Johnny over at the blog Fides Quaerens Intellectum has been discussing arguments for what is called the A-Theory of time. This is the theory that time can only truthfully be consider to be akin to how we speak of it in tensed terms. That is in terms of past, present, and future - typically with ontological differences between the three. The A-Theory of time is typically contrasted with the B-Theory of time, sometimes called Four Dimensionalism. This is the idea that we can consider time the way we do space. In other words we can treat past, present and future as a position in time, much the way we talk of positions in space. Now many arguments against foreknowledge proper argue for the A-Theory of time, so this is indirectly applicable to the several recent discussions.
I discussed Johnny's first post a few weeks ago. That was basically an argument about how if A-Theory sentences can't be translated into B-Theory sentences and some propositions using A-Theory language are true, that A-Theory must be true. Overall the argument was interesting, but fairly problematic due to the claim that A-Theory sentences ascribe real A-properties. (i.e. the claim that a sentence like, "I am now in my office," entails a certain ontology where "now" has a kind of special reality)
Johnny has moved on to two more arguments. His second post is about how date-sentences can't be translated. That is, translate a sentence with tense into a tenseless sentence. Thus the sentence, "It is now time for the meeting" uttered at 1:00 PM on Feb 21, 2005 can't be translated into "The time for the meeting is 1:00 PM on Feb 21, 2005." Needless to say, on the face of it that seems controversial at first glance. But of course the first sentence includes talk of "now" while the other doesn't. Further that now is presumably indexed to the speaker.
There is an obvious counter-argument to the approach Johnny takes. (I'll let you read his full argument) Consider for example talk of space using the same argument. We might have the sentence, "The meeting is here" uttered in my office. Is this equivalent to, "The meeting is in my office" or not? I think not, since the former has talk about "here" in the same way that Johnny's example includes talk about "now."
Both are indexical - that is their truth value depends upon the context they are spoken in. Indexicals can be philosophically problematic for many theories. Typically they are found in sentences involving pronouns. But often there are implicit pronouns in sentences. For instance Johnny's first sentence includes a kind of hidden assumption of the speaker and thus an "I." But the "I" or speaker of a sentence has not just time (present in time) but place (present in space). That means, that at least on the face of it, if presentness entails the A-Theory of time that there but be something akin to an A-Theory of Space. That is talk of space as three dimensions is false. There is really just here and there. (With there presumably translatable into before, behind, above, below, right and left) Put in this fashion, do we really want to commit to such a theory? Perhaps some do, but it seems like people are far more willing to ascribe this special subjective nature to time than they are to space. In other words, can we adopt the argument for the A-theory of time without simultaneously by the same logic adopt a fully relativistic conception of reality. (i.e. that both time and space are not real in terms of a container model - we have something closer to what Leibniz proposed for space)
Clearly that's not necessarily that controversial. Both Mach and Einstein attempted to achieve such a theory. Of course both failed miserably and there is no evidence that such a fully relativistic theory is possible. All the physics requires a substantial space. There are some arguments that time can be treated differently, although they have problems. (I'll not get into those for now)
The point is that if we accept the semantic theory of time argument, it seems a stronger argument for B-Theory of time than A-Theory, simply due to that physical fact. i.e. we probably ought translate Johnny's sentence as, "Someone at 1:00 pm uttered the sentence, 'it is now 1:00 pm' asserting that it is 1:00 pm." In other words, the mysterious nature of these kinds of A-sentences is really just a feature of holism. A sentence has its meaning partially from its context. The issue is thus really how to consider indexes in propositions.
This takes us to Johnny's third post on Token-Reflexive Sentences. There Johnny ask whether a sentence like "the forest is now burning" can be translated as "the forest is burning simultaneously with this utterance." The question he asks is whether that second sentence can possibly be true if no one utters it. A simpler version of this is the sentence, "I am Clark." Is that sentence true or false? Clearly it depends upon who is uttering it.
Johnny's point with all this is that token-reflexive sentences can't translate these sorts of sentences. But if we accept holism, this isn't surprising. We can't fully translate any sentence in a meaningful way without translating its context as well. In other words this whole line of thinking about A-Theory of Time is simply a manifestation that sentences don't have an a-contextual meaning. It is a fact about a problem in philosophy of language and tells us nothing about the metaphysics of time or space.
Good discussion, Clark. I think you have summarized what I've said with accuracy. Let me clarify a few things, though.
Some A-theorists can harmonize their view with four-dimensionalism. They claim all of time is ontologically real, but only one flowing moment is "now." Sometimes, this is thought of as the "moving spotlight" view--now is just the moment the spotlight is on, although space-time is fundamentally a four-dimensional block. (I happen not to be this kind of A-theorist. I'm a strict presentist (i.e., only that which exists now really exists; past and future entities are not on an ontologically real par with present entities). I also have no problem with divine foreknowledge.)
According to the New Tenseless theories of time (e.g., see Nathan Oaklander) they accept that A-sentences cannot be translated into B-sentences. This avoids the nasty step of coming up with a translation scheme that works. Unfortunately, this leaves the properties ascribed in A-sentences dangling "out there." Someone like Oaklander would say that they can't be translated because A-sentences incorporate properties that only exist on the A-theory of time. So, I admit more needs to be than just show that B-sentences cannot translate A-sentences.
What I intend to show (next week?) is that A-sentences ascribe the property of presentness. I've read a little more about what "ascription" means, and I might be able to give you a better handle on what I mean by the term. Moreover, I think this will help bridge that gap between "mere language" and "actual reality."
One last point: I don't think there is a parallel between the indexical "now" and other indexicals like "here." All the truth-conditions are translatable and don't present striking problems like the indexical "now" does. At least, I've never seen anyone demonstrate the parallel.
Could you explain the difference logically between "now" and "here" that doesn't beg the question? I'll admit I'm dubious.
One more quick thought. I think one problem with sentences like "I am Clark" is that they are incomplete in meaning until they are given a full meaning in a particular utterance. Philosophers like to be able to talk about the meaning of sentences independent of any particular utterance. (What Searle calls corporate meaning) I think it an error to think all these have a determine meaning. Indeed I think the problem of indexicals highlights this problem in philosophy of language. (Yes, I know there are various sophisticated ways of dealing with indexicals)
My own favored approach I've come to only the past few years. It comes out of Peirce's notion of a proposition which I've discussed before. This excerpt is probably one of the better explanations.
I'd note that often propositions are used rather loosely in philosophy. I have to admit that I studied philosophy of language a fair time before I really got a grasp on them. I think they are one of those notions referred to a lot but without being careful about what we mean. This allows a lot of equivocation over what they are. Some treat them as some ideal sentence that any particular sentence could be translated into. Some treat them as some mysterious immaterial entity that has the property of being true or false. Some treat them as an ideal meaning as an idea. (i.e. not as a sentence)
The problem of propositions may not appear to be relevant, until you start asking what it means for a sentence with indexicals to be true. At that point I think the problem of propositions does raise its head.
Peirce's solution is that a proposition is a possible assertion. He then allows for incomplete propositions. He also invokes his doctrine of continuity to claim that there are different degrees of assertion. That's how he gets out what a speech act theorist would call illocutionary force. (Although the two notions don't exactly translate perfectly)
I'll have to look at Peirce more closely. He is definitely an important thinker that I know very little about. I appreciate your filling me in here.
As for the indexical difference of "now", I'll probably have to do a whole post on that. I will probably need to re-read John Perry's "Essential Indexical" stuff too.
Good objections and observations, Clark! I will do my best to address some of them in the upcoming week.
Peirce's view sounds similar to a common medieval view: propositions are 'enunciabilia': possible enunciations.
I agree vehemently with your point about propositions; the question I always ask when propositions play an important role in the argument is, "Roughly speaking, do they here mean what is proposed, or the proposing of it, or the mental judgment expressed, or the verbal proposal that expresses it?" And it is surprising both how inconstant it is, and how important the differences can be.
I wrote a post on the problem here last August; although it's rough and in retrospect not entirely satisfactory in its expression.
A lot of Peirce's views are surprisingly medieval. Surprising, since medieval philosophy doesn't exactly get a lot of respect. Peirce himself called himself "an Aristotelian of the scholastic wing, approaching Scotism, but going much further in the direction of scholastic realism" (CP 5.77n1). Even a lot of his semiotics have medieval connections. Duns Scotus definitely is a big influence on him as is Ockham, although he clearly differs with Ockham on many important matters.
If anyone is interested, here's a brief discussion of the relationship between Peirce's thought and Duns Scotus. Those interested in Peirce's own writings might check out this book review he did for The Nation which delves a lot into medieval philosophy (as did the Berkeley one I linked to earlier)
Johnny has up an other chapter in his discussion of A-Time. This one gets at the "ascription" element of his proof. His answer is that A-sentences ascribe presentness. In other words the sentence "John is blogging" means "presentness inheres in John's blogging."
Now I'll admit that despite having occasional gusts of neoPlatonic sympathies (pardon the pun) that the notion of "inhering" is one of those notions that seems a bit empty. My sense is to suggest that there is some phenomena of "presentness" which is manifest within the other phenomena. Whether that's what Johnny means, I can't be sure. But I think it is.
Now please note, as per my earlier comments, I don't have a problem with the notion of presentness. I just think that presentness entails a temporal presence and a spatial presence along with likely a lot more. Further while I believe in four dimensionalism, I also take consciousness and "feeling" rather seriously. (In Peircean terms, all phenomena includes firstness, secondness, and thirdness) So I don't have a problem with this talk of presence, depending upon how one does it. (Put an other way, I think presence is far more complex than I think most do)
The real question is though whether this poses a problem for B-time. The way Johnny presents the argument is that one can't translate a A-sentence for a B-sentence. Recall, however, that to me this is a problem of holism. In general I don't think sentences can easily be translated without translating all the sentences that form their context as well. So the fact that this phenomena of presentness can't be translated into a simple sentence means little. What has to be established is that it can't be translated into any set of sentences.
Clark: It seems to me that the real problem is one of contextual relations as you say -- but that makes matters worse for the B-theory of time and not better. If I state: "the house is burning at t," and "I am in the house at t" form a complex of sentences, what I still need to establish is that "it is now t" so that I know what to do now. However, sentences that have such referential meaning as "now ____" to us seem to be irreducibly A-theory sentences. So I agree with Johnny and I think his critique of the B-theory is cogent.
Blake seems like a really smart guy. After all, he agrees with me!
...but seriously. If you admit that the B-sentences cannot translate A-sentences, then you must deny that A-sentences are true. That seems like a terrible price to pay, although some have suggested that A-sentences are just "useful fictions" or "psychological necessities" that aren't really true. If the B-theory is unlivable, why believe it?
As for your concerns about four-dimensionalism, most sophisticated A-theorists accept four-dimensionalism as an epistemic tool for theoretical science, but they claim there is no need to postulate an ontological fourth-dimensional entity to harmonize with GTR. I'm not a scientist or a son of a scientist, so I don't have any explanations of my own. I simply take the word of people who do know like Quentin Smith and William Lane Craig.
With respect to Craig, his conception of SR and GR has been attacked rather heavily. There certainly are interesting things in GR and especially quantum gravity related to what is called the hole argument and a move towards a more Leibnizean conception of space-time. I was for a long time convinced by them. I finally had to admit that all the physical theory points towards a substantial space-time.
If you are interested there are several papers on this at the philosophy of science repository. One of the better ones is this one. "Presentism and Relativity"
I should add that a more limited conception of A-theory that allows a kind of consciousness might be more acceptable. (i.e. that doesn't embrace presentism)
One last comment - hybrid theories presumably do allow translation between B-theory and A-theory sentences.
Interesting paper up at Weather's list of new philosophical papers. "The irrelevance of the presentist/eternalist debate for the ontology of Minkowski spacetime" With a topic like that, how can't you read it? (Well, I'll probably have to print it off and read it this weekend)
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