I want to talk about externalism and especially some of Williamson's recent writings. However from a few recent discussions I think I ought first clarify what externalism is. There are, so far as I'm aware, three main types of externalism that pop up in various epistemological debates. So let me summarize them and then explain why it's important to keep them separate as well as discuss some confusions and complications.
Content Externalism: The claim that the content of mental states are distinguished by extra mental entities. (For more see this Stanford article)
Justification Externalism: The claim that the justification for a belief depends upon extra mental entities. (For more see this Stanford article)
Vehicle Externalism: The claim that the entities constitutes a mental state or property are within one's body (or within one's head in some strands)
The basic idea is that content deals with intentions and intentions are in terms of what is "out there" and not just inside ones mind. Thus how you are related with the external world will change the nature of an intentional mental state like a belief. The typical example for this are two people on different planets, one with water and one with a water-like substance. When considered internally they are identical but the question is whether their beliefs or other intents are the same. Putnam is famous for this example.
Justification, on the other hand, deals with whether a belief is supported. The typical externalist here is a reliabilism which argues to be justified one need only be following a reliable process. Many dislike this view since they feel it makes it impossible to discuss justification since it isn't in terms of our mental content. Some, like Williamson, don't really move towards reliabilism but still have justification being in terms of knowledge that has external content and support.
Vehicle externalism really ends up being a discussion of whether the mental is purely "within" ones body or even brain. I think it tends to get overlooked in the debate, but it ends up being important. I say that because what counts as internal or external to ones mind is often assumed to be equivalent to what is internal or external to ones body. But if the extension of the mind isn't equivalent to the extension of the body, then that becomes problematic. Indeed I'd go so far as to say that some confusion over externalism with respect to content or justification is really due to vehicle confusion. I suspect, for instance, that Davidson's anomalous monism ends up entailing vehicle externalism and that this then problematizes the claim of some that he is a justification internalist.
Perhaps I'm wrong in this. But I think that sometimes these issues aren't really kept straight. Further I think the very problem of the relation of the mind or the given with the world in which we find ourselves become prominent here. That brings us to Heidegger and some of the post-Heideggarian philosophers. By and large though there hasn't been much work on engaging the Continental and Analytical traditions in a discussion of externalism. Actually Mark Rowlands' book Externalism does try to engage Continental thought into the discussion - he also emphasizes the problem of vehicle externalism. Indeed I think he may have coined the term. Of course Rowland doesn't discuss knowledge at all.
I tend to think there is a relationship between these three kinds of externalism that hasn't been dealt with well in the literature, that I can see. It simultaneously seems a place where a fruitful exchange of ideas between the two main philosophical traditions could offer insight.
I just came upon a paper that makes several similar points to the above. It is "What is Externalism" by Katalin Farkas.
I should add two other kinds of externalism.
One is Carnap's external questions and internal questions. I'll confess I'm not well versed on these and wouldn't have even thought about then had Dennis and David not mentioned them to me. The idea is that a question is external if it can't be answered within ones framework. (Basically like a paradigm in Kuhn)
The other is ontological externalism and internalism. This is the idea of the subjective and the "objective." Quine discusses this a lot. Think of it as the ontology of the feel of something being subjective versus objective. Pure externalism says that the subjective is purely illusionary.
We could also separate knowledge externalism from justification externalism, as I blogged about a while back (though some of your comments there implied you might reject this distinction?)
No, in fact I mentioned something similar over on John's blog.
As to how I feel about it, I don't know. I've been very persuaded by Williamson's treatment of knowledge and haven't found the criticisms of his position that strong. He argues for a Davidson like holism where ones total knowledge counts as justification. In that case then I think the two positions entail each other.
However if one must know what counts as justification and knowledge is external, then it would seem on the face of it that knowledge externalism entails justification externalism. This gets to an interesting question of whether knowledge of our beliefs must be externalist in some sense. I think that certainly some philosophers would argue that - especially those in the more hermeneutic tradition or semiotic traditions. But probably not everyone. Likewise the opposite seems to follow as well. I can't imagine anyone arguing for justification externalism allowing knowledge internalism.
By the way, I think the comments at your blog highlight a problem I touched on above. There seem to be two senses to externalism across all these topics. The first is a boundary that depends upon whether we have active awareness of the entities necessary for the topic. This then really is a debate about luminosity. Yet an other way of placing the barrier is over the "where" of the entities. i.e. are they reducible to neurological states or not. Finally an other way I've seen the breakdown is as a general sense of "mind" wherein what is in the mind may not be open for our inquiry. i.e. a more thorough-going recognition of the unconscious within our mind.
The problem is that philosophers don't always seem to be careful about what they mean by mind or externalism. Part of the problem is that philosophers with very different philosophies of mind wish to discuss the same topic with each other. So they try to "bracket" the mental discussion and deal just with the epistemological ones. Yet, in a sense, that means they are often talking about different things. I suppose sometimes the argument can survive the issues. For instance Putnam's two earth argument can be applied in many different settings. Maybe its just me, but I find that often the topics get confusing as I'm not exactly sure what is meant.
I just recalled this post on the top three developments in 20th century epistemology over at Certain Doubts. Along with the posts Richard linked to, it seems quite relevant. I note that Sandy Golberg brings up an issue I mentioned, mainly the relationship between semantic externalism (basically content externalism) and epistemological externalism (justification). She is apparently editing a forthcoming volume on this topic which might be quite interesting.
One thing I ought to add to my earlier comments is the difference and relationship between contextualism in epsitemology and externalism. I'll confess I don't know enough about contextualism as I ought - despite it being all the rage at the moment. So it's hard for me to say exactly how it differs from externalism. (Assuming it does by much)
One more additional distinction. Putnam's example was originally about meanings but was then extended to all mental content. Yet clearly one need not imply the other.
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