Over at Philosophy, et cetera Richard has a great post on ethics and human nature. I've been reading quite a few books and discussions that last while that attempt to place ethics in terms of evolution and human nature. One popular one from last year was Plinker's The Blank Slate. A surprisingly similar one I'm working through right now is The Science of Good and Evil. Both a quite good for extinguishing a few myths, such as the idea that people (especially primitive people) are either naturally good or naturally evil. Both discuss instincts for behaviors that we'd judge both good and bad. Yet in a way, neither really addresses ethics, despite the claims of each.
For instance Plinker has this discussion about why people might rape and does quite a good job against some of the arguments against the being inclinations in this regard. (i.e. human use violence to obtain nearly everything, why would sex be somehow different?) At the same time though, he clear judges this act as immoral and something our civilizations have developed rules against. (Often rape was allowed in many circumstances, especially by conquering armies, in the ancient world) Likewise with racism. There are probably good biological reasons to be xenophobic. But we recognize them as wrong. Yet, how do we recognize them as wrong? Clearly we're judging these instincts by something outside of human nature. Plinker in particular makes a lot of egregious claims (IMO) missing this point. I don't know if the other book does. Anyway, Richard does a rather excellent job going through some very similar issues.
I haven't read Pinker, but here's my working hypothesis on the plausibility of ethics arising naturalistically via evolution (warmed over from a comment elsewhere):
Consider the emotional responses to being a victim of, say, stealing, adultery, or (a relative’s) murder. The emotional responses—the reaction in our bodies, increased heartrate, adrenaline, etc.—are primal, predating the rational functions of modern humans, and selected for because of the obvious ramifications that stealing, adultery, and murder have for one’s ability to pass on one’s DNA. But evolution is hierarchical, acting not only on individual organisms struggling for existence, but on species that are born, compete, and die (extinction). Our species (and primate and hominid forerunners) depend on cooperating social units for survival in the ’species struggle’; hence selection for both innate `ethical’ instincts, intertwined with the development of cultural rules (and brains capable of developing, changing, and transmitting culture).
Our `depraved’ or `natural man’ tendencies are commonly recongnizable from evolution as a result of `selfish’ individuals needing to pass on their DNA. Much less appreciated is that our `god-like’ attributes of love, cooperation, etc. also may arise from naturally from evolution, from selection pressures acting at a higher hierarcharhical level. Both `good' and `bad' are in us in tension, a tension which reflects the evolutionary history of partially competing interests of individuals and species-as-a-whole.
Some books that have influenced this view of mine: On emotions as body-responses (with feelings as the mind's perception of those responses): Looking for Spinoza by Antonio Damasio. On the evolutionary origins of cooperation, as well as both conserved and plastic aspects of culture, Human Natures: Genes, Cultures, and the Human Prospect by Paul Ehrlich. On the hierarchical nature of evolution, see The Structure of Evolutionary Theory by Stephen Jay Gould.
Shermer's book, which I've almost finished now, is actually quite good on all this. He ends up moving down a pragmatic line (largely following Peirce it appears) along those lines. His argument though is that these "selfish" or "altruistic" instincts really can't be broken down quite that easily. Some things simply are very subtle and are manifest for various reasons.
As you say though, it seems like there is a tension between small communities and the individual. Further we clearly can form larger units due to technology and civilization. (150 for primitive tribes, millions or 10's of millions for nations today)
The big issue then is with what ought we judge these evolutionary instincts so as to judge them good or bad. Initially, as my post above shows, I thought Shermer was going to go the Plinker route and largely avoid that too much. But instead he really goes right to jugular on the issue. He suggests that instead of asking what ethics "is" he suggests we ought to look at how we know whether something is good and work off that. He then ends up suggesting something he calls "provisional ethics" which is just Peirce's notion of making a hypothesis about ethics and trying it out on various ethical dilemmas. Its quite well done and ends up being a lot better a book than I expected.
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