Chapter 6 brings us the main arguments for incompatibilism - the conflict between foreknowledge and free will. As such it is a very good place for people interested in the topic to start reading. In a few places Ostler makes what might be some subtle distinctions that people new to the debate may not catch. For instance the distinction between it being true at a given time that what God knows will happen versus the "how" of the knowledge. That's an important point since many people in folk explanations of foreknowledge instinctively assume a kind of backwards "causation." i.e. that God knows because I choose - that the choice is logically prior to the knowledge even if not temporally prior. Ostler does a good job explaining why this doesn't work as well as placing the arguments in their historic contexts.
Now many of my responses to Ostler's argument have been discussed at my blog the past few months. So I'll not go into depth on them. I'll just point out that Ostler's discussion tends to assume that the time in this world is all the time there is. Certainly that makes sense in the historic development of Christian theology. Creation ex nihilo and an absolute beginning to time arrive fairly early in the development of Christian theology. Yet for a Mormon such developments are just that. Theological developments and not necessarily sanctioned by revelation. The beginning of this world tells us nothing of other worlds nor does it tell us that this is all that God is creating. Rather it tells us what we need be concerned with rather than the totality of God's creative activity.
Unsophisticated folk traditions have often made use of scriptures like D&C 88:110, speaking of the "end times" that say things like, "there shall be time no longer; and Satan shall be bound..." These are taken to imply that there is an end to time. Now this doesn't make much sense ontologically, from what I can see. There are simply too many problems with it. The idea is often tied to the notion that God himself is outside time. Yet the LDS doctrine that God is fundamentally embodied seems hard to reconcile with such notions. My sense is that such notions arise from reading LDS scripture and theological statements in terms of non-Mormon theology regarding God's essence. (i.e. fundamentally more in keeping with Platonic essences than in keeping with the materialism of Mormon theology) I bring this up because such approaches to theology are often invoked by Mormons in the free will debate. I think that Ostler deals with these rather well, although I feel he excludes an obvious other reading.
Consider the universe as a four-dimensional substance and further allow there to be other such four-dimensional universe objects. then we have a way for how we can be essentially temporal beings yet be "out of time." There are theological reasons for asserting such a view, and I'll not go into it further here. But I think this is at a minimum a fruitful ontology of time to consider. Further, I think that some of the approaches to time in this chapter might be of interest with this reconception.
Having said that though, I should also point out that this doesn't resolve the fundamental problem that Ostler highlights quite well. If, at t1 a persons knows what will happen at t2 then it must happen. Questions of causation can't resolve this. The future is fixed. This doesn't, as some assert, entail fatalism. (The belief nothing we do can affect the future) But it certainly does imply the future is fixed in the same manner that the past is. Note that this doesn't imply that we experience the future the same as the past. That ought be obvious, but some might confuse that matter. However it does raise the point that absolute foreknowledge implies a static future concerning what is fixed.
The problem is that while this is typically discussed as entailing that the entire timeline is fixed, that point really doesn't follow. (Ostler does acknowledge this in the chapter, but it is important to state) Thus the future need only be fixed from the moment foreknowledge emerges as an actuality. Of course while not logically necessary, it seems to follow that possible foreknowledge would also fix the future. So the question is, how far in the future is the future fixed and from when in the past was it fixed?
The other folk tradition within Mormonism is expressed by Talmage where God's foreknowledge is compared to a parent's foreknowledge of their children. I hear this view quite regularly, even more than the idea of God being outside of time. Yet there are only two ways to consider the analogy. The first is that God doesn't really know what his children do. It's merely a prediction that can be wrong. (This is the view Ostler subscribes to) The other is that the children aren't really free (which I think is true for many childhood behaviors).
All in all this is a fairly straightforward chapter. I favor the solution to the problem by invoking time segments - spheres of fixity determined out of freedom. However the other solutions clearly are that there is no free will, of the sort Ostler asserts, or that there never are truths about the future.
Discussions on individual chapters from Blake Ostler's Exploring Mormon Thought: The Attributes of Godliness can be found on our Reading Club page.
My apologies for taking so long to get back to the Reading Club. I'll hopefully be more regular from now on.
I intentionally don't go into too much depth on the "time segment" approach to free will. I delved in a little deeper back in November. (here and here) However the core dispute in this matters really is over the meaning of free will and responsibility. Since that is the topic for the next chapter of Ostler's book, I'll deal with it there.
Clark,
I just noticed this review and you follow up post over at Splendid Sun. I read the two other posts linked and now have a better idea of both the position you have taken to explain the foreknowledge of God and how it differs fundamentally from Blake’s position. I thought the most amusing line in the exchanges was your comment:
Let me put it this way, which do you think is more theologically controversial? Suggesting that our fundamental freedom and responsibility arose at the time of our fall into this world, or the claim that God doesn't have foreknowledge?
This also gets to the heart of the matter. Both arguments have major obstacles to overcome.
I must say that on the whole your overall position seems more controversial and difficult to defend than Blake’s does. It seems like less of a stretch in our revealed theology to explain why God has fundamentally limited foreknowledge than it does to redefine the prophetically proclaimed conceptions of agency.
Even though you observed that “Basically the controversy boils down to how much you trust intuition.” It seems to me to be more than that (although that is a good point). If that is the case doesn’t it imply that many of the prophets (like Lehi) were just plain wrong and leaning too heavily on intuition? I’m neither a physicist nor a philosopher -- just a businessman -- so perhaps I am missing the crux of this. But your position seems to be odds with even the writings of Moses, who had an experience that I suspect every physicist would dream of:
And it came to pass, as the voice was still speaking, Moses cast his eyes and beheld the earth, yea, even all of it; and there was not a particle of it which he did not behold, discerning it by the spirit of God. And he beheld also the inhabitants thereof, and there was not a soul which he beheld not; and he discerned them by the Spirit of God; and their numbers were great, even numberless as the sand upon the sea shore.
Yet this same Moses – who saw the whole picture and every particle of the earth from start to finish (I presume Blake would argue as blueprints or mock-ups only) went on to describe all sorts of stories of people making real choices that really mattered… If this fixed-future concept is accurate, doesn’t that mean that all of God’s “work” and “glory” were completed at the beginning of the universe – along with all of our real choices? How did Moses miss that?
I have seen enough of your writings to know this is nothing new to you and you will say that what I perceive intuitively is not really how things are in this universe. You are right about one thing – that certainly is counter-intuitive.
Part of me wants to believe that there is some mysterious way that God can in fact predict all future acts of all people with exactness. I had sort of hoped that you had come up with a theory that allowed God to some how see our future without having any influence on our agency in the here and now. I guess, though, that such a thing is a paradox – regardless of what type of time God exists in. But I suspect that with Blake’s “Maximal Power” theory He can come pretty close to that anyway.
In this review you bring up the Talmage position and conclude that either God doesn’t really know what the child will do or that the child isn’t really free. The example of Peter denying Christ is a perfect case study for this. How did Christ know if the future isn’t fixed? I listened to Blake’s comments at the ’01 Sunstone conference and he admitted that this the most difficult prophesy to explain. (Blake’s book came in the mail today and I skimmed through the first seven chapters of his books and didn’t see anything on this case there.) His defense at the conference seemed anemic to me too. He opined that “It just ain’t so.”
But if the NT accounts are accurate I think Blake’s theories could still hold water. If Christ and the Father had sufficient knowledge of Peter, they would know under which of the pressures and circumstances that would surely follow he would deny Christ three times. They could easily prompt their apostle to be in the right place, knowing that he would obey. Promptings do not coerce – they just invite. So no agency is violated there. By the same token God could invite any number of the mob via promptings to point out Peter as a follower of Christ. Perhaps in that mob hundreds had to be prompted before three chose to heed the promptings… in any case there is no violation of agency. It is like when I teach a Sunday School class and ask for a volunteer to give the prayer. There is no coercion, just an invitation and an acceptance. Everyone is free to choose throughout.
So while this officially falls into your “God didn’t really know” category, the odds of God falsely prophesying are probably effectively zero.
Obviously I’m leaning in Blake’s direction on this subject. Am I missing something? (Sorry for the length of this post… I got on a roll or something…)
Geoff, I'll try to respond to your comments in more depth later. I'm a little busy right now. But first a couple of clarifications.
I should note that I'm really not a proponent of the position I'm arguing for. That may sound strange, but really my position is that for any position that doesn't have a clear answer we should try to see the range of possible acceptable positions. So I'm more interested in seeing alternatives to the Libertarian position. It doesn't necessarily mean I accept them. I just feel somewhat strongly that the alternatives to Blake's arguments from within Mormonism ought be made. I'm probably not the best to make them since it is an area outside of my normal interests. But no one else was jumping up to the plate so. . .
(Ben Huff actually had some interesting comments via Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals but never clarified them. My suspecion is that it won't work and just ends up rejecting free will)
Regarding the second part, I think we need clarify how freedom is manifest to us (i.e. how we experience freedom) and what freedom is at its ultimate layer. Blake critiqued me on this point as well. However I think Blake wants to say that our sense of the phenomena of freedom is what freedom actually is.
To make an analogy, we all experience cars and other regular world entities. Yet we know that because of science the reality of such entities is quite different from how we experience them. (Perhaps I ought say, "part of the reality," so as to not neglect the aspect of realtiy in terms of how we use them) Yet if I were to go up to a person and describe quantum mechanics it would seem completely unrelated to what they experience with their experience of a car, of driving and so forth.
What I'm arguing is that we keep our sense of freedom that Blake relies on. However I argue that perhaps at its fundamental or primordial level, freedom is a little more complex than it first appears.
Geoff, a few of your questions will come up in the next chapter, the first part of which deals with Blake's exegesis of 2 Ne 2. (I think it controversial in a few places and definitely adds in to the text in many ways) So if you can wait a day or so I'll be getting to that. (I'll probably break the chapter up into a few posts)
The problem is that you seem to assume that the only way to have "real choices that matter" is via Blake's libertarianism. Yet that is what I find so controversial. If I ontologically produce free choices and then experience them in time later and come to understand them there, I don't see how that is no a real choice that matters.
Regarding the claim that God's work would be completed at the beginning of the universe, I don't think that is true, since we must still experience the choices. i.e. salvation and God's work aren't simply about him knowing the end but us being at the end.
Regarding there being a way that God can know the future but not influence me now, it is important to note that even the strict determinist doesn't claim this. Once again this is a subtle point, but even Blake in his book acknowledges that the omniscience claim need not have God's knowledge influencing my choice. His claim simply is that it entails the choice being fixed. But not necessarily caused. i.e. who I am determines what I choose.
Regarding the most difficult prophesy for Blake to explain, I confess I still find the issue of Jesus Christ willingly choosing to die and Adam willingly choosing to fall the most problematic cases. In both cases the kind of free will Blake espouses logically entails that the plan of salvation could fail or that God would force both events to be unfree. He explained his position on those. I don't have time to look up the message for them though. But they are in the blog somewhere. While he can answer these objections, I confess to finding his solutions somewhat disturbing.
Regarding Peter, the problem is that you have God arranging things for a prophesy of failure to occur. i.e. God is arranging for failure. The question then becomes, why? Doesn't a God who does such things disturb you?
Thanks for the responses, Clark. These are very helpful.
You are doing an admirable job of exploring alternatives to Blake's position on foreknowledge -- especially since it doesn't sound like the position you have proposed is necessarily one you believe. I'm glad you are attempting to step up to the plate and test the theories.
Regarding this whole subject of perceptions and intuition often being wrong, etc.: There is a fundamental difference between trusting our intuition in things like physics vs. things like the nature of God or the reality of on-the-fly choices we make. I'm sure you would agree that God himself see things as they really are and from all angles and perspectives. (That is sort of what omniscience -- or maximal knowledge -- is all about.) And our scriptures tell us that the Spirit teaches us things "as they really are". Therefore, it seems reasonable that the impressions and intuitions we have that make us believe our choices actually happening now and mattering now are at least partially coming from the Holy Ghost who “speaketh the truth and lieth not” and “speaketh of things as they really care, and of things as they really will be”. If so, then our intuition on those matters are accurate. This Spirit-driven intuition thing normally would not apply to scientific intuitions so I don’t know that it is fair to compare the two.
Regarding my foolish hope of God having pure foreknowledge without the future being fixed: I was just displaying my naiveté and lack of philosophical training for you!
Regarding when God’s work is done in your proposed model: I’m not sure how God watching a fixed future unfold is part of His work. Sort of like a director watching the finished movie – the work is done by that point.
Regarding the risk of Adam or Christ failing: Isn’t this completely consistent with the scriptures that explain God too has the potential to “drop the ball” and thus cease to be God? Ours is a doctrine that includes such risk.
Regarding why God would help Peter fail: It was probably simply a chance to show Peter his weakness. This too is completely consistent with our scriptures: “And if men come unto me I will show unto them their weakness”. So no, this does not disturb me in the least.
It's not that I disbelieve it. I honestly don't have a strong opinion one way or an other. The philosopher I'm most partial to, Peirce, definitely would favor Blake's view. However that doesn't mean its right. He has as a fundamental "belief" the idea of absolute chance in such a fashion no knowledge of the future would make sense. On the other hand the view I espoused here fits with neoPlatonism and Peirce definitely has neoPlatonic tendencies. Further he's a strong empiricist and offered all his thoughts as hypothesis. So "clumbs" of determinism rather than the kind of chance he assumed fits most of his ideas just fine. The only difference isn't chance, it is how time is organized. And that's a subtle topic to say the least.
Regarding intuition, I disagree. Our intuitions of God are, in my opinion, as apt to be wrong as any. As our our intuitions of free will and pretty much all else. More is always necessary, in my opinion.
As for how God sees things, I honestly don't know. I don't think scriptures are particularly clear on the matter so I can't say. I think we tend to project onto God how we think he ought to see things. I think that a mistake. It may be he has partial foreknowledge, for instance. Yet the debate so often is between absolutes of different kinds. I'm not at all sure that is wise, which is why I'm curious about middle grounds. (And I think the position I espoused is a middle ground between the two extremes of the free will debate)
Regarding God's work, the work is to bring to pass the immortality and eternal life of man. The work isn't done until we leave this universe. (IMO) The temporal implications of that assertion though get complex and subtle again. Once again the linear time line view of temporality doesn't fit and would lead you astray if that is a true assertion.
As to whether God can cease to be God. Blake has asserted that in his book on the basis of the inductive argument in the Book of Mormon. I don't agree with that reading. However clearly Brigham Young thought God could do it. But that's not really pertinent to either of the examples I gave. I think that the King Follet Discourse resolves the worry about God ceasing to be God. i.e. there's a fundamental equivocation over the meaning of "God."
If God can use force or determination to show us our weaknesses, then why not for our whole life?
I'm glad you are presenting and fleshing out an alternative to Blake’s ideas. I certainly wouldn't argue his ideas are absolutely right and alternatives are wrong -- I just like the sound of some his ideas.
I readily concede that our intuition about God is very prone to be wrong if it is self-generated. However, if such “intuition” is really revelation from God via the Holy Spirit, I counter that it is correct and accurate. (The problem, of course, is testing/proving the source of such intuition/revelation.)
Yes, you are right that when the work is done relies on temporal assumptions -- fair enough.
Have you fleshed out your alternate reading of the "cease to be God" passages? I'm curious how one would handle that.
Regarding my proposed Peter explanation -- I don't see God as using any force or determination in the model. The Lord’s own words in D&C 121 can serve as a guide to what determines force. He can use any of these methods to invite His children to follow a path: by persuasion, by long-suffering, by gentleness and meekness, and by love unfeigned; By kindness, and pure knowledge,. But people are always still free to ignore any such invitations or simply refuse them -- the scriptures (and our own lives) are full examples ignored or refused Divine promptings. How is God’s use of such gentle invitations using force or determination?
As you say, determining what is revelation from what is intuition is what is key. The mere fact you discuss distinguishing it suggests a distinction between intuition and revelation. i.e. that you recognize the problematic place of intuition.
Regarding force, I think consciously placing people in circumstances where they will act in a certain way given their character is a kind of force. But that gets into the muddier issue of when we are free even if we are indeed free in some circumstances. That in turn gets to the issue of habits and so forth. I'll leave that topic for later.
Thanks.
Just one clarification last clarification -- I would not say that God actually went as far a "placing people in circumstances" in the specific case we have been examining. Placing does imply force. I suggested he simply invited people to be in places and those people freely accepted the invitation. (This is separate from the larger topic you mentioned of when/if we are free, of course).
I recognize that. I just think that some are too quick to consider manipulated people still free. Often I have a hard time seeing them as free.
Then you get in to a problem of calling all prompting from the Spirit "manipulations". The word “manipulate” carries lots of negative connotations in our language. Are you ready to accuse God of being manipulative? There must be a less loaded word for it. Isn't there a point where influencing and inviting without forcing is ok or even expected? God having no such direct influence on us (while assuming full agency of man) sounds more like a deist position...
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