I finally had time to read through the discussion that Goerge, Geoff, and Blake have been conducting. My apologies for the delay. A few brief thoughts. Hopefully tonight or tomorrow morning I can continue on with Blake's book.
1. If true free will is operative then small changes from God's predictions will compound. It seems very difficult to believe that God is the ultimate predictor if his predictions rest on truly free (in the Libertarian sense) beings. Those asserting that he can predict given this underlying phenomena that almost parallels randomness have a lot to explain. Certainly some things might be predictable. But actual specific events, such as the kind of device used to kill Christ, seem difficult to predict. Anything not predicted must therefore be imposed by God in some fashion.
I think it ironic that those requiring predictive power must end up with a God who must intervene more than those who view freedom more loosely.
2. It seems to me that one problem with critiques of foreknowledge is that they generally assume absolute foreknowledge akin to an absolute entity. I'm actually in agreement that God isn't an "absolute" of the fashion found in the philosophical tradition. I think attempts to buy into that view rob Mormonism of what is distinct.
However this raises an other issue - the linguistic. The common problem I see in the early days of the apostasy is taking terms with a meaning in common sense experience and applying them beyond that world. Especially when they are applied into the ontological realm. Thus omnipotence doesn't have a sense of all power within the scope of events expressible in common experience. Rather it is pushed to extremes to mean all power logically consistent. A common sense notion becomes an ontological one.
I raise this point to suggest that the whole Libertarian debate in religion really partakes of this spirit. Free will as it has a sense in the world of common experience with the entities and behaviors of common experience is pushed into the ontological realm. The ultimate issue, as I see it, isn't so much the logical one. I agree with Blake that with the sense of free will he brings up with the limits of application (or lack thereof) that what he says follows. Where I disagree is over whether that application of a common sense term into a philosophical term is appropriate.
In a sense the battle is not the one I think you are waging George, but one over the meaning and range of the term agency.
Secondly, I think that Blake often sets up a strawman when he critiques absolute foreknowledge. Foreknowledge can still be foreknowledge if it is limited. A God who knows half of the future still has foreknowledge. Further a God with such limited foreknowledge entails a logical scenario where Blake's argument no longer holds. There then arises the issue of what limited foreknowledge is. Is it simply knowing a finite number of events? Does it entail some sense of vagueness? Of knowledge of universals? All those questions need asked, but rarely are brought up in the debate.
3. It seems to me that the most fruitful way to consider freedom is to break out of the approach as it has been conducted in the analytic tradition and perhaps to a degree in the old philosophical tradition. Free will as a linguistic issue must be conceived of purely within the realm of that language that term arises in. To conflate systems of language (the common sense or folk with the philosophical) is in error. The scriptures were not written with philosophical language and must be considered accordingly.
If we instead consider of what is primal or fundamental about freedom as freedom we can move to consider what grounds the phenomena of freedom rests on. (As opposed to the use of the term freedom) That is, we must move to the phenomena itself and not act as medieval schoolmen constructing philosophical arguments from the scriptures, no matter how subtle.
We must then move the the relationship between our language and the phenomena to see the relationship. But I earnestly think that the phenomenological questions must come first. Further we must be on the lookout for equivocations, instabilities, and uncertainties in our language use. My inclination is to say that the reason there is a compatibilist vs. Libertarian debate is because both senses are found in common language. We then have interminable philosophical debates because we want one sense to dominate and be the sense. I'm sure many will disagree. But I think we try to repressed the essentially equivocal and unstable nature of our common sense language.
4. To me the most fruitful limits on discussion to pose is that if there is foreknowledge our discussion of it is at best limited to this world during the existence of this world. Debating if foreknowledge took place prior to the existence of this sphere of existence seems futile. As does pushing foreknowledge to knowledge of events outside this sphere of existence. Second, we must limit foreknowledge in the way we limit omnipotence. A foreknowing being may have extensive foreknowledge, but it doesn't follow logically that there are no physical limits on what can be foreknown. We must therefore avoid the temptation to adopt an absolutist sense of the "omnis" even within the realm of this sphere.
As I've argued before, the primordial nature of this sphere might fruitfully be considered chosen at the moment of its existence. This primordial freedom is not the same as free will considered in common sense language. Rather it is what grounds the possibility of such.
The discussion of free will in the regular realm asks the question of free will for a being. But this presupposes that we can distinguish in an absolute sense the boundaries of that being. I think that in a sense this requires that there be "something" essential to the being that choses. In a sense we end up with possible equivocations there. Certainly we can talk about a person as a person, as an identity. But we must always keep in mind that our discourse rests on the perhaps problematic nature of identity. That will possible affect our ability to push our discussion into realms where the nature of identity has a logical effect on our arguments.
I'm no expert on this debate, though I have been following it.
My complaint is that Blake and others seem to be critiquing foreknowledge of God from a more "traditional" Christian viewpoint, rather than an LDS one where we exist (on some level) independent of God.
Does it make a difference if God has absolute foreknowledge of beings that exist independently of him and on some basic level, he did not create?
It seems to me most arguments on foreknowledge assume that God created us as we are, whereas it seems to me that LDS theology says God did not create us as we are, but instead provided a framework for us to become like him.
But, I'm no expert and my thoughts on this issue are less than half-formed. But I think it makes a difference if we are not wholly the creation of God.
I don't think, Ivan, that critique really applies to the basic logic of the issue. The basic argument against compatibilism merely makes use of the meaning of true to discuss a fixed future. The real issue is the meaning of free relative to a fixed future. With regards to the "how" of foreknowledge, it just doesn't matter for the argument.
Clark: Perhaps we could discuss your points individually.
1. It seems to me that it is not objectionable in the least that our Father is a hands on God and not removed from us. Further, there are many types of events that are highly predictable -- such as a crowd of Pharisees becoming murderous when they are called hypocrites in front of others. (It seems to me that Jesus did plenty of provoking). However, it is unreasonable to expect anyone to explain how or what God actually did or does to realize the events that have transpired to bring about his plan. The best that can be asked is a general outline it seems to me. Any other demand is unreasonable.
2. In a sense what I propose is limited foreknowledge. This point is really the issue of how God knows as much as what God knows. If God knows the future because it already exists (or because there are already true counterfactuals of freedom) then an assumption has been made about the nature of reality that is inconsistent with open alternatives. Moreover, we all have a direct sense that we deliberate and choose among alternatives and we have direct experience of bringing about one of the alternatives among others that were open to us. I'm always puzzled at those who reject such direct and immediate experience. In any event, the reason that I concluded the discussion with Zagzebski's argument was to show that the real issue is an issue of the nature of time and of how God knows. It seems to me that those who believe in forekowledge invariably believe that teh future already exists and therefore is fixed in terms of logical priority if not chronological priority. Moreover, it seems that there is a burden to explain how God could use his foreknowledge for his providential purposes if the future is fixed logically prior to his ability to do anything about it.
3. I just cannot grasp what you're talking about here.
4. I'm largely in agreement with 4.
As for Ivan's comments, it seems to me that such a notion of uncreated intelligences entails a form of libertarian free will and very likely also an existentialist "stuckness" with such freedom.
I'd agree with (1) except to the point that it seems difficult to believe that such predictions could be made hundreds of years earlier with respect to the death sentence that Romans would impose. But we've discussed that before. It seems to me that the Libertarian view requires God to intervene in ways that many would find distasteful. (i.e. that God basically entrapped the Jewish mobs to kill him, or that he ensured that Romans would crucify people)
My critique of (2) is simply that knowledge entails truth and truth about the future entails a fixed future. So I don't see how that avoids your problem. I mentioned that in your response to George in the other thread. It just isn't clear to me how God can have any foreknowledge in a Libertarian scheme except with respect to lawful phenomena he is too weak to change.
I recognize you don't grasp (3). Further that is basically my view of D&C 93. That intelligence in that discussion is more primordial freedom as discussed by Heidegger.
I'm still trying to figure out a way to express (3) in a clearer fashion. I've tried quoting relevant sections of Heidegger in the past. But I'll have to figure out a better way.
Ah, well - there we go.
I knew I didn't really understand this issue, but at least I know that what I thought wasn't really central to the issue.
back to my usual confusion........
(keep it up - I don't mind being confused).
Ivan, basically the argument is that for at a given time for any statement about the future to be true, that future must be fixed at that time and for all time thereafter. That's what I mean about it being tied to truth and not how one knows.
I think that part of the debate is uncontroversial and always has been. For knowledge of X to be knowledge, X must be true.
The real debate is over the meaning of the term free and whether the term can be truthfully applied when there is a fixed future. That is far more controversial.
I fail to see the necessity, or even the wisdom, of excluding discussion of pre-existent agency. It was an important part of our life and certainly had a great deal to do with setting the stage for what we have found in mortality.
I still feel that in the pre-existence we had the only opportunity to truly exercise free will, as understood in the term moral agency.
It seems that LFW includes much of what I understand to be moral agency; Knowledge of choices, knowledge of consequences, opportunity to truly be free to choose. If these issues are not directly addressed in the definition they are implied. The one element missing is the necessity of knowing God's will in the matter. When Blake says that Mormons understand free will in terms of free agency he is correct with the modified definition of free will. It should be expanded to include God's will.
Much of our life depended upon the choices made before we came here - how can that be ignored?
I suggest that we made decisions based on a full application of moral agency. When that happened there were choices and options that were no longer available. It included the conditions of mortality. The acceptance of these conditions affected the free will choices we would have. Therefore it is useless to discuss this life in terms of complete free will and by ignoring the pre-existence.
Foreknowledge has to be based on the plan that God presented to us in the pre-existence. God knew that He would be successful. That knowledge had to be based on something. Success means, in my view, that everyone would receive the best they were capable of receiving - taking into consideration all of the factors that might affect that outcome; personality, tendencies toward righteousness, etc, etc.
I know you fellows want to talk of these on a philosophic basis, but sometimes the theologic approach had value as well. It must somehow form the basis for identifying "mormon thought"
At least as I see it.
George
George, the reason I exclude discussion of what happens before or after this world is simply because we don't know much about what happened there.
As I mentioned in the link I provided earlier, I think one fruitful way of thinking about this world is four dimensionally. In that scheme we adopt a holism in which everything is freely created as a whole. We are a part of that choice. Now clearly that's not freedom in the sense Blake uses it, which is tied to individual agents. But that's what I meant a few days ago when I said I thought we chose in the pre-existence.
Certainly the choices we made before now affect us. We're not ignoring them. I'm just not sure how it is relevant to the question at hand, unless you are saying it was there that we had free agency and that we don't have any here.
I am not saying that we have no moral agency in this life, but I am saying that it is somewhat impaired by the vail over our mind and the circumstances we find ourselves in. We cannot act with full agency with only partial understanding.
And Yes I would suggest that the agency we experienced in the pre-existence was of a fuller nature than we have here.
For such a momentus decision concerning participation in the plan that led us to earth, I do not think that it would be right to make decisions impaired by a lack of full knowledge and understanding. That could only take place before we came here and that is why I continue to put such emphasis on the pre-existence. Once we made that decision our future choices were limited, but because we made the choice to follow the Fathers plan and accept the limitations and circumstances here we can accept the limited nature of agency on this earth as an extension, if you will, of the full agency we expressed before.
George
That's fine George. My point is simply the question of what our choices there have to do with the nature of whether we are free here or what free means. i.e. what impact on the arguments it has.
It has to do with the nature of agency in this life because it forms the basis for our life here.
We made a choice in the War in Heaven to accept the plan. Along with that acceptance came an understanding of the consequences of our decision, ie what our life would be like here on earth.
In making that known to us God knew what kind of choices we would make and was thereby able to so order the earth to provide for the greatest opportunity for us to maximize our potential. Our agency would be less, by that I mean compromised, by the conditions of the fall and the vail over our minds.
Therefore our definition of what it really means to be free in this life is impacted by the plan of salvation as presented to us in the pre-existence.
Freedom and agency in this life is compromised compared to our life pre-mortal. I think we can agree to that. Therefore we must define agency and free will in this life with that in mind. It affects our understanding of foreknowledge in that we had to have faith in the ability of God to complete His plan or we would not have supported the plan in the first place.
Without an assurance that God really knew what He was doing we would be unable to express faith in the plan. Knowledge enhances faith, it does not replace faith. The more knowledge we have the more we can express faith in the outcome.
Therefore, in my mind, God not only is able to have complete foreknowledge, but must possess it for us to be able to support His plan with our faith.
In order to make the crucial desicion about following God or not, we needed a time when we could act in perfect agency. That was in the pre-existence, and could not be present in this life.
I probably need to organize the response better, but I hope you can see how I feel that the pre-existence is crucial to understanding the nature of agency in this life and the importance of foreknowledge on the part of the Father.
George
So your argument basically is that for us to be able to choose rationally and deliberatively in the pre-mortal life, we had to know that everything would work out and that could only be known if God had foreknowledge.
However if God knows everything will work out because he has sufficient power to ensure that it will work out, then how is this an argument for foreknowledge of the sort you assert?
Clark said: "It just isn't clear to me how God can have any foreknowledge in a Libertarian scheme except with respect to lawful phenomena he is too weak to change." First, you ignore that there are events that are physically probable to occur and God knows them. Aand why do you think that God must be too weak to change them? Further, as time moves forward, people become entrenched in a character that makes certain kinds of actions and responses probable. So the nearer we get to the more certain the probabilites become.
Second, God can be certain that he can intervene to bring about his plan. I admit to just being mystified at why you think such intervention must be done is a way that is incompatible with free will. I have brought up the atonement several times as an example of God's intervention that is consistent with free will -- indeed, the very ground of our agency. God has knowledge of his plan and that it is certain to be fulfilled -- so it is justifiable true belief and foreknowledge. It just isn't absolute or exhaustive but resourceful and responsive to many different possible scenarios. It seems to me that you just lack faith in God's resourcefulness.
Blake, you neglected my argument about why he can't know them - the meaning of truth. By the very argument in your book for the fixity of the future following from foreknowledge, it would follow from your claim God knows probabilistically. The probability element would satisfy the justification component of knowledge but not the truth component. To repeat my point for God to know at time T it must be true at time T and thus the future must be fixed at time T.
It seems to me your argument works only by either redefining the meaning of knowledge as strong belief or by applying a double standard.
Regarding intervention, I didn't say it was incompatible with free will. I said it involved acts that many would find troubling. i.e. it raises the problem of evil. For instance if God intervenes to produce Roman crucifixion then I think the claim that God is evil follows naturally. Likewise if God encourages the Jews to kill Jesus, it seems God is ethically responsible for that. So the problem is primarily one of ethics, not free will. I certainly agree God could be resourceful. I just find the approach disturbing. It seems you solve one problem by bringing in an other bigger one.
"The real debate is over the meaning of the term free and whether the term can be truthfully applied when there is a fixed future. That is far more controversial." Yes, I believe, as you know that the future is fixed, MY future is fixed and I am the one who is partially fixing it. My future is fixed in that whatever I will do is that which I will do. Of course there is a big question mark on what am "I"? But since we, as Mormons, are dedicated to a strict materialism, meant in the Mormon way, we can't appeal to any kind of "future opening" magic. (I'm not trying to isult you by being sarcastic, that's just how I speak sometimes.) If one is to respond that this view of the future is not free enough, I would respond that any more freedom doesn't mean that much to me. I can see nothing which we could gain by speculating on the existence of multiple futures. There is only one future, the one that we are now moving into.
Clark: You ignore that God has certain knowledge that his plan will be fulfilled in the future. I agree that probabalistic knowledge is not certain, but it is knowledge of probabilities, and in addition some physical processes undoubtedly limit and determine some outcomes (e.g, God can know that the sun will come appear over the horizon from our perspective tomorrow -- and he could change that if he wanted to but he also knows that he won't change it). So even though God doesn't know what free persons will do, there is a very large range of phenomena that can be predicted with great accuracy and some with absolute certainty. What God predicts are usually elements of his plan that he will insure comes about.
God didn't intervene to "cause" the Romans to crucify him; they freely chose to crucify him. Yet given human nature it was highly probable that Christ's light would provoke a violent response. The Romans freely chose to be provoked by Christ and it was foreseeable with high probability that they would freely react as they did. So Christ may have provoked the response -- it hardly follows as you supposed that he was somehow evil in doing so. Your assertion that Jesus would be responsible if he did acts that provoked the Romans to violence is a non-sequitur pure and simple.
Jeff: What are you talking about? Of course only one possible future will eventually occur. However, you simply gloss over the relevant point that right now there are several possible futures (and they don't exist althought they are merely logically possibilities). Thus your suggestions that there "is" only one future is multiply flawed. First, the future doesn't exist yet in any way (otherwise it isn't truly future but present). Second, the issue isn't how many futures will actually occur, but how many are possible given present events. If you assert that only one future is possible then you have a lot of explaining to do. Third, materialism doesn't entail that thre is only one possible future as you seem to suppose -- quantum theory is a concrete example of purely material processes that are indeterminate and allow several possible futures.
Man! I just got ripped up, and not without good reason. For one, I have little to no training philosophically speaking so I can understand if it is difficult to understand what it is I am saying. Sometimes, it is difficult for me (not a good sign). Let me try to explain myself better.
1) "First, the future doesn't exist yet in any way (otherwise it isn't truly future but present)." This is true, but if the future doesn't exist yet, how can we really talk about a fixed future, or futures being open to us? What I was trying to say is that there really is only one future which will matter much and all the other that we can say might have been, never really were.
2)"Second, the issue isn't how many futures will actually occur, but how many are possible given present events. If you assert that only one future is possible then you have a lot of explaining to do." I was trying to assert, in a not very eloquent way, that only one future is practically possible, and that speaking of logical possibility and extending beyond this, doesn't give us any benefits worth holding out for. I simply don't see the advantages of indeterminism.
3)"Third, materialism doesn't entail that thre is only one possible future as you seem to suppose -- quantum theory is a concrete example of purely material processes that are indeterminate and allow several possible futures." I agree, but quantum theory is not what we should be holding out for. Random fluctuations does not give us better freedom, freedom worth wanting, just haphazard freedom free of responsibility. What I was trying to say is that some Christians claim indeterminacy by saying that the soul somehow makes our decisions and this is why we, unlike the beasts of the field, have God-given free will. This is the main idea behind the cartesian theater, we don't want to think that our minds are merely our material brains. But in Mormonism we believe that our minds are material in the form of our physical brains combined with spiritual element and intelligence. This was BY's reasoning that all results have a cause, even if they come from more refined matter. So, yes QT is indeterminate, but 1) its not the kind of indeterminacy we should want, and 2) it tends to cancel itself out anyways so it doesn't infringe too much on the otherwise vastly deterministic world around us.
Clark says: "So your argument basically is that for us to be able to choose rationally and deliberatively in the pre-mortal life, we had to know that everything would work out and that could only be known if God had foreknowledge.
However if God knows everything will work out because he has sufficient power to ensure that it will work out, then how is this an argument for foreknowledge of the sort you assert?"
George responds: I am not sure of your second question. What I assert is that God has foreknowledge and that it is consistent with our mortal agency.
God formulated the plan and presented it to us for approval. As a result of the acceptance process, which surely entailed modification in the details of the plan, God became aware of how the plan would work and what would be needed in the future for the plan to succeed. I am not concerned, at this point, with anything but the foreknowledge God has regarding this mortal existence and in particular my, and your, salvation.
We have the freedom to act in this life, but it has been affected by our acceptance of the Fathers Plan and by the mortal experience. Once the plan has been accepted and implemented, then the bullet has been shot and will hit the target. It still involves our freely (within the mortal limitations) arrived at decisions and actions, but is protected by the foreknowledge of God as to what is necessary to do to provide for its success.
The Foreknowledge of God is a certainty of a future based on 100% predictive abilities. Our Moral Agency is based on decisions made based on complete knowledge and understanding in the pre-existence, and incomplete knowledge and understanding in this life.
While you may not agree with this position, I would be interested in the whys and wherefores of your agreement or disagreement with the proposition.
George
"To repeat my point for God to know at time T it must be true at time T and thus the future must be fixed at time T."
I am not sure that this is true. If we define God's knowing as a predictive quality then it is only true within the limits of that predictive ability. I assert that it is a 100% ability, but it still only says that my prediction is that it will be true at that future point in time.
It seems to be a situation where although it is technically not true that absolute foreknowledge is possible, from a practical perspective foreknowledge works and is necessary. We all seem to agree that God has foreknowledge within certain limits. I simply assert that those limits have no practical boundaries, and certainly none for this mortal existence.
It seems foreknowledge is important scriptually. Therefore we need to understand the concepts within those scriptural limits.
George
Way too much here to comment on, so I will pick out only one small point:
Clark: It seems to me that the Libertarian view requires God to intervene in ways that many would find distasteful. (i.e. that God basically entrapped the Jewish mobs to kill him, or that he ensured that Romans would crucify people)
Distasteful, yes. But isn't it precisely this kind of thing the OT god seems to take pleasure in? Cf, for example, Exodus 9:12, 10:20, 11:10 and 14:8. Poor Pharoah never stood a chance-- he was set up from the start, and the first-born of Egypt had to pay the price.
Michael, I think that's an excellent point. However some might say that the way we read those passages is incorrect. Joseph Smith claimed by inspiration that Exodus 9:12, for instance, ought to read, "And Pharaoh hardened his heart . . ." Thus he seemed to think the Biblical text in the KJV was erroneous in those passages.
Recall that for a Mormon the Biblical text isn't necessarily fully accurate. Most Mormons see the compilation of the Bible as done by uninspired scribes. While most Mormons, for various reasons, don't like the documentary hypothesis, I think the documentary hypothesis actually lines up fairly well with LDS perceptions of the problem with the OT. Although it clearly does cause some problems, mainly due to the Book of Mormon quoting passages of Isaiah that scholars claim were written after the Lehites left Jerusalem.
Blake, your line of thought requires that God can know his future choices. But that is only possible if he isn't a free agent. Certainly if we change the meaning of knowledge to mean something else, your line of thought works somewhat. (Although exactly what a probability means with respect to a Libertarian free agent is not at all clear to me - it seems to me that if one follows a Kane route and makes quantum indeterminacy the basis for free will that one hasn't really achieved a whole lot more beyond determinism - but that's a whole other conversation I'll hold off on)
You say, "your assertion that Jesus would be responsible if he did acts that provoked the Romans to violence is a non-sequitur pure and simple."
I disagree. If I intentionally tease my brother to illicit a response and he responds the way I intend, I clearly am partially responsible for that response. Exactly why you think God is different in this matter is not at all clear to me.
Response to Dorfman: It seems to me that you are judging in a way that is unwarranted. Jesus merely did what loving persons always do -- he told the truth and didn't play games with the Pharisees. Nothing wrong with that -- in fact it is divinely admirable. Second, some people can't handle the truth (as the proverbial line goes), espeically when the truth is told about themselves and it convicts them. Third, it is quite easy tosee that those who reject the truth will become violent to keep up their Pharisaical self-deception. So I don't see anything untoward here-- but you are free to judge as you. I believe that telling the truth is great and it is not a stretch to see that telling the truth provokes those who hate truth to violence (do I need to give a recitation of how many times that has happened in the history of the world?).
Response to Jeff: You are basically confused in your point (1). The future is fixed only it already exists or is a determinate result of what already is. Those of us who believe that the choices we have must be geunine and not merely the upshot of the past or of a future that logically obtained before we could do anything about it hold that openness of the future is essential to several things we want: (1) moral responsibility; (2) the power to choose what our future shall be; (3) avoidance of attributing evil to God; (4) the ability to freely choose to love and accept others so that love is possible. Your view allows none of these.
I agree that if quantum indeterminacy were the only type of degrees of freedom then it would be of little use to free will since it is random. My point, rather, was that materialism doesn't logically entail determinism and QM is a specific counterexample to prove the point.
I discuss the kind of freedom that emerges from self-organizing chaotic systems in my book. The brain happens to be such a self-organzing chaotic system that is in principle unpredictible (on several views of chaos theory). So your assertion that the world around us is largely determined is just false in my view -- it is largely a chaotic system with some self-organizing systems and entities within it.
The notion that there will be only one actual world is beside the point that we are discussing. The issue is whether there is more than one possible world given the way the world (in its entirety) is now and whether we have power to choose among some of those alternatives.
Response to Clark: With respect to Jesus being responsible for provoking the Pharisees, see the response to Dorfman. Stated more responsibly: Jesus told the truth about the Pharisees and he could easily see that they would choose to take offense at that truth. Do you really maintain that what Jesus did and said had not role in the Pharisees actions to kill Jesus? Such a view is rather absurd in my view -- I believe that Jesus was not culpable but he knew that telling the truth about to them them would anger them and that they would seek to take his life as a result of the threat he constituted to them. (This discussion is rather appropriate since today is Good Friday and since we all have a bit of Pharisee in us).
I don't know what you are getting at when you say that: "your line of thought requires that God can know his future choices. But that is only possible if he isn't a free agent." I maintain that God knows the full range of choices open to Him -- an incredibly vast array of options. How does that entail that God isn't free? I'm just confused at this assertion.
The point I was making is that under your scheme, he does it because he has to bring about a prophesy made centuries earlier. In my scheme he knew what would transpire centuries earlier but the events later don't intent that outcome. It seems to me a significant difference.
Regarding God being free. God knows the choices open to him, but if he is truly free he can't know what choice he'll pick nor if he'll change his mind. Indeed elsewhere you've explicitly argued that God does change his mind. The point being that God can't know what his future choices will be and still be free.
George: Freedom and agency in this life is compromised compared to our life pre-mortal. I think we can agree to that.
Actually we don't agree on that. The problem with your arguments here George is that you are building a superstructure on a foundation of your unique and personal view of details of our pre-mortal existence. I recently wrote a post on this subject and actually mentioned my understanding of you view as my option C.). See that post here. I think that before you can use your understanding of our pre-mortal life as a foundation for arguments in this foreknowledge debate, you need to spell out exactly what those assumptions are. You can do that over at my pre-mortal existence post if you want.
George: Without an assurance that God really knew what He was doing we would be unable to express faith in the plan.
Clark talked me into using the words "predictive assurance" in place of "foreknowledge" over at New Cool Thang. I get the feeling that wouldn't do for you, though. You seem to be set on the need for true knowledge of the future.
Oops the italics and bold tags I used didn't work in that last comment. The "George:" are quotes from George's earlier comments.
I tend to agree that George's view of the premortal life seems a tad controversial. I'm not sure why foreknowledge is necessary for our decision, unless he means that we must know that success will happen. But I think we can allow for that without having foreknowledge of particulars.
Clark: Your assertion that "he does it because he has to bring about a prophesy made centuries earlier" is simply off. Christ speaks the truth because he is truthful and not to fulfill a prophecy -- indeed, just what prophecy did you have in mind? He simply knows that in speaking the truth those to whom he speaks will not be willing to abide the truth and therefore they will seek cause against him. That is what the scriptures say. So you notion that I am asserting that Christ is somehow purposefully provoking the Pharisees so that they will kill him is just nonsense. He knows that he will speak the truth and that they will kill him for it. What more is needed to assert that his crucifixion can be predicted?
Clark asserts: "Regarding God being free. God knows the choices open to him, but if he is truly free he can't know what choice he'll pick nor if he'll change his mind. Indeed elsewhere you've explicitly argued that God does change his mind. The point being that God can't know what his future choices will be and still be free." Once again, this is just off. God can know which choice he will make because he has chosen it freely! Look, if God chooses at T1 to send a Savior if Adam sins, he knows that there will be a Savior if Adam sins and it is a result of his free choice. Further, if at T2 God sees that Israel has sinned and he chooses to have calamities befall Israel at T3 to bring them back to him, then he knows at T2 that calamities will befall Isreal at T3 -- but not whether Israel will turn to him. He knows at T2 that the calamities will occur because he freely chose at T2 to bring them about at T3. However, just as the scriptures expressly say, it may be that God expects Israel to come back to him because of these calamities but they won't and he will be disappointed and feel grief. So your suggestion is just inaccurate. I'm puzzled by it to say the least.
Blake, I was thinking of 1 Ne 11:33, Ether 4:1 and Moses 7:55 all giving rather detailed assertions regarding the manner of Jesus' execution.
I simply don't see how a probabilistic approach would allow God to predict hundreds or thousands of years earlier that the Roman would use crucifixion as an execution method. Given the amount of free agents involved along the way, it seems God according to your account must be responsible for crucifixion among the Romans.
Regarding the last point, I'm not making that complex a point. If at T1 God "knows" that at Tn he'll do X then he's not free to change his mind. If he can change his mind is a robust way, then he can't really count on his predictions since he can't be sure he won't think differently in the future.
Clark: As you know I believe that teh BofM prophecies are actualized by JS given an expansion view of the text. However, even assuming that they were prophecied in exactly the way written doesn't seem much a strethc since they assert the ways in which Christ will suffer and die -- they don't seem so specific to me to be difficult to predict. (As for the begetting of son by a virgin, it seems to me that God was rather directly involved in bringing that about and Mary didn't have much free will about it). The natural events at the time of Christ's death could obviously be brought about by God without destroying anyone's free will (except to the extent they were killed -- that would seem to have an impact on the range of choices available wouldn't it?)
As for the last point, God can know what he is open to change his mind about (i.e., destroying Nineveh; changing is mind about destroying the Isrealites as actual scriptural instances where God changes his mnd) and what he isn't (e.g., the atonement). So he can have foreknowledge of those things which ae just non-negotiable. It seems to me that if you rely on scriptures like 1 Ne. 11:33 you must also accept and explain Jonah and Ex. 32.
Clark: None of these scriptures say that there will be Romans involved. None say that he will suffer a Roman crucifixion. They say he will suffer and be "raised up." They aren't as specific as you represent them to be.
We'll probably just have to agree to disagree on this matter Blake. To me it is difficult to believe that thousands of years ago God could predict the manner of death of Jesus without having true foreknowledge. I just can't wrap my mind around how it is possible without him bringing it about. Claiming it is an expansion by Joseph Smith seems unlikely given the way the texts are construction (IMO) and a bit of a dodge.
With regards to the second point, when you say, "what he is open to change his mind about" it sounds almost like you are limiting God's freedom a fair bit. i.e. some aspects of his thought are determined and are not free. It seems intuitive to me that God's knowledge of his future choices is of the same sort as his knowledge of any other free actor. So I'm afraid I'm not exactly sure what you are saying in the above to explain this problem away.
With regards to explaining away the OT, I consider the OT to be the most corrupt of all scripture. I think the Book of Mormon certainly supports that view. I find Jonah particularly problematic in its current form and simply don't trust any literalist appeal to it as having much by way of authority. That's not to discount entirely its historicity in the least. Just that I suspect there is a lot of error and exaggeration in it and I'm not willing to accept its descriptions of God as sufficiently accurate as to trust.
Exodus 32 suffers partially from the same problem - the role that scribes before and after the Exile had on the text itself. Since I don't consider the scribes inspired, I'm loath to put too much trust on particular wordings. (Especially given the changes Joseph Smith gave in the JST on such matters as Pharoah mentioned by Michael) With regards to this text though, I'm assuming you are referring to verse 14. However I don't see what possible relevance that has to me. Recall that I have no problem with people changing their mind. Recall that I simply don't buy the extensions to the utility problem of foreknowledge you assert. I have no difficulty believing that a foreknowing being could change their mind. Of course they would know they would change their mind. But so what?
Clark, I'm going to make one last comment and then give it a rest. When you say "when you say, "what he is open to change his mind about" it sounds almost like you are limiting God's freedom a fair bit. i.e. some aspects of his thought are determined and are not free," it is just plain incorrect. The initial decision was made by God freely. If he then decides he's not going to change his mind about what he initially freely decided then he also freely decides that. No aspects of his thought are determined except by him in his free will.
Your response on the OT is non-responsive. As you say, it is a bit of a dodge (bartering was important in ancient Israel and these texts are perfect examples of such bartering customs -- i.e., they are genuine reflections of this ancient culture and how it interacted with God.
The problem Blake, is that you are assuming that when God makes a decision at T1 and decides he's not going to change his mind at T1 that somehow that holds through for t > T1. That's what I'm critiquing. You simply can't say that and remain consistent. God simply doesn't know that he'll not change his mind unless he has foreknowledge. That is, his knowledge of his self is akin to his knowledge of others.
With regards to the OT, I don't really think it a dodge. I honestly don't trust fully many OT texts. I honestly don't see how that is a controversial statement in an LDS context. With regards to bartering, all that would indicate is that a foreknowing God would know the requirement of bartering and act accordingly. To assume that because God acts according to the customs of those he interacts with that those customs shed light on his nature seems difficult to accept. (If that is what you are saying. I'm actually not entirely sure what your second paragraph is getting at)
Clark: Of course God can know he won't change his mind -- he merely commits by his word not to do so. He's free to decide to change his mind or to decide that his initial decision is unchangeable. You don't explain why God couldn't commit unchangeably to a thing he says and decide that he'll remain open about others. You merely assert and I can see no logical reason (and you certainly haven't shown one) that your position. Notice that I said that I was going to make a last comment and then give it a rest. Well, I changed my mind. But God is a lot more trustworthy than I am and if he has committed to an act as unchangeable then it is unchangeable.
However, it seems to me that it would make more sense for God to remain open on almost all issues. I prefer the God I know who interacts alive, now in the moment of free decision, who waits on me to work with me to plan the next step. However, God undoubtedly has reasons (of which we cannot be expected to be aware) for choosing one thing to remain resolute about and others to leave open.
Blake, the logic is the same for any free person as you've outlined. For God to know he won't change his mind then it must be true that he won't change his mind in the future. Thus he is not free with respect to changing his mind, according to your definition of free. But you assert God is free to change his mind. That's a rather straightforward logical inconsistency.
The problem is that when you say "he merely commits by his word not to do so" that avoids the problem which is he can't know if he will adhere to his commitment.
Just a quick thought before bed. I'm earnestly trying to think through how your claim would work. If only to better understand your position. The only way I think it would work would be the following.
God has the ability to permanently alter his mind. That is he has the power to make a change that he doesn't have the power to change. This power is with respect to beliefs. So God can, if he so chooses, make a change in his "brain" such that he permanently believes X or desires Y. He is no longer free with respect to those beliefs or desires. Yet, clearly he is still free since there are other choices still open to him. But he is less free than before.
I think that will work, but it requires this ability to do but not undue with respect to his composition. I suspect many would find that problematic.
Geoff: The problem with your arguments here George is that you are building a superstructure on a foundation of your unique and personal view of details of our pre-mortal existence. I recently wrote a post on this subject and actually mentioned my understanding of you view as my option C.).
George: As you, ever so briefly, outlined then my view would be a combination of your a) and c). So you can see that my view is not unique and personal, but consistent with the views of at least some others. I think that if I took the time I could make quite a case based on scripture and prophetic statements. But since we are speaking from a logical sense then I am not so sure that I have to do that, as much as I have to make sure that my view is logical and consistent. You intimate in your other blog that you see some holes in this view. Interesting, for I, of course, do not.
Furthermore, as I have stated before, the pre-existence is crucial to understanding this life. If, as you seem to suggest, it is a complete unknown then we are missing a very big piece of the puzzle. Foreknowledge is the subject we are pursuing. "ForeLife" if you will, is the venue in which it occurs. How can we speak of an attribute of God without discussing and understanding, as best we can, the circumstances that affect the concept?
Geoff: Clark talked me into using the words "predictive assurance" in place of "foreknowledge" over at New Cool Thang. I get the feeling that wouldn't do for you, though. You seem to be set on the need for true knowledge of the future.
George: Quite the contrary. I assert that God has predictive powers that are 100% certain. This avoids, in my mind, the problems with absolute foreknowledge while allowing for us to be able to express faith in the outcome. This view has been refined somewhat by our discussion, but is basically the view I came to the discussion with in the first place. I called it foreknowledge, while now I realize that is probably not the best term, at least not in these kinds of discussions.
It has the problem of being a bit of semantic nonsense, in that you have to ask what is the difference between 100% "predictive assurance" and knowledge. Yet as I see the discussion progress it seems that this sort of parseing of the meanings is important to each of you. God does not really *know*, but has complete assurance as to what will happen. It seems a way of saying that God knows, but not really. So far that is the most comfortable concept to me. It allows for a God that is involved temporally in His creation, while having powers and abilities that enable Him to truly be in control of His plan. A plan that allows for freedom as well as some assurance of fairness. A concept that does not allow for those kinds of abilities and powers does not seem to be truly worthy of worship - admiration perhaps, but not worship.
I suggest that when Blake says that God has *some* powers of prediction and *some* ability to respond to the world and *some* power to do this or that, then he is limiting God in a manner that does not make me comfortable. I am concerned iwth statements that suggest that God was prepared *if* Adam sinned to provide a Savior. That kind of "knowledge" is not very comforting, for without Adam's fall we would not be having this discussion. And God becomes less of an enity worthy of worship and more of a pachinko player. I do not find these limitations consistent with the descriptions of God I find in scripture or prophetic statements.
In the same manner I find the idea of redefining scripture in a manner not consistent with itself and with prophetic statemens a real problem. Not that it is not appropriate to question and investigate, but that it can lead to some real interesting conclusions. I have some views that are inconsistent with the statements of the GA's (but not, in my view, inconsistent with scripture) so I am sympathetic to your right to do the same. But great care must be employed and I find the dismissal of statements such as are found in Sec 93 disturbing.
Sorry for the long post. I just got up so I am fresh and ready to go. :-)
George
Clark: Look, God knows that he is absolutely trustworthy and that if he freely decides he is going to do something unalterably, then his decision is unalterable. He is free because the decision to make an decision unalterable was freely made. It is unalterable from and after the point that the decision is made and not before. That of course distinguishes it from knowledge based upon facts outside of himself like a fixed future that logically obtains before he can interact with it. In terms of scholastic theology, it is what we would call "free knowledge" because the truth of the matter is a truth only because God has decided to bring it about. Thus, God is free and he can know the future to the extent the future is entailed in one of his unalterable decisions.
So take for example the building of the temple in Independence, Mo.. He has a plan that it will be built. It will be built and it is certain and he foreknows it. However, the time and the way that it will be built is not certain. He can change his mind about the how and when (as he actually did) but not about the fact that it will be built. Of course, he could have insisted that it be built at the time and place he orginally stated "in this generation by this generation" but that wasn't important -- apparently -- because he was willing to revoke that command. However, he knows that the temple will be built sometime because it is part of his plan.
However, the atonement was something that had to be carried out just how he planned it (through pain and suffering of his Son) when he planned it (in the meridian of time) and so God himself came down to accomplish it. It appears to me that God caused the birth of his Son in a manner that really didn't leave much elbow room for Mary to say "I'd rather not."
God's certain knowledge is based on the fact that he is ultimately trustworthy, ultimately worthy of our faith, not on the way things are independently of his plan - that, at least, is the view of the Lectures on Faith and I believe it is good thinking and good doctrine. God's knowledge is, that is, based on his "free knowledge" and not on his "middle knowledge". God also has certain natural knowledge (of all logical truths and physically determined truths given the natural order); however, neither his natural knowledge nor is middle knowledge includes future contingents -- which is contrary to the view of those who affirm exhaustive and absolute foreknowledge.
George: I think we will be best served by agreeing to disagree on this issue because I don't think we have enough commonality to carry on a discussion that goes anywhere.
George: You are uncomfortable with the "if" Adam sins we will send a Savior statement? I didn't come up with either that statement or the "if". If you'll recall, it is entrenched in the LDS view of God's plan in our rituals. So you are free to reject it or be uncomfortable, but it is not really open to debate as to whether it is a legimate statement of the LDS view of God's plan.
If fact, isn't that the exact phrase in the temple account? "IF Adam sins we will provide a Savior"?
Blake; I am uncomfortable because in the absencse of the Fall the Plan of Salvation is entirely twarted. There would have been no mortality for any of us.
To suggest that the Father would not arrange things so that this would happen opens up the point that the Father's will in this matter is completely under the control of Adam and his actions in the Garden.
Therefore I need to find another reason for the statement you allude to. Simply stated it is a result of describing an event to us consistent with our being behind the vail.
Of in another way of saying it the truth of the matter in the mortal sphere is different (independent) of the actuality in the Celestial sphere. Plato's cave comes to mind.
George
Blake says: "George: I think we will be best served by agreeing to disagree on this issue because I don't think we have enough commonality to carry on a discussion that goes anywhere."
Well that may be so. My concern always comes down to the individual in this matter. I think that you indicate that God has the power and the will to intervene so that free will is protected, while at the same time the salvation of the individual is also not subject to events beyond his control
Were that the case I would not be do adamantly in disagreement. I do not see how that is logically possible. So I come up with another solution.
However there is nothing wrong with disagreeing on this, or any other point. It is hardly crucial to our salvation to know the details.
If there is one thing I am sure of is that if I am wrong, I can repent of my ignorance real fast.
George
George: Can I gently suggest that your imagination is not broad enough? What makes you think that a Fall was the only way for God to achieve his purposes? What makes you think that God doesn't have a lot contingencies and that he is resourceful enough to achieve them?
We all made the choice to leave God's presence, and for LDS the idea of pre-existence is entailed in the idea of the Fall where all mankind was once in God's presence and has chosen alienation as a means of allowing us space to freely choose to re-enter God's presence -- as you have so eloquently pointed out.
Just what are you uncomfortable with? Is it that if we don't cooperate then God cannot achieve his purposes? Well, for us individually, God's plan to bring about our eternal life (living the kind of life he lives) is contingent on our free will and it may be the God's desire to save us and exalt us will not be realized. That is what the war in heaven was all about -- and you now seem to want to take the other side where everything is guaranteed. I for one will remain committed to free will despite the risks that it entails. You can cash in your chips on that plan at any time if you wish [grin].
George responses to Blake: Geoff says I am so original as to have a completely unique view of the pre-existence and then you say I need more imagination.
I am just pleased to be able to give you both something to smile about. :-)
"Adam fell that men might be ..." is but one citation that suggests that if Adam did not fall men would not be.
I am not saying imagination does not have its merits, but not when speculation is allowed to run completely rampant. Every possible contingency does not need to be examined with the goal of demonstrating that the commonly preached view is wrong. I am sure you are aware, likely more than I am, of the scriptures and statements that support the view that the fall was necessary for the plan of salvation to take effect. I just choose not to ignore those views - even if he means to hold my imagination in check. Your book declares itself to be about Mormon Thought, perhaps it should be titled Thoughts about Mormon Doctrines or some such thing. Nothing wrong with that - it is just that what you are suggesting is not consistent with my understanding of mormon thought, at least not present day thinking.
I am not requiring that all is guaranteed. Quite the contrary. I do feel that our life in the pre-existence is part of the formula and that our life here is a reflection, in some way, of our ongoing life from before the vail. It seems you have agreed, at least in part, with that idea. I do take it a bit further. I do not think that we enter into this life without the benefit,or penalties, or our life prior. And the real risk or uncertainty was found in the pre-existence. This life is ordered so as to show each of us that our faith in the Father was justified and that we are capable of living as He suggested we would. So that when we are placed in certain circumstances it is with a goal in mind. Perhaps that is an idea of guarantees, rather than complete freedom to see anything happen. But I view this life as a final experience - I don't even really like the word test but it's OK - that will provide us with the tools needed to continue our progression beyond what we were able to do in the incorpreal state. But if there were no constraints (circumstances) in our lives then our salvation would return to a random and lucky occurance. I cannot accept that idea. It seems rather wasteful and foolish to simply say - well the atonement will make up for all the slip-ups and errors. That is too much like predesitnation and the Father simply choosing who He would apply that to.
And I think it unnecessary to limit God so that He must act in that manner. I rather like to give God the credit of being Omni-everything and able to forsee and act so as to have His plan succeed.
Perhaps we will have a chance sometime to discuss it face to face so that the nuances can become evident. It is so hard via this medium to do that.
George
Blake, I think we'll have to agree to disagree. To me it sounds like you're trying to bring in a deterministic without acknowledging what it is. I don't think your answer really dealt with the objection I made. If God has the power to change his beliefs and there is nothing fixed he can look to to tell what his future beliefs are (something that determines them) then there is no way he can be sure in the future that he'll always chose what he'd chose now. I just don't see a way around that problem.
When you say God knows he is absolutely trustworthy that avoids the issue of how he could know that he was absolutely for all future times unless there was a fixed nature of some kind that determines his choices.
I think it's kind of pointless to keep going on since it seems like I just keep repeating the problem and you just keep repeating your position. (Which I understand - honestly - I just don't think it avoids the logical problem of God's power and his freedom to believe what he wants)
George, I think you need to go back and read through the argument more carefully. If God has predictive powers that are 100% certain then it logically must be the case that his beliefs always hold. If they always hold then there is no significant "could have chosen otherwise." Thus Blake's argument holds. All you really are doing is bringing in determinism and trying to avoid that it actually is determinism. (IMO) It seems to me that you miss the role knowledge plays in the argument. 100% certainty implies knowledge so merely relabeling the term doesn't avoid the issue.
Clark: There is one feature of God's knowledge that you seem not to notice. God knows all of the possibilities. He can know, given such knowledge, that no matter what happens he can bring it about that X and there is no possibility that would occur such that he would change his mind about bringing it about that X. Thus, once God has freely decided to bring it about that X, it follows that X is certain and there is no power or occurrence such that X will not occur. Nothing outside of God determines that X will be the case; it is a matter of God freely choosing to bring it about that X. With all due respect, it just isn't that difficult from my perspective. I really don't see that your objection has any practical significance even if it were well taken.
Clark, I acknowledge the problem you present. As I said it presents a case of semantic nonsense. I am not sure I have the posting skills to properly present the argument.
Hence my fall back on one of the arguments Blake used in his book when faced with a similiar problem. I suggest that technically it is not possible, but for all practical reasons it is true that God is able to predict with certainty.
However, it is no more satisfying to say that God knows some but not all. That He is able to have His prophets predict and prophesy, but it is not certain that they are reliable. And all sorts of other situations that present a problem for the position that God does not KNOW at least in some sense.
In my mind the scriptures are clear. My explanation and understanding is not so clear.
If you can help me to express it, or understand it, better I would be grateful. I think I gained from the discussion of God's interaction with mortality, I would like to see the same with this problem. However I doubt that I can find satisfaction in the arguments against God's knowing, in some sense, what is going on.
George
I think that when Blake continues to argue that God knows all of the possibilities it is also important to take into consideration that in organizing the Plan of Salvation He creates the possibilities for this world. Therefore there is more to "knowing the possiblities" than simply being aware of what is happening without the creative input. The creative input makes Him aware of the possibilities, but also limits the possibilities to those that are possible within the creation enviroment.
It seems to me therefore that the argument that God knows the possibilities is an unnecesary argument. God has created the enviroment that presents any possibilites that are consistent with His plan.
In my view.
George
I was just curious, do any animals have libertarian free will? Where is the line between those that do and those that don't? If your answer involves an Adam of any sort, please define him (when and who was he).
George, I think the claim, "for all practical reasons it is true that God is able to predict with certainty" is exactly what is at issue. After all, the claim is basically that we might be ignorant of how to resolve the issue but clearly as a practical matter it is resolved.
I should add that I don't find that a bad position to take in the least. I'd just suggest that going along the same way someone might assert compatibilism for similar reasons. i.e. they can't prove why compatibilism is true, acknowledge the strong arguments against it, but believe as a practical matter it is true.
The reason I say I can respect that position is that I think physicists largely do just that sort of thing with the GR/QM problem of quantum gravity. However they also obviously spend a lot of time trying to resolve it and come up with a theory of everything.
Jeffrey, regarding animals I think the Libertarian view requires that there be rational self-aware deliberation, thus excluding most animals. However I don't think all would agree on that issue.
I was just wondering where the line is, or how such an account could handle the gradualism inherent in evolution. After all, as you have seen, just saying "the children of God have it, and the rest don't" simply doesn't cut it. Especially if one adopts, as I do and I think Blake does too, of self-existing spirits for animals. There is a continuum from less intelligent to more intelligent. It seems a bit wrong to draw an all-or-nothing line.
The problem is consciousness and being able to deliberate. Blake's pretty clear on those points. I don't think even the biggest proponents of the intelligence of dolphins, apes, or crows suggest they have the kind of deliberative capabilities that Libertarians claim is necessary for free will.
Of course not all Libertarians give exactly the same conception of free will. Then there are us heathen who don't require conscious awareness or formal rational deliberation for free will. So I'm much more open to animals being free.
I am also confused by Assertion that chaotic systems are not considered deterministic.
1) Is this really so?
2) Does it give us the kind of free will that we want?
3) Would other chaotic systems outside of our brain be considered deterministic? If not, would such systems be a form of free will?
I guess what I am saying is that whenever people insist that the universe is not deterministic, they mention quantum mechanics. But this is not the kind of indeterminism that gives us anything. Both Clark and Blake see this. And so Blake mentions chaotic system. And this leads me to my three quetions.
I'll probably get to your point later. There are two kinds of chaotic systems. Chaos proper is mathematically deterministic. I'd have to check his book, but I believe Blake is highly influenced by Kane who tries to see free will as an emergent quantum mechanical phenomena, taking an interpretation of QM wherein indeterminacy is something ontologically real. (As opposed to interpretations such as the Wave Guide interpretation of Bohm)
I tend to agree that this doesn't really resolve anything. Appeals to chaos either merely "hide" the determinism or else have pure randomness which seems hard to reconcile to free will. There are actually a fair number of arguments arguing somewhat pragmatically that Libertarians are in practice not that different from compatibilists and that it is a difference without a difference. I'm not entirely convinced, but then I'm not at all convinced by the ontological explanations that attempt to ground Libertarian free will either.
If incompatibilism is true then I'm of the opinion that it is simply likely that Libertarian free will is false.
But I'm not quite ready to debate all of that. If you are interested I'd suggest reading the Garden of Forking Paths and some of the papers or discussions listed there.
Jeff: There are different takes on chaos theory. It can be developed mathematically as a closed system that is determinstic or an open system that is not deterministic (but not merely random either). I cite several articles on this view of chaos theory in my response to Sears published in Dialogue. So I believe that Clark hasn't looked carefully at chaos theory when he asserts that it is either determinstic or merely random.
Chaos theory allows for self-organizing systems where order spontaneously develops out of the seeming chaos -- and the brain functions as such a self-organizing system in the way that neural networks co-ordinate and fire in neural patterns of populations of neurons responding to stimulii or that are activated in the act of thinking and deliberating. I cite one of the first studies at Berkeley that established the self-organizing chaotic systems involved in neural networks in my book.
I am not influenced by Kane (his book came out after mine). I am influenced more by Tim O'Connor who argues for emergent agent causal free will. His view comes closest to mine and it is a full blooded leeway compatibilist view. The notion is that the properties of mind emerge with neural complexity. Such a view seems to simply be a fact. Ants have more mental ability than snails, and dogs have greater mental capcity than ants and chimpanzees have greater capacity than dogs because of the complexity of their neural networks and brains systems. It seems that mental properties emerge from such complexity. Free will seems to be a property that emerges when the complexity is such that we can deliberate as morally reponsible beings -- that is, when we become persons. So what is at issue is very fundamental to what we are. There are a lot of action theorist philosophers that deny that we are moral agents because they buy determinism and see that it is incompatible with moral agency (I'd say the vast majority of atheistic or agnostic action theorists).
I'd love to hear why Clark thinks that incompatibilism means that Libertarian free will is false. I think that he means if simple, random indeterminism is true then libertarian free will is false -- and on that we agree. Free acts are not merely random but are the result of self-determining choices. However, I am both a source incompatibilist and a leeway incompatibilist. I believe that our choices must ultimately be up to us to be such that we are accountable for them -- otherwise, whatever ultimately explains such a choice is ultimately responsible and we are not. I also believe that we must be able to choose among genuinely open alternatives to be free because in the absence of genuine alternatives there is nothing to be free about. For instance, I am free in a morally responsible sense only if I could have done otherwise, for if I do something for which I am morally culpable then such a judgment implies that I ought to have done some act X other than what I did. If I ought to have done X, then it must be possible for me to do X, for ought implies can.
A couple of questions:
1) What, exactly, am "I" as in "I" am responsible?
2) Shouldn't a distinction be made between inevitable and unavoidable? Example: Is it inevitable that I am now writing this? (I personally as a compatibilist, believe this.) Is it unavoidable that I am now writing this? (Of course it is.)
3) If a person (I'll use Blake's example), Kid Rock decides to rob 7-11 and we rewind the tape to the exact, and I mean EXACT same circumstances, will he do the exact same thing according to libertarianism? I assume the answer is no, since there are indeterminate things going on, but common sense (a poor source of knowledge) would say otherwise.
4) Don't we, as Mormons, believe in notions of partial responsibility? (I assume nobody really believes that a child magically becomes totally responsible on their 8th birth day.) Can't this be used in a deterministic Mormon setting to avoid an infinite regress when it comes to responsibility?
5) If we are being tested to see what "we" will do, do we really have to be absolutely free? Can't it be that "we" are being tested as to what kind of, I know it's crude, causal filters we are?
6) Does anybody know what an intelligence is supposed to be as used by JS? Is it made up of spirit matter? Is it spirit matter? Is it supposed to be utterly immaterial, even spiritually? And what part does this intelligence play in "me"?
Congratulations to Jeffrey for hitting the nail squarely on the head, when he wrote: 1) What, exactly, am "I" as in "I" am responsible? .
This question (and those like it) ought precede all others in discussions regarding "Free Will": Who is the "I" in "I will..."?
A side question: is there scriptural precedent for considering God to be omniscient? Indications of imperfect knowledge seem to come as early as Genesis 3:9.
Clark comments: "I think the claim, "for all practical reasons it is true that God is able to predict with certainty" is exactly what is at issue. After all, the claim is basically that we might be ignorant of how to resolve the issue but clearly as a practical matter it is resolved.
I should add that I don't find that a bad position to take in the least. I'd just suggest that going along the same way someone might assert compatibilism for similar reasons. i.e. they can't prove why compatibilism is true, acknowledge the strong arguments against it, but believe as a practical matter it is true."
George comments: This is acceptable to me. The idea that someone might come to another conclusion, even with the same set of facts, is demonstrated everyday.
That is one reason why I fall back and ask what is compatible with the scriptures? And then I take the position that we ought to be able to construct a model that works with that added information. Other than as a intellectual exercise I see little, if any, usefulness coming out of a discussion that goes contrary to revealed matters. I understand that the interpretation of those matters can vary greatly and often find myself in such discussions trying to decide what the "correct" interpretation is - and very often find myself unable to resolve the particular issue. So I judge not anothers interpretation just because it disagrees with mine - (although many times a contrary opinion is wrong for reasons other than simple disagreement with me.)
The questions I ask: Is the concept I have of the situation logical and possible? How does it fit with other information? Can problamatic points be resolved? or at least accepted until further information is available.
The idea that God has not foreknowledge (of some description) does meet my criteria and therefore I seek for a description that does fit the requirements.
Sorry I am not able to use philo-speak as I try to describe these situations. I am a rather ordinary fellow.
George
A comment about the CHAOS discussion.
I understand, to some limited degree, the idea that out of a system of chaos, order may emerge. I wsa first introducted to the idea as a young boy with the description of Brownian movement in a physics class. So I conclude that it can also work in far more complicated situations.
The concern I have with accepting it in its fullest implication is that there is no way to predict the effect on an individual enity in the system. All of the participants form a system that is fully predictable on the Macro level, but we are totally without any such predictive ability on the Micro level.
And now you are speaking of my salvation. I cannot accept the idea of randomness when individuals are concerned. Randomness is not the same as agency. If I accepted the idea that we were created at birth it would be easier to accept this idea - afterall without a prior history it makes not much difference what happens to the individual. But we are not in that situation, so some modification of the concept is necessary to satisfy the concerns regarding eternally existence enities - you and me.
George
We are now entering the phase of the discussion that requires us to engage the mind-body problem, neurophilosophy and their relation to the issues of free will and moral responsibility.These are very LARGE issues and difficult to address, frankly, reponsibily in an blog post.
Jeff, as a compatiblist you must explain the obvious -- how we can be responsible for our action X where X is fully explained by circumstances for which I am not responsible and over which I had no control. You must also explain how we can be responsible when we cannot do otherwise.
Libertarians have a different challenge. How can I be responsible if the processes that issue in "my" decision are random or indeterminate? I believe that a process view is the best way to frame these issues -- and that is a very long discussion. I present the basics of this discussion in chapter 7 of my book. With all due respect, I am at a lost to see how tose of you who are compatibilists (I assume determinists of some srtipe) can square your views with the fundamentals of gospel. E.g., Jeff did you really mean that your actions are all both inevitable and also unavoidable? That is what you say -- and for any free agent that is just inconsistent.
Blake, I actually am probably more familiar with chaos than you assume. It is taught rather extensively in physics. However the issue arises that Searle's often talked about in his work on mind. Emergence versus radical emergence. I honestly think that anything that is an emergent property of a deterministic system is itself deterministic. I think that anything that is emergent out of a ontologically indeterminate (random) system is itself ultimately "random" despite any order it establishes.
That's one of the main reasons why I've kept bringing up Heidegger as I think he offers a clear way out of this predicament. Further, as Michael quite eloquently put it, the issue is what "I" am. It seems that question of the "I" is typically neglected in these discussions when it is key and fundamental. (And, also, a place where I disagree with Blake)
Clark: If we have to solve the mind-body problem and issues of identity theory before we can discuss free-will, then have a very large discussion. I had planned to take up the issues of the mind-body problem in the third volume of my book -- with a basic process view of the mind-body problem that Kevin has already made an intial start at elucidating. Further, I am not at all convinced that process views are in any way incompatible with Heidigger's view, but I've got to take more time looking at the latter's views to really know. In any event, in process thought there is genuine emergence (and I really don't believe that physics can answer the basic philosophical issues posed regarding emergence). I would recommend a review of O'Connor's papers on emergence which have been very well received because they are well thought-out, clearly in dialogue with the latest science offers, and logically rigorous. They can be found on David Chalmer's website.
O'Connor's papers on emergence can be found here:
http://php.indiana.edu/%7Etoconnor/MetaphEm.pdf
here:
http://www.iscid.org/papers/OConnor_OntologicalEmergence_103103.pdf
here:
http://php.indiana.edu/%7Etoconnor/Emergent_Individuals.pdf
here:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/properties-emergent/
here:
http://php.indiana.edu/%7Etoconnor/Causality_MFW.pdf
and here: http://php.indiana.edu/%7Etoconnor/Em_Prop.pdf
Thanks for the links. I actually have several of O'Conner's books. But I'll check out the links. I do think I've been fairly consistent that the identity issue is core to the free will issue from day one, and is why I find the way the debate goes to be very misleading.
Two helpful posts I'd made in the past on the topic are here and relative to Ben's comments on Nietzsche I also briefly touched on his views which I find relevant. I thought I'd posted a few months back an extended quotation from Heidegger on the free will problem out of The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic but I can't see to locate it right now. I may repost it as it is an excellent passage that helped me coalesce my own views.
Clark & George et al.: The issues related to the viability of various models or notions of what our agency consists in may depend on the concept of the self (to some degree). However, it is important to note that the issues as to whether foreknowledge can be useful; whether petitionary prayer makes sense; whether God's foreknowledge is compatible with an open future and/or libertarian free will are not dependent on that issue.
I argue at length in the second volume that the type of relationship LDS thought posits obtains between persons and God (a genuine relationship that is freely chosen) requires libertarian free will. Indeed, I argue that any genuine relationship requires such freedom that is not the mere upshot of what went before and not already fixed in the relationship, require some version of libertarian agency. Moreover, while I don't claim that my view of libertarian agency is obviously free from problems or clearly not controversial (what view is?), I do claim that it is a viable view that accords well with LDS sripture (though I don't claim that this particular view is scripturally mandated).
By the way Blake, when is volume two expected out?
June 2005. There will also be a volume of essays out before Christmas 2005 in which I deal with issues related to metaphysical monotheism (the traditional view) and monarchic monotheism (which is a view that I argue is consistently biblical and adopted in LDS thought prominently in the Nauvoo period but also consistent with what went before).
I wanted to return to a question that many of you have asked about the prophecy that Peter would deny Christ thrice. I've kinda been wating for someone to bring this up, but since it now appears that this thread is dead, I think it may now be useful. I believe that Victor Ludlow's suggestion that Jesus was not as much predicting what Peter would do as telling Peter what to do. In other words, the Greek is open to the reading that Christ says effectively: "Peter, deny me three times this night..." knowing that Peter was essential to the Church and that his life was in danger if he were linked to Jesus. So Peter didn't deny Jesus, rather, he followed his Master's instruction to say that he didn't know him to preserve his life. Jesus knew that Peter would be important to the survival of the nascent church and that it was essential to preserve his life. Peter "wept bitterly" not so much because he had betrayed the Master, but because he had been required by circumstances to deny him and the Master had been taken to face death.
Similarly, a knowledge of Jewish customs at Passover gives us insight into how Jesus knew that Judas would betray him (and in fact already had at the time Jesus predicted that one of them would betray him). I won't go into great detail except to observe that Judas was the keeper of the purse and he had the duty to gather a donation for the poor that would be given to them at the door of the Temple at the conclusion of the Feast of Unleavened Bread. Judas had already agreed with the Jewish officials to identify Jesus when he stated what is sometimes taken as a prophecy that Judas would betray him.
Further, Jesus knew that Judas would dip his sop into the same sop bowl as Jesus because it was the Passover custom to recline at a triclinium table with the person on the left sharing a sop bowl with the person on his right. We know that Judas sat next to Jesus because he dipped a sop in the same bowl -- and Jesus knew that Judas was sharing the bowl and would dip further because they had shared the same sop bowl throughout the Passover meal (the last supper) and would continue to do so. Thus, it was a matter of just practical common sense that Judas would dip his sop in the same bowl.
I also want to just mention on this Easter that we all came to this earth with faith that Christ would see his mission to its conclusion. WE didn't know for sure that he would; but we had faith in him. We trusted him to see it through. All could have been lost if Jesus had not done the Father's will in finishing the work he was given by going through with the atonement. Everything hung in balance in that moment in Gethsemane -- the entire world. We had faith in Jesus -- not because it was certain or somehow impossible for Jesus to fail (as some of you appear to think), but faith is possible only because it was possible for him to fail. We trusted his love and commitment to us and our salvation. Praise be to our Lord and God for his love in seeing his mission through to its end -- in suffering. I believe that he inquired of his Father genuinely whether that cup couldn't pass from, genuinely asking if there wasn't some other way that the atonement could be accomplished. He didn't enter the atonement with absolute forekowledge, already knowing that it was inevitable that he would do it -- rather, it was a genuine and open question for him as to whether that cup might pass. All glory to him for loving us that much and seeing it through to its better end and its gorious conclusion!
Just for the record I thought that Blake's last paragraph in his last post - regarding his testimony of the Savior and his atonement is right on. I agree wholeheartedly with his description and feelings.
I think that the comment in Mark 14:13 where the Savior is described as being "sore amazed" indicates great fear about his ability to complete the task. I suggest that even the Savior had to have faith in the plan and his personal ability. Even the Savior had some sort of vail on his mind that prevented him from fully understanding all involved in his actions.
But - that does not mean that the Father could not have predicted with a very high probability that the Savior would complete the task. I suspect that you would all agree. It is the probability factor that we disagree on.
This paragraph seems to suggest an understanding different from some of your earlier posts, Blake. I appreciate you making your feelings on this issue so clear.
George
That's a very interesting reading Blake I'd not heard before. Very intriguing and believable. I do think (and this supports your view) that narrative history, especially told after the fact by second parties, probably isn't the best source for determining prophecy. They tend to distort events and also fit events looking backwards.
Thanks George. We agree that the Father knew that the Son would carry out his mission to its glorious end with a very high degree of probability. I suggest that even the Father had faith in Christ and his love and commitment. He trusted his Son absolutely -- but not because he has absolute forekowledge. I just want to add that we often overlook the fact that our faith is trust in interpersonal terms. We trusted our Savior and his love, not some logically necessary truth or given set of fact that dictated that Christ was certain to fulfill the atonement. In the second volume I argue that true faith in the sense of trust is possible only where it is possible that what we trust has the possibility of failing to be the case. I trust my Father and our Master because I know and love them and I trust their love and commitment to me. If I demanded that it had to be certain that Christ would fulfill his mission before I would trust him, then I don't really trust Christ at all but instead whatever it is that is external to his free will and loving character that makes his atonement certain. That is why I believe that what is at stake in our conversation is true faith of the type that matters -- interpersonal trust and love.
While I like what you said in this last post there is one element of concern that I would like to comment on.
It seems as though you are suggesting that we cannot have faith if we have a sure knowledge. I suggest that, if this is true, then your suggestion is not reasonable.
In order to have faith we must be aware of a condition or possibility. In the simplest of terms I offer the example of our need to have faith in conditions A, B, C, and D. If we are aware of A, B, and C then we are able to express faith in their fulfillment, or existence, or whatever is needed. But if we are unaware of condition D then we will be unable to express even rudimentry faith in that condition.
He whom has the greatest knowledge still created our worlds by the use of Faith. In a similiar manner the greater our knowledge the greater can be our faith.
Furthermore, we worship the Father and express faith in His plan and then also express faith in His Son, who is the agent for the atonement needed for the plan to succeed. But the faith in centered in the worship of the Father.
While we can understand that it is possible for the Son to fail, we can nevertheless express faith in the Father's ability to know what will happen. The fact of the Father having knowledge of the fact does not reduce our faith in His understanding. And the fact that He needs to use faith to do His will does not reduce the possibility of His knowledge.
Knowledge enhances Faith, it does not replace Faith.
Comments?
George
George: As you, ever so briefly, outlined then my view would be a combination of your a) and c). So you can see that my view is not unique and personal, but consistent with the views of at least some others.
George, I have been intending to flesh out all of the scriptural and logical holes in the traditional "My turn on Earth" view of or pre-mortal existence. I think I can show that this model as presented is inconsistent with the whole of scripture and with clear teaching by Joseph. Keep your eye on New Cool Thang if you's like to participate in that discussion.
George: Geoff says I am so original as to have a completely unique view of the pre-existence and then you say I need more imagination.
While the ingredients you use may be common, your recipe is wholly your own.
I suspect that this thread is basically dead, but felt that I needed to respond to these comments made some time ago.
Posted By: Blake | March 26, 2005 09:38 AM
George: You are uncomfortable with the "if" Adam sins we will send a Savior statement? I didn't come up with either that statement or the "if". If you'll recall, it is entrenched in the LDS view of God's plan in our rituals. So you are free to reject it or be uncomfortable, but it is not really open to debate as to whether it is a legimate statement of the LDS view of God's plan.
Posted By: Jeffrey Giliam | March 26, 2005 11:08 AM
If fact, isn't that the exact phrase in the temple account? "IF Adam sins we will provide a Savior"?
George comments: If you are speaking of the temple in this situation you both have it wrong.
I think that you are speaking of what happens after the transgression, incident to the fall from the garden. The question has to do with if Adam would "covenant" to keep the commandments God would send a Savior.
I would suggest that it was not so much a question about if Adam would sin, he had already done so, but rather a suggestion of possibilities. Furthermore it was not just a question for the individual man Adam, but more logically for all of mankind. I suggest that it was clear that not only Adam, but all of mankind would sin and that a Savior would be needed.
Therefore a covenant would be needed and the offer was given, and accepted. God knew that Adam would accept it, there was no other logical choice, and that Adam and all of mankind would sin and need the Savior.
So I suggest that the "if Adam sins" is in fact not entrenced in our rituals, not is it a legitimate expression of mormon doctrine, but rather the idea is the expression of a very real expectation that he would sin.
George
George: Look again. Pay attention.
Blake - that is a crazy thing to say. I waited until I went and confirmed before I responded.
The idea is that if Adam made a covenant to keep the commandments a Savior would be provided. You see if I am not correct.
Or not, as you wish.
George
George. Go again. Pay attention.
Your condesending, irritating, comments do not add to the discussion. I will certainly go again and I will continue to pay attention. And I am certainly willing to admit to the possibility of being wrong. But I was just there a few hours ago and I listened with this question in mind. You seem to be unable to accept that it is even conceivable that you have erred.
Perhaps you are thinking of something entirely different, and we are arguing in completely different realms.
I might just for the sake of argument point out where you made a factual error in your book. On page 201 you said the *term* "free agency" appears in 2 Nephi 2. The term "free agency" appears nowhere in scripture anywhere. Zero times - unless my GospeLink is all screwed up. The word agency only appears 8 times and the term "moral agency" only once.
The concept is there but the *term* is not.
Now I point that out just to suggest that it is possible that you can be, although I am sure it rarely happens, wrong.
Geez.
George
George: I'm sure that I made a lot more mistakes and errors than you have pointed out. If that's the worst I did, however, adding "free" to "agency," then I feel really good about it. You are right, we are talking about different things or statements. Go back.
George, I just checked, and while the phrasing isn't exactly as Jeff suggested, it is very, very close. Without saying too much for obvious reasons, I'll just say it is "if he yields..." Two things are provided on condition of the yielding.
If you covenant ... I will provide a Savior. Or words to that effect.
The emphasis is on covnanting rather than on future sinless performance.
It is readilly apparent that when the statement is given the need for a Savior has already been established. The need was based on the need to atonement for the universal problem of the fall Transgression/Fall of Adam. To suggest that it was, at that point, a conditional statement that a Savior might not be needed if Adam would not sin is faulty.
The transgression had occurred and, in my mind, God certainly knew that we would sin and would need a Savior for those sins as well. To conclude otherwise is to fly in the face of logic and reality.
The Savior was a necessary part of the Plan. Why a necessary part? Not only because of what had happened with Adam but because God was aware that we would sin. Even in the future.
The temple is not appropriate for continued discussion.
Blake says: "If that's the worst I did, however, adding "free" to "agency," then I feel really good about it."
George: You are right Blake it is not a big deal. But you did not just add "free" to "agency" for the word agency does not occur in 2 Nephi or not even the entire Book of Mormon. It only occurs in the D&C and PofGP. This is an error of fact not interpretation. But as you suggest - no big deal.
If I have made a conclusion based on looking in the wrong place then I need more hints from you as to where to look. I thought you meant the Temple and the rituals there. I responded specifically to the time of explusion.
George
Ok, as I said if I am wrong I repent real fast.
We are both wrong and we are both right.
During the planning for the creation and during the creation your comment is made. If - yeild to temptation (sin) - Savior.
However when it comes time to commit Adam, at the expulsion, to action my phrasing is used. If - covenant - Savior.
I would still suggest that it stretches credibility to think that God did not know that Adam (mankind) would sin. And surely God did not wait until sin occurred to involve Jesus in the atonement. It was part of God's plan from the start.
Sorry about my obnoxious comments. That is an apology without reservations.
But .... you might also review and see that I also was as "correct" in my statement as you were in yours.
Best wishes,
George
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