A few days ago we discussed the previous discussion the problem of describing God. As you recall I ended it with the claim that Dennis' claim was highly problematic. We've had a few back and forth discussions via email. The basic issue is the role of description in reference. Now as David Landrith pointed out in that discussion, it is clearly that case that part of our referring is determined by our descriptions. And I'd agree. However it seems clear to me that the part that isn't is quite important. To get started though, let me put the argument in a slightly different form, as restated by Dennis.
P1. When Isabella uses the term 'God' in such a way that it does not apply to the being that (most) Mormons would call God.
P2. Isabella is part of a religious tradition that employs the term God in a particular way that is consistent with her usage.
P3. If one uses a term in a way that is consistent with a particular linguistic practice determined by a community of which one is a member then one's usage is correct.
C. So, if Isabella discovers that there is a being of the sort that Mormons call God, she is right to say that this is not God.
My response is the following example.
Betty, the wife of my friend is told that Clark was the person her husband talked to about a business deal in the library last week who always wears an orange shirt. Now she uses this definition quite regularly, telling her friends about Clark. Now she talks to me on the phone and says, "Oh, Clark, you talked to my husband about this business deal." I reply that I was. She then goes off about my orange shirts. I tell her I don't own an orange shirt and can't recall ever wearing one. She yells, "you're not Clark. Quit pretending to be Clark!"
Now, is she right in saying that I am not Clark, even if I can prove that I am the person her husband spoke to about the business deal? I suspect we'd all say no. Yet I don't see the difference between this and Dennis' example.
Now one way to look at this is in terms of causal theories of reference. I'm not necessarily appealing to those theories, if only because I have grave difficulties with the way notions of causality are normally treated. Where I tend to agree though is in saying that reference is not purely a matter of description.
Probably a better way, in my mind, to consider the issue is from more of a Peircean point of view. If we appeal to Peirce's theory of meaning, best expressed in the pragmatic maxim we have the following:
In order to ascertain the meaning of an intellectual conception one should consider what practical consequences might conceivably result by necessity from the truth of that conception; and the sum of these consequences will constitute the entire meaning of the conception. (CP 5:8-9)
What Peirce means isn't quite how many uncritically take him. Rather it means that if we say something is hard, its meaning is entailed by how we measure hardness. Further it becomes clear as we consider practical implications that we can discern whether a concept is correct or not and in the process of analyzing it, correct it.
In the case of Betty, it becomes clear that she was referring to me when she talks of Clark, but that she has some erroneous descriptions. I think the same would likely be true of Isabella unless the example of her belief is constructed in a very contrived fashion. (i.e. in such a way that any such reference is impossible)
Just to add to the above, I don't think this a minor point, but an important one about language. I don't think any concept of real things is completely and accurately described. There are always somethings added and somethings missing. i.e. our descriptions always "miss" our reference. Further I don't think our concepts in our mind fit nice little simple propositions the way that the examples in philosophy of language do. In practice our concepts are contaminated by use, ambiguity and the fact we conceive as much by making differences as positive statements.
In a very real sense I think most philosophy of language oversimplifies language to such an extent that it is frequently hard to take it seriously.
I stand by my initial claims that the way the topic is "framed" is more than a little contrived (but which is in keeping with the way philosophy of language is often conducted IMO) However I probably should clarify somewhat why I feel this way as well as present the opposing view.
Dennis defended this example as an idealization that tells us something that goes on in language. Now I think idealizations are useful if it is an ideal limit of something that happens naturally. That is some ideal point we'd reach if only we could continue our process on indefinitely. Thus I don't have any problem with Peirce's idealization of truth as what all inquirers would agree upon in the long run. However the idealizations that often occur in philosophy are, in my mind, contrivances, in that they are not anything that can be seen as converging upon in even the "ideal" case. They are instead very artificial situations that have been so divorced from actual usage so as to not tell us what they claim to be telling us. They are, in my ideas, akin to the ideal doubt that we find in Descartes meditations.
Of course perhaps I was a tad strong labeling it "contrivances" overly much. Still, I think this is perhaps an example of that gap between Continental thought and Analytic. (Not that I think I am characteristic of Continental thought in the least)
I should add that some somewhat "contrived" situations can be interesting to me. For example I think that Gettier and Frankfurt examples are both interesting and informative. (Others disagree, of course, and think even those overly contrived and emblematic of problems in how Analytic philosophers conduct themselves) I think I don't mind those sorts of examples though because they seem to be real possibilities, if only with some future technology, as in the case of the Frankfurt cases. (Although even there I suspect the technology isn't that far off - besides which those are really just expansions from earlier examples by Locke I believe which are real world situations)
I just think that using descriptions without referring is contrived, so I suspect the whole approach just seems misplaced to me.
Having said all that though Dennis did clarify his thinking on the matter - suggesting ties to Carnap and Wittgenstein. Alas two philosophers I'm just not familiar with to the degree necessary to discuss them with any confident. However the idea, as Dennis presents it is the notion of internal questions vs. external questions in Carnap's notion of frameworks. (I'm sure David can comment here since he seems fairly familiar with this)
The idea, as I understand it, is that frameworks are somewhat akin to Kuhn's paradigms. However they are the entire interpretive framework. A question is internal if it can be addressed by the framework and external if it can't.
Now I'll confess that I'm not up on the exactly nature of Carnap's frameworks nor the main objections. So I'm really not able to say much more at this point. The idea is, as I understand it, that Mormons believe questions about God can be addressed internally to our framework while Catholics believe questions about God can not be address internally to their framework. Were I to hazard a guess I'd think that this is not so.
I've been thinking about this a while and think that the question ends up being the same question as that of "translation" of scientific entities between scientific theories. For instance are electrons, as understood in 1910 really the same object as those understood after the advent of Quantum Electordynamics in say the 1960's. Clearly the descriptions are different - much different. Yet, I think we want to say that they are the same entity.
Now that's not exactly the same issue, since the claim of externalism is more akin to asking about quarks in say 1910, if I have the issue right. But surely we can ask about quarks. Further surely there are experiments that a person from 1910 could be presented with so as to understand quarks. And certainly he'd agree, if rational, that quarks were indeed what was constituting protons and neutrons. And isn't that what is really parallel to the question about God?
Perhaps David can answer that. (Or answer it over in LDS-Phil)
I think this gets at my point to. Reference to be reference must always include the future and future inquiry as much as it does my current understanding. While that sounds like a rather Continental approach to the issue, it is also a very Peircean one.
I think that I'll read up on Peirce on this issue, as now I am rather intrigued.
BTW - this paper by Joseph Ransdell on Peirce's theory of iconic signs is probably rather important to this topic. I'd add that it is over the issue of icons that Derrida turns to Peirce and sees thoughts close to his own. Those who've followed my comments at times on the relation between Peirce and various Continental philosophers also will note that it is here that the debate hinges - over how to take icons.
I've closed comments in order to avoid spam since I don't check this older blog as much anymore.
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