occur. We only see variations within phyla.
Despite the way I might come across, I'm not that dogmatic about this issue. Large-scale evolution may be true, and if it is, I don't see it as a threat to my religious beliefs.
Well it is less "the other side" than simply a side other than my own personal one. I've met enough Mormons who probably share your view on these matters to recognize that "side" isn't properly descriptive. (grin) I was more thinking of the fact that I've frequently come down for a rather traditional reading of evolution on my blog.
I should add though that I typically enjoy reading people who disagree with me as they make me think and question more. I want to see the flaws in my view (or what the "strongest arguments" are against my view).
Of course some see that as a little odd on my part... (grin)
Brandon over at Siris has a few more comments.
I just have a few brief comments. The first is the whole god of the gaps issue. Brandon suggests that it is only applicable to call it a god of the gaps argument once the gap is filled in. I can't agree with that. The whole point is that there is a claim that whatever science can't explain must be attributed to God. It is that complain that scientists have. If I understand Brandon, it is that skepticism is fair game and God is as good an answer as any. I just don't buy it, if only because so many gaps in scientific knowledge have been filled, there is good reason to think that science will fill in the remaining ones.
While Brandon is right that the god of the gaps label is a little question begging, the complaint seems a good one. Now there may be some gaps that science can't answer. But it seems like there has to be some very compelling arguments to suggest that we'll never be able to answer them before I'd buy using this gap as meaning much.
But I suspect that here we're equivocating over the meaning of "god of the gaps." Perhaps a different term is more applicable - the argument from silence.
The claim that intelligent design is science I find a hard time buying as well. This gets into the infamous demarcation problem in philosophy of science, of course. But I just don't see ID as fitting the role of science. (Questions of testability and falsification being the obvious problems) Now ID proponents do suggest that it is science, and thus they may see that they are claiming no "failure" of science. But I really don't think this approach to the issue is helpful.
Certainly there can be reasonable grounds for being pessimistic of an avenue of approach in science. The question really is whether ID is being reasonable in that fashion. I don't think it is.
Brandon concludes this first argument with, "IDers are not arguing from an unfillable gap to a designer that bridges the gap; they are arguing that ID is the best way to fill the gap."
This seems a difference without a difference. What is the distinction between a gap that can't be explained without a designer and claiming that those who claim there is a designer is the best way to fill the gap. The two positions seem identical to me.
Brandon's second point about there being many design arguments is a good one. One failure of traditional evolution proponents tend to cast all arguments under the same rubric. That's unfair and often a bit misleading. Further one must admit that teleological arguments are often employed within evolutionary studies, whatever philosophers of science might think of it. Teleology implies a kind of designer, even if the designer can be thought of in ways different from how an Evangelical might. (i.e. panpsychism)
The problem here though is moving from these more benign design arguments to the way ID is typically presented to the public.
Put simply, I'm willing to admit that evolutionary proponents label design too broadly and often use the worst position as a stand in for the best positions. But I think that ID proponents often do this as well. In way though this is an inherent problem when critiquing a movement rather than specific assertions. (One can see the same problem with broad ambiguous categories like feminism, existentialism, socialism, postmodernism, and even theism)
Brandon's bringing up eliminative materialism (Rorty's position on philosophy of mind and psychology) is an interesting one I'd never considered. I'm not eliminative materialist, but I certainly agree that often our categories and concepts need radical revision. Almost certainly I believe this will happen in evolution and biology. But I don't think we can, with any justification outside of religious faith, make such claims.
Clark, I disagree with the claim that IDers are arguing that "whatever science can't explain must be attributed to God"; they are trying to put forward ID as itself the scientific explanation that prevents the need for ad hoc explanations. Since they are going that route, they really can't be 'God of the gaps' because the criticism that something is 'God of the gaps' implies 1) it involves a fillable gap that it treats as unfillable; and 2) it is an ad hoc explanation. ID doesn't do the first (although my own view is that it makes a more serious mistake) and can be defended from the latter (see next paragraph). What IDers do is a) give reasons for rejecting certain sorts of evolutionary theories if taken as complete explanations; and b) argue that the causal inference to a designer gives a scientific alternative to these theories for the areas not covered. Whatever the problems with their reasoning, this is structurally not any different than any other case of a rejecting a scientific theory and proposing a replacement. They aren't arguing that science can't fill the gap; they are arguing that it can, through a scientific theory of design. If they are to be accused of anything, it cannot be of pessimism about scientific progress or of saying that science can't deal with irreducible complexity; rather, they would have to be accused of passing something off as science that is not, and that is a very different charge.
The difference is a real difference, because no one can reasonably argue that all design involves an ad hoc appeal to a designer; thus science must be able to fill some gaps with designer-based explanations without any resorting to 'God of the gaps' or even 'designer of the gaps'. ID attempts to capitalize on this by arguing that the same principles used in such cases (or that should be used in such cases) can apply to biological cases. There is some tendency to think that the mere appeal to a designer makes it a 'God of the gaps' argument; this is simply an error, since not all appeals to designers are such, and the whole ID argument (this is notable in both Behe and Dembski) is that their appeal to a designer is in this latter group.
I agree, though, with a number of other things you say (particularly about ID also conflating design arguments - although IDers do often talk about the ID movement being a big-tent sort of movement). I do think, though, that there is a potential scientific niche for something like what Dembski, in particular, is going for, namely, in fields that already have to deal with design in some way (certain areas of applied mathematics, like those involved in cryptography; forensics; and the like). I think there are problems with Dembski's proposals, but he does say some interesting things that are worth some sort of investigation. Unfortunately, the biological issue keeps sapping attention from these more interesting aspects of the theory, that might actually turn out to yield some real (even if only minor) contribution, if refined and developed.
Brandon, I recognize what ID is claiming to do. I just don't think they are actually doing it. I suspect our view on whether "god of the gaps" is applicable really depends upon how you see ID. Which, I suppose does open one or both of us up for charges of begging the question. Still, I think it is an important point. Ultimately the issue is whether ID is doing science or speculative metaphysics. You say that is a very different charge, but I really don't think it is. Rather I think them all wrapped up together quite closely.
Now as I mentioned in your earlier article, I think claims that there aren't metaphysics in science are false. In my mind metaphysics always has been a critical part of scientific theorizing, claims of the positivists notwithstanding. Further there are also those areas not yet open to testing, such as a lot that occurs in theoretical physics. For instance is M-theory (the new name for the latest incarnation of superstrings) metaphysics or physics? Or somewhere in the middle? What about Linde multiverses?
Now I think it is unarguable that ID isn't yet in the clear science area. Some might suggest it is in the realm equivalent to superstrings. I'd disagree, but it would be hard to conclusively argue one way or the other.
Once again, I don't want to lump all teleological arguments together, and I fully agree with you there. But I think there is a good reason why biologists largely reject ID as propounded by the major religious groups.
Increasingly I found ID to be as you described Clark. It all boils down to "the world is too complex", "God must have done it", without any reference to real research that has gone on or modern explanations. The constant refernces in the creationist press and blogs to Darwin and gradualism negates over 50 years of the modern synthesis. I posted a reply to Johnny-Dee's blog. I hope I made sense.
P.S. Evolving Thoughts is a neighbour of mine, just down the road, sort of.
Cheers
Clifford M Dubery
Clark, I understand you; but as I see it, it does no good to criticize people for aspects of an argument they are not actually giving; and a 'God of the gaps' label is just not a good way to characterize the actual concerns of biologists about ID, nor can IDers be genuinely accused of pessimism about scientific progress, because their position does not logically make such a charge possible.
On metaphysics: that there has always been metaphysics involved in scientific reasoning is I think undoubtable. It does not follow, however, that scientific discoveries and theories have any more than the vaguest and most minimal metaphysical implications in themselves, because entirely different metaphysical positions can accommodate them. And historically people who try to pull metaphysical implications out of scientific theories have almost always been wrong.
I see what you are saying Brandon, but I don't see this as a problem anymore than the fact that people who trust scientific theory to be consistent are typically proven wrong. Scientific theory can be useful independent of its meaning, of course. Thus we still largely use Newtonian mechanics independent of thought about its meaning since we recognize that GR and QM renders the question moot to anyone but historians. Nonetheless, the meaning is an intrinsic part of theory. So much so that we have the whole issue of the incomesurability of theory issue in philosophy of science. (i.e. does the fact that what we mean by electron is so different from what was meant in the 19th century that they are different entities?)
While often different metaphysics can be applied to theory (withness the interpretations of QM or the three main interpretations of pre-GR classical physics) I don't think it follows that discoveries and theories have only vague or minimalistic implications. The implications of GR were it right were huge in my opinion. Further one can argue that difference of opinion over meaning simply suggest that the theory isn't worked out, not that it can provide only vague assertions. An example of this might be black hole theory prior to empirical evidence. Without evidence, it seems to be more metaphysics than physics. Yet, I don't think I'd want to place it in the role you hold for it.
My point isn't so much to disagree with you in substance, merely in emphasis and value. i.e. I think metaphysics, depending upon how one places the border, plays a large and important role in scientific theory and more importanly scientific theorizing.
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