Over on LDS-Phil Dennis Potter raises an interesting question concerning reference, description and God. The question is how we can know that we refer to the same God. Consider that a Catholic woman we'll call Isabella dies. According to LDS theology she'll be in a world of spirit beings and will be at some time taught about the gospel to the degree necessary so as to enable a free choice to accept it or reject it. (To all non-LDS readers, this is a basic belief of Mormons and is indeed tied to our theology of temple work for the dead) Well these missionaries in the spirit world teach Isabella but her concept of God is different from what these missionaries teach.
For argument's sake we'll say that somehow Isabella convinces God to actually come and speak to her. God appears and she sees that He rules the afterlife. She decides that some of her Catholic beliefs were false but then concludes that there is no God. There's this guy with a body who has a lot of power, but who is not God. The afterlife in which this person places everyone is really great, but it isn't the best place, according to her. Now if Isabella is wrong, asks Dennis, what makes her wrong?
The basic idea is that God for Isabella has been defined as a greater than which can not be conceived ala Anselm. Even if the God she encounters is maximally great he isn't greatest as conceived of in the definitions Isabella was taught. Thus the problem as Dennis presents it.
Now I'd touched upon a rather similar situation a month or so back. There the issue was whether Kripke's rigid designators were necessary to deal with God. There the issue I raised is that what counts is the reality external to my descriptions. i.e. the interactions. Thus descriptions are most emphatically not taken to be stable. Instead they develop based upon my interactions and relationships with this being I designate as God.
Dennis' presentation is slightly different though. But I think much of the same principles apply. My initial reply to Dennis was that he was taking the issue in purely theoretic terms rather than considering the entity with which Isabella relates as essentially other than the descriptions.
Dennis responds that Isabella's view of God is based purely on what was taught by other people. In other words she claims that 'God' has no reference at all because God means 'a greater than which can not be conceived.' In other words the meaning of God is determined by my community. To quote Dennis, "my community tells me what this concept means. If I decide to use it differently then I am speaking of a different concept." And later, "meaning is obviously a matter of concention. I could have meant something else with the string 'God'"
This gets to the heart of the matter. To what degree is language a matter of convention? My first initial reaction was to appeal to certain Continental philosophers. However knowing that Dennis is a good Analytic philosopher I instead appeal to Donald Davidson who most explicitly denies that convention can fix meaning in the fashion Dennis desires. He actually has a whole paper on the subject "Communication and Convention" in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation.
However by happenstance one of the papers I was consulting on last week's posts on Davidson and Peirce over anomalous monism also deals with this issue. Check out "Abductive Reasoning in Peirce's and Davidson's Account of Interpretation"
The basic idea of Davidson though really isn't that different from some of the criticisms that Derrida makes in Limited Inc. There is a rather serious question about convention being what some need to ground intention and use within description.
I just realized I didn't provide my answer in the above. Specifically I don't think Dennis' claim that Isabella's understanding of the meaning of God is purely a matter of the definition she was given. I think there are all sorts of connotations and issues of reference that are invoked of necessity by her. The issue of Davidson and company is just the more philosophically rigorous reason for why convention can't work the way Dennis wants it to.
Great set of questions, Clark. I run into analogous problems quite often, coming from a completely different starting point. This question of "what is referred to when we say the word 'God'" is particularly interesting for non-believers-- I have a recording of Derrida speaking about this very subject, questiong how the "use/mention" distinction breaks down when God is the intended referent.
Naturally, this ties directly into the issue of theodicy, which is only a problem if one's notion of "god" requires certain essential properties (that of omnipotence and benevolence) that conflict with a (self-evidently) non-perfect world. (Jim Holt suggests that if we start from the world and work backwards, we can infer a god that is 100% evil and 80% effective.)
Obviously, theodicy is not a problem to one whose notion of god is Zeus, or Thor, or Ganesha. What is possibly less obvious, is that the omnipotent, omni-benevolent notion of god is clearly inconsistent with the god of the Old Testament (for example), which leaves me to wonder: what is it, really, that believers believe when they believe in (a certain) god?
That's somewhat where Dennis is going, although he's not fond of Derrida. Basically he argues that the word God doesn't have a referent for Catholics. I tend to, within Catholic theology, think there is more reference but not description. But then I've always been partial to negative theology and Meister Eckhart.
The problem is that the LDS notion of God really isn't an attempted description or reference the the ultimate ousia. To the degree Mormons favor such a discussion they more fall into the discussion of Levinas. Derrida, especially in his later works, is very Levinasian of course. But what is so interesting about Levinas to a Mormon theologian is that the treatment of God as Other gets expanded to what one might call the other minds problem. i.e. other people are Other in the same way God is.
So the issue then becomes, and I think this is true of Derrida's comments on God to a certain degree, not whether we can reference God but whether there is some part of God we can't reference or at least describe. But if that is true of God, then isn't it true of anyone we name? i.e. at a certain point, what is the significance of this inability?
I certainly do think that has direct application to Dennis' question. I prefer going the Peirce/Davidson route though since it builds upon more common ground with him.
Dennis clarified a few points about his argument that make it even more interesting. Basically the concern he wants to get at is whether we can discern whether a problem is a theological one or a semantic one.
In other words it doesn't matter if Isabella's belief is really Catholic or if anyone shares it. (Thus arguing against my appeal to Davidson) The point is that Isabella, for whatever reason, believes God means "greatest conceivable being." That may also make an appeal to Levinas or even the ousia someone unhelpful.
Now I think this is an impossible situation, due to the relationship between use and meaning. i.e. I think meanings inherently get contaminated such that Isabella never could understand the meaning in purely this way. So to me this is one of those artificial examples philosophers sometimes come up with to argue for a point.
In my mind this shows a supposed problem purely because one has defined it this way. That is we might as well say, "suppose we have a definition believed unrelated to use or reference - doesn't this show a problem where we can't distinguish whether something is a semantic issue or a real issue?" But of course this is only possible because you made something purely semantic which begs the question in some important ways. (IMO)
Now you've got me sampling your webpage here and there, Clark. And I, as usual, have some little thing to say that may be rather sophomorish to the better educated who may frequent it.
Let me relate a little story that happened to me, to illustrate the nature of God,as I have found a small part of Him to be. This story I often use to illustrate that He has a sense of humor, but it will also perhaps give some insight to Isabella's perplexity.
Back in the 80's, I worked at National Semiconductor in West Jordan, Utah. My section head was Ghulam Patel, a devout Muslim who prayed five times a day, as per his beliefs. One day, there was a project that needed a couple of hours on Saturday to finish up, and Ghulam and I were the only ones there working on it. At the end, I was feeling a good glow from the spirit, and suggested to Ghulam that we have a prayer together, to express thanks, and so on. He declined, and I wasn't offended at his rejection, as it was done in a kind manner. As I was driving out of the parking lot, leaving the plant, I realized the (mild) offense that I presented to Ghulam, as it would infringe on his five set prayer times, as well as imposing my beliefs on him. So I asked "Father, Ghulam is a good man. Listen to his prayers." Immediately I got the response: "Very well. After I've finished listening to your prayers, I'll change wigs and listen to Ghulam's prayers." I couldn't help bursting out laughing.
Although Isabella's concept of God and of the afterlife may not match the reality she faces after death, she will not be able to honestly deny that God is her Father; Isabella will remember the face of her Father.
Whether she can match her notion of God to the qualities possessed by her Father is definitely a good question. It is interesting to point out that the worship of the creator of mankind is so commonly embedded in so many ancient and current religions.
I have an interesting coworker who was brought up in a Buddhist household. She has grabbed the ideas of religion she likes best to make her own theories of the afterlife. Her particular brand of the afterlife features personal nirvana. She rejects the notion of eternal families pointing out the failures in her own family and her desire to be apart from her family members. She also talks about how this nirvana might get boring, and she might decide to thrust herself into the mortal body of some happy creature.
When I share my belief in an eternal plan, she says she will choose not to be part of that plan. Although I have proposed that following the plan may be like following gravity - one has no choice - she maintains that she will be able to choose.
Sounds to me like the worship of choice! Will Isabella be allowed to choose if she believes God is God? Or will it be revealed in a way that Isabella will know that God is God? My inclination is that denying God's credentials is analogous to denying one's own birth.
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