Stanford has up a new entry on Neutral Monism. Neutral monism is like most other claims of monism the idea that there is only one kind of "stuff." It is unlike other monisms like say that of Spinoza who says there are both physical and mental properties, or Leibniz, who says there's mental but that the physical is an "emergent property." Neutral monism instead says that the ultimate stuff of existence is neither mental-like nor physical-like but something inbetween. (Thus the neutral) Bertrand Russell is the figure most associate with neutral monism, but the main historic figure in its development is actually the physicist Ernst Mach.
Mach is an interesting figure because he spent his days (among other things) trying to develop a fully relativized theory of mechanics. In doing this he was attempting to follow Leibniz. Leibniz, you may recall, not only was a monist, but wished to say that all space was relative to the entities and that space thus wasn't a real container in which things were found. There were problems, primarily with acceleration. Mach failed, but Einstein took up his project and thereby developed first special relativity and then general relativity. Einstein's philosophy was closer to Spinoza, but one can see the influence of Mach I think as well. There is, in relativity, an essential place of the observer and thus one could argue the mental. (Not everyone argues that, of course) While Einstein was a monist, I don't believe he was a neutral monist and I think he ended up being closer to Spinoza with the mental and the physical being related, but different. (Alas, I'll confess I don't know off the top of my head the answer to that - I ought to look it up)
The pragmatist William James is also a major figure in the history of neutral monism. He argues "pure experience" is neither physical nor mental. His ideas certainly influenced those who espoused neutral monism. Indeed I've read he was one of the main influences on Russell's adoption of the doctrine. However I'm simply not enough of a James scholar to be able to argue the minutiae of his position. Clearly Peirce was opposed to the then popular neutral-monism. He says "it is sufficiently condemned by Ockham’s Razor…. By placing the inward and outward aspects of substance on a par, it seems to render both primordial." (CP 6.24) Peirce's view, I've argued, is closer to Davidson's anomalous monism.
Just a note, for those interested, the following paper touches upon some issues I mentioned regarding Peirce. "Two Unjustly Neglected Aspects of C.S. Peirce’s Philosophy of Mind"
I've closed comments in order to avoid spam since I don't check this older blog as much anymore.
and Theology
Number of unique visitors:
Blogged by Clark Goble