A few interesting discussions regarding A-Time vs. B-Time. One is a very interesting discussion and summary of arguments for B theories of time. That's the more scientific sense of time where time is discussed "tenselessly" (i.e. without reference to a notion of present) A theories of time suggest that the present is primal. There is a big debate about which theory is fundamental and that discussion often is wrapped up into the free will debate. Anyway the discussion of B theories of time is from a new blog called Mumblings and Grumblings. There are three interesting posts with presumably more to follow. (Post 1, Post 2, and Post 3) Whether you agree with him or not, the posts are interesting.
In a related theme John over at Fides Quaerens Intellectum has a discussion on the semantic argument for the A theory of time.
1. A-sentences cannot be translated into B-sentences.
2. A-sentences ascribe A-properties.
3. Some A-sentences are true.
4. Therefore, A-properties exist.
5. Therefore, the A-theory of time is true.
The obvious place where people will have problems is in (1) and perhaps (2). However I think there is a problem with (4) due to the inference from ascribing a property to the property being real. In the comments someone suggested that we don't have to read (4) Platonically. However consider if we have a theory that something like "coolness" functions the way "the present" functions in the above argument. We'd not want to say that a theory about reality that entails coolness treated objectively is true just because some sentence like "The Fonze is cool" is true. Put more simply, I think there is an underlying issue about realism and anti-realism that is being avoided in the argument.
Of course I could well be wrong. After all half the things I post on this blog are me feeling my way through ideas rather than presentation of what I think after investigating an issue.
I had a brief discussion of A-Theory versus B-Theory of time back in November. Some might find it interesting. Others not so much.
John clarified the argument somewhat. Apparently "ascribe" means to predicate a real property of an entity. Thus my complaint about (4) and my appeal to the realist/anti-realist distinction really is a complaint about (2). So I wasn't being nearly as clever as I thought.
I've closed comments in order to avoid spam since I don't check this older blog as much anymore.
and Theology
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Blogged by Clark Goble