The other day I briefly mentioned the main senses of externalism and internalism in philosophy. I think that confusion over these many senses often undermines discussions regarding externalism. Today, I'd like to consider a few of the main arguments regarding externalism, along with some of the complexities in the discussion.
Probably the best place to start is with G. E. Moore who offered a famous contradiction that set the stage for many discussions about externalism. He offered the following three propositions, at least one of which has to be false.
1. Knowing there is a hand here requires knowing that I am not dreaming.
2. I know there is a hand here.
3. I do not know that I am not dreaming
Now one of the main goals of epistemology is to figure out ways to avoid the skeptic who claims we can't have knowledge. This is a tradition that goes back in a significant form to Kant. Of course it does goes back much farther than that - to the ancient Greek skeptics at least. How can we overcome doubters? Now both Moore and the skeptic accept (1) but then differ over which other proposition is causing the problem. Moore rejects (3) while the skeptic, doubting knowledge, doubts (2). Externalism arises by doubting (1).
Now philosophers aren't just concerned with refuting the skeptic. They are also concerned with being wise and rational. Thus the focus on arguments and rationalism. For instance one friend of mine rejects externalism because he feels it rejects the entire project of epistemology which is partially to not believe unjustified claims. The danger is, he feels, that by allowing knowledge to be tied to things we are not aware of that people can justify anything. There is some justification for that worry. After all many of the big proponents of externalism use it to justify religious beliefs for which there is no evidence. The problem is that if externalism can be so used to justify Christian belief, why not Islamic belief, or Jewish belief? We are left with no way to judge among them and it seems the skeptic wins indirectly.
I'm not sure I agree with that. An other trend in epistemology is called naturalized epistemology. The most famous proponent of this view was Willard van Orman Quine. In one sense Quine rejected the very approach to epistemology that brought about the externalism debate. Rather than worrying about justification Quine felt that epistemology should be closer to science. In a sense what Quine thought we ought be concerned with what evidence forms a satisfactory theory. He thus effectively changes the topic.
Looking at the approach of naturalized epistemology, what we end up doing is looking at paradigmatic cases of knowledge (or accurate theories for Quine) and see what in a person enables them to have such beliefs. This analysis ideally will involve an appeal to psychology and neurology. In practice naturalized epistemology hasn't quite lived up to the hype. However that may well be because we're still very early in on in the development of an understanding of how the brain works.
You can see from that approach and the close connection to science, that many naturalized epistemologists aren't worried about how we, with our awareness, can determine which beliefs are or aren't justified. Rather they adopt a view more akin to a scientist outside of a person analyzing their body and environment to see what produces knowledge. Thus even if one sees naturalized epistemology as avoiding the externalist/internalist question, it certainly appears like it takes a stance inherently externalist in nature.
One might also suggest that anyone rejecting the utility of a category most likely accepts a new way of categorizing events that crosses the lines of the earlier categorical divide. That is, where one divides phenomena is different. But if an externalist is one who simply includes things the internalist rejects, then it would seem any reject of the internalist/externalist category implicitly is an externalist.
Moving beyond naturalized epistemology, there are other problems with the internalist project. For one there is a fair degree of ambiguity over what internalism is. Consider for instance memory. We remember things all the time, but clearly what justifies our memory isn't available for us in terms of our awareness, the way the steps of a math problem might be. Now the internalist might say that while our memory isn't before us now, at one time it was. But this raises the problem of whether awareness is current awareness, past through future awareness, or potential awareness. It doesn't appear to me like there is consensus on that matter.
An other problem, and a case frequently raised by the externalist, is how to consider false memories. It seems many internalists have a hard time with this. How can we be sure we are justified? It seems that what determines whether a memory is false or not is the process by which we recall. But that isn't really available to our awareness. A naturalized epistemologist might appeal to whether the systems in the brain are functioning correctly. But the internalist normally can't do this. Some internalists simply shift the discussion from what we are aware of in our mind to what is inside our head. Thus, to them, a discussion of proper mental functioning is perfectly compatible with a discussion of internalism. Some might respond, however, asking if it makes sense to talk of proper mental function without an appeal to what is outside the brain.
One solution to this is for the internalist to point out that justification isn't equivalent to ensuring truth. One might well be justified in say ones memories, because they are normally correct in terms of predicting future mental experience. Yet this leads to the odd situation where a person judged externally, by say a doctor, would be judged unjustified in beliefs but judged internally they would be considered justified. This isn't a small matter either since it gets to the heart of the problem of "dreaming" that Moore raised in our initial argument. However now we might expand it to include delusions of the sort a mentally ill person might encounter.
I think one solution to all this is to reject the whole approach to epistemology that Descartes ushered in. Descartes didn't really focus on what we'd call epistemology today. Modern epistemology more rose as a specific topic of philosophy much later with Reid, Kant, and Hume. But certainly Descartes' approach to knowledge oriented modern philosophy in terms of the knowing ego who attempts to overcome doubt in terms of what they can't doubt. You'll note that internalism inherently appeals to that approach. We speak of the individual knower and their mind, just as Descartes does.
What if, instead of just focusing in on the individual, we considered knowing a community effort? It seems we'd undercut a lot of the problems. Of course the internalist could still talk about a knowing mind knowing what others say. But if that alone isn't enough - if knowledge itself is found in the community and not the individual, then we really end up embracing a strong sense of externalism. Further, I strongly feel that the whole project that Quine ushered in is inherently valuable. I truly that that if we want to know whether we are justified in knowledge we must have a better sense of how the brain works with its environment.
One should also point out to those who claim externalism undermines the entire epistemological project that externalist certainly allow one to discuss justifications. It is just that at a certain point, one can't go any further. One has to say something is a given and that it can only be justified by something external. The alternative, as I see it, is to embrace some sort of foundationalism. That's what Descartes did by finding something he couldn't doubt. Empiricists do the same thing, saying that something like sense-data is inherently true. But why are these "foundations" inherently true? We end up with a situation where we simply stop the regress of justifications. I think that in effect all this does is give the project to the externalist who can at least offer reasons external to the mind for why something may be justified. If we don't, then I think we leave the skeptic a lot of strength, as we see in the original argument by Moore.
Hat tip to Mark Riddle for a quote from Davidson on community and knowledge. (I believe it is from that recent review of Davidson's book by Rorty - I don't have the original source)
The acquisition of knowledge is not based on a progression from the subjective to the objective; it emerges holistically and is interpersonal from the start
Over on LDS-Phil Mark raises the question of whether the conscious and unconscious is often like two people. (A comment by Davidson - loosely construed) At what point is the community like the unconscious? This isn't something to consider metaphoric. We can actually cut parts of the brain so that one half the brain knows something and the other half doesn't, but believes it does. There are all sorts of weird things that can happen neurologically like that. The idea of a "simple self" is, to my eyes, very problematic, and is where I think Continental Thought enters into the discussion.
Thanks for the thought-provoking insight. I wonder if perhaps Moore's premise (and perhaps all philosophical discussion surrounding the phenomenon of "knowledge") doesn't fail in its fundamental misapprehension of the definition of the word "knowledge."
Moore conflates "knowing" with "deducing." I can know -- ie, comprehend, discern, experience, recognize -- a thing without first deducing it. (Clark makes nearly the same point with his Riddle quote.)
Moore may further be wrong in asserting that knowledge and dreaming are mutually exclusive. (cf, The First (and every other) Vision.)
--The Practical Mormon
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